An analysis of the MFN clause under asymmetries of cost and market structure

Abstract.  We conduct a welfare comparison of MFN and tariff discrimination in an oligopoly model of trade between two exporting countries and one importing country. While MFN dominates tariff discrimination from a world welfare perspective when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to either cost or market structure, such need not be the case when both types of asymmetries co‐exist. In particular, when high‐cost exporters are merged and the cost disadvantage of the merged unit relative to competing firms is of intermediate magnitude, tariff discrimination can be welfare preferred to MFN (even when the average tariff is actually lower under MFN). JEL classification: F13, F12     

Wage inequality and overeducation in a model with efficiency wages

Abstract.  This paper shows that the existence and persistence of 'overeducation' can be explained by an extension of the efficiency wage model. When calibrated to fit the amounts of overeducation found in most empirical studies, the model implies that both the relative wage and the relative employment of high‐skill workers depend inversely on aggregate economic activity. Keeping aggregate employment constant, furthermore, low‐skill unemployment rises, following an increase in the relative supply of high‐skill labour, and relative wages may be insensitive to changes in relative labour supplies. The model may help to explain rising wage inequality in some countries since the early 1970s. JEL classification: J31     

Finance–Growth Nexus and the P‐bias: Evidence from OECD Countries

Recent studies provide new empirical evidence confirming that financial development is linked to economic growth in OECD countries. Using new dynamic panel regression techniques, these appraisals indicate that within the group of high‐income countries stock market size as a measure of financial advancement contributes significantly to overall economic activity. Applying the same advanced techniques, this paper questions this conclusion by showing that the findings of these studies seem to be not only not robust with respect to adding new observations but also likely to be plagued by a severe price bias which belittles the information content of the used financial indicator (stock market capitalization). We provide evidence that anticipative price effects (i.e. expectations of future growth, reflected in current stock prices) may be driving the statistical relationship between stock market activities and economic growth in high‐income countries to a much larger extent than recent analyses of the finance– growth link in OECD countries suggest .     

A cost‐benefit analysis of R&D tax incentives

Abstract.  Although technical knowledge generates spillover benefits, production of technical knowledge creates congestion externalities; thus, private R&D investment could be inefficient. A computable general equilibrium model is used to rank tax incentives by their effects on research effort and measure welfare effects. Five results stand out: R&D tax credits produce relatively large increases in research effort and welfare. Lower corporate income tax rates and ITCs for downstream users of high‐tech production inputs rank second. Revenue losses from lower personal income tax rates can produce welfare losses. Ironically, ITCs for upstream producers of innovative inputs are ineffective. Incremental R&D credits dominate comprehensive credits. JEL Classification: E62, H21, O38     

Preferential trade areas, multinational enterprises, and welfare

Abstract.  The effects of preferential trade areas (PTAs) on the investments by multinational enterprises and their implications for the welfare of members and non‐members are studied in a model with two types of firms: national firms and multinational firms. In the presence of multinational activity PTAs can create new investment as well as divert investment from non‐members to members. Both affect the welfare of members positively. More interestingly, if the investment creation effect of a PTA is sufficiently strong, then the PTA could be welfare enhancing for non‐members as well. JEL classification: F2, L1     

Inequality and trade

Abstract.  We incorporate demand‐side considerations in trade in a systematic but straightforward way. We do so by focusing on the role of inequality in the determination of trade flows and patterns. With non‐homothetic preferences, when countries are similar in all respects but asset inequality, we find that trade is driven by specialization in consumption , not production. Besides, these assumptions allow us to generate some interesting international spillover effects of redistributive policies. Finally, we study a model of monopolistic competition and find a novel V‐shaped relationship between the ratio of inter‐industry to intra‐industry trade and a country's inequality. JEL classification: F11, F12     

Interconnectivity of communications networks and international trade

Abstract In this study a multi‐country model of trade is developed that captures the role of country‐specific communications network interconnectivity, which enhances trade in intermediate business services. The number of countries connected to internationally interconnected networks is found to determine the structure of comparative advantage. That is, countries with interconnected networks have a comparative advantage in the good that requires business services provided via networks. In connected countries, producers of that good benefit from the efficient transmission of business services. This research also demonstrates that countries whose country‐specific networks are not connected to the interconnected networks may become worse off as the result of trade. JEL Classification: D43, F12
Interconnectivité des réseaux de communication et commerce international Ce mémoire développe un modèle de commerce international impliquant plusieurs pays qui cerne le rôle de l'interconnectivité des réseaux de communication de chaque pays. Cette interconnectivité enrichit les flux de commerce dans les services intermédiaires d'affaires. Il appert que le nombre de pays connectés aux réseaux internationalement connectés détermine la structure de l'avantage comparatif. Ce qui veut dire que les pays qui ont des réseaux interconnectés ont un avantage comparatif dans le bien qui requiert les services d'affaires fournis par les réseaux. Dans les pays connectés, les producteurs de ces biens bénéficient de la transmission efficace de ces services d'affaires. La recherche montre aussi que les pays dont les réseaux nationaux ne sont pas connectés aux réseaux interconnectés peuvent voir leur situation s'empirer en conséquence du commerce international.     

