货币政策纳入资产价格目标后能更好地调控经济波动吗——基于金融结构视角的分析

本文通过构建包含金融结构的NK-DSGE模型,分析在不同的金融结构下,包含金融资产价格稳定目标的扩展型货币政策能否更加有效地熨平经济波动.研究表明:(1)相比传统货币政策,包含金融资产价格稳定目标的货币政策不仅能更好地熨平宏观经济波动、缩短波动持续期,还能提升社会福利;(2)在扩展型货币政策框架下,央行需结合不同类型冲击下金融结构与宏观调控变量波动的异质相关性,依据金融结构市场化进程,灵活调整其对各个变量的调控力度;(3)在扩展型货币政策框架下,当经济体系面临非持续性技术冲击、投资边际效率冲击或金融冲击时,金融结构市场化程度越高,社会福利增进效果越好.本文的研究为宏观经济调控政策特别是货币政策决策提供了有益启示,或可为新时期增强宏观经济调控效果、构建兼顾金融稳定和经济稳定的平衡发展路径提供新思路和新抓手.     

劳动市场摩擦与机会主义货币政策

本文在存在劳动市场摩擦的DSGE模型框架下考察机会主义货币政策的合理性。研究发现,当经济中存在显著的工资粘性、雇佣成本和搜寻匹配摩擦时,实行灵活通胀目标的机会主义货币政策在社会福利效果上优于以稳定通胀和产出缺口为目标的标准泰勒规则,并接近无约束最优政策的福利效果。因此在这些条件下,机会主义货币政策是中央银行合理的政策选择。     

Systemic risk: A new trade-off for monetary policy?

We introduce time-varying systemic risk (à la He and Krishnamurthy, 2014) in an otherwise standard New-Keynesian model to study whether simple leaning-against-the-wind interest rate rules can reduce systemic risk and improve welfare. We find that while financial sector leverage contains additional information about the state of the economy that is not captured in inflation and output leaning against financial variables can only marginally improve welfare because rules are detrimental in the presence of falling asset prices. An optimal macroprudential policy, similar to a counter cyclical capital requirement, can eliminate systemic risk raising welfare by about 1.5%. Also, a surprise monetary policy tightening does not necessarily reduce systemic risk, especially during bad times. Finally, a volatility paradox a la Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) arises when monetary policy tries to excessively stabilize output.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy Rules in a Monetary Union

This paper investigates the importance of fiscal policy in providing macroeconomic stabilization in a monetary union. We use a microfounded New Keynesian model of a monetary union, which incorporates persistence in inflation and non-Ricardian consumers, and derive optimal simple rules for fiscal authorities. We find that fiscal policy can play an important role in reacting to inflation, output, and the terms of trade, but that not much is lost if national fiscal policy is restricted to react, on the one hand, to national differences in inflation and, on the other hand, to either national differences in output or changes in the terms of trade. However, welfare is reduced if national fiscal policy responds only to output, ignoring inflation.     

金融中介效率对货币政策效果的影响——基于动态随机一般均衡模型的研究

本文运用新凯恩斯框架下的DSGE模型研究金融中介效率对货币政策效果的影响,研究结果表明:(1)无论是利率规则还是数量规则,金融中介效率的提高都会弱化货币政策对产出、消费和通货膨胀的影响;(2)在利率规则下,金融中介效率提高还会平滑劳动的波动,并最终减少社会福利损失,而在数量规则下,金融中介效率提高会放大货币政策冲击造成的劳动的波动,并最终放大社会福利损失。因此,货币政策的中介目标应当由货币供应量向利率转变。     

Learning and the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank

This paper examines the welfare implications of alternative inflation targeting proposals for the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. We assume that policy makers have to “learn” the laws of motion of inflation in an economy characterized by “stickiness” in domestic price setting behavior and subjected to recurring shocks to productivity, exports and foreign price. We find that a switch from an “asymmetric” inflation targeting strategy to an “symmetric” makes little difference in welfare payoffs, but it comes at a cost of much higher interest-rate variability. We also find that there are practically no welfare gains from switching from an inflation-targeting strategy based on the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) to a strategy based on the domestic price component of the HICP.     

货币政策操作需要考虑银行资本监管吗

持续宽松的货币政策与巴塞尔协议下银行资本监管的共同作用,可能是本次美国次贷危机产生和经济持续波动的主因之一。巴塞尔协议下的银行资本监管,较大地改变了信贷资金的流向和经济运行规律,从而必然影响到货币政策发挥作用的基础条件与传导途径。本文结合经济周期对银行资本约束下的IS-LM模型进行了扩展分析,发现银行资本约束会通过影响银行信贷渠道使货币政策产生非对称性效果,从理论上论证了货币政策的操作必须考虑银行资本监管。本文还运用随机前沿分析(SFA)方法检验了2000～2009年我国货币政策与银行资本监管联合效率,表明在引入银行资本监管后货币政策实现经济目标的联合效率下降。因此,为了达到稳定物价与产出的总体目标,在货币政策反应函数中必须考虑银行资本及其监管状况。     

货币增长是否导致了通货膨胀?——基于因果关系的动态视角

本文通过构造GF统计量检验了我国2001年以来货币增长与通货膨胀的动态因果关系,并通过设计"格兰杰-F"检验和"格兰杰-F"统计量考察了经济增长在货币增长与通货膨胀传导关系中所扮演的角色。研究发现:货币增长并非总是通货膨胀的格兰杰原因;2008年以后,货币增长逐渐成为影响物价水平的主因,但经济增长是实现这一因果关系的主要途径之一;在经济增速放缓时期,由于货币因素所导致的物价水平上涨能够刺激经济增长。     

A Model for Studying the Effect of EMU on European Yield Curves

In January 1999, the European monetary union (EMU) was formally launched with 11 member countries. However, before May 1998 there was considerable uncertainty about who would join EMU, and whether the project would start on time. When a monetary union is formed, exchange rates between the member countries are irrevocably fixed, and yield spreads stemming from exchange-rate risk are eliminated. As a direct consequence, EMU affected the prices of long-term bonds well before 1999, but quantifying this effect can be difficult when there is uncertainty about the monetary union. We address these issues and develop a bond-pricing model which explicitly takes into account that a country may join a monetary union at a future, unspecified date. The empirical results show that a narrow EMU, consisting of Germany, France and the Benelux countries, has been priced with almost 100% probability throughout the period 1995–1998, whereas, on average, the implied probability of joining EMU has been somewhat lower for the other EU countries. However, in the period leading up to May 1998, the estimated probabilities have increased considerably for the countries that joined EMU in January 1999.     

Monetary policy effects in times of negative interest rates: What do bank stock prices tell us?

This paper investigates bank stock performance following different monetary policy actions in times of positive and negative interest rates. Controlling for the broader stock market, monetary policy announcements that cause an unanticipated downward shift in the yield curve and a flattening of the shorter-end of the yield curve are found to persistently reduce bank stock prices once the interest rate environment is negative. Consistent with the deposits channel of monetary policy, the effects are larger and more persistent for banks that are relatively dependent on deposit funding. By contrast, a surprise movement in the slope of the longer-end of the yield curve does not impact bank stock prices in times of negative interest rates. Accounting data confirm that a parallel drop in the yield curve following a monetary policy decision in a negative interest rate environment hurts banks through shrinking deposit margins.     

金融危机的原因以及中央银行在避免下一个危机所起的作用(英文)

最近一次的金融危机揭示了在大量信息不对称,金融尝新复杂和监管框架不完整这样的金融世界里,"自我调节"显然不能起到作用。本文认为,已经至少有两个主要政策影响着金融危机。一个是监督管理政策,另一个是货币政策。此外,本文还分析了中央银行能如何来帮助避免下一场财政危机。特别是,对于宏观审慎性政策的作用和限制进行了讨论。     

论资产负债项目的性质与暂时性差异的形成

资产负债项目的性质对其暂时性差异的形成有着直接的影响。一般而言，货币性资产、负债项目不形成暂时性差异，而非货币性项目则有可能形成暂时性差异。在有些情况下，这一结论似乎并不成立，如应收账款等项目有时也会产生暂时性差异，事实上，该资产项目此时已不再是严格意义上的货币性项目。弄清这一规律，不论在理论上还是在实践中均有重要意义。     

公众预期与货币政策有效性

现代货币政策理论特别强调预期在货币政策有效性发挥中的核心作用。在对有关经典预期理论进行探讨之后,借助标准的新凯恩斯模型分析了预期对货币政策操作结果的影响,认为公众预期会对货币政策有效性产生影响,使得政策结果偏离目。标水平,而且在把“Brainard不确定性”纳入分析框架之后,预期对货币政策有效性的影响程度将更大,即政策结果完全由预期决定,同时对预期形成的影响因素进行了有益的探讨。并在对全文总结的基础上,提出了一些建设性的启示。     

The welfare costs of expected and unexpected inflation

The monetary search model by Lagos and Wright (2005) is extended with imperfect information about nominal shocks as in Lucas (1972). An analytical solution exists with logarithmic preferences. In general, individuals hold precautionary balances. Calibrated to United States postwar data, the welfare cost of the monetary cycle is calculated to be small (below 0.0003% of GDP) compared to the welfare cost of the inflation tax (around 0.25% of GDP). The main reason for the minute welfare cost of the monetary cycle is its low amplitude in 1947-2007. But, monetary crashes, such as those experienced during the Great Depression, can generate important welfare costs.     

经常账户冲击、资本账户管理与中央银行货币政策操作

经常账户负向冲击及引发的宏观变量联动性通常对各经济体央行货币政策操作构成挑战。本文构建了融入经常账户冲击的小型开放经济DSGE模型,比较了采取不同资本账户管理工具(数量型和价格型)情景下,央行执行数量型货币政策规则、盯住CPI通胀泰勒规则、盯住PPI通胀泰勒规则下,经常账户负向冲击对货币政策操作的异质性影响及传导机制,并进行了福利分析。主要结论如下：第一,经常账户负向冲击将对本国央行货币政策操作构成一定影响;第二,资本账户管理可以成为缓冲经常账户负向冲击的防火墙,价格型资本账户管理工具与盯住PPI通胀泰勒规则相结合造成的福利损失较小;第三,经常账户贸易端与收益端双重负向冲击对一国货币政策操作的影响更大,但公众预期到的经常账户恶化对货币政策操作的影响将有所减弱。本文认为,转型经济体央行应倾向于执行价格型货币政策规则,最优货币政策应在稳定价格水平与缓释风险方面进行权衡,适度降低对名义汇率的关注度,稳慎推进资本账户开放进程,并可优先选择价格型资本账户管理工具。     

Does better information about foreign shocks improve monetary policy?

This paper examines whether better information about foreign shocks leads to welfare-improving monetary policy using a stylised two-country New Keynesian general equilibrium model. We demonstrate that when terms of trade externality exist and national central banks have the incentives to shift terms of trade in their own favour, the equilibrium under imperfect information may be welfare superior relative to an equilibrium with perfect information. In addition, the welfare gains or losses from information sharing between central banks are found to be small for empirically plausible range of parameters for risk aversion and elasticity of labour supply.     

Home bias,exchange rate disconnect,and optimal exchange rate policy

This paper examines how much the central bank should adjust the interest rate in response to real exchange rate fluctuations. The paper first demonstrates, in a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, that home bias in consumption is important to replicate the exchange rate volatility and exchange rate disconnect documented in the data. When home bias is high, the shock to Uncovered Interest rate Parity (UIP) can substantially drive up exchange rate volatility while leaving the volatility of real macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, almost untouched. The model predicts that the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to that of GDP increases with the extent of home bias. This relation is supported by the data. A second-order accurate solution method is employed to find the optimal operational monetary policy rule. Our model suggests that the monetary authority should not seek to vigorously stabilize exchange rate fluctuations. In particular, when the central bank does not take a strong stance against the inflation rate, exchange rate stabilization may induce substantial welfare loss. The model does not detect welfare gain from international monetary cooperation, which extends Obstfeld and Rogoff's [Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K.,2002. Global implications of self-oriented national monetary rules, Quarterly Journal of Economics May, 503–535] findings to a DSGE model.     

Sovereign risk and the bank lending channel in Europe

The main purpose of this article is to analyze how sovereign risk influences the loan supply reaction of banks to monetary policy through the bank lending channel. Additionally, we aim to test whether this reaction differs in easy and tight monetary regimes. Using a sample of 3125 banks from the euro zone between 1999 and 2012, we find that sovereign risk plays an important role in determining loan supply from banks during tight monetary regimes. Banks in higher sovereign risk countries reduce lending more during tight regimes. However, we find little evidence to support any relationship between sovereign risk and loan supply reaction to monetary policy expansions. These results are very interesting for the way monetary policy is conducted in Europe. Banking union, banking system strength, and the budget control of governments would be necessary measures to reduce the heterogeneous transmission of the monetary policy in the euro zone.     

外汇市场压力下中国货币政策效果的实证分析

对中国外汇市场压力(Exchange Market Pressure,EMP)、国内货币供给、利率、经济增长之间的相互关系进行分析表明:为应对外汇占款增加而导致的通货膨胀压力,货币当局的货币政策是紧缩性的。但是,紧缩性的货币政策又会引起EMP增大。因此,紧缩的货币政策对通货膨胀的抑制效果只能是短期性的。此外,货币供给对经济增长有显著影响,利率变化对经济增长及资金流动的信号作用已经比较明显。在美国金融危机的背景下,国内通货膨胀压力的基本消除为解决中国长期以来面临的货币政策困境提供了契机。