商业银行信贷支持连锁经营企业的业务模式及建议

随着连锁经营企业的快速发展,其信贷服务需求也随之增加,为商业银行发展信贷业务提供了广阔的市场.从商业银行信贷支持连锁经营企业的业务模式看,主要包括总部担保、加盟商自行担保以及综合利用总部和加盟商信用担保的授信模式.为做好对连锁经营企业的信贷支持,商业银行需在信贷产品选择及要素设计、客户营销与准入、调查及审查审批、风险管理等方面做出努力.     

浅谈连锁企业规模扩张及模式选择

连锁经营作为企业发展的形式之一,得到了很多企业的广泛关注和重点发展,如何进行连锁企业规模扩张在一定程度上决定着企业经营战略的成败。本文分析了连锁经营竞争优势及连锁经营规模扩张与规模效益关系,通过对连锁企业经营扩张的几种典型模式比较,结合我国连锁企业发展状况,提出进一步扩张我国连锁企业经营的对策。     

商业银行负债管理存在的问题及对策研究

随着利率市场化的不断推进和互联网金融的扩张,商业银行负债管理对其盈利能力、风险管理等产生较大的影响,负债管理在商业银行经营管理中地位也更加重要.本文利用层次分析法对商业银行的负债管理进行定量分析,发现不同类型的商业银行负债管理水平存在较大差异,但负债管理中存在的问题较为集中,最后根据面临的主要问题提出了相关政策建议.     

商业银行如何加强声誉风险管理

商业银行声誉管理是对商业银行声誉的创建、维护和发扬,是商业银行以科学决策为核心,通过多种手段建立并维持与社会公众信任关系的一种现代管理方法。声誉管理包括声誉的创建、维护、巩固、扩张、挽救、修复等环节。2009年1月,巴塞尔委员会新资本协议征求意见稿中,已明确指出银行应将声誉风险纳入其风险管理流程之中。本文试对商业银行声誉风险管理体系的构建作粗浅探讨。     

专业建设是提高连锁经营管理人才素质的重要途径

连锁经营在我国的迅速崛起,为高校提出了一个新的要求———必须加快连锁经营管理专业建设。因为连锁经营科技含量较高,需要专业的连锁经营管理人才,而高等教育在连锁经营管理专业建设上却表现出了明显的滞后性,专业建设作为提高连锁经营管理人才素质的重要途径,必须尽快加以实施。在实施过程中,必须明确该专业的特点、课程设置、教材建设、师资队伍建设、实验室及实训基地建设等。     

跨区域扩张对中小商业银行效率影响的研究

本文采用面板数据对我国10家正在跨区域扩张进程中的上市中小商业银行进行了Malmquist指数效率分析,发现中小商业银行的跨区域扩张对于银行本身的效率提高并没有明显作用,但是这种发展战略对于中小商业银行未来影响还是可期的,只是在扩张中应注意扩张节奏、扩张方式等因素。     

商业银行资本管理能力提升的路径探析

<正>资本是商业银行抵御所面临的系统性风险和个体性风险的最后屏障,也是支持和约束商业银行资产扩张、信贷投放的支柱和保障。目前,国内商业银行资本管理尚处于探索和完善阶段,本文从商业银行资本补充的迫切性出发,梳理总结商业银行资本管理的现状和存在的问题,探究商业银行资本管理能力提升的路径和解决方案。     

浅析如何优化商业银行经济资本管理

商业银行经济资本管理是强化资本刚性约束、控制风险扩张的有效途径,也是目前一个新的银行管理热点。本文通过分析商业银行经济资本管理问题所在,进而探讨优化经济资本结构的对策,实现业务和效益的和谐统一,从而有利于商业银行构建高效的风险控制机制,促进其可持续发展。     

浅析如何优化商业银行经济资本管理

商业银行经济资本管理是强化资本刚性约束、控制风险扩张的有效途径,也是目前一个新的银行管理热点.本文通过分析商业银行经济资本管理问题所在,进而探讨优化经济资本结构的对策,实现业务和效益的和谐统一,从而有利于商业银行构建高效的风险控制机制,促进其可持续发展.     

对商业银行精细化管理的思考

一、商业银行实施精细化管理的必要性 首先,精细化管理有助于商业银行节约成本．实现粗放型经营向集约化经营的转变。过去我国商业银行曾经以市场占有份额多、存贷款总量大等而自豪。只重视资源投入,忽视结构调整、产出收益和风险控制,走的是依靠规模和信贷扩张的路子。随着金融业的对外开放和国有商业银行股份制改造的加快,人们已认识到粗放经营对银行经营管理的危害性,“精细化”已经被越来越多的金融机构所重视。     

商业银行特许权价值风险约束效应研究

从银行特许权价值的定义入手,利用样本银行1998～2007年的年度数据,阐述和分析了银行特许权价值的风险约束效应。研究结果表明,银行特许权价值对银行的风险行为有很强的约束效应,即拥有较高特许权价值的银行不会倾向于采取过度冒险的经营行为,而那些特许权价值较低的银行会增加冒险经营的动机。     

