Preemption,leapfrogging and competition in patent races

This paper investigates when patent races will be characterized by vigorous competition and when they will degenerate into a monopoly. Undersome conditions, a firm with an arbitrarily small headstart can preempt its rivals. Such ‘?-preemption’ is shown to depend on whether a firm that is behind in the patent race, as measured by the expected time remaining until discovery, cant ‘leapfrog’ the competition and become the new leader. An example of an R&D game with random discovery illustrates how ?-preemption can occur when leapfrogging is impossible. A multi-stage R&D process allows leapfrogging and thus permits competition. A similar conclusion emerges in a model of a deterministic patent race with imperfect monitoring of rival firms' R&D investment activities.     

When a Loser Gains: Free Riding in the Innovation of Network Goods

We consider duopolists innovating and producing a good subject to network externalities. If successful in R&D, a firm sells both the old product and the new one. The new product increases the utility of its user; it also generates a higher network externality than does the old product. A firm which fails to innovate nevertheless profits from the success of the rival: the network effect raises the value of the old product it still produces. A firm free-rides on the innovative efforts of another firm, reducing the incentives of any firm to innovate.     

Multi-market interaction and decentralization of R&D decisions

In this paper, we analyse under what conditions it is profitable for a multi-divisional firm to encourage divisions to perform independent R&D, and when it is better to centralize R&D so that the level be chosen co-operatively. Under Bertrand competition, firms always centralize R&D decisions. Under Cournot competition, however, with divisions of the same firm producing substitute products, the strategic advantage of decentralizing R&D compensates the co-ordination loss when the degree of substitutability among the products is not too high; in all other cases (when products are very good substitutes or when divisions of the same firm produce complement goods) the pay-off to co-ordination is greater than the strategic advantage of decentralization. Social welfare is maximized when firms centralize R&D.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

Dynamic R&D competition with memory

We consider a differential game of R&D competition and explore the impact of rivalry on the firms' investment behavior over time. Using closed-loop strategies and hence allowing for strategic interactions among rival firms we show that R&D spending by the individual competitor is increased due to competition in the race for priority. This leads us to argue that competitive encounters enhance R&D activities at the same time as increasing efficiency in the race for a technological breakthrough.     

R&D and Output in a Regulated Vertically Integrated Oligopoly

This paper examines input price regulation's effects on research and development (R&D) and output in a vertically integrated industry. A single integrated firm produces the crucial input and the output. The non-integrated rival does not produce the input but buys it from the integrated firm at a regulated price. Only the integrated firm engages in cost-reducing R&D. Results show that changes in input price have a negative effect on the integrated firm's output and R&D. The non-integrated firm's output response to changes in input price depends upon the slope of the demand curve. The welfare analysis examines the social desirability of such regulation.     

Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in an asymmetric duopoly with product R&D

We compare the Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in an asymmetric duopoly with product R&D competition. If a firm’s marginal cost is lower than that of its rival, then this firm (its rival) is referred to as the more (less) efficient firm. Under each mode of competition, there are three types of equilibria: blockaded-entry, deterred-entry, and accommodated-entry. Moreover, the presence of R&D investment makes it harder for the less efficient firm to survive. Cournot competition entails a unique equilibrium, whereas Bertrand competition may yield two equilibria. It is harder for the less efficient firm to survive under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Versus Cournot competition, Bertrand competition yields higher industry output, and it shifts production from the less efficient firm to the more efficient firm. This result, together with the known size effect, explains the following three findings. First, the more efficient firm has a normal output ranking, whereas the less efficient firm may demonstrate an output reversal. Second, the more efficient firm may demonstrate a R&D reversal, whereas the less efficient firm has a normal R&D ranking (its Cournot R&D effort exceeds its Bertrand R&D effort). Third, Bertrand competition is more welfare-efficient than Cournot competition.     

Matching public support for private product-innovating R&D: a theoretical analysis

This paper develops a theoretical model of product innovation where research and development (R&D) effort by a monopolist firm is endogenous and its outcome uncertain. The government attempts to aid such efforts with a matching grant. We consider different scenarios depending on whether two parties act simultaneously, act sequentially, or take part in a dynamic cooperative game with a trigger strategy. We also consider cases (i) when the products are exported, (ii) when the firm lobbies for R&D subsidy, and (iii) when the firm is foreign owned. We characterize situations when government intervention increases the chances of product innovation and when it does not.     

R&D competition, absorptive capacity, and market shares

This paper deals with an oligopolistic industry where firms are engaged in cost-reducting R&D activity to maximize their market shares. The existence and uniqueness of a feedback-Nash-optimal R&D strategy for each firm are discussed. Our simulations highlight that variations in spillovers hardly influence the firms' R&D investment, if their absorptive capacities to exploit extramural knowledge depend on their R&D efforts. Moreover, extramural knowledge cannot completely replace in-house R&D. However, a high level of public R&D favors the firm with the most restrictive R&D expenditure constraint and/or with the lowest initial R&D stock, provided it invests in R&D.     

Knowledge disclosure as intellectual property rights protection

We consider the problem of an inventor who discloses knowledge under the threat of a rival who may patent a competing idea. Disclosure diminishes the probability that the rival has of receiving a patent (legal externality) but it also decreases the rival’s marginal R&D cost (knowledge externality). Our results reveal that: (i) when the knowledge externality is ‘large’ (‘small’) relative to the legal one, an increase (decrease) in the patentability standard leads to higher disclosure and promotes R&D and (ii) if subsequent research creates positive external effects, the patentability standard should be set to promote further disclosure and R&D in equilibrium. The impact on the equilibrium configuration of changes in market profits is also examined.     

Innovation,competition and firm size distribution on fragmented markets

This paper presents a simple model of firm and consumer behavior. We formulate a sub-market entry game, where boundedly rational firms decide on investing in R&D for inventing new products that will appeal to targeted groups of consumers. The success depends on the amount of resources available for the project as well as on the firm’s familiarity with market characteristics. Successful innovation feeds back into the firm size and (potentially into) market knowledge and increases the future R&D productivity. A new product decreases the market-shares of incumbents. However, this business stealing effect is asymmetric across incumbent population. We identify the section of parameter space where firms have an incentive to diversify horizontally. In this section, the model results in rich industrial dynamics. Firm size heterogeneity emerges endogenously in the model. Equilibrium firm size distributions are heavy tailed and skewed to the right. The heaviness of the tail depends on submarket specificity of firm’s market knowledge. This relationship is non-monotonic, emphasizing two different effects of innovation on industrial dynamics (positive feedback and asymmetric business stealing).     

Demand Shift Effect of R&;D and the R&;D Organization

We assume that R&D investment by a firm improves the quality of the product. This is reflected in an upward shift of the demand function. Firms can do R&D either independently or cooperatively. We show that cooperative research strictly dominates non-cooperative research, both in terms of profitability and welfare. Also, R&D investment by each firm under cooperative research is larger for a relatively high R&D output elasticity. The higher the degree of product differentiation and/or larger the R&D output elasticity is, the larger the increase in quality level under cooperative research, compared to non-cooperative research, will be.     

Industry R&D intensity distributions: regularities and underlying determinants

This paper aims to examine the nature of the distributions of firm R&D intensities within industries and explore the factors that underlie the industry R&D intensity distributions. In particular, following the seminal study by Cohen and Klepper (1992) and using some new and rich data on firm R&D intensities for seven industries across six countries, this study examines the regularities in the industry R&D intensity distributions and demonstrates, based on a simple model of firm R&D, that the industry R&D intensity distributions are governed by the distributions of technological competence, a measure of firm R&D productivity, which corresponds to the notion of the “unobserved R&D-related capabilities” suggested by Cohen and Klepper (1992). This study found that firm R&D intensities within industries are lognormally distributed, displaying a strikingly regular pattern across industries, that the industry distributions of the levels of technological competence are also lognormal, and that, based on the formal model of firm R&D and the notion of the unobserved R&D-related capabilities, the distribution of firm technological competence within an industry underlies the industry's firm R&D intensity distribution.     