Firm survival and exit in response to trade liberalization

Abstract.  This paper considers the implications of changing trade barriers for the survival of Canadian manufacturing firms. The findings suggest that Canadian tariff reductions decreased the probability of survival for Canadian firms while declines in American tariffs increased that probability. Combining these effects, two‐thirds of Canadian manufacturing firms saw their probability of survival increase as a result of the tariff reductions mandated by the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement. However, the vulnerability of a firm to failure as a result of trade liberalization was mitigated by the characteristics of that firm, particularly scale and leverage. JEL classification: F1, L1     

Strategic policy for product R&D with symmetric costs

Abstract.  In this paper I examine strategic policy for product R&D in an international duopoly where domestic and foreign firms are identical. It is shown that strategic R&D policy is described by a subsidy schedule contingent on firms' quality choices. Unilateral policy enables its domestic firm to produce a high‐quality product, making equilibrium outcome unique. With two active governments, in equilibrium they implement different subsidy schedules. Two equilibrium outcomes exist, which are identical except for the identity of the countries. Thus, both countries have an equal chance to become the high‐quality exporter. Both Bertrand and Cournot cases are examined. JEL classification: F12, F13
Politique stratégique pour le R&D dans le développement de nouveaux produits quand les coûts sont symétriques.  Ce mémoire examine la politique stratégique pour le R&D dans le développement de produits nouveaux dans un duopole international où les entreprises domestique et étrangère sont identiques. On montre que cette politique est décrite par cédules de subventions qui dépendent des choix du niveau de qualité des entreprises. Une politique unilatérale permet à l'entreprise domestique de manufacturer un produit de haute qualité– ce qui engendre des résultats d'équilibre uniques. Si deux gouvernements sont actifs, en équilibre, ils mettent en place des cédules de subventions différentes. Deux résultats d'équilibre existent qui sont identiques sauf pour l'identité des pays. Donc les deux pays ont une chance égale de devenir l'exportateur du produit de haute qualité. On examine les cas de figure à la Bertrand et à la Cournot.     

Gradual globalization and inequality between and within countries

Abstract.  This paper investigates the effects of gradual trade liberalization on intra‐country and inter‐country inequality. It assumes two countries, North and South, and two factors, skilled labour and unskilled labour. North is defined as the one that is relatively skilled‐labour abundant and larger. A marginal trade liberalization from autarky is shown to (a) increase (decrease) in skilled‐unskilled wage differential in the North (South) and (b) raise the inequality between North and South. As the global economy approaches free trade, a marginal trade liberalization has effects, which are the opposite of (a) and (b); that is, the relative wage falls in the North and rises in the South, and North‐South inequality decreases.     

Endogenous Comparative Advantage*

We develop a model of trade between identical countries. Workers endogenously acquire skills that are imperfectly observed by firms; therefore, firms use aggregate country investment as the prior when evaluating workers. This creates an informational externality interacting with general equilibrium effects on each country's skill premium. Asymmetric equilibria with comparative advantages exist even when there is a unique equilibrium under autarky. Symmetric, no‐trade equilibria can be unstable under free trade. Welfare effects are ambiguous: trade can be Pareto‐improving even if it leads to an equilibrium between rich and poor countries, with no special advantage regarding country size.     

A theory of mutual migration of polluting firms

Abstract.  Suppose that governments care about their tax revenue and local firms have some say in environmental regulations. Then, the level of employment and environmental compliance may be negotiated. We find that firms located in different countries can improve their threat‐point payoffs by mutual migration. This in turn affects the negotiated output/employment and environmental regulations, which causes profits to increase if the firm's threat‐point payoff is higher than that of the local government. The model predicts that pollution‐intensive firms or firms with highly inelastic demands are more likely to move out. Increases in the government's valuation of the environment, or in the degree of globalization also cause mutual migration of dirty firms. The effect of a government caring about consumer surplus leads to a lower pollution tax, reducing firms' incentives to move out. JEL classification: F2, Q0     

Trade between symmetric countries,heterogeneous firms,and the skill premium

Abstract This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization between symmetric countries on the skill premium. I introduce skilled and unskilled labour in a model of trade with heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003) and assume a production technology such that more productive firms are more skill intensive. I show that the effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality crucially depend on the type of trade costs considered and on their initial size. While fixed costs of trade have a potentially non‐monotonic effect on the skill premium, a drop in variable trade costs unambiguously and substantially raises wage inequality.     

The determinants of bilateral trade

Abstract.  In this paper we present a monopolistic competition model that incorporates asymmetric trade barriers and international differences in production costs. The model implies a highly non‐linear bilateral trade equation. Estimation of this equation yields parameters for the elasticity of substitution and trade costs that are more reasonable than those found in previous studies. A simulation indicates that trade liberalization will shift trade from rich countries to poor countries and from within continental trading partners with preferential trade agreements to intercontinental trading partners. JEL Classification: F1     

The adjustment of external tariffs in the Kemp‐Wan‐Grinols compensation scheme

Abstract.  This paper considers the adjustment of external tariffs when two countries integrate and implement the Kemp‐Wan‐Grinols compensation scheme. Attention is also paid to the restrictions set by Article XXIV of GATT. This paper shows how the external tariffs would change in a three‐good, three‐country model under the assumption of gross substitutability. The results are sensitive to the initial trade pattern. In particular, they depend on the number of goods initially traded between the member countries. The analysis can be extended to a multi‐commodity model if the preferences of the countries have identical CES representation. JEL classification: F11, F15     

Inward Investment and Technical Progress in the United Kingdom Manufacturing Sector

This paper investigates the impact of direct investment by foreign‐owned companies on technical progress and hence labour productivity in the UK manufacturing sector. Using an industry‐level panel data set we find that foreign‐owned firms have a significant positive effect on the level of technical efficiency in domestic firms. There is evidence of significant intra‐industry and inter‐industry spillovers from inward investment. These findings remain robust even when other factors such as imports and domestic R&D expenditures are allowed for. Inward investment appears to be a much more important source of technical progress than foreign trade.     

A Schumpeterian North–South Growth Model of Trade and Wage Inequality*

The paper presents a dynamic general‐equilibrium model of interindustry North–South trade that is used to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on the Northern wage distribution. Both countries have a low‐tech sector where consumer goods of constant quality are produced by use of unskilled labor. The North also has a high‐tech sector that employs skilled labor and features a quality‐ladder model structure with endogenous growth. Both innovation and skill acquisition rates are endogenously determined. In a balanced trade equilibrium, it is found that Southern‐originated (Northern‐originated) trade liberalization leads to an increase (decrease) in Northern wage inequality both between skilled and unskilled workers and within the group of skilled workers. The endogenous change in the Southern terms of trade determines the direction of change in unskilled wages in both the North and the South.     

PROFIT TAX AND FIRM MOBILITY IN A THREE‐COUNTRY MODEL

We construct a three‐country model that incorporates international relocation by imperfectly competitive firms and examine both the effects of each country's profit tax reduction on the consumption and welfare of all countries, and the incentive for the countries to decrease the profit tax. In such a model, both the terms of trade and international relocation of firms offer the key to understanding the impacts of one country's profit tax policy. In particular, we note that the relocation of firms from the other two countries is positively related to the wage incomes of the third country through a shift in labour demand, and the terms‐of‐trade improvement is not only positively related to the wage incomes, but also negatively related to profit incomes through a shift in world consumption demand. We show that (i) in a three‐country world economy, regardless of the reduction's source, the profit tax reduction of each country leads to relocation of firms away from foreign countries toward its own economy and deteriorates the terms of trade of its economy and (ii) this becomes a ‘beggar‐thy‐neighbour’ policy in the sense that it lowers the welfare of the other foreign countries.     

Output/Endowment and Commodity/Factor Price Relationships and Welfare in a Multilateral Trade Model with Partial Factor Mobility

A multilateral model of trade with both commodity flows and partial mobility of factor flows is set up. This model is used to develop factor endowment/output relationships as well as commodity/factor price relationships. Welfare consequences of these parametric shifts are examined. The model is built on the customs union framework which involves three countries and both commodity and factor flows. Owing to spillover effects in multilateral trade models, many nontraditional results are obtained. Many developed countries accept skilled and unskilled migrants from other countries. These migrants are generally accepted on a quota system. Moreover, it has been established that an increase in the migrant quota in the presence of factor mobility may raise or lower the output and welfare in the country not receiving migrants. In fact it is shown that the non‐migrant receiving country could be immiserized due to loss of capital. The main message of this paper is that in a multilateral trade framework there exist international spillover effects which must be taken into consideration in national policymaking.     

Antidumping protection and R&D competition

Abstract.  In recent years antidumping protection has spread throughout the world. Evidence shows that antidumping often targets R&D‐intensive sectors, raising a concern that it may adversely affect worldwide investments in R&D. We investigate this issue in a model of reciprocal dumping extended to a two‐stage game, in which two firms first choose R&D levels and then compete in prices. We find that, when a single government institutes antidumping law, the protected firm decreases investment in R&D, while the constrained firm invests more. When both governments engage in antidumping actions, both firms invest more in R&D than under free trade. JEL classification: F12, F13