Cash Transfers to the Poor and the Labor Market: An Equilibrium Analysis

This paper studies the effects of cash transfers to the poor on the labor market. This is investigated in a matching model with endogenous labor market participation and job destruction. Depending on their productivity, workers might want to stay in the job, become unemployed, or leave the labor market; in addition, workers out of the labor force might decide to search for a job. Cash transfers are introduced to all agents with income below a given level. Two qualitative results are found: (i) The size of cash transfers has a negative effect on the employment rate, but an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate; and (ii) the coverage of this welfare program has a positive effect on the employment rate, and an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate. The numerical simulations also show that: (i) if the government target is to reduce inequality and poverty, the more efficient policy is to increase the level of benefits instead of increasing the eligibility of the program; (ii) compared with a welfare program that condition eligibility to labor market participation, the “unconditional” cash transfer program has a stronger impact on inequality and poverty, but with a reduction in labor market participation and output.     

Importing the Poor: Welfare Magnetism and Cross-Border Welfare Migration

I test for welfare-induced migration by comparing AFDC participation in border counties to interior counties in the same state. If migration costs are lower for border county residents, border counties on the high-benefit side of a state border should have higher welfare participation relative to the state's interior counties. Border counties on the low-benefit side should have lower welfare participation relative to the state's interior counties. The results obtained using county-level data from 1970-90 indicate that having a neighbor with benefits that are $100 lower increases AFDC expenditures in border counties by 4.0-6.8 percent relative to interior counties.     

Search costs and efficiency: Do unemployed workers search enough?

Many labor market policies affect the marginal benefits and costs of job search. The impact and desirability of such policies depend on the distribution of search costs. In this paper, we provide an equilibrium framework for identifying the distribution of search costs and we apply it to the Dutch labor market. In our model, the wage distribution, job search intensities, and firm entry are simultaneously determined in market equilibrium. Given the distribution of search intensities (which we directly observe), we calibrate the search cost distribution and the flow value of non-market time; these values are then used to derive the socially optimal firm entry rates and distribution of job search intensities. From a social point of view, some unemployed workers search too little due to a hold-up problem, while other unemployed workers search too much due to coordination frictions and rent-seeking behavior. Our results indicate that jointly increasing unemployment benefits and the sanctions for unemployed workers who do not search at all can be welfare-improving.     

Policy consequences of limited cognitive ability

This paper analyses the welfare effects of price restrictions on private contracting in a world where agents have a limited cognitive ability. We deal with that by assuming that people compute the costs and benefits of entering a transaction with an error. We first discuss an example of an auction that will attract the least efficient buyers, because these are those who have made the largest mistake. We then study the case for government intervention when the government knows the distribution of true costs and benefits as well as that of errors. By imposing constraints on transaction prices, the government eliminates some that are on average inefficient - because the price signals that one of the parties has typically grossly overestimated its benefit from participation. This policy may increase aggregate welfare even though some of the transactions being blocked are actually efficient.JEL Classification: D81, J38, K31Gilles Saint-Paul: This paper is based on my Spanish Economic Review lecture at the Spanish Economic Association meeting, Salamanca, December 2002. I am grateful to the organizers for inviting me, and to participants and especially Juan Dolado for their useful comments.     

Effects of tariffs and real exchange rates on job reallocation: evidence from Latin America

Openness to international competition can lead to enhanced resource allocation in the end. While factor reallocation is essential if net benefits are to be derived from trade liberalization, the process generates costs both for transitioning workers and for employers undergoing personnel turnover. Net welfare gains depend on adjustment costs. Understanding of these issues has been hampered by data limitations. In this paper, we overcome some of these limitations by using new, harmonized measures on job creation and destruction for a number of countries in Latin America. We use these new series to investigate the impact of the removal of protectionism on net employment and gross job reallocation in Latin America. We find a robust pattern showing that reductions in tariffs and exchange rate appreciations increase the pace of job reallocation within sectors. We also find, however, some evidence of declining net employment growth as trade exposure increases. For example, we find some evidence that in the wake of tariff reductions, there is lower net employment growth.     

