Do different streams of capital flows affect asset prices differently?

This paper explores the impact of six types of gross capital flows (debt, equity, and banking gross inflows and outflows) on two dimensions: (1) extreme episodes of surges, stops, flights, and retrenchments, and (2) the probability of boom-busts in ASEAN-4 asset markets for the period 1993–2018. To this end, we first decompose gross capital inflows and outflows from Balance of Payments 5 and 6 and show that ASEAN-4 is largely dominated by portfolio flows and a relatively small magnitude of banking flows. However, when we link this decomposition to the extreme episodes, our findings show banking flows are volatile enough to cause greater occurrences of flight and retrenchment episodes while volatile debt flows tend to lead to surge and stop episodes. In the second part, we construct asset price index for ASEAN-4 that can detect boom-busts periods with a minimal noise-to-signal ratio eight quarters ahead. We use heteroscedasticity panel probit and ordinal generalized linear models to show that fundamental variables and banking inflows are statistically significant at increasing likelihood of boom-busts in asset markets. These two findings highlight that although largest percentage of capital flows come through debt and equity markets, the banking channel is of paramount importance in causing extreme episodes of flight and retrenchment as well as boom-busts of asset markets.     

Do directors perform for pay?

Many corporations reward their outside directors with a modest fee for each board meeting they attend. Using a large panel data set on director attendance behavior in publicly-listed firms for the period 1996–2003, we provide robust evidence that directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings when board meeting fees are higher. This is surprising since meeting fees, on average roughly $1,000, represent an arguably small fraction of the total wealth of a representative director in our sample. Thus, corporate directors appear to perform for even very small financial rewards.     

Do monetary policy announcements affect stock prices in emerging market countries? The case of Thailand

We examine the effect of monetary policy announcements in Thailand, which is one of emerging market countries in Asia, on stock prices at the firm level. We find that the expected change, rather than the unexpected change, in interest rates affects stock prices. The stock price response to the interest rate announcement is asymmetric. For instance, the relation between interest rate surprises and stock prices is conditional on the direction of the interest rate change. In general, macroeconomic conditions and firm characteristics cannot explain the stock price reaction to the announcement. In addition, stock prices of firms in different industries appear to react heterogeneously to the interest rate announcement.     

Do oil prices drive food prices? The tale of a structural break

It is frequently argued that biofuel (and ethanol) promotion policies in the United States have created a link between oil and corn prices that has accentuated the recent rally in the price of that crop and its substitutes (especially soybeans). Even though it is intuitively appealing, one problem with this hypothesis is that ethanol policies have been in place in the US for more than 35 years, whereas the run up in food prices dates back only to 2006. However, a significant change in US biofuel policy during that year provides an adequate framework to test for the existence of a structural break in the stochastic properties of the corn and soybean price processes. The results show that structural stability is rejected, and the transmission of oil price innovations to corn prices has become stronger after 2006 (no changes with respect to soybeans). There is also a significant transmission of corn price innovations to oil and soybean prices. Moreover, the data show evidence of a previously non-existent cointegration relationship between oil and corn prices.     

Why do privatized firms pay higher dividends?

We examine state income and reputation incentives to account for the high dividends of privatized firms. Consistent with these agency-cost based incentives, we show strong and robust evidence that the extent of state ownership is positively related to corporate dividends. We distinguish between the empirical importance of these incentives using variation in the rule of law to protect minority shareholders, the fiscal deficit and the political orientation of the state. Our findings show that an incentive to enhance the state's reputation with minority shareholders can account for the high dividends of privatized firms.     

Do prime brokers intermediate capital?

Prime brokers play an important role in intermediating arbitrage capital to hedge funds. A fund’s peer-group ranking, relative to funds that share the same prime broker, significantly affects how investors respond to its past performance. I decompose the standard performance-flow relationship into two components: (1) flows that respond to overall performance rank, and (2) flows that respond to relative (within prime broker) performance rank. Strong relative rank drives fund in-flows, while poor overall rank drives out-flows. These results suggest that prime brokers intermediate about 40% of the standard performance-flow relationship.     

