Dynamic central bank independence indices and inflation rate: A new empirical exploration

It has been argued that economies with more independent central banks experience lower inflation over time. In this paper we show that this relationship is sensitive to the methodology through which central bank independence indices are constructed. We stress the importance of employing dynamic central bank independence indices in two ways. First, we perform unit root tests with structural breaks to verify if the implementation of central bank reforms represents a structural break for the inflation rate dynamics. Second, we implement a panel data analysis.We find evidence that legislative reforms that modify the degree of independence of a central bank have a strong impact on the inflation rate dynamics. Moreover, underlying the importance of employing dynamic central bank independence indices, we confirm the negative relationship between the latter and inflation for a sample of 10 OECD countries.     

Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence

Political monetary cycles are less likely to occur in countries with independent central banks. Independent central banks can withstand political pressure to stimulate the economy before elections or finance election-related increases in government spending. Based on this logic and supporting evidence, we construct a de facto ranking of central bank independence derived from the extent to which monetary policy varies with the electoral cycle. The ranking avoids well-known problems with existing measures of central bank independence and provides independent information about average inflation and inflation volatility differences across countries.     

Testing the transparency benefits of inflation targeting: Evidence from private sector forecasts

Using inflation forecast data for 11 IT adoption countries, IT adoption is found to promote convergence in forecast errors, suggesting that it enhances transparency. This result, which is subjected to several robustness checks and found to be robust, supports Morris and Shin's (2002) contention that better public information is most beneficial for forecasters with bad private information. However, it does not support their hypothesis that better public information could make private forecasts less accurate.     

Price-level versus inflation targeting

This paper shows that price-level targeting outperforms inflation targeting in the standard New-Keynesian model, under the assumption that the central bank is forced to operate in an environment characterized by discretion. In the benchmark case, with no persistence in the shocks, the commitment solution can be fully replicated. Intuitively, price-level targeting introduces history dependence and a stationary level of prices, both of which are prominent features of the commitment solution.     

The impact of central bank digital currency variation on firm's implied volatility

The paper investigates whether a firm's implied volatility is affected by the volatility of central bank digital currencies. Our sample covers 2853 listed companies in the United States from 2014 to 2018. First, we find the variation of central bank digital currency has a positive impact on a firm’s implied volatility. Second, the healthier firms’ conditions can reduce the relationship between central bank digital currency variation and a firm’s implied volatility. Third, the positive relation between central bank digital currency and firm’s implied volatility still exists in investment-grade, speculative-grade, and unrated firms. Finally, to eliminate the endogeneity problem, we adopt simultaneous equation models (SEM) and find our results are still robust after excluding endogenous concerns. Our research provides a reminder for corporate managers and new implications for policymakers.     

Optimal central bank transparency

Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transparency. Up to this optimum more transparency is desirable: it improves the quality of private sector inflation forecasts. But beyond the optimum people might: (1) start to attach too much weight to the conditionality of their forecasts, and/or (2) get confused by the large and increasing amount of information they receive. This deteriorates the (perceived) quality of private sector inflation forecasts. As a result, inflation is set in a more backward looking manner resulting in higher inflation persistence. By using a large scale panel data set on the transparency of central banks we find empirical support for an optimal intermediate degree of transparency at which inflation persistence is minimized. Our results indicate that while several central banks would benefit from further transparency increases, some already have reached the optimal level.     

Monetary policy transmission in vector autoregressions: A new approach using central bank communication

In this paper, we study the role played by central bank communication in monetary policy transmission. We employ the Swiss Economic Institute’s Monetary Policy Communicator to measure the future stance of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy. Our results indicate, first, that communication has an influence on inflation (expectations) similar to that of actual target rate changes. Communication also plays a noticeable role in the transmission of monetary policy to output. Consequently, future work on monetary policy transmission should incorporate both a short-term interest rate and a communication indicator. A second finding is that the monetary policy transmission mechanism changed during the financial crisis as the overall effect of monetary policy on (expected) inflation and output is weaker and of shorter duration during this period compared to the overall sample period.     

What measure of inflation should a developing country central bank target?

