The value of access to finance: Evidence from M&As

We examine synergies in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) generated by firms’ comparative advantages in access to bank finance. We find robust evidence that greater access to bank finance increases firms’ attractiveness as acquisition targets. Targets’ comparative advantage in bank finance improves bank credit supply and reduces financing costs for the merged firms. These effects are more pronounced for acquirers with greater frictions in accessing bank loans and acquirers with greater growth opportunities. Overall, this paper reveals that targets, not just acquirers, contribute to financial synergies in M&As.     

Bank portfolio choice with private information about loan quality: Theory and implications for regulation

This paper models bank asset choice when shareholders know more about loan quality than do outsiders. Because of this informational asymmetry, the price of loans in the secondary market is the price for poor quality loans. Banks desire to hold marketable securities in order to avoid liquidating good quality loans at the ‘lemons’ price, but also have a countervailing desire to hold risky loans in order to maximize the value of deposit insurance. In this context, portfolio composition and bank safety is examined as a function of the market distribution of loan quality, and the distribution of deposits. The model suggests that off-balance sheet commitments have little effect on bankruptcy risk, and induce banks to hold more securities. We also show that an increase in the bank equity requirement will unambiguously increase bank safety in the long run. In the short run, banks are unambiguously riskier on-balance sheet, although the effect on bank safety is ambiguous.     

The effects of reputation and relationships on lead banks’ certification roles

We investigate the certification roles of lead bank retention in US syndicated loans with respect to interest rates, then explore how lead banks’ reputation and previous relationships with the borrower alter such certification effects. Our findings support the certification hypothesis. Loan spreads are found to decrease with a higher retention ratio, after controlling for the endogeneity of loan price and retention. The magnitude of certification effect is reduced when the lead bank is a more reputable lender and when there are prior bank–borrower relationships. Lead bank reputation and prior lending relationships can therefore substitute for the need to certify.     

Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults,self-cures and securitization

A leading explanation for the lack of widespread mortgage renegotiation is the existence of frictions in the mortgage securitization process. This paper finds similarly small renegotiation rates for securitized loans and loans held on banks' balance sheets that become seriously delinquent, in particular during the early part of the financial crisis. We argue that information issues endemic to home mortgages, where lenders negotiate with large numbers of borrowers, lead to barriers in renegotiation. Consistent with the theory, renegotiation rates are strongly negatively correlated with the degree of informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders over the course of the crisis.     

The market reaction to debt announcements: UK evidence surrounding the global financial crisis

We examine the stock market response to announcements of public, bank and privately placed debt issuance by large UK firms surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008. Prior to the crisis, we find that stock prices respond positively to announcements of bank debt issuance only. This is restricted to the sub-sample of syndicated bank loans and this is suggestive of the certification from multiple lenders conveying a signal of creditworthiness. We find that abnormal returns on the announcement of bank loans have declined since the financial crisis, both in absolute terms and in comparison to alternative borrowing sources. Overall, our results suggest that surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008, bank loans have become less informative as a signal of the creditworthiness of borrowing firms.     

Banks as information specialists: The case of hospital lending

This study analyzes data from the US hospital industry for evidence that banks enjoy informational advantages over direct lenders. In a multivariate analysis, we find a strong positive relationship between bank loans (as a share of total borrowing) and profitability among hospitals widely perceived as financially weak. Thus, among such hospitals, reliance on bank loans suggests the presence of hidden factors that enhance the hospital's financial standing. This supports the view that financial intermediaries are information specialists.     

Agency problems,accounting slack,and banks’ response to proposed reporting of loan fair values

We investigate the determinants of bank representatives’ responses to the United States Financial Accounting Standard Board’s 2010 Exposure Draft that proposes fair value measurement for most financial instruments. Over 85% of the 2971 comment letters were received from bank representatives, with most bank-affiliated letters addressing—and opposing—one issue: fair value measurement of loans. The Exposure Draft proposes that companies report both fair value and amortized cost measures for loans; thus, the proposal should result in increased levels of loan-related information and improved financial reporting transparency. We investigate three reasons for bank representatives’ resistance. First, fair value measurement should result in less accounting slack than the current incurred-loss model for loan impairments; therefore, we propose that representatives from banks that historically utilized that slack will resist fair value measurement for loans. Second, we propose that agency problems are an important motivating factor because bank representatives reaping more private benefits from their franchises have less incentive to support increases in financial reporting transparency. Third, we test whether the most common reasons for opposition included in the comment letters are associated with negative letter writing. Our analyses support the first two determinants of bank representatives’ resistance to the Exposure Draft. Specifically, accounting slack and lower demand for accounting transparency are strongly associated with resistance to the standard. However, we find that stated reasons for resistance are not associated with letter writing. Specifically, representatives at firms with difficult to value loans and firms that mostly hold loans to maturity are no more likely to resist the standard than others. The narrow scope of bank representatives’ comments and our empirical findings suggest that bankers’ responses to the Exposure Draft may be more driven by concerns over reduced availability of accounting slack and accompanying de facto regulatory forbearance than by the conceptual arguments they offer. Our results have implications for standard setters, who must navigate special interests as they attempt to promulgate high quality accounting standards, and for users of financial statements who must consider how political forces shape generally accepted accounting principles.     

