Dynamics of Persistence in International Inflation Rates

Characteristics of inflation play a key role in policy formulation and market analysis. Several studies have analyzed inflation persistence and reached diverging conclusions. In this paper, we investigate the dynamics of inflation persistence using fractionally integrated processes and find that there has been a clear decline in inflation persistence in the United States over the past two decades. We also show that the presence of fractional integration in inflation successfully explains previous diverging results. Lastly, we provide some international comparisons to examine the extent to which there has been a commensurate decline in inflation persistence in the other G7 economies.     

Home sweet home: Home bias and international diversification among individual investors

A striking feature of international portfolio investment is the extent to which equity portfolios are concentrated in the domestic market of the investor. We investigate differences in home bias on an individual level by studying portfolios formed as a part of the new defined contribution pension plan in Sweden. We estimate the likelihood of home bias and use individuals’ demographic and socioeconomic features as explanatory variables. Our findings indicate that the likelihood of home bias is caused by both rational and irrational factors. Moreover, we relate home bias to investors’ desire to hedge against inflation, sophistication and overconfidence.     

New tests of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve

Lagged dependent variables typically play an important role in empirical models of inflation. Do these lags reflect backward-looking inflation expectations, or do they proxy for rational forward-looking expectations, as in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve? Galí and Gertler [1999. Inflation dynamics: a structural econometric analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 44, 195-222] attempt to answer this question using GMM to estimate specifications incorporating both lagged and future inflation. They report small coefficients on lagged inflation and conclude that the new-Keynesian model provides a good first approximation to inflation dynamics. We show that these tests have low power against alternative backward-looking specifications, and demonstrate that their results are also consistent with a backward-looking Phillips curve. Using an alternative approach, we find that the new-Keynesian pricing model cannot explain the importance of lagged inflation in standard inflation regressions, and find that forward-looking terms play a very limited role in explaining inflation dynamics.     

Inflation dynamics: A cross-country investigation

We document that “persistent and lagged” inflation (with respect to output) is a world-wide phenomenon in that these short-run inflation dynamics are highly synchronized across countries. In particular, the average cross-country correlation of inflation is significantly and systematically stronger than that of output, while the cross-country correlation of money growth is essentially zero. We investigate whether standard monetary models driven by monetary shocks are consistent with the empirical facts. We find that neither the new Keynesian sticky-price model nor the sticky-information model can fully explain the data. An independent contribution of the paper is to provide a simple solution technique for solving general equilibrium models with sticky information.     

The economics of options-implied inflation probability density functions

Recently a market in options based on consumer price index inflation (inflation caps and floors) has emerged in the US. This paper uses quotes on these derivatives to construct probability densities for inflation. We study how these probability density functions respond to news announcements and find that the implied odds of deflation are sensitive to certain macroeconomic news releases. We also estimate empirical pricing kernels using these option prices along with time series models fitted to inflation. The options-implied densities assign considerably more mass to extreme inflation outcomes (either deflation or high inflation) than do their time series counterparts. This yields a U-shaped empirical pricing kernel, with investors having high marginal utility in states of the world characterized by either deflation or high inflation.     

Why Don’t Oil Shocks Cause Inflation? Evidence from Disaggregate Inflation Data

This paper uses disaggregate U.S. inflation data to evaluate explanations for the breakdown of the relationship between oil price shocks and consumer price inflation. A data set with measures of inflation, energy intensity, labor intensity, and sensitivity to monetary policy is constructed for 97 sectors that make up core CPI inflation. A comparison of the 1973–85 and 1986–2006 time periods reveals that substitution away from energy use in production and monetary policy were both important, with approximately two‐thirds of the change in response of inflation to oil shocks being due to reduced energy usage, and one‐third to monetary policy. We find no evidence that other factors, such as changes in wage rigidities or changes in the persistence of oil shocks, played a role.     

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve: From Sticky Inflation to Sticky Prices

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) model of inflation dynamics based on forward-looking expectations is of great theoretical significance in monetary policy analysis. Empirical studies, however, often find that backward-looking inflation inertia dominates the dynamics of the short-run aggregate supply curve. This inconsistency is examined by investigating multiple structural changes in the NKPC for the U.S. between 1960 and 2005, employing both inflation expectations survey data and a rational expectations approximation. We find that forward-looking behavior plays a smaller role during the high and volatile inflation regime to 1981 than in the subsequent period of moderate inflation, providing empirical support for sticky price models over the last two decades. A break in the intercept of the NKPC is also identified around 2001 and this may be associated with U.S. monetary policy in that period.     

Identifying the influences of nominal and real rigidities in aggregate price-setting behavior

We formulate a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates staggered contracts of multiple durations and that enables us to directly identify the influences of nominal vs. real rigidities. We estimate this framework using macroeconomic data for Germany (1975-1998) and for the U.S. (1983-2003). In each case, we find that the data are well-characterized by nominal contracts with an average duration of about two to three quarters. We also find that new contracts exhibit very low sensitivity to marginal cost, corresponding to a relatively high degree of real rigidity. Finally, our results indicate that backward-looking price-setting behavior (such as indexation to lagged inflation) is not needed in explaining the aggregate data, at least in an environment with a stable monetary policy regime and a transparent and credible inflation objective.     

Testing Commitment Models of Monetary Policy: Evidence from OECD Economies

Inflation in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was low in the 1960s, rose for a time before peaking in the 1970s or early 1980s, and then fell back to initial levels. This paper shows that a simple time inconsistency model of monetary policy does not explain OECD inflation outcomes, except in the United States. The hypothesis that time inconsistency mattered only in earlier decades fits the data no better than the baseline model. We find some, albeit limited support for a model in which inflation spills over from the United States into other countries as a result of exchange rate targeting.     

Accounting for a Shift in Term Structure Behavior with No-Arbitrage and Macro-Finance Models

This paper examines a shift in the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates in the United States during the mid-1980s. We document this shift using standard interest rate regressions and using dynamic, affine, no-arbitrage models estimated for the pre- and post-shift subsamples. The term structure shift largely appears to be the result of changes in the pricing of risk associated with a "level" factor. Using a macro-finance model, we suggest a link between this shift in term structure behavior and changes in the dynamics and risk pricing of the Federal Reserve's inflation target as perceived by investors.     

Are inflation expectations rational?

Several recent papers report evidence of an apparent statistical bias in inflation expectations and interpret these findings as overturning the rational expectations hypothesis. In this paper, we investigate the validity of such an interpretation. We present a computational dynamic general equilibrium model capable of generating aggregate behavior similar to the data along several dimensions. By construction, model agents form “rational” expectations. We run a standard regression on equilibrium realizations of inflation and inflation expectations over sample periods corresponding to those tests performed on actual data and find evidence of an apparent bias in inflation expectations. Our experiments suggest that this incorrect inference is largely the product of a small sample problem, exacerbated by short-run learning dynamics in response to infrequent shifts in monetary policy regimes.     

U.S. Monetary Regimes and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro Area

Monetary policy in the United States has been documented to have switched from reacting weakly to inflation fluctuations during the 1970s, to fighting inflation aggressively from the early 1980s onward. In this paper, I analyze the impact of the U.S. monetary policy regime switches on the Eurozone. I construct a New Keynesian two‐country model where foreign (U.S.) monetary policy switches regimes over time. I estimate the model for the U.S. and the Euro Area using quarterly data and find that the United States has switched between those two regimes, in line with existing evidence. I show that foreign regime switches affect home (Eurozone) inflation and output volatility and their responses to shocks, substantially, as long as the home central bank commits to a time‐invariant interest rate rule reacting to domestic conditions only. Optimal policy in the home country instead requires that the home central bank reacts strongly to domestic producer‐price inflation and to international variables, such as imported goods relative prices. In fact, I show that currency misalignments and relative prices play a crucial role in the transmission of foreign monetary policy regime switches internationally. Interestingly, I show that only marginal gains arise for the Euro Area when the European Central Bank (ECB) adjusts its policy according to the monetary regime in the United States. Thus, a simple time‐invariant monetary policy rule with a strong reaction to Producer Price Index (PPI) inflation and relative prices is enough to counteract the effects of monetary policy switches in the United States.     

An open-economy new Keynesian Phillips curve for the U.K.

We estimate a pricing equation or “new Keynesian Phillips curve” (NKPC) obtained from a structural dynamic model of price setting based on Rotemberg [1982. Sticky prices in the United States. Journal of Political Economy 90(6), 1187-1211] and extended to capture employment adjustment costs and the openness of the United Kingdom. This model nests the baseline Galí and Gertler [1999. Inflation dynamics: a structural econometric analysis. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 127-159) and Sbordone [2002. Prices and unit labor costs: a new test of price stickiness. Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 265-292] relationship between inflation and marginal cost in the limiting case of no employment adjustment costs, no impact of relative prices of imported inputs on real marginal cost and a constant equilibrium markup. Our findings indicate that each of our modifications to the baseline NKPC model is important for U.K. data, so that inflation in the U.K. is explained both by changes in employment and by changes in real import prices, in general, and real oil prices, in particular. External competitive pressures also seem to affect U.K. inflation via their impact on the equilibrium price markup of domestic firms.     

The Happiness Trade‐Off between Unemployment and Inflation

Unemployment and inflation lower well‐being. The macroeconomist Arthur Okun characterized the negative effects of unemployment and inflation by the misery index—the sum of the unemployment and inflation rates. This paper makes use of a large European data set, covering the period 1975–2013, to estimate happiness equations in which an individual subjective measure of life satisfaction is regressed against unemployment and inflation rate (controlling for personal characteristics, country, and year fixed effects). We find, conventionally, that both higher unemployment and higher inflation lower well‐being. We also discover that unemployment depresses well‐being more than inflation. We characterize this well‐being trade‐off between unemployment and inflation using what we describe as the misery ratio. Our estimates with European data imply that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate lowers well‐being by more than five times as much as a 1 percentage point increase in the inflation rate.     

Does Inflation Targeting Affect the Dispersion of Inflation Expectations?

In this paper, we examine the effect of having an inflation targeting framework on the dispersion of inflation forecasts from professional forecasters. We use a panel data set of 25 countries—including 14 inflation targeters—with 16 years of monthly information. We find that the dispersion of long-run inflation expectations is smaller in targeting regimes after controlling for country-specific effects, time-specific effects, the level and the variance of inflation, disinflation periods, and global inflation. On average, the full effect is not observed until the third year after implementation of inflation targeting. When we differentiate between developed and developing countries, the dispersion of inflation expectations after inflation targeting is smaller and statistically significant only in developing countries.     

Estimating the credibility of Brazilian monetary policy using a Kalman filter approach

The objective of this study is to estimate the credibility of the monetary policy followed by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) during the period 2006–2015. To estimate this credibility, we use the Kalman filter in three measures of inflation expectation: two collected via market survey and via consumer polling, as well as the breakeven inflation. The results provide evidence of the existence of three shifts in the perceived credibility of BCB inflation targets during the period analyzed: (i) credibility declined sharply in mid-2008, at the most critical moment of the subprime mortgage crisis; (ii) credibility was relatively stable from early 2009 through mid-2013; (iii) credibility trended downward thereafter, when the real interest rate was less than the minimum rate compatible with the inflation target. By associating the estimated credibility with macroeconomic and financial variables, we find a downward trend in credibility during recessionary periods and an inverse relationship between credibility and output gap, between credibility and variation in the BRL/USD exchange rate, and between credibility and historical inflation. In addition, we find that market survey and breakeven inflation credibility measures are important in predicting sovereign risk. Furthermore, changes in the inflation rate are important for predicting only credibility measured on consumer polling, validating the assumption that measures from consumer polls are backward-looking and formed based on consumers’ adaptive expectations.     

Disagreement and Biases in Inflation Expectations

Disagreement in inflation expectations observed from survey data varies systematically over time in a way that reflects the level and variance of current inflation. This paper offers a simple explanation for these facts based on asymmetries in the forecasters' costs of over- and underpredicting inflation. Our model implies (i) biased forecasts, (ii) positive serial correlation in forecast errors, (iii) a cross-sectional dispersion that rises with the level and the variance of the inflation rate, and (iv) predictability of forecast errors at different horizons by means of the spread between the short- and long-term variance of inflation. We find empirically that these patterns are present in inflation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. A constant bias component, not explained by asymmetric loss and rational expectations, is required to explain the shift in the sign of the bias observed for a substantial portion of forecasters around 1982.     

International Evidence on the New Keynesian Phillips Curve Using Aggregate and Disaggregate Data

We present a unique empirical analysis of the properties of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) using an international data set of aggregate and disaggregate sectoral inflation. Our results from panel time‐series estimation clearly indicate that sectoral heterogeneity has important consequences for aggregate inflation behavior. Heterogeneity helps to explain the overestimation of inflation persistence and underestimation of the role of marginal costs in empirical investigations of the NKPC that use aggregate data. We find that combining disaggregate information with heterogeneous‐consistent estimation techniques helps to reconcile, to a large extent, the NKPC with the data.     

A Phillips Curve with Anchored Expectations and Short‐Term Unemployment

This paper examines the behavior of U.S. core inflation, as measured by the weighted median of industry price changes. We find that core inflation since 1985 is well‐explained by an expectations‐augmented Phillips curve in which expected inflation is measured with professional forecasts and labor‐market slack is captured by the short‐term unemployment rate. We also find that expected inflation was backward‐looking until the late 1990s, but then became strongly anchored at the Federal Reserve's target. This shift in expectations changed the relationship between inflation and unemployment from an accelerationist Phillips curve to a level‐level Phillips curve. Our specification explains why high unemployment during the Great Recession did not reduce inflation greatly: partly because inflation expectations were anchored, and partly because short‐term unemployment rose less sharply than total unemployment.     

Exploring international differences in inflation dynamics

Standard closed-economy DSGE models have difficulty replicating the persistence of inflation. We use a multicountry dataset to establish some empirical regularities on persistence and volatility of aggregate consumer prices for 135 countries since 1993. We find both persistence and volatility to be low (high) in developed (developing) countries relative to the full sample average. This pattern is also observed in low (high) inflation countries. We then employ a two-country DSGE framework to investigate the extent to which structural open economy features, such as incomplete exchange rate pass-through, the existence of nontraded goods, and international financial market incompleteness, can help in replicating the persistence and volatility of consumer prices. Our simulation results indicate that the model can replicate the degree of inflation persistence seen in the data for both developed and developing countries, but cannot generate the low levels of volatility observed in developed economies.