Did CDS trading improve the market for corporate bonds?

Financial innovation through the creation of new markets and securities impacts related markets as well, changing their efficiency, quality (pricing error), and liquidity. The credit default swap (CDS) market was undoubtedly one of the salient new markets of the past decade. In this paper we examine whether the advent of CDS trading was beneficial to the underlying secondary market for corporate bonds. We employ econometric specifications that account for information across CDS, bond, equity, and volatility markets. We also develop a novel methodology to utilize all observations in our data set even when continuous daily trading is not evidenced, because bonds trade much less frequently than equities. Using an extensive sample of CDS and bond trades over 2002–2008, we find that the advent of CDS was largely detrimental. Bond markets became less efficient, evidenced no reduction in pricing errors, and experienced no improvement in liquidity. These findings are robust to various slices of the data set and specifications of our tests.     

Does deregulation induce competition in the market for corporate control? The special case of banking

Using a sample of 936 acquisitions of commercial banks, we examine the relation between the probability to engage in value-reducing acquisitions and corporate governance structures, as well as the relation between acquirer announcement-period abnormal stock returns and antitakeover indices and measures, and how these relations were affected by the change in the market for corporate control, caused by deregulation due to the implementation of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 and the Financial Service Modernization Act of 1999. We find that prior to deregulation there is no relation between probability to engage in value destroying acquisitions or acquirer returns and antitakeover indices, whereas after the adoption of the FSMA, probability to engage in value destroying acquisitions and the stock market reaction to bidder M&A announcements are both significantly related to governance indexes and measures. Our findings further confirm the linkage between the market for corporate control, antitakeover indices and firm value.     

Are future capital gain opportunities important in the market for corporate control? Evidence from China

Stock prices of Chinese target companies react positively to the announcement of block trades. Such a reaction is greater when publicly tradable shares (PTS) are transferred than when bidders obtain nonpublicly tradable shares (NPTS). PTS transactions also perform significantly better in the long run than do NPTS transactions. These results suggest that stock liquidity matters for corporate control rights transactions to improve target firms' management. We also find that bidders appoint a new CEO or chief director in more than half of the cases of block trades. Better stock price performance for PTS transactions comes mainly from targets with high Tobin's Q. Capital gain opportunities are likely to motivate bidders to expand target firms' businesses for capital gains.     

How does the corporate bond market value capital investments and accruals?

This paper examines whether the mispricing of accruals documented in equity markets extends to bond markets. The paper finds that corporate bonds of firms with high operating accruals underperform corporate bonds of firms with low operating accruals. In the first year after portfolio formation, the underperformance is 115 basis points using an accrual measure that includes capital investments and 93 basis points using an accrual measure that is based only on working capital investments. The Sharpe ratios of the zero-investment bond accrual portfolios are comparable to those of the corresponding zero-investment stock accrual portfolios. The results are also robust to risk adjustments based on both a factor model consisting of the Fama and French (J. Financial Econ 33 (1993) 3) stock and bond market factors and a characteristics model based on bond ratings and duration. Cross-sectional Fama–MacBeth regressions that use individual bond data and control for stock and bond issuances in addition to ratings and duration also confirm the time-series portfolio findings. Overall, our results reveal an accrual anomaly among bonds similar to that observed among stocks.

Firm size,takeover profitability,and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control: Does the absence of anti-takeover provisions make a difference?

The market for corporate control is generally regarded as an important disciplinary mechanism in well developed economies. Entrenchment mechanisms commonly used by US firms in the form of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) may offer some protection from disciplinary action, facilitating entrenchment and value-reducing behavior. One manifestation of entrenchment is poor acquisitions, with the literature reporting significant losses to large acquirers, and to acquirers with a higher number of ATPs. We examine the profitability of acquisitions in Australia, a market where US-style ATPs are prohibited. The results show that unlike their US counterparts, large Australian acquirers earn significant value for their shareholders, both in terms of announcement returns and long-run operating performance improvements. Takeover premiums are also substantially lower than those reported for the US and UK, and do not differ between large and small acquirers. Premiums are also positively correlated with long-run operating performance, indicating that they reflect real synergies, as opposed to hubris or overpayment. We also find that bidders who destroy value in takeovers are likely to be subsequently acquired. However, unlike US evidence, larger acquirers are just as likely to be targeted for takeover as smaller acquirers, indicating that size is not an effective impediment to the disciplining function of the market for corporate control in Australia. The findings are robust to several econometric issues common to the type of models used in our analysis.     

Does corporate control determine the cross-listing location?

This paper explains the choice of the cross-listing location with particular emphasis on the level of investor protection provided by the host market. We find that firms with concentrated control, with a higher level of risk and those with more pronounced financing needs cross-list on a market with better investor protection. We also find support for the bonding hypothesis as firms from markets with weak shareholder protection tend to cross-list on markets with significantly higher shareholder protection.     

Has the CDS market lowered the cost of corporate debt?