A welfare economic analysis of labor market policies in the Harris–Todaro model

This paper presents a welfare economic analysis of the benefits of various labor market policies in the Harris–Todaro labor market model. The policies considered are a policy of modern sector job creation, which I call modern sector enlargement (MSENL); a policy of rural development, which I call traditional sector enrichment (TSENR); and a policy of wage limitation in the urban economy, which I call modern sector wage restraint (MSWR). First, I analyze the inequality effects of these policies. I then perform two welfare economic analyses, the first based on summary measures of labor market conditions (total labor earnings, unemployment, inequality of labor incomes, and poverty rates) and the second based on dominance analysis in the labor market, in both cases assuming that the costs are borne elsewhere. The results of the welfare analyses are compared, and it is shown that TSENR unambiguously increases welfare in the labor market using both approaches, the other policies yield ambiguous results, and no policy is unambiguously welfare-decreasing.     

A model of occupational choice,offshoring and immigration

This paper develops a two‐country model of offshoring and immigration with occupational choice and endogenous firm productivity. Individuals in Home choose to become entrepreneurs or workers, whereas those in Foreign can only be employed as workers. Entrepreneurs produce output using a fixed set of tasks that can be performed locally or abroad. The model predicts that pro‐immigration policies increase the number of entrepreneurs, raise productivity, and improve the aggregate welfare. It also predicts that lowering offshoring costs generates job polarization and welfare polarization, but improves the aggregate welfare.     

Endogenous neighborhood effects on welfare participation

This article examines the impact of neighborhood welfare participation on individual welfare participation, that is, the endogenous neighborhood effects. Endogenous neighborhood effects generate social multipliers. Few existing empirical studies on neighborhood effects distinguish between endogenous neighborhood effects and exogenous neighborhood effects, that is, the effects of neighborhood characteristics. This article constitutes an early attempt to identify and estimate endogenous and exogenous neighborhood effects separately. I construct an instrumental variable for neighborhood welfare participation rate based on the variation in welfare benefits and neighborhood demographic composition to address the reflection problem and the omitted neighborhood variables problem. A two-step method is proposed to separately estimate endogenous and exogenous neighborhood effects. The results show that neighborhood welfare participation plays an important role in a woman’s welfare participation both before and after the welfare reform in 1996.     

The optimal taxation of unskilled labor with job search and social assistance

In order to explore the optimal taxation of low-skilled labor, we extend the standard model of optimal nonlinear income taxation in the presence of quasi-linear preferences in leisure by allowing for involuntary unemployment, job search and an exogenous welfare benefit. In trading off low-skilled employment against work effort of higher skilled workers, the government balances distortions on the search margin with those on work effort. Higher welfare benefits typically reduce taxes paid by low-skilled workers and raise marginal tax rates throughout the skill distribution.     

Does skill obsolescence increase the risk of employment loss?

In this article, we analyse whether technological change induces skill obsolescence and early labour market exit, and to what extent training participation and on the job learning reduce these risks. Using panel data on older workers, we find that workers report skill obsolescence more often when learning is a structural characteristic of the job. This perceived skill obsolescence is not related to a higher probability of losing employment. Instead, workers who experience skill obsolescence appear to learn more on the job and participate more often in training, which decreases the risk of losing employment. These results are consistent with the dynamic model of skill obsolescence and employment loss we develop in this article. Moreover, we find that when workers with long job tenures decrease their training participation, this is an early indicator of future job loss.     

The Impact of Social Segregation on the Labor Market Outcomes of Low-Skilled Workers*

We study the impact of network homophily on labor market outcomes in a search-and-matching model with two job search channels: the formal market and social contacts. There are two worker types: low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The homophily level determines whether the referral networks of the two types are mixed or segregated from each other. We show that there exists an intermediate homophily level that minimizes the unemployment rate and maximizes the wages of low-skilled workers. Complete integration does not maximize the welfare of low-skilled workers, unless it improves their productivity. We argue that our model can explain the empirical findings on the labor market effects of the Moving-to-Opportunity experiment and the integration of immigrants.     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO RETIREMENT PROGRAMS: THE ROLE OF TAX AND BENEFIT TIMING

It is well known that pay-as-you-go retirement programs reduce steady-state welfare and the capital stock in dynamically efficient overlapping generation (OLG) economies. The common two-period OLG model obscures, however, the relationship between the magnitude of these effects and the ages at which taxes are paid and benefits received. Program changes that shift taxes to older workers or benefits to younger retirees have effects similar to reductions in program size, yielding steady-state welfare gains and increases in capital accumulation while imposing transition costs on current generations. This analysis has policy implications for both tax and benefit timing . ( JEL H55, E62)     

Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium*

In this paper we introduce a general equilibrium model of search unemployment that incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms maximize profits while recognizing that the compensation package may affect the queue of job applicants and the absence rate. The analysis provides results concerning the effects of social insurance benefits and other determinants of workers' and firms' behavior. The normative analysis identifies externalities associated with firm‐provided sick pay and examines the welfare implications of alternative policies.     