Do different forms of government ownership matter for bank capital behavior? Evidence from China

This study attempts to reconcile the conflicting theoretical predictions regarding how government ownership affects bank capital behaviour. Using a unique Chinese bank dataset over 2006–2015 we find that government-owned banks have higher target capital ratios and adjust these ratios faster compared to private banks, supporting the ‘development/political’ view of the government’s role in banking. This effect is stronger for local government-owned and state enterprise-owned banks than for central government-owned banks. We also find that undercapitalized government-owned banks increase equity while undercapitalized foreign banks contract assets and liabilities as their respective main strategy to adjust their capital ratios.     

Do spot food commodity and oil prices predict futures prices?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Futures prices reflect the price that both the buyer and the seller agree will be the price of a commodity upon delivery. Therefore, these prices...     

Do oil futures prices predict stock returns?

This paper explores stock return predictability by exploiting the cross-section of oil futures prices. Motivated by the principal component analysis, we find the curvature factor of the oil futures curve predicts monthly stock returns: a 1% per month increase in the curvature factor predicts 0.4% per month decrease in stock market index return. This predictive pattern is prevailing in non-oil industry portfolios, but is absent for oil-related portfolios. The in- and out-of-sample predictive power of the curvature factor for non-oil stocks is robust and outperforms many other predictors, including oil spot prices. The predictive power of the curvature factor comes from its ability to forecast supply-side oil shocks, which only affect non-oil stocks and are hedged by oil-related stocks.     

The performance of venture capital investments: Do investors overreact?

Using a unique proprietary data set of over 5400 realized and unrealized venture capital investments between 1980 and 2005, we examine the impact of demand-related factors, e.g. entrepreneurial activity, as well as supply-related factors, i.e. money provided by VC investors, on the return of individual VC investments. This way, we are able to shed more light on the question whether volatile VC investment returns are rather driven by fundamental changes with regard to the number of attractive investment opportunities or by the overreaction by investors. We find that rising demand for VC, i.e. an increase in entrepreneurial activity, results initially in higher returns. However, our results also indicate that overreaction on the supply side can be observed, destroying deal-level results. Overfunding, specifically overinvesting seems to be a recurring characteristic of the VC industry. In fact, contra-cyclical investment strategies yield highest deal-level returns.     

How do banks adjust their capital ratios?

We analyze the dynamics of banks’ regulatory capital ratios. Using monthly regulatory data of large German banks, we estimate the target level and the adjustment speed of the capital ratio for each bank separately. There exists a target level for a substantial percentage of banks. Unlike with panel regressions, we can estimate individual adjustment speeds and find large variation across banks. Adjustments on the liability side are most effective, although adjustment rates on the asset side are higher. Private commercial banks (neither state-owned nor cooperative) and banks with a high level of proprietary trading are more likely to adjust their capital ratio tightly. Banks with a target capital ratio compensate for low target ratios with low asset volatilities and high adjustment speeds. They seem to care mainly about the resulting probability to comply with the regulatory minimum. Assuming low variation of this probability explains most of the large cross-sectional variation of bank capital.     

Forecasting metal prices: Do forecasters herd?

We analyze more than 20,000 forecasts of nine metal prices at four different forecast horizons. We document that forecasts are heterogeneous and report that anti-herding appears to be a source of this heterogeneity. Forecaster anti-herding reflects strategic interactions among forecasters that foster incentives to scatter forecasts around a consensus forecast.     

Do insurers adjust prices for the adoption of loss prevention technologies? Evidence from Danish municipal contracts

Using data from 40 Danish municipalities on building characteristics, loss prevention technologies, insurance claims, and insurance bids from 2008 to 2019, we investigate whether and how loss prevention technologies influenced contract prices. The insurance bids cover a variety of municipal buildings across a range of risks including fire, water leakage, and building security as well as structure detection and alarm systems. The study shows that the magnitude of historical claims may affect both pricing offers and interest in loss prevention technologies. We do not find that loss prevention technologies have any significant influence on contract price. This suggests inefficiencies in the market from imperfect information.     

Do consumers pay for one-stop banking? Evidence from an alternative revenue function

In providing financial services jointly, banks may reduce costs due to complementarities in production (cost economies of scope) or raise revenues from complementarities in consumption (revenue economies of scope). Cost economies of scope between bank deposits and loans have been found to be small. Revenue economies of scope are investigated here for the first time and found to be insignificant over 1978–1990 for both small and large banks and for those on or off the revenue-efficient frontier. The lack of complementarities between deposits and loans — where benefits are most likely to occur — suggests that claims of important synergies from an expansion of banking powers be taken with caution.     

Do capital flows change domestic credit allocation?

Since the 1990s, domestic bank credit has been reallocated away from lending to non-financial business and toward households. An expanding literature discusses negative effects on growth and stability of this change in credit allocation. We research its drivers. We hypothesize that if foreign capital flows into economies with few investment opportunities, it may substitute for domestic bank lending to non-financial business, so that bank balance sheets become more dominated by household lending. In GMM estimations on data for 36 economies over 1990–2011, we find evidence consistent with this mechanism. Foreign capital inflows into the non-bank sector (but not into the bank sector) are associated with lower shares of business lending in domestic bank portfolios. The association is weaker in economies with more investment opportunities, whether proxied by investment shares, current account surpluses, or EMU membership. Our results highlight the importance of sectoral destination in determining the effects of capital flows.     

Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?

We provide empirical evidence on how the practice of competitive benchmarking affects chief executive officer (CEO) pay. We find that the use of benchmarking is widespread and has a significant impact on CEO compensation. One view is that benchmarking is inefficient because it can lead to increases in executive pay not tied to firm performance. A contrasting view is that benchmarking is a practical and efficient mechanism used to gauge the market wage necessary to retain valuable human capital. Our empirical results generally support the latter view. Our findings also suggest that the documented asymmetry in the relationship between CEO pay and luck is explained by the firm's desire to adjust pay for retention purposes and is not the result of rent-seeking behavior on the part of the CEO.     

Do small businesses adjust their capital structure? Evidence from the global financial crisis in Japan

We investigate the extent to which small businesses adjust their capital structures to target levels when their leverage increases substantially during a financial crisis. We examine Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) program during the 2008 global financial crisis. The increased leverage from the use of the ECG program during the crisis increased the probability of default. Additionally, small businesses adjusted their leverage ratios to the target range before the crisis. However, such adjustments were weak during and after the crisis, particularly for target firms in the ECG program.     

Do banks overstate their Value-at-Risk?

This paper is the first empirical study of banks’ risk management systems based on non-anonymous daily Value-at-Risk (VaR) and profit-and-loss data. Using actual data from the six largest Canadian commercial banks, we uncover evidence that banks exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates. The data used in this paper have been extracted from the banks’ annual reports using an innovative Matlab-based data extraction method. Out of the 7354 trading days analyzed in this study, there are only two exceptions, i.e. days when the actual loss exceeds the disclosed VaR, whereas the expected number of exceptions with a 99% VaR is 74. For each sample bank, we extract from historical VaRs a risk-overstatement coefficient, ranging between 19 and 79%. We attribute VaR overstatement to several factors, including extreme cautiousness and underestimation of diversification effects when aggregating VaRs across business lines and/or risk categories. We also discuss the economic and social cost of reporting inflated VaRs.     

Adopting residual income-based compensation plans: Do you get what you pay for?

Managers, consultants, and the financial press assert that compensation plans based on residual income change managers' behavior. This assertion is empirically tested by selecting a sample of firms that began using a residual income performance measure in their compensation plans and comparing their performance to a control sample of firms that continue to use traditional accounting earnings-based incentives. The results generally support the adage `you get what you measure and reward'. The results also support many hypothesized managerial actions associated with residual income-based performance measure incentives.     

Bank capital and credit market competition: Will competitive pressure lead to higher capital levels?

This paper establishes a theoretical model to study the relationship between credit market competition and bank capital. In the model, bank capital can alleviate the debt overhang problem, and the extent to which banks can enjoy the gain of holding capital is decreasing in the competitive pressure in the credit market. It is shown that credit market competition reduces banks' incentive to hold capital. Deposit insurance also induces banks to hold less capital. In addition, bank capital regulation is welfare improving, and banks may voluntarily hold capital in excess of regulatory minimums.