Informational Frictions and the Credit Crunch

In this paper, I estimate the magnitude of an informational friction limiting credit reallocation to firms during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis. Because lenders rely on private information when deciding which relationship to end, borrowers looking for a new lender are adversely selected. I show how to separately identify private information from information common to all lenders but unobservable to the econometrician by using bank shocks within a discrete choice model of relationships. Quantitatively, these informational frictions appear to be too small to explain the credit crunch in the U.S. syndicated corporate loan market.     

Bank Finance versus Bond Finance

We present a model with agency costs where heterogeneous firms raise finance through either bank loans or corporate bonds and where banks are more efficient than the market in resolving informational problems. We document some major long‐run differences in corporate finance between the United States and the euro area, and show that our model can explain those differences based on information availability. The model fits the data best when the euro area is characterized by lower availability of public information about corporate credit risk relative to the United States, and when European firms value more than United States firms banks’ flexibility and information acquisition role.     

Corporate Debt Structure and the Financial Crisis

We present a DSGE model where firms optimally choose among alternative instruments of external finance. The model is used to explain the evolving composition of corporate debt during the financial crisis of 2008–09, namely, the observed shift from bank finance to bond finance, at a time when the cost of market debt rose above the cost of bank loans. We show that the flexibility offered by banks on the terms of their loans and firms' ability to substitute among alternative instruments of debt finance are important to shield the economy from adverse real effects of a financial crisis.     

The integration of bank syndicated loan and junk bond markets

This paper hypothesizes that the special role of banks as corporate quasi-insiders has been changing due to developments in informational, legal and institutional infrastructures of syndicated loan markets. We investigate the integration of intermediated and disintermediated financial markets through highly leveraged transaction (HLT) syndicated loans during the 1990s. We demonstrate that, with the emergence of traded HLT syndicated loans as an alternative high-yield asset to high-yield bonds, market integration has dramatically increased. Taking the late 1980s and 1990s together, different factors explain the movement of credit spreads of the two markets. HLT loan market’s spreads are strongly affected by bank liquidity. Bank liquidity’s effect on HLT loan spreads disappears after 1993. From 1994–1999, junk bond market liquidity factors affect bank loan pricing. We interpret these changes as evidence of the erosion of bank specialness.     

Financial integration and business cycles in a small open economy

The purpose of this study is to examine a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework with financial and informational frictions and foreign borrowing in the case of money growth and technology shocks for a small open economy and to analyze the implications of varying degrees of financial integration for aggregate fluctuations and propagation mechanisms in the economy. The existence of informational asymmetries among the agents in the model necessitates financial intermediation in the economy. Moreover, there is uncertainty involved in the production process which leads to collateralized borrowing by firms and, therefore, has to be taken into account in the design of the loan contracts between firms and financial intermediaries. It is shown that increasing financial integration amplifies the effect of a positive, temporary monetary shock on output, consumption, investment, labor demand and loans; whereas it has barely any implication for the impact of a positive, temporary technology shock on the economy.     

Shadow banking of non-financial firms: Arbitrage between formal and informal credit markets in China

In China's credit markets with financial repression, state-controlled non-financial firms (SOEs) are privileged in gaining access to bank credit, while non-SOEs, especially those small- and medium-sized firms, are disadvantaged. Corporate re-lending emerges as a response wherein the former secure bank loans and then re-lend to the latter. We document the characteristics of inter-corporate loans from a sample of legal cases. We employ four empirical strategies to conduct a forensic study of re-lending by detecting abnormal relations between financial accounts of listed firms. State-controlled companies conduct more re-lending, and firms with better growth opportunities, stronger corporate governance, and more financial constraints engage less. We compare re-lending with entrusted loans and find that firms extending nonaffiliated entrusted loans conduct re-lending actively, while firms offering affiliated entrusted loans do not. We also compare inter-corporate loans with micro-credit company loans in a review of legal cases.     

