银行监管力量重构损害了市场约束的效用吗——基于亚洲银行1991-2005年面板数据的研究

各国金融安全网的实施导致银行的监管体系发生重构，会导致市场约束受到“挤压”，已经逐步地被经济学家们认可。但是对于亚洲国家来说，监管力量的重构是否影响了市场约束却尚未得到明确的实证结论。本文的研究立足于此，研究发现亚洲金融危机对亚洲国家和地区的市场约束的扭曲较大，各国和地区在银行危机后加强银行监管的行为导致了这种“低成本”的市场约束的损伤。     

银行监管中的最优市场约束研究

基于社会利润最大化的视角,本文研究了银行监管中的最优市场约束问题.研究发现:在银行监管中实施最优的市场约束不仅可以提高银行监管帕累托效率,而且可以给社会带来最大的利润;最优市场约束水平受到银行"额外价值",无市场约束时贷款失败的概率、贷款成功的收益、市场约束的成本弹性等因素的影响,且与这些因素呈正相关;最优市场约束水平对银行"额外价值"、贷款成功的收益这两个因素的变化敏感性较强,对无市场约束时贷款失败的概率的变化敏感性较弱,对市场约束的成本弹性的敏感性呈现出由强变弱的趋势.     

市场约束与银行风险承担的文献回顾

市场约束是指银行的利益相关者出于时自身利益的考虑,会在不同程度上关注银行的经营和风险状况,并根据其掌握的信息采取一定措施影响相关的利率和资产价格,从而通过市场对银行的经营产生约束作用.市场约束是维护银行业稳定的重要机制.巴塞尔协议Ⅱ的新的监管框架中把市场约束与资本监管、政府监督共同作为有效银行监管的“三大支柱”,同时2006年底中国也全面开放了银行业市场,市场对中国商业银行风险承担的约束作用也越采越大.本文系统的回顾了国内外关于市场约束对商业银行风险承担的影响,包括市场约束的存在性、存款保险、政府监管对市场约束作用的影响以及危机时的市场约束,这对我国商业银行市场约束作用的发挥具有很好的借鉴意义.     

我国银行业市场约束效应研究

文章运用我国12家银行2000-2005年的面板数据,通过估计银行存款增长率对银行风险变化做出的反应,实证的检验了我国的市场约束力情况,结果显示市场约束力对于四大国有银行较弱,对其他银行有较强的约束力,从一个侧面论证了我国只覆盖国有银行的隐性存款保险制度的存在.     

存款人市场约束机制研究

与股东和债权人相比,存款人时银行的市场约束一直以来相对较弱.文章首先回顾了有关存款人市场约束的相关文献,然后利用数学模型分析了影响存款人市场约束力度的因素,在此基础上对我国商业银行加强市场约束提出了相应的建议.本文的创新之处在于将影响存款人市场约束力度的主要因素及其相互关系纳入一个模型中进行综合讨论,从而对加强市场约束机制进行了比较全面的分析.     

银行市场约束与政府监管的权衡与选择研究——对我国银行外部监管效应的论证

随着金融全球化和金融创新的发展,宏观系统性冲击造成了一系列银行危机。政府监管和市场约束作为银行外部监管体系的两个工具,其作用越来越受到重视。文章分析了在发生系统性冲击时如何在二者之间进行权衡和选择,从而达到最优的监管组合的效果,并针对中国的现实提出了政策建议。     

寻找有效的银行监管政策

近年来,接连爆发的银行危机引起了全球监管界的高度重视,一些国际机构,如巴塞尔银行监管委员会,国际货币基金组织和世界银行等,相继提出了许多被誉为“最佳实践”的政策建议,呼吁各国监管机构尽量采纳和实施。各国监管当局也纷纷推出了一系列加强监管的措施。但是,如何判定这些政策的有效性、优越性和普通实用性,需要对大多数国家实施的监管政策进行总结研究。     

显性部分存款保险下的有效银行退出机制--基于成本收益分析下的博弈分析

目前,中国银行业还没有建立起有效的市场退出机制和相关的制度安排,这不符合市场经济条件下金融业的基本规则,也给国家带来了沉重的负担.本论文通过一个二阶段完全信息动态博弈模型的分析揭示,由于银监会未建立起有效的成本约束下的市场退出机制,使得相机抉择的关闭机制对于商业银行而言是一个不可置信的威胁,促进了商业银行的冒险投资,加之隐性存款保险的存在,形成巨大的社会成本和福利损失.目前条件下,加快市场退出机制建设并建立与之相配套的显性部分存款保险制度是一个上佳的选择.     