Many have claimed that credit default swaps (CDSs) have lowered the cost of debt financing to firms by creating new hedging opportunities and information for investors. This paper evaluates the impact that the onset of CDS trading has on the spreads that underlying firms pay to raise funding in the corporate bond and syndicated loan markets. Employing a range of methodologies, we fail to find evidence that the onset of CDS trading lowers the cost of debt financing for the average borrower. Further, we uncover economically significant adverse effects on risky and informationally opaque firms.     

Fragmentation and heterogeneity in the euro-area corporate bond market: Back to normal?

We assess the degree of market fragmentation in the euro-area corporate bond market by disentangling the determinants of the risk premium paid on bonds at origination. By looking at over 2400 bonds we are able to isolate the country-specific effects which are a suitable indicator of the market fragmentation. We find that, after peaking during the sovereign debt crisis, fragmentation shrank in 2013 and receded to pre-crisis levels only in 2014. However, the low level of estimated market fragmentation is coupled with a still high heterogeneity in actual bond yields, challenging the consistency of the new equilibrium.     

Testing for efficiency in the Saudi stock market: does corporate governance change matter?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We study the informational efficiency of the Saudi stock market (SSM), while accounting for corporate governance change, based on single, multiple,...     

Does cross-listing facilitate changes in corporate ownership and control?

This paper examines whether controlling shareholders of foreign firms use a US cross-listing to facilitate changes in ownership and control. Prior to listing, about three quarters of the firms in our sample have a controlling shareholder. After listing, about half of the controlling shareholders’ voting rights decrease, with an average decrease of 24% points that differs significantly from that of the controlling shareholders of benchmark firms that do not cross-list. Large decreases in voting rights are associated with controlling shareholder characteristics, domestic market constraints, and better stock market performance and liquidity. In addition, there is control change in 22% of the firms. Controlling shareholders are more likely to sell control, and are more likely to do so to a foreign buyer, than controlling shareholders of benchmark firms. The results suggest that controlling shareholders who want to sell shares or their control stake can use a US cross-listing to decrease the cost of transferring ownership.     

What drives corporate default risk premia? Evidence from the CDS market

This article studies the economic factors behind corporate default risk premia in Europe during the period 2006–2010. We employ information embedded in Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts to quantify expected excess returns from the underlying bonds in market-wide default circumstances. We disentangle the compensation to investors for unexpected changes in the creditworthiness of the bond issuer from their remuneration for the risk that the bond's price will drop in the event of default. Our results show that the risk premia associated with systematic factors influencing default arrivals represent approximately 40% of total CDS spread (on median). These premia also exhibit a strong source of commonality; a single principal component explains approximately 88% of their joint variability. This factor significantly covaries with aggregate illiquidity and sovereign risk variables. Empirical evidence suggests a public-to-private risk transfer between sovereign credit spread and corporate risk premia. Finally, the compensation in the event of default is approximately 14 basis points of the total CDS spread, and a significant amount of jump-at-default risk may not be diversifiable.     

Exercise test on the older patient: is it still as predictive as for the younger patient?

Exercise testing predicts both cardiac events and mortality after age 65, just as it does for younger patients. In both age groups, functional aerobic capacity itself is a potent indicator of mortality risk. In the elderly, achievement of predicted functional aerobic capacity identifies favorable mortality even in the presence of CAD and CAD risk factors.     

Idiosyncratic volatility vs. liquidity? Evidence from the US corporate bond market

Our objective in this paper is to determine empirically the extent to which fixed-income investors are concerned about the relative effects of equity volatility and bond liquidity in the cross-section of corporate bond spreads. Our tests reveal that while both volatility and liquidity effects are significant, volatility, representing ex-ante credit shock, has the first-order impact, and liquidity represented by bond characteristics and price impact measure has the secondary impact on bond spreads. Conditional analysis further reveals that distressed bonds and distress regimes are both associated with significantly higher impact of volatility and liquidity shocks. However, the relative impact of these effects varies conditional on the underlying bond attributes and overall market conditions.     

Are the strategic stars aligned for your corporate brand?

In recent years, companies have increasingly seen the benefits of creating a corporate brand. Rather than spend marketing dollars on branding individual products, giants like Disney and Microsoft promote a single umbrella image that casts one glow over all their products. A company must align three interdependent elements--call them strategic stars--to create a strong corporate brand: vision, culture, and image. Aligning the stars takes concentrated managerial skill and will, the authors say, because each element is driven by a different constituency: management, employees, or stakeholders. To effectively build a corporate brand, executives must identify where their strategic stars fall out of line. The authors offer a series of diagnostic questions designed to reveal misalignments in corporate vision, culture, and image. The first set of questions looks for gaps between vision and culture; for example, when management establishes a vision that is too ambitious for the organization to implement. The second set addresses culture and image, uncovering possible gaps between the attitudes of employees and the perceptions of the outside world. The last set of questions explores the vision-image gap--is management taking the company in a direction that its stake-holders support? The authors discuss the benefits of a corporate brand, such as reducing marketing costs and building a sense of community among customers. But they also point to cases in which a corporate brand doesn't make sense--for instance, if you are a product incubator, if you've recently experienced M&A activity, or if you are expecting fallout from risky ventures.     