Optimal unemployment insurance: transitional dynamics vs. steady state

In this study, we ask whether the presence of precautionary savings substantially reduces the optimal replacement rate in an European economy type characterized by high unemployment benefits and moral hazard. We build a simple job search model calibrated on French data and, in line with previous studies, find that the optimality criterion based on comparisons of steady states leads to a low optimal ratio. Yet, this result ignores potential transitional costs due to the necessity for agents to increase their savings and reduce their consumption whenever the ratio is cut. We therefore build a dynamic model taking full account of the transition, and show that a reduction in benefits reduces welfare. Even though the long-run optimal replacement rate is lower than the current one, transitional costs dominate long-run gains.     

The wage and non-wage costs of displacement in boom times: Evidence from Russia

This paper analyzes the costs of job loss over the years of a booming economy, 2003–2008, using unique data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. In addition to analyzing standard labor market outcomes, such as forgone earnings, employment, hours worked and wage penalties, our unique data set allows us to investigate additional non-wage costs of displacement, in particular, fringe benefits, the propensity to have an informal employment relationship or a temporary contract. We find that displaced individuals face large foregone earnings following displacement, which are heterogeneous across education and ownership type of firm from which the worker separated. There is no evidence of wage penalties for re-employed displaced workers. However, we find an increased probability of working in informal or temporary jobs if previously displaced and a reduction in the number of benefits.     

Occupational Segregation and the (Mis)allocation of Talent

In this paper, I study how occupational segregation affects the allocation of talent in a competitive labour market. I propose a model of occupational choice in which heterogeneous workers must rely on their social contacts to acquire job‐vacancy information. While occupational segregation implies benefits in terms of job‐finding probability, it also leads to allocative inefficiencies. Efficient and equilibrium outcomes differ due to a network externality that leads workers to segregate too little, and a pecuniary externality that leads workers to segregate too much. Which effect dominates depends on the elasticity of wages to changes in the degree of occupational segregation.     

Measurement error in models of welfare participation

We consider the problem of modeling welfare participation when measurement error may affect simulated welfare entitlement. We identify a flaw in past implementations of the ML approach and develop a more appropriate ML approach. A model of welfare participation is estimated for British pensioners, linking the probability of participation to the value of benefit entitlement, incorporating the nonlinear rule relating entitlement to the household's income and financial assets. The model is used to evaluate the claim costs incurred by participants. When we allow for measurement errors in income and assets, estimated claim costs are substantially reduced.     

On the Efficiency of Job Search with Social Networks

This paper provides a simple matching model in which unemployed workers and employers can be matched together through social networks and through more efficient, and also more costly, methods. In this framework, decentralized decisions to utilize social networks in the job search process can be inefficient and give rise to multiple equilibria. More precisely, in a decentralized equilibrium, social networks can be overutilized, with respect to an efficient allocation, in some circumstances and underutilized in others. Moreover, the existence of different job search methods can give rise to a higher job search intensity than the efficient one. This is in sharp contrast with the standard result, derived in matching models, according to which search intensity is always too low if not efficient. Finally, in the presence of different job search methods, conditional unemployment benefits hikes, which can be used as a coordination device to improve welfare when individuals.     

Credible redistribution policy and skilled migration

We analyze the joint determination of income redistribution and migration flows across fiscally independent regions. In our model, regional governments lack commitment so their policy announcements must be credible, and redistribution between skilled and unskilled workers is bounded by informational constraints. In any given region, the welfare of all workers is increasing in the share of skilled workers, as after-tax incomes increase for both skilled and unskilled workers. When skilled workers are more geographically mobile than unskilled ones, the endogenous response of redistribution policy can induce regional agglomeration of skilled workers. We also find that the equilibrium features symmetry-breaