首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 30 毫秒
1.
Summary. Most of the literature on collusive behavior in auctions ignores two important issues that make collusion difficult to sustain at least in one-shot interactions: the detection of cheating and the verification of bids. Colluding bidders may deceive each other by using shill bidders. Also, if the identities of the bidders and their bids are not published then it would be difficult to verify the bid of a colluding bidder. This paper addresses these problems in one shot second price auctions where one bidder offers another bidder a side payment in exchange for not participating in the auction, while the number of other bidders is stochastic. In spite of the barriers to collusion mentioned above, a simple side payment mechanism which depends only on the auction price is introduced. It induces a successful collusion, eliminates the verification problem, provides no incentive for the use of shill bidders and guarantees that the proponent obtains ex-post non-negative payoff. The colluding bidders are ex-ante strictly better off compared with the competitive case, irrespective of their types.Received: 27 November 2002, Revised: 28 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.Yair Tauman: Correspondence toWe would like to thank an anonymous referee for very valuable comments and suggestions that significantly improved the paper. We thank Shmuel Zamir for a helpful discussion.  相似文献   

2.
We investigate whether efficient collusive bidding mechanisms are affected by potential information leakage from bidders' decisions to participate in them within the independent private values setting. We apply the concept of ratifiability introduced by Cramton and Palfrey [Cramton, P.C., Palfrey, T.R., 1995, Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement, Games Econ. Behav. 10 (2), 255–283] and show that when the seller uses a second-price auction with participation costs, the standard efficient cartel mechanisms such as pre-auction knockouts analyzed in the literature will not be ratified by cartel members. A high-value bidder benefits from vetoing the cartel mechanism since doing so sends a credible signal that she has high value, which in turn discourages other bidders from participating in the seller's auction.  相似文献   

3.
Suppose that bidders may publicly choose not to learn their values prior to a second-price auction with costly bidding. All equilibria with truthful bidding exhibit bidder ignorance when the number of bidders is sufficiently small. Ignorance considerations also affect the optimal reserve price.  相似文献   

4.
In almost common-value auctions one bidder (the advantaged bidder) has a valuation advantage over all other (regular) bidders. It is well known that in second-price auctions with two bidders, even a slight private-value advantage can have an explosive effect on auction outcomes as the advantaged bidder wins all the time and auction revenue is substantially lower than in a pure second-price common-value auction. We explore the robustness of these results to the addition of more regular bidders in second-price auctions, and the extent to which these results generalize to ascending-price English auctions in an effort to provide insight into when and why one ought to be concerned about such slight asymmetries.  相似文献   

5.
Optimal Multi-Object Auctions   总被引:11,自引:0,他引:11  
This paper analyses optimal auctions of several objects. In the first model bidders have a binary distribution over their valuations for each object, in which case the optimal auction is efficient. The optimal auction takes one of two formats: either objects are sold in independent auctions, or a degree of bundling is introduced in the sense that the probability a bidder wins one object is increasing in her value for the other. The format of the optimal auction may depend upon the number of bidders. In the second model the restriction to binary distributions is relaxed, and the optimal auction is then inefficient.  相似文献   

6.
The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU‐ETS) has chosen to adopt an auctioning procedure to initially allocate CO2 emission permits. Free allocation of permits will become an exception for the third phase (2013–2020) and most firms will have to buy all their permits on the market or via auctions. The ability of bidders to collude is a key concern about the design of the auction format. To counter collusion, the auction can be open to bidders without compliance obligations (speculators). This paper aims at studying experimentally speculation as a collusion‐breaking device in two different auction mechanisms: the uniform‐price sealed‐bid auction and the ascending clock auction. Our results suggest that a uniform sealed‐bid auction open to speculators should be chosen from a revenue maximization point of view. In this mechanism, compliance agents adopt an aggressive strategy toward speculators. This strategy significantly increases the seller's revenue, compared to the more collusive clock auction. In the latter, on the contrary, bidders accommodate speculators, letting them buy permits in the auction and buying their necessary permits on the secondary market. However, as opening the auction to speculators deteriorates efficiency, the regulator faces a trade‐off between these two objectives.  相似文献   

7.
Most prior theoretical and experimental work involving auction choice has assumed bidders find out their value after making a choice of which auction to enter. We examine whether or not bidders knowing their value prior to making a choice of which among multiple alternative auction formats to enter impacts their choice decision and/or the outcome of the auctions. The results show a strong impact on auction choice. Subjects with low values choose the first price sealed bid auction more often while subjects with high values choose the ascending auction more often. The number of bidders in each auction, revenue, efficiency and average bidder surplus all end up equalized.  相似文献   

8.
Collusion-Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0  
We analyze a public good problem when agents form a grand coalition to promote their own collective goal instead of that of society as a whole. When collusion takes place under symmetric information , the collusion-proof Samuelson rule takes a simple form that is close to an ex ante cost-benefit analysis . Then, we analyze the case where agents collude under asymmetric information . First, we describe the set of collusion-proof allocations. Second, we establish the collusion-proof Samuelson rule that highlights the role of coalitional virtual valuations . Asymmetric information within the coalition allows the principal to recover some flexibility in the design of the optimal policy. We finally discuss the nature of the inefficiency created by the agents' collusive behavior and the scope of their ex ante gain in forming a coalition.  相似文献   

9.
In a principal-multi-agent setting we investigate how optimal contracts should be modified under relative performance evaluation when agents collude. Agents may write side-contracts, which are not contingent on their effort choices but indirectly control them through side-transfers. We show that the optimal collusion-proof contract is to introduce a “discriminatory policy” in the sense that the wage schemes offered to agents depend on their identities even if they are identical with respect to productive abilities. Such discriminatory wage schemes explain the organizational strategy of “divide and conquer” as an optimal response to collusion.  相似文献   

10.
Abstract. This paper analyses the auction designs chosen for awarding 3G licences in the UK and Germany and compares them with respect to revenues and bidders' surplus using a laboratory experiment. In our study with a given number of bidders, the German design leads to higher revenues. However, bidder surplus in the German design is lower and bidders face a severe exposure problem. Because this might discourage participation, it will probably lead to less competitive bidding in real applications.  相似文献   

11.
钱大可  宋福根 《技术经济》2011,30(6):100-105,124
通过分析网络团购拍卖机制下的竞标者等待达到拍卖保留价格现象,提出网络团购拍卖过程中存在竞标者队列,并揭示了竞标者队列的性质及其对网络团购拍卖机制设计的影响。研究指出:网络团购拍卖存在较大数量的成功竞标者,这些成功竞标者因需等待拍卖最终成交而形成竞标者队列;拍卖方对竞标者队列进行的服务与成批服务的排队系统相似,但也存在差异;拍卖方可优化网络团购拍卖机制,以保证获得拍卖收益,并减少在服务过程中出现的队列拥塞现象的发生。  相似文献   

12.
We analyze bidding behavior in large discriminatory-price auctions in a common value setting where the number of objects is a non-trivial proportion of the number of bidders. We show that the average price paid in the auction is biased downward from the expected value of the objects, even in the competitive limit. We show that conditional on a signal that falls below a threshold, a bidder bids no more than the expected value of an object conditional on the signal and winning; while conditional on any signal that lies above the threshold the bid is strictly lower than the expected value conditional on the signal and winning.  相似文献   

13.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We examine solutions to mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions.  相似文献   

14.
Much of the existing auction literature treats auctions as running independently of one another, with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction. However, in many online auctions, a number of substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid on several auctions at the same time. Recent theoretical research shows how bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions, the current paper providing the first empirical evidence in support of competing auctions theory using online auctions data from eBay. Our results indicate that a significant proportion of bidders do bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids on auctions with the lowest standing bid, as the theory predicts. The paper also shows that winning bidders who cross-bid pay lower prices on average than winning bidders who do not.  相似文献   

15.
When the owner of an object sells it through an auction run by an agent of hers, corruption may appear. In a first-price auction, corruption can make honest bidders more or less aggressive, or their behavior can remain unchanged. We identify sufficient conditions for each of the three possibilities. We analyze the effects of corruption on efficiency, bidders’ welfare and expected revenue. Our results apply as well to the situation—unrelated to corruption—where one of the bidders is granted a right of first refusal.  相似文献   

16.
在代理人类型相关的非线性定价环境中,代理人之间可能结成联盟操纵信息并进行套利,垄断厂商需要设计出同时防范信息操纵和套利的定价合约.对类型相关且代理人数n≥3的情形,Che and Kim(2006)证明了包含信息操纵与套利的合谋行为可以无成本防范.对n=2这一在激励机制设计问题中占有重要地位的情况,本文证明无成本防范这一结论不再成立:信息操纵行为会引起配置效率的扭曲,套利活动会引起配置的进一步扭曲.并且,类型正相关和负相关时配置的扭曲方式不同.负相关时的配置扭曲将随着类型相关度的逐渐减弱而消失,而正相关时的配置扭曲不会随着类型相关度的减弱而消失.扭曲方式的差异导致有套利情形下的配置效率随着信息结构呈现不连续变化.从而,本文也推广了Laffont and Martimort(2000)的类型相关但无套利和Jeon and Manicucci(2005)的存在套利但类型无关情形下的结论.  相似文献   

17.
I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.  相似文献   

18.
I compare two information structures in a common value first-price auction with two bidders: In one, each of the two bidders knows only his own signal about the value of the object, and in the other, one of the bidders learns his opponent's signal as well. Gaining the additional information in the second information structure makes the informed bidder worse off if the value is submodular in the bidders' signals and better off if it is supermodular. If the value is supermodular, then the seller's revenue tends to be lower with the informed bidder than without.  相似文献   

19.
Private information revelation in common-value auctions   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
When a seller has information that could help bidders to estimate asset value, a dictum of auction theory has been that all such information should be publicly announced to bidders. The possibility of privately revealing this information to one or more bidders is introduced. Seller in some circumstances may attain higher expected revenue through revealing his information privately. Examples show that the role of private revelation is more complex than simply generating bidder asymmetry.  相似文献   

20.
We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) [1] shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is sufficient for efficiency of the English auction with two bidders and suggests that it is also a necessary condition. This paper clarifies and extends Maskin?s results to the case of N bidders. We introduce the generalized single-crossing condition—a fairly intuitive extension of the pairwise single-crossing condition—and prove that it is essentially a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium of the N-bidder English auction.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号