Do auctions induce a winner's curse? New evidence from the corporate takeover market

We contrast the winner's curse hypothesis and the competitive market hypothesis as potential explanations for the observed returns to bidders in corporate takeovers. The winner's curse hypothesis posits suboptimal behavior in which winning bidders fail to adapt their strategies to the level of competition and the amount of uncertainty in the takeover environment and predicts that bidder returns are inversely related to the level of competition in a given deal and to the uncertainty in the value of the target. Our measure of takeover competition comes from a unique data set on the auction process that occurs prior to the announcement of a takeover. In our empirical estimation, we control for the endogeneity between bidder returns and the level of competition in takeover deals. Controlling for endogeneity, we find that the returns to bidders are not significantly related to takeover competition. We also find that uncertainty in the value of the target does not reduce bidder returns. Related analysis indicates that prestigious investment banks do not promote overbidding. Analysis of post-takeover operating performance also fails to find any negative effects of takeover competition. As a whole, the results indicate that the breakeven returns to bidders in corporate takeovers stem not from the winner's curse but from the competitive market for targets that occurs predominantly prior to the public announcement of bids.     

What slice of the pie? The corporate bond market boom in emerging economies

This paper studies the determinants of shifts in debt composition among emerging market non-financial corporates. We show that the determinants of bond market access in EMs vary with global cyclical conditions and across local and foreign currency markets. We find that the role for institutions and macro fundamentals in creating an enabling environment for markets increased during the post-crisis period for local currency markets. Foreign bank linkages additionally explain why local currency bond markets increasingly substituted for banks in channeling liquidity to EMs. In the case of foreign currency markets, in turn, global cyclical factors accounted for most of the variation. Furthermore, a country’s relative sensitivity to global factors appears to vary with the size of its foreign currency bond market rather than local fundamentals. Our results highlight the risk of capital flow reversal in those EMs that benefited from the upturn in the global financial cycle mostly due to the relative size of their bond markets rather than strong fundamentals.     

The IPO corporate social responsibility information disclosure: Does the stock market care?

We create textual information indices using corporate social responsibility (CSR) information extracted from IPO prospectuses in China. We use the indices to measure the issuers’ corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate environmental performance (CEP) and assess how the stock market reacts. We find that CSP disclosure is significantly related to the post‐market performance of the firm. Specifically, better CSP disclosure is correlated with higher post‐IPO listing holding period returns among firms that do not disclose donations or environmental expenditures, although the association does not hold for firms that make donations and environmental expenditures. In addition, institutional investors seem to care more about the CEP information for a firm than the CSP information.     

Does the executive labor market discipline? Labor market incentives and earnings management

This paper investigates the role of outside options in the executive labor market on earnings management decisions. To proxy for executives’ outside options, we use the number of times other firms cite the executive’s firm as a compensation peer. We find that executives with more citations conduct less earnings management. Exploiting the 2006 SEC requirement for compensation peer disclosure as a quasi-natural shock to executives’ awareness of outside options, we show that the executives who should be more responsive to outside options significantly reduce earnings management. Cross-sectional tests support a labor market discipline channel of outside options. Finally, we exploit state-level recognition of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and enforcement of non-compete agreements as cross-sectional restrictions on labor mobility and show that the impact of peer citations on reducing earnings management is stronger when there are fewer restrictions on mobility.     

Do they do it for the money?

Using a sample of all top management who were indicted for illegal insider trading in the United States for trades during the period 1989-2002, we explore the economic rationality of this white-collar crime. If this crime is an economically rational activity in the sense of Becker (1968), where a crime is committed if its expected benefits exceed its expected costs, “poorer” top management should be doing the most illegal insider trading. This is because the “poor” have less to lose (present value of foregone future compensation if caught is lower for them). We find in the data, however, that indictments are concentrated in the “richer” strata after we control for firm size, industry, firm growth opportunities, executive age, the opportunity to commit illegal insider trading, and the possibility that regulators target the “richer” strata. We thus rule out the economic motive for this white-collar crime, and leave open the possibility of other motives.     

The relationship between pension funds and the stock market: Does the aging population of Europe affect it?

In recent decades, pension fund investment has increased rapidly because of population aging and growing doubts about the viability of western public pension systems. As a result, pension funds have become dominant in stock markets. This paper examines the influence of the pension fund assets invested in equities on stock market development and the market efficiency of 13 European countries, from 1999 to 2014. Our results vary by country, by pension model and among the one-model countries. Nevertheless, revealing a concern about saving for retirement. Finally, our efficiency analysis reveals that the influence of pension funds varies over time and across markets, due to arbitrage opportunities that provoke adaptive managerial strategies.