The value of distorting overhead cost allocations in an agency setting

This paper shows a strict demand for suitably chosen inaccurate overhead cost allocations in an agency model in which a profit centre manager is in charge of production cost containment and pricing decisions. Given exogenous restrictions on the compensation scheme, the use of distorted overhead costs by transforming the performance measure into an ‘accounting profit’, helps calibrate incentives for the manager. The paper derives conditions for under- or overallocation of overhead costs to products. Generally, underallocation is preferable if the riskiness of quantity is strongly positively related with price and unit cost of a product, or if the product is relatively more price-sensitive.     

Does the cost of capital differ across countries? An agency perspective*

In this keynote speech, I ask the question: Does the cost of capital differ for firms located in different countries? I argue that there are two ways to look at the cost of capital. First, there is the neoclassical perspective, which assumes that there are no agency problems. In integrated markets, the neoclassical cost of capital is the same in every country. Second, there is the agency perspective. Agency costs increase the cost of capital understood as the expected rate of return necessary for an investment to leave the value of the firm unaffected. Adjusting the cost of capital for agency costs, I argue that it differs across countries because of differences in corporate governance. I then provide a comparison of the agency-adjusted cost of capital between Japan and the US.     

A financial-economic evaluation of insurance guaranty fund system: An agency cost perspective

Recent occurrences of financial distress to some insurers have raised questions about whether the current guaranty system is adequate to protect policyholders. Four new systems have been proposed. Using the state preference model, it was found the Stewart's national system faring the best, if it adopts uniform regulation. Based on agency theory, the pre-assessment approach and the policyholder surcharge (or premium increase) recoupment method were found to be better than the current post-assessment approach and premium tax offset method. Furthermore, uniform policy limits and regulations are recommended.     

A remark on managerial behaviour and agency cost

This paper studies the relationship between managers’ private profit and agency cost using dynamic modelling methods. We conclude that the agency cost is a concave function of the managers’ private profit and that the managers’ private profit will lead to more investment cash outflow.     

Executive risk-taking and the agency cost of debt

Firms compensate managers to maximize shareholder value, yet these same incentives affect bondholder risk. We investigate the relation between executive equity pay and the cost of debt. Our findings indicate a “u-shaped” relation between bond yields and equity pay. These results are consistent with the notion that bondholders prefer a moderate amount of executive equity pay and above or below that level, bondholders increase yields to protect their interests. These findings suggest that moderate levels of equity pay mitigate the agency costs between firm shareholders and bondholders.     

Trade credit use and bank loan access: an agency theory perspective

In this study we find that firms’ use of trade credit significantly facilitates their access to bank loans in the future, suggesting a complementary relationship. Such a relationship is more profound for firms with higher perceived agency costs, i.e., firms with opaque corporate information, firms located in regions with less developed external institutions, and firms at an early stage of existence. Firms switch from trade credit to bank loans as the main source of debt financing as they age. However, the process is slower for firms with a greater level of corporate information opacity and firms located in regions with weak external institutions.     

Dynamic portfolio optimization with liquidity cost and market impact: a simulation-and-regression approach

We present a simulation-and-regression method for solving dynamic portfolio optimization problems in the presence of general transaction costs, liquidity costs and market impact. This method extends the classical least squares Monte Carlo algorithm to incorporate switching costs, corresponding to transaction costs and transient liquidity costs, as well as multiple endogenous state variables, namely the portfolio value and the asset prices subject to permanent market impact. To handle endogenous state variables, we adapt a control randomization approach to portfolio optimization problems and further improve the numerical accuracy of this technique for the case of discrete controls. We validate our modified numerical method by solving a realistic cash-and-stock portfolio with a power-law liquidity model. We identify the certainty equivalent losses associated with ignoring liquidity effects, and illustrate how our dynamic optimization method protects the investor's capital under illiquid market conditions. Lastly, we analyze, under different liquidity conditions, the sensitivities of certainty equivalent returns and optimal allocations with respect to trading volume, stock price volatility, initial investment amount, risk aversion level and investment horizon.     