中国银行特许权价值的风险自律效应研究

将银行破产风险分解为经营不确定性与风险覆盖能力、杠杆风险与资产组合风险,建立动态面板模型并采用2003~2013年中国上市银行的数据和系统广义矩估计方法,分析特许权价值激励银行降低风险承担的途径和方式。研究发现：我国银行特许权价值具有抑制银行风险的自律效应,银行为避免过高风险而遭受监管惩罚或丧失市场资源,保持特许经营条件和优势,将进行积极的风险管理;特许权价值的风险自律效应主要通过促使银行提升风险覆盖能力、降低资产组合风险和杠杆风险来实现。     

特许权价值、市场结构与银行风险承担

银行业的风险程度关系到整个经济体的稳定与发展,控制风险是银行经营的重要目标之一。目前对银行风险承担的研究主要从特许权价值和市场竞争的角度分别展开分析。本文以156家中国商业银行为研究对象,同时分析了银行特许权价值、市场竞争程度对银行风险的影响。通过实证分析,我们发现目前影响我国商业银行特许权价值的因素主要来自银行因素而非市场因素;在没有控制内生性的前提下,发现银行特许权价值有效地约束了银行风险,而市场竞争的加剧增加了银行风险行为;在控制银行风险和特许权价值内生性后,发现特许权价值对中国商业银行风险的约束效应基本不存在。因此,要维持银行业的稳定,需要规范银行的竞争行为,提高特许权价值的风险约束效应。     

Market Structure, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking

This paper discusses the effect of capital regulation on the risk taking behavior of commercial banks. We first theoretically show that capital regulation works differently in different market structures of banking sectors. In lowly concentrated markets, capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking behavior because banks’ franchise values are low and banks have incentives to pursue risky strategies in order to increase their franchise values. If franchise values are high, on the other hand, the effect of capital regulation on bank risk taking is ambiguous. We then test the model predictions on a cross-country sample including 421 commercial banks from 61 countries. We find that capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking only in markets with a low degree of concentration. The results remain robust after accounting for financial sector development, legal system efficiency, and for other country and bank-specific characteristics.     

探索支持个人本外币兑换特许业务的发展路径

个人本外币兑换特许业务自2008年试点以来，尤其在2012年国家外汇管理局对特许业务的管理办法进行修订以来，业务量和机构家数增长迅速。但与国际货币兑换公司相比，国内仍存在业务量较低、对银行的依赖较大、业务范围较窄等问题。文章回顾了该业务在我国的发展现状，借鉴成熟国际特许机构的发展经验，对促进我国特许业务发展提出相关政策建议。     

Bank Capital Requirements, Capital Structure and Regulation

This paper studies the impact of capital requirements, deposit insurance and franchise value on a bank’s capital structure. We find that properly regulated banks voluntarily choose to maintain capital in excess of the minimum required. Central to this decision is both firm franchise value and the ability of regulators to place banks in receivership stripping equity holders of firm value. These features of our model help explain both the capital structure of the large mortgage Government Sponsored Enterprises and the recent increase in risk taking through leverage by financial institutions. The insights gained from the model are useful in guiding the discussion of financial regulatory reforms.     

对我国商业银行特许权价值形成要素的实证分析

特许权价值是银行具有的从受保护市场获取未来租金的牌照价值,由市场相关因素和银行相关因素决定.本文在5家上市银行1999-2006年的面板数据基础上,利用托宾Q的方法度量特许权价值,并构建多元线性回归模型,得知随着市场优势因素的弱化,特许权价值整体呈现下降的趋势,而银行内在效率是其稳定的关键,对于银行业的稳健经营具有重要意义.     

Does the stock market value bank diversification?

This paper investigates whether or not functionally diversified banks have a comparative advantage in terms of long-term performance/risk profile compared to their specialized competitors. To that end, this study uses market-based measures of return potential and bank risk. We calculate the franchise value over time of European banks as a measure of their long-run performance potential. In addition, we measure risk as both the systematic and the idiosyncratic risk components derived from a bank stock return model. Finally, we analyze the return/risk trade-off implied in different functional diversification strategies using a panel data analysis over the period 1989–2004. A higher share of non-interest income in total income affects banks’ franchise values positively. Diversification of revenue streams from distinct financial activities increases the systematic risk of banks while the effect on the idiosyncratic risk component is non-linear and predominantly downward-sloping. These findings have conflicting implications for different stakeholders, such as investors, bank shareholders, bank managers and bank supervisors.     

The effect of TARP on the propagation of real estate shocks: Evidence from geographically diversified banks

This study examines the effect of TARP on the propagation of real estate shocks via geographically diversified banks in the U.S. I find that TARP money provided for banks exposed to distressed areas (i.e., “affected” banks) was positively associated with small business loan originations in “non-distressed” areas (i.e., counties with smaller real estate shocks), mitigating the shock transmission. In addition, the bailout funds facilitated “affected” banks’ faster return to their pre-crisis level of franchise value. Overall, the marginal benefit of TARP funds seems to have been greater for “affected” TARP banks. I conclude that this policy helped “affected” banks cleanse/strengthen their balance sheets and recapitalize, which paved the way for increased lending.     

Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking

Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, J Finance 60:1329–1343, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. Using a model where competition arises from falling switching costs for entrepreneurs, we show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.