从“管水协会”案例看民间协会的集体行动机制

局部区域性共享资源的治理应当以社区自治为主,政府间接支持为辅的方式。由于共享资源的性质决定了社区自治是集体行动的性质,因此需要围绕协会的组织与领导实现共享资源治理中的成本投入与分摊以及收益的分享。以协会的组织和契约性规则为正式制度,结合以互惠合作为核心的群体规范等非正式制度共同构成"管水协会"这类民间协会的集体行动机制,实现共享资源的社区自治。     

异质性与共享资源的自发治理——关于群体性合作的现实路径研究

共享资源在人类的经济社会中普遍存在。共享资源治理的收益引发了群体内部的信任与合作问题。传统理论的个体假设是狭隘、过度抽象的完全理性,忽视了个体基于现实场景中的决策和行为选择,因而无法获得符合现实的理论解释。一个群体能够依靠规则、组织机构等正式制度以及群体规范等非正式制度实现治理过程中的投入与产出分享、对合作行为给予激励以及机会主义行为的惩罚,从而通过群体性合作实现共享资源的治理。因而问题就转为分析每个个体在追求自身利益的决策和行为选择中能否通过策略互动实现自我实施的规则与群体规范,实现共享资源自发治理的群体秩序,通过两阶段模型说明了异质性个体在实现正式的制度供给和内生的群体规范方面的作用机制,对于我们理解现实世界的群体性合作问题提供了新视角。     

社群合作与共享资源的自发治理

社群合作问题是由共享资源的存在所引发的集体行动需求和自我组织治理的问题。由于共享资源组成成分的多样性造成集体行动实现和维持的复杂化,不同性质的共享资源要求不同的治理方式,因而具体的规则或制度安排就不同。但其共同点就是都需要小区居民之间的合作和自觉参与,以实现共享资源的自发治理收益。     

领导、追随与社群合作的集体行动-行业协会反倾销诉讼的案例分析

集体行动是集体性物品生产或共享资源自发治理所引发的群体性合作问题,然而治理收益的非排他性决定了“搭便车”动机和行为的存在,导致集体行动实现的困难。本文通过引入异质性个体及其在集体行动实现过程中的策略互动来分析可能的动态博弈均衡结果,表明由于异质性的存在,决定了个体充当领导者、跟随者或者搭便车者的不同角色。本文利用这一理论模型解释了温州烟具协会应对欧盟打火机的反倾销诉讼事件。     

领导、追随与社群合作的集体行动——行业协会反倾销诉讼的案例分析

集体行动是集体性物品生产或共享资源自发治理所引发的群体性合作问题，然而治理收益的非排他性决定了“搭便车”动机和行为的存在，导致集体行动实现的困难。本文通过引入异质性个体及其在集体行动实现过程中的策略互动来分析可能的动态博弈均衡结果，表明由于异质性的存在，决定了个体充当领导者、跟随者或者搭便车者的不同角色。本文利用这一理论模型解释了温州烟具协会应对欧盟打火机的反倾销诉讼事件。     

产业集群治理的集体行动:影响因素及实现条件——以温州打火机产业集群集体诉讼为例

产业集群治理行动是旨在建立和维护集群可持续竞争优势的集群治理主体共同参与的集体行动。根据集群集体行动产生的诱因,可将其划分为内生型集体行动和外生型集体行动,二者提供的产品都具有公共产品性质。影响集群集体行动的因素主要包括:领导型企业、社会资本、公共服务机构和集群代理机构、地方政府行为、团体讨论和个体声音等。基于异质性假设,在朱宪辰、李玉连(2007)的博弈模型基础上,通过将声誉机制纳入其中,得到的启示是:一个集群如果拥有良好的声誉机制,就有利于集体行动的实现,反过来,如果集群中信用和守信文化没有建立,声誉机制不健全,就可能导致集体行动的失败。     

共享资源治理模式创新的实现路径——集体行动的组织理论与实证分析

主流经济学一直认为市场和政府互为替代品,而没有给介于其中的自愿合作组织留下空间。其实,以小区为单位的局部治理模式的发育,为纠正市场和政府失灵提供了第三种替代机制。本文通过南京市28个小区865个样本的抽样调查数据的实证分析表明,业主合作的集体行动需要异质性个体充当创新企业家,最终在互动中形成契约性规则和群体规范。     

公共选择视角下的集体行动效率及其制度含义

开展集体行动不仅要考量其合法性,也要考量集体行动的效率。从经典的激励机制设计和社会选择理论中得不出能实现集体行动效率的现实可行途径。公共选择理论认为,集体行动效率的制度含义是达成对集体行动的一致同意,这种一致同意是可以在对集体行动的讨论过程中形成的。     

集体行动何以可能？——关于集体行动动力机制的文献综述

社会科学界对集体行动动力机制的研究由来已久。结构主义者认为结构才是集体行动的本源,结构决定了意识形态从而也决定了集体行动;功利主义认为有着共同利益的群体成员才有集体行动的可能,但个人理性会令集体行动陷入困境;而建构主义则认为人们是依据意义的社会建构来采取行动的,但集体行动所需的共同意识、资源、成员都需要组织者积极动员,除了群体的意义建构在影响集体行动,行动者的理性也仍然在考察不断变化的周围世界的基础上参与行动抉择。在借鉴国外最新理论的基础上,结合特定社会情境,中国学者建立了一个解释现阶段中国社会正在发生的集体行动的本土化模型。     

基于行动者网络理论的社交平台不实信息协同治理研究

为有效降低不实信息在社交平台上带来的社会影响,通过分析不实信息协同治理机制来改进治理效果。在分析不实信息相关特征的基础上,借助行动者网络理论,对不实信息初期扩散和后期治理两个关键阶段分别构建相应的行动者网络模型。通过行动者网络模型的构建和比较,分析目前不实信息治理过程中存在的两阶段关键行动者相异;转译机制缺失,联结动力不足;处理阶段中关键行动者专业人士影响力弱、招募能力不足等问题。在此基础上,提出应厘清行动边界,明确权责形式、规范意见领袖和平台的行动机制,构建多元网络充分发挥集体行动优势,以增强不实信息的协同治理效果。     

森林资源管理协调中的公共治理困境分析

文章首先阐述了森林资源的公共物品属性,并从国有林经营管理体制出发,深入分析目前森林资源现有管理模式面对的公共治理困境：集体行动的失范、共识和合作的困窘、机会主义行为难以克服、官僚化与浪费的消极抑制等风险。     

社区参与、集体行动与新农村建设

在发展中国家,社区参与治理已经成为农村经济发展的关键.传统理论强调个人理性行为导致集体行动困境.本文通过将参与意识纳入博弈论分析框架演绎出社区参与发生的外部条件,外部通过降低个体参与的成本收益比率,促使社区参与规模产生临界值效应而形成高水平集体行动均衡,社区参与形成的集体行动促使公用地悲剧为公用地繁荣.我国新农村建设过程中,需构建政府、市场和社区参与的综合发展框架.     

The capacity for self-governance and post-disaster resiliency

A community’s capacity for self-governance depends on the social coordination capacity of community organizations and associations, the ability of community members to effectively access both bonding and bridging social capital, the ability of community members to leverage their shared histories and perspectives, and the stability of social networks within the community. Both Elinor Ostrom and Jane Jacobs have explored how a community’s capacity for self-governance affects its ability to solve complex problems (for example, dealing with crime, the provision of public goods, or problems of neighborhood blight). The greater a community’s capacity for self-governance the better able it is to deal with these complex challenges. This paper examines how pre-disaster systems of self-governance aid in post-disaster community recovery. Our analysis focuses on the Mary Queen of Vietnam (MQVN) community and Gentilly, examines the effectiveness of their systems of self-governance prior to Hurricane Katrina and explores the role these systems played in promoting community recovery after the disaster.     

INCENTIVE ISSUES IN R&D CONSORTIA: INSIGHTS FROM APPLIED GAME THEORY

This article sketches how insights from applied game theory can be applied to Research and Development (R&D) consortia using a case study on an international plant breeding consortium. The insights jointly comprise a new “logic of collective action in R&D,” which is inspired by Olson’s Logic of Collective Action but goes beyond it. We analyze R&D consortia as institutions that respond to a variety of incentive problems which are obstacles to realizing the benefits of cooperation that arise due to the public goods nature of outputs, complementarities of inputs, and economies of scale and scope. Additionally, we sketch a “big‐picture” consortium game, which abstracts from specific incentive issues. (JEL B41, D02, H41, O31, O32)     

Cooperative conversion and communalization: Closely observed interactions between the material and the mental

Various authors, including Elinor Ostrom, have shown that the legal form of a cooperative has many of the characteristics of a Common. Here we focus on cooperative conversion, through which conventional enterprises become labor‐managed firms (LMFs), viewing it dynamically as a communalization process. These processes are addressed in the light of a field survey carried out in France, looking at six firms involved in cooperative conversion. The changes entailed are two‐dimensional, both material and mental. This is visible, for example, when finding the capital to mount an LMF: members of the workforce must draw on their own funds; they must also believe in the project. Through our empirical observations we highlight the obstacles in the way of forming an LMF. In particular participants must undertake a work of negotiation hinging on stakes marked by the two, largely inseparable dimensions. Ultimately we query the ethic brought into play in the collective action of constituting a Common. Specifically, individuals must contribute to a collective action underpinned by principles of self‐governance, or commoning, the rock on which the Common rests. A key finding of our study is to demonstrate that a Common can only be successfully created if the constituent processes are consistent with the overall goal. In other words the manner in which we travel is inseparable from our final destination; otherwise we shall surely lose our way.     

Conceptualising environmental collective action: why gender matters

This paper demonstrates how institutions for natural resourcemanagement (such as community forestry groups), which appearto be participative, equitable and efficient, can be found lackingon all three counts from a gender perspective. It also examinespossible gender differences in social networks, values and motivations.Although there is little to suggest that women are inherentlymore conservationist than men, the distinctness of women's socialnetworks embodying prior experience of successful cooperation,their higher dependence on these networks (as also on the commonsin general), and their potentially greater group homogeneityrelative to men, could provide an important (and largely ignored)basis for organising sustainable environmental collective action.The paper also outlines the factors that can constrain or facilitatewomen's participation in formal environmental management groups.Illustrative examples are drawn from rural South Asia.     

公共池塘资源自主治理理论与我国农村社区公共产品治理的研究

埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆的公共池塘资源自主治理理论完善了准公共产品理论,结合社会资本因素的集体行动及制度供给理论给我们提供了研究农村社区公共产品供给及治理新的视角。基于此,在简要回顾目前国内农村社区公共产品治理研究及其不足之处的基础上,借鉴公共池塘资源自主治理理论,提出今后我国农村社区公共产品治理研究中需要进一步加强研究的内容及方向,以促进农村公共事业的可持续发展。     

Competition and Cooperation in the Small Firm Sector

This paper examines the nature of economies of scale in the small firm sector and aims to provide new insight into the economic efficiency of small firm industrial districts. The theoretical analysis identifies the role played by collective external economies of scale that are realised through cooperation over input activities. Using game theory it is shown that cooperation can emerge both as a result of rational profit maximising behaviour and as a result of institutional and cultural environments that encourage cooperation and trust. The implications for industrial policy are discussed in the concluding section.     

Cooperation in collective action*

The ability to cooperate in collective action problems – such as those relating to the use of common property resources or the provision of local public goods – is a key determinant of economic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problems in developing countries. First, which institutions discourage opportunistic behaviour and promote cooperation? Second, what are the characteristics of the individuals involved that determine the degree to which they cooperate? We first review the evidence from field studies, laboratory experiments, and cross community studies. We then present new results from an individual level panel dataset of rural workers.