In closed or open economy models with complete markets, targeting core inflation enables monetary policy to maximize welfare by replicating the flexible price equilibrium. We analyze this result in the context of developing economies, where a large proportion of households are credit constrained and the share of food expenditures in total consumption expenditures is high. We develop an open economy model with incomplete financial markets to show that headline inflation targeting improves welfare outcomes. We also compute the optimal price index, which includes a positive weight on food prices but, unlike headline inflation, assigns zero weight to import prices.     

Learning and the central bank

It is well known that sunspot equilibria may arise under an interest rate operating procedure in which the central bank varies the nominal rate with movements in future inflation (a forward-looking Taylor rule). This paper demonstrates that these sunspot equilibria may be learnable in the sense of E-stability.     

Learning and the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank

This paper examines the welfare implications of alternative inflation targeting proposals for the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. We assume that policy makers have to “learn” the laws of motion of inflation in an economy characterized by “stickiness” in domestic price setting behavior and subjected to recurring shocks to productivity, exports and foreign price. We find that a switch from an “asymmetric” inflation targeting strategy to an “symmetric” makes little difference in welfare payoffs, but it comes at a cost of much higher interest-rate variability. We also find that there are practically no welfare gains from switching from an inflation-targeting strategy based on the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) to a strategy based on the domestic price component of the HICP.     

Words that shake traders : The stock market's reaction to central bank communication in real time

This paper investigates the effects of Federal Reserve's decisions and statements on U.S. stock and volatility indices (Dow Jones Industrial Average, NASDAQ 100, S&P 500, and VIX) using a high-frequency event-study analysis. I find that both the surprise component of policy actions and official communication have statistically significant and economically relevant effects on equity indices, with statements having a much greater explanatory power of the reaction of stock prices to monetary policy. For instance, around 90% of the explainable variation in S&P 500 is due to the surprise component of Fed's statements. This paper also shows that equity indices tend to incorporate FOMC monetary surprises within 40 min from the announcement release. Finally, I find that these results are robust along several dimensions. In particular, I consider different estimators, such as the Generalized Empirical Likelihood, and I extend the sample to include the recent period of heightened financial stress. This sensitivity analysis corroborates that central bank communication about its future policy intentions is a key driver of stock returns.     

Financial contagion and the role of the central bank

We investigate the role of a central bank (CB) in preventing and avoiding financial contagion. The CB, by imposing reserve requirements on the banking system, trades off the cost of reducing the resources available for long-term investment with the benefit of raising liquidity to face an adverse shock that could cause contagious crises. We argue that contagion is not due to the structure of the interbank deposit market, but to the impossibility to sign contracts contingent on unforeseen contingencies. As long as incomplete contracts are present, the CB may have a useful role in curbing contagion. Moreover, the CB allows the banking system to reach first-best allocation in all the states of the world when the notion of incentive-efficiency is considered. If the analysis is restricted to constrained-efficiency, the CB still avoids contagion without, however, reaching first-best consumption allocation. The model provides a rationale for reserve requirements without the presence of fiat money or asymmetric information.     

Deconstructing credibility: The breaking of monetary policy rules in Brazil

Can political interference deconstruct credibility that was hardly-earned through successful stabilization policy? We analyze the recent switch in the conduct of monetary policy by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB). Brazil is the largest Emerging Market Economy to formally target inflation, having adopted the Inflation Targeting (IT) regime in 1999. In the early years of IT, the BCB engaged in constructing credibility with price setting agents and succeeded to anchor inflation expectations to its target even under adverse conditions such as exchange rate crises. We argue that this effort to maintain IT rules-based policy ended in 2011, as a new country president and BCB board came to power. We then discuss the consequences of this credibility loss. Our main results can be summarized as follows: (i) we provide strong empirical evidence of the BCB’s shift toward looser, discretionary policy after 2011; (ii) preliminary evidence suggests that this shift has affected agents’ inflation expectations generating social and economic costs.     

Does inflation targeting improve fiscal discipline?

We explore the performances of inflation targeting (IT) adoption in terms of fiscal discipline (FD), while most existing studies focus exclusively on the role of FD as a precondition for IT adoption. Using a sample of developing and developed countries, we show that IT adoption exerts a positive and significant effect on FD, a result robust to a wide variety of alternative specifications. In addition, this effect is statistically significant only in developing countries, a result that may fuel the current debate regarding the relevance of IT adoption in general, and particularly for developing countries.     