定向降准、贷款可得性与小微企业商业信用——基于断点回归的经验证据

小微企业在我国经济发展中起到了重要作用,但由于长期面临融资约束问题,使其不得不诉诸非正式制度(如商业信用)来缓解融资困难。党的十九届五中全会明确提出,支持小微企业成长为创新重要发源地,完善促进小微企业发展的政策体系。其中,实施“精准滴灌”式的货币政策,对小微企业成长尤为重要,是金融服务实体经济的必然要求。我国央行的定向降准政策激励银行向小微企业提供贷款,有利于疏通小微企业通过正式制度(如银行贷款)进行融资的渠道。本文基于定向降准这一自然实验,采用断点回归设计,评估贷款可得性对小微企业商业信用的影响。研究发现:第一,正式制度对于非正式制度存在明显的替代效应,即小微企业贷款可得性上升以后,对商业信用的需求显著下降。第二,不同的模型设定与稳健性检验,均得到一致的结论。第三,贷款可得性提高对小微企业商业信用的影响因企业异质性而有所差异。本文研究为银行贷款与商业信用之间的替代关系提供了来自中国小微企业的证据,有助于理解定向降准政策对小微企业融资决策的影响,为扶持小微企业发展的政策制定提供参考。     

Supply of bank loans and business debts: A view from historical bankruptcy cases

As bank loans fell in the 2008 crisis, business bankruptcy increased. To study how bank loans affect business balance sheets and bankruptcy, we use new data on bankrupt businesses in Missouri between 1898 and 1942. We confirm that when banks curtail loans, courts see more bankruptcies among businesses with high exposure to bank debt. To reduce real volatility, policy‐makers can set tough bank liquidity requirements in the upswing of business cycle but allow weaker requirements in the downswing. We also find that between 1914 and 1933, businesses in St. Louis were more sensitive to changes in bank loans than businesses in Kansas City, probably due to the tight monetary policy conducted by the conservative St. Louis Fed. The Glass‐Steagall Act weakened the relationship between bank loans and business debt structure. The takeaway is that lender‐of‐last‐resort practices stabilize both the financial sector and the real economy.     

Arranger Certification in Project Finance

Using a sample of 4,122 project finance loans worth $769 billion arranged from 1991 to 2005, we demonstrate that certification by prestigious lead arranging banks creates economic value by reducing overall loan spreads compared to loans arranged by less prestigious arrangers. Banks participating in these loan syndicates, rather than the project sponsors, pay for this certification. They do so by allowing top tier arrangers to keep larger fractions of the upfront arranging fees. Results are robust to the correction for the endogenous choice of loans by prestigious arrangers and indicate that certification is even more valuable during periods of extreme financial stress.     

Optimal Monetary Policy Rules and House Prices: The Role of Financial Frictions

We probe the scope for reacting to house prices in simple and implementable monetary policy rules, using a New Keynesian model with a housing sector and financial frictions on the household side. We show that the social‐welfare‐maximizing monetary policy rule features a reaction to house price variations, when the latter are generated by housing demand or financial shocks. The sign and size of the reaction crucially depend on the degree of financial frictions in the economy. When the share of constrained agents is relatively small, the optimal reaction is negative, implying that the central bank must move the policy rate in the opposite direction with respect to house prices. However, when the economy is characterized by a sufficiently high average loan‐to‐value ratio, then it becomes optimal to counter house price increases by raising the policy rate.     

The certification value of private debt renegotiation and the design of financial contracts: Empirical evidence from Europe

By using a sample of bank loan renegotiations by European firms, I show that the renegotiation of financial contracts bears a certification value, while deeply changing the contractual features of the loan over time, to the benefit of shareholders. I find that amendments to financial covenants and to loan amounts increase the cumulative abnormal returns of a borrowing firm by 10–15%. Early and less frequent renegotiations of bilateral loans with short maturities also imply a positive stock market reaction. Amendments signaling the early accrual of new and positive information allow increasing firm value.     

Monetary policy and financial stability in a banking economy: Transmission mechanism and policy tradeoffs

The 2008 global financial crisis demonstrated that monetary policy and financial stability policy are more highly interrelated than previously thought. This paper analyzes the interactions between these policies using a non-linear overlapping-generations model with financial frictions in the form of banking financial intermediation. The paper embeds negative externalities due to contagion effects in physical investments which creates the need for financial stability policy. We show how the monetary policy transmission mechanism depends on financial stability policy tools as well as on regulatory and institutional constraints.We find policy tradeoffs in trying to accomplish both monetary and financial stability targets. The central bank must take these tradeoffs into account when selecting the tools in its policy toolbox. Another important finding is the interchangeability of price stability and financial stability policy tools.     

BORROWING RELATIONSHIPS,MONITORING, AND THE INFLUENCE ON LOAN RATES

While monitoring borrowers, a bank obtains private information about its customers, giving the bank an informational advantage in the production of subsequent services. Competing theories exist on the way banks use this advantage in the pricing of subsequent services to the customer. If moral hazard limits the transfer of private information, the borrowing relationship transforms into an informational monopoly and can be characterized as a “wasting asset.” Alternately, if the banks' competitive environment necessitates that cost economies are shared, the relationship has “value.” Ordering pairs of successive loans made to a particular borrower as prior loans and subsequent loans, and controlling for environmental, borrower, and loan characteristics, we show that the subsequent loan is priced significantly lower than the prior loan.