Rethinking agency theory in developing countries: A case study of Pakistan

We investigate if agency theory effectively explains agency conflict in the context of a developing country namely, Pakistan. Utilising data from 26 semi-structured interviews, we found that in Pakistan, there is no variation in risk preferences of principals (minority shareholders) and agents (majority shareholders). We also found that remuneration packages and board independence are not effective tools for governing owner managers in Pakistan. Thus, policy makers must shift their focus from soft internal governance mechanisms of appropriate remuneration and board independence. We propose for a rigorous external audit function, and appointment of independent directors and external audit firms by regulator.     

Supporting ALARP decision making by cost benefit analysis and multiattribute utility theory

Current guidance in the UK and elsewhere indicate upper and target risk limits for the operation of nuclear plant in terms of individual risk per annum. ‘As low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) arguments are used to justify the acceptance or rejection of policies that lead to risk changes between these limits. The suitability of cost‐benefit analysis (CBA) and multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) are assessed for performing ALARP (‘as low as reasonably possible’) assessments, in particular within the nuclear industry. Four problems stand out in current CBA applications to ALARP, concerning the determination of prices of safety gains or detriments, the valuation of group and individual risk, calculations using ‘disproportionality’, and the use of discounting to trade‐off risks through time. This last point has received less attention in the past but is important because of the growing interest in risk‐informed regulation in which policies extend over several timeframes and distribute the risk unevenly over these, or in policies that lead to a nonuniform risk within a single timeframe (such as maintenance policies). The problems associated with giving quantitative support to such decisions are discussed. It is argued that multiattribute utility methods (MAUT) provide an alternative methodology to CBA which enable the four problems described above to be addressed in a more satisfactory way. Through sensitivity analysis MAUT can address the perceptions of all stakeholder groups, facilitating constructive discussion and elucidating the key points of disagreement. It is also argued that by being explicitly subjective it provides an open, auditable and clear analysis in contrast to the illusory objectivity of CBA. CBA seeks to justify a decision by using a common basis for weights (prices), while MAUT recognizes that different parties may want to give different valuations. It then allows the analyst to explore the ways in which different parties might (or might not) come to the same conclusion even when weighting items differently.     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.     

An investigation of wholly‐owned foreign subsidiary control through transaction cost economics theory

This paper investigates the management control systems used by multinational corporation headquarters to control wholly‐owned foreign subsidiaries. Our theory development is based on transaction cost economics. First, we conduct a series of exploratory interviews, providing an insight into the context, and second, we provide empirical evidence based on cross‐sectional survey data. Our results indicate that activity traits (uncertainty, asset specificity and post hoc information impactedness) have significant implications on control choices, in particular the control archetype combinations chosen by headquarters, although not all results are consistent with theory predictions. Our findings are supported by extensive alternative testing.     

Product market competition and the value of corporate cash: An agency theory explanation

In this paper, we document the effect of product market competition on cash value and provide evidence supporting the agency discount mechanism. Using the regulation-induced IPO suspensions in China as shocks to product market competition, we find that reduced competition threat, induced by competitors' IPO delay, decreases incumbent firms' value of cash reserve. The effect of IPO suspension on cash holding is more pronounced for companies with severe agency problems and loose governance mechanisms but not statistically different across high and low predation threats. Furthermore, we show that the marginal value of cash increases when IPO restarts, and our baseline results hold in both a large sample and a matched sample of firms. Our paper contributes to the literature by providing the plausibly causal effect of product market competition on cash value and an explanation from the perspective of competition's disciplinary role in mitigating managers' slack.     

Asset allocation and age effects in retirement savings choices

We examine the asset allocation decisions of members of three large Australian retirement savings funds. Superannuation Guarantee legislation in 1992 made Australian employees compulsory investors by requiring employers to contribute a fixed proportion of earnings to a superannuation fund on behalf of employees. A majority of these employees can choose an investment strategy for these contributions. We examine how actual investment strategy and asset allocation choices of members change with age in view of the conventional wisdom that individuals allocate less to risky assets as they age and investments theory which provides conflicting advice on the issue.     