Research and development and trade policies for product innovation in the presence of foreign competition

This paper examines two policy instruments — a matching grant and import tariffs — for encouraging research and development (R&D) in product innovation by a domestic firm when it faces foreign competition. We do so by developing a theoretical model of product innovation where R&D effort is endogenous and its outcome uncertain. We examine the effects of a reduction in import tariffs on private expenditure on R&D, on public support for such R&D, and on total R&D expenditure. We find that in response to a reduction in import tariffs, the domestic firm always reduces its private R&D investments, but the total level of R&D expenditure (i.e., including public support) might go up depending on the level of tariffs. In particular, we find that it will go up if the initial level of tariff is higher than a critical level. When tariff is endogenous, we find that the socially optimal level of tariffs is positive. One finding that is of particular interest is that supporting private attempts to product innovate in the form of a matching grant program leads to a socially optimal level of product R&D.     

Technology Strategy And Product Diversity

This paper considers a three-stage game of a differentiated oligopoly: firms first make their entry decisions, then they choose production technologies and in the third stage of the game they decide product prices. The technology choice can be understood as selecting one from a pool of those recently available as well as developing a new technology through innovative activities. The resulting market equilibrium is then compared with the social optimum. The main conclusions are that a monopolistically competitive market will typically undersupply both product variety and production scale. R&D competition in a free entry differentiated oligopoly will lead to insufficient R&D investment at firm and industry levels.     

Do R&D expenditures matter more than those of marketing to company performance? The moderating role of industry characteristics and investment density

Confronting competitive environment, enterprises differentiate their product by promoting their R&D or marketing capacities. Scholars have verified that there is a direct relationship and a deferred effect between R&D expenditures and firm performance, but that there exists an inconsistency between marketing expenditures and firm performance. However, previous studies have neglected to analyse and compare the impact of corporate R&D and marketing investment on performance, and also ignored the moderating effects of different industry characteristics and investment densities. The study attempts to fill the gap by constructing a model to accommodate all these factors. The empirical results indicate that R&D and marketing expenditures have a positive impact on enterprise operating performance, and that there is a longer deferred effect in R&D expenditures than in marketing expenditures. By investing in R&D expenditures, manufacturing enterprises can increase their performance more than in service enterprises, and electronic enterprises can improve their performance compared with other types of firms. Finally, investments with higher R&D density can result in a higher performance.     

How does leverage affect R&D intensity and how does R&D intensity impact on firm value in South Korea?

We examine how leverage affects corporate research and development (R&D) intensity, as well as examine the impact of R&D on firm value in South Korea, a country in which corporate-funded R&D intensity is one of the highest in the world. Among our main results, we find that growth opportunities have a positive effect on R&D intensity, while leverage has a negative effect on R&D intensity. When leverage is at an extremely high level, the relationship between growth opportunities and R&D intensity turns from positive to negative. Using instrumental variables, we find that R&D generates an increase in firm value.     

A comparative analysis of the change in R&D efficiency: a case of R&D leaders in the technology industry

This paper measures the cumulative change in research and development (R&D) efficiency of globally leading R&D companies in the technology industry. We use Data Envelopment Analysis /Malmquist index to analyse 49 such companies. The change in R&D efficiency is analysed by decomposing the Malmquist index into ‘catch-up’ and ‘frontier shift’ indices, and by comparing cumulative indices to those at the starting period. Those cumulative indices are obtained at both a firm and an industry level. Results indicate that the overall R&D efficiency of these globally leading R&D companies declined slightly during the period 2007–2013. At a firm level, this study determines in detail how the trend of each firm in R&D activities differs from other companies.     

R&D in Indian manufacturing enterprises: what shapes it?

The article examines the factors influencing research and development (R&D) in manufacturing entities. Using data on a large sample of companies for the period 1995–2007, the finding indicates that large companies have a higher probability of pursuing R&D, although with lower intensity. In terms of magnitudes, a 10% increase in firm size raises R&D intensity by roughly 0.6%. Both the intensity and the probability of undertaking R&D initially declines for older firms. Outward orientation, and especially foreign currency earnings, has a significant bearing on R&D efforts. R&D efforts are also found to vary significantly across firm ownership.     

Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly

We compare steady states of open loop and locally stable Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) in a general symmetric differential game duopoly model with costs of adjustment. Strategic incentives at the MPE depend on whether an increase in the state variable of a firm hurts or helps the rival and on whether at the MPE there is intertemporal strategic substitutability or complementarity. A full characterization is provided in the linear-quadratic case. Then with price competition and costly production adjustment, static strategic complementarity turns into intertemporal strategic substitutability and the MPE steady-state outcome is more competitive than static Bertrand competition.