银行规模视角下的市场约束——基于大中型商业银行的经验研究

在隐性保险制度背景下,选取13家大中型商业银行2001—2011年的年度数据为研究样本,实证研究了银行规模与市场约束效应的关系。研究结果表明:商业银行规模越大,对市场约束作用削弱程度越强,对银行救助难度也越大;当第一大股东为国家或国有法人时,不论银行规模如何,市场约束明显减弱;考虑规模因素时,市场约束作用与银行资本结构和上市与否之间不存在直接关系,而盈利水平与市场约束作用的关系会受隐性保险制度影响。     

对我国系统重要性银行的市场约束真的有效吗*——基于9起监管事件的实证研究

由于系统重要性金融机构（SIFIs）存在“大而不倒”效应,如何对其进行有效监管,进而降低其可能带来的系统性风险,一直是一项重要问题。本文选取巴塞尔协议第三支柱市场约束这一角度,采用事件研究法,针对我国的全球系统重要性银行（G SIBs）股票收益对于2011—2015年期间巴塞尔银行监管委员会、金融稳定理事会以及中国银监会发布的G SIBs名单和出台SIBs监管政策等共9次监管事件产生的反应进行分析,并将我国进入G SIBs名单和未进入该名单的上市银行进行了对比,旨在研究监管政策的出台是否影响了市场对于该类机构的预期,即是否起到了市场约束的效果。结果表明,其中仅有巴塞尔委员会发布更新后监管要求这一事件对相关G SIBs股票收益产生了显著的负面影响,其他8次事件均未使相关银行股票产生显著的负异常收益。这表明在大部分情况下,市场约束在对我国SIBs的监管中并未起到显著作用,未达到降低该类银行道德风险的效果。     

REFORMING BANK CAPITAL REGULATION: USING SUBORDINATED DEBT TO ENHANCE MARKET AND SUPERVISORY DISCIPLINE

In 1988 the Basel Capital Accord introduced minimum risk-weighted capital requirements for internationally active banks. In recent years there has been a growing realization that there are significant problems with the capital guidelines. As financial firms have become more sophisticated and complex they have effectively arbitraged the requirements and have become so good at it that the regulations have essentially ceased being a safety and soundness issue for supervisors and have become more of a compliance issue. Indeed, the Basel Committee is now evaluating reforms to the capital accord and is considering various means to improve the risk-capital relationship and to increase the role of market discipline. The authors argue that many of the problems that currently exist can be addressed, and some additional benefits not previously possible under the current capital guidelines can be realized, by increasing the role of subordinated debt in the bank capital structure. The authors discuss the potential benefits and offer a capital reform proposal that would improve both market and supervisory oversight. This should lead to more prudent risk management behavior by the larger, more complex banking organizations, resulting in a safer industry with less potential for systemic problems.     

BANK RUNS: DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS*

Diamond and Dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs. We extend the Diamond–Dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors. We find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first‐best outcome: depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects. However, an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first‐best allocation.     

BANK FAILURES: THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CONNECTION

It is generally accepted that banks must be regulated so as to avoid the moral hazard situation that deposit insurance generates. Accepting this argument implies that expanded bank powers must await deposit insurance reform. This article rejects the accepted view and argues instead that the existing regulatory system enhances rather than diminishes the riskiness of banks' portfolios. The article argues that the benefits from permitting banks to diversify probably would outweigh the costs. It concludes, however, that deposit insurance is a major culprit in the current wave of bank failures.     