Technical analysis: An asset allocation perspective on the use of moving averages

In this paper, we analyze the usefulness of technical analysis, specifically the widely employed moving average trading rule from an asset allocation perspective. We show that, when stock returns are predictable, technical analysis adds value to commonly used allocation rules that invest fixed proportions of wealth in stocks. When uncertainty exists about predictability, which is likely in practice, the fixed allocation rules combined with technical analysis can outperform the prior-dependent optimal learning rule when the prior is not too informative. Moreover, the technical trading rules are robust to model specification, and they tend to substantially outperform the model-based optimal trading strategies when the model governing the stock price is uncertain.     

Toxic chemical releases and idiosyncratic return volatility: A prospect theory perspective

We investigated whether and how firms’ toxic chemical releases (TCRs) affect idiosyncratic return volatility (IRV) using a prospect theory lens. Utilising a large sample of US public listed firms over the period 2001–2018, we find a significant and positive association between TCRs and IRV, suggesting that firms releasing more toxic chemicals have higher IRV. Additional analyses show that a positive association between TCR and IRV is more evident among firms with (i) high revenue, (ii) lower financial constraints and (iii) fewer environmental violations. A further test also suggests that a positive association between TCRs and IRV is contingent on political leadership ideology and market states. Our results remain consistent with weighted TCRs, IRV based on the Fama–French three-factor model, fixed-effect two-stage least square estimator (FE-2SLS), and other robustness checks. These findings shed light on the role of equity markets as a driver for capital-intensive pollution abatement activities and enhanced compliance with environmental laws, standards and best practices.     

Finance theory: A house without windows

In this paper we aim to build on the existing critical finance literature by exploring how finance theory maintains both its momentum and hegemony. More specifically, by using an example at the core of finance theory (namely, portfolio asset allocation) we illustrate how finance keeps itself artificially alive by taking data from the outside world, often ignoring the rich complexities of the context which has given rise to the data, and using these ‘new facts’ to create puzzles which then lead onto more activity to see how the accepted core can or cannot be extended to incorporate the ‘new facts’. Against this process the paper then shows how the more obvious approach of engaging with the various participants can lead to greater insight and understanding. Given this approach, facts are not just anomalies which need to be explained away but part of the environment which help us to understand the various activities of individuals and organisations. The paper concludes by outlining a research agenda which develops a number of streams of research in critical finance and needs to be addressed in an open manner if traditional finance is to move from being closed and increasingly moribund to a subject which captures the vibrancy and dynamism of financial activities/markets across the globe.     

Managerial optimism: New observations on the unifying theory

Managerial optimism theory is behavioral finance's greatest achievement. It explains two prominent features of corporate financial behavior – over‐investment and pecking‐order capital structure preferences – that otherwise require two different theories with mutually incompatible assumptions about managerial loyalties to shareholder‐value maximization. After reviewing the development of managerial optimism as a unifying theory, I use a simple change of measure to transform risk‐averse optimism to risk‐neutral probabilities that can be pessimistic or optimistic depending on wealth changes. This unexplored feature has implications for, among other things, pay for performance when managers are excessively optimistic.     

Greenness index: IPO performance and portfolio allocation

This study examines how the greenness of the firm affects the short- and long-term performance of IPOs. To measure the greenness of the firm, we develop the Greenness Index based on the emissions produced. We find that the greenness of the firms operating in services and financial sectors is higher than in other sectors. To examine the short- and long-run performance of IPOs, we classify our sample into high and low green firms. In the short-run, high green firms obtain a lower return than low green firms. However, high green firms perform better than low green firms in the long-run. This study also determines the factors that cause short- and long-run performance, and the results suggest that the firm’s greenness negatively influences initial returns and underperformance of IPOs. Finally, we develop a theoretical model in terms of the portfolio's allocation and assert that investors participate in high-green firms to optimize their portfolio.