Inflation targeting makes the difference: Novel evidence on inflation stabilization

Though 28 and 29 provides theoretical evidence that the introduction of inflation targeting is consistent with an inflation stabilizing monetary policy, empirical evidence that the introduction of inflation targeting actually changes central bank’s behavior is still missing. This paper aims to close this gap and estimates forward-looking monetary policy rules for 20 inflation targeting countries. To this end, we use a data set which is available to the central bank in real-time, published on a frequently basis, comparable among all countries, and which includes the periods before and after the introduction of inflation targeting. We find that the introduction of inflation targeting significantly shifts the central bank’s reaction function toward inflation stabilizing. We also provide evidence of time-varying effects and find that central banks stabilize inflation once inflation targeting is introduced. We take our results as strong evidence that the introduction of inflation targeting makes the difference for monetary policy strategies.     

The impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate: evidence from three small open economies

This paper studies the impact effect of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand during the 1990s. Shocks are identified by the reaction of three month market interest rates to policy announcements that were not themselves endogenous to economic news on the same day. The main result is that a 100 basis point contractionary shock will appreciate the exchange rate by 2-3 percent on impact. The association of interest rate hikes with depreciations that is sometimes observed during periods of exchange market pressure is mainly attributable to reverse causality.     

Inflation targeting and the forward bias puzzle in emerging countries

Based on quarterly data on 31 emerging countries (among which 16 are inflation targeting countries) from 1990Q1 to 2014Q3, we obtain a strong support for the conjecture that the implementation of inflation targeting weakens the Fisherian relation between expected depreciation and the interest rate differential (uncovered interest parity condition) and thus is conducive to the appearance of the forward bias puzzle in emerging countries. We show that this reflects the performance of inflation targeting regimes in lowering the level and volatility of inflation. Our finding holds when controlling for country-specific effects, time-specific effects, global disinflation, exchange rate management, crises, and using different econometric techniques.     

The determinants of issuing central bank digital currencies

Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) are considered ‘digital fiat currencies’ that do not have a physical form, which is a key distinction from conventional fiat money. This study aims to identify factors that influence central banks’ decisions in taking advanced actions to issue CBDC, namely, the economic, market, demographic and technical factors. Data is collected from the CBDC Tracker and the WB database for the period 2013–2021. We applied the Pooled OLS estimations to examine the impact of the key factors on being in an advanced stage for issuing CBDC; moreover, probit and logistic regression are employed to robust our results and overcome the limitations of Pooled OLS. The findings demonstrate that underdeveloped economies are more engaged in issuing CBDC. Besides, better regulations, FDI inflow, young populations, and more urban societies would increase the probability of CBDC issuance. Nevertheless, results show the impact of technical factors is heterogeneous across countries.     

Inflation targeting,credibility, and non-linear Taylor rules

In this paper we systematically evaluate how central banks respond to deviations from the inflation target. We present a stylized New Keynesian model in which agents' inflation expectations are sensitive to deviations from the inflation target. To (re-) establish credibility, monetary policy under discretion sets higher interest rates today if average inflation exceeded the target in the past. Moreover, the central bank responds non-linearly to past inflation gaps. This is reflected in an additional term in the central bank's instrument rule, which we refer to as the ”credibility loss.” Augmenting a standard Taylor (1993) rule with the latter term, we provide empirical evidence for the interest rate response for a sample of five inflation targeting (IT) economies. We find, first, that past deviations from IT feed back into the reaction function and that this influence is economically meaningful. Deterioration in credibility (ceteris paribus) forces central bankers to undertake larger interest rate steps. Second, we detect an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative credibility losses, with the latter dominating the former.     

Replacing a “Disobedient” Central Bank Governor with a “Docile” One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation

This paper identifies two mechanisms that empirical papers on central bank independence assume to be embedded in the yardstick measure of turnover rate of central bank governor: (i) the removal of a governor who is perceived as a challenger by the government and (ii) whether his/her replacement is an ally of the government. We identify the first mechanism with premature exits of central bankers and the second by examining whether or not the incoming governor is drawn from the ranks of the executive branch of the government. We find that only premature exits and replacements with government allies increase inflation.