资本监管、银行信贷与货币政策非对称效应

本文通过对在单一约束的商业银行利润函数中植入监管当局惩罚函数的静态理论模型的分析得出:监管当局以提高资本充足率为核心的监管行为不仅有效地影响了商业银行的信贷行为和风险意识,而且强化了"逆风向行事"的货币政策的非对称效应,接着本文对我国1998年以来经历的两次经济波动进行了实证分析,其结论是:1998年以来,监管当局对商业银行以降低坏账率、提高资本充足率为核心的监管行为强化了我国货币政策非对称效应。     

MARKET VALUE ACCOUNTING AND THE BANK BALANCE SHEET

Market value accounting for depository institutions is frequently suggested as a means of limiting losses to the deposit insurance funds. But opponents argue that market value accounting is too costly to be worth the effort. This article examines each balance sheet category to determine the feasibility of marking bank portfolios to market. One can assume that almost two-thirds of the asset side and over half of the liability side already are at market. In addition, securities and loans to less-developed countries are traded in secondary markets. Thus, the major cost of market value accounting would be computing current values of commercial loans through discounted cash flow analysis. But efforts now are under way in the private sector to develop less costly ways to determine market values. If market value accounting is adopted, then it will likely have its greatest effect on institutions with large holdings of loans to less-developed countries.     

转轨经济中的银行监管代理关系与监管者自利

由于历史方面的原因,转轨经济中的银行监管具有某些特殊性,这些特殊性表现在市场结构、监管体制和监管者偏好等方面,同时也决定了转轨经济中的最优监管策略可能有别于发达国家所面临的情形,尤其是当监管者存在自利倾向时,监管行为可能偏离社会福利最大化的目标,偏离的程度受到交替关系临界值、声誉权重、审查成本和社会福利权重等因素的影响。     

REGULATION,IMPERFECT COMPETITION,AND THE U.S. ABORTION MARKET

The U.S. abortion market has grown increasingly concentrated recently, while many states tightened abortion laws. Using data on abortion providers, I estimate an equilibrium model of demand, price competition, entry and exit, to capture the effect of regulation on industry dynamics. Estimates show regulations played an important role in determining the abortion market structure and evolution. Counterfactual simulations reveal increases in demand‐aimed regulation were the most important observed factor in explaining recent abortion declines. Simulating Utah's regulatory regime nationally shows tightening abortion restrictions can increase abortions in equilibrium, mainly through tilting the competitive landscape toward low‐price providers.     

REGULATION OF BANK INTEREST RATE RISK

This paper argues that the direct control approach to regulating bank interest rate risk is not the most effective one. First, a bank's interest rate exposure cannot be summarised in a single measure. Rather there are a number of such measures, depending on the target adopted, and it is not possible to determine all of them simultaneously. Basing a capital requirement on any one of these measures can have ‘unintended consequences' for the others. Secondly, changes in interest rates have a range of complex effects on banks and these effects cannot be incorporated in any single numerical measure of interest rate exposure. The paper also raises doubts about the usefulness of disclosure requirements as a tool of prudential regulation of bank interest rate risk management. The preferred approach is a supervisory regime which ensures that banks have in place an effective system for managing their own interest rate exposures. One aspect of this supervision must be to ensure that banks are using simulation analysis to measure the effect on them of changes in interest rates.     

REGULATORY FORBEARANCE AND DEPOSITOR MARKET DISCIPLINE: EVIDENCE FROM SAVINGS BANKS IN KOREA

This paper investigates whether regulatory forbearance for savings banks in Korea affects the market discipline of depositors using data from 2000 to 2010, which are characterized by a series of exits of savings banks. We find that depositors' sensitivity to the savings banks' asset quality decreases when there is regulatory forbearance for failing savings banks. This forbearance effect is also observed in the behavior of the depositors of the neighboring savings banks in the same business area. These results suggest that regulatory forbearance may cause depositors to misjudge bank risks, increasing the expected costs of bank failure. (JEL G21, G28)     

连续时间模型下的寿险需求和中国寿险市场的相关实证研究

本文以我国寿险市场为背景,通过建立包括保险决策的资产选择的动态连续时间模型,给出了保险产品价格成本效应对寿险需求影响的理论分析,并通过具体的数据分析讨论了模型的意义。本文还实证研究了目前我国保险市场一些主要的保障型寿险产品的附加保费因子及其对我国居民保险需求的影响。这在某种程度上解释了我国目前保障性保险需求不足的现象。同时本文实证分析的结果显示我国的保障性保险还远没有满足我国居民的潜在需求,并针对这种现象提出了相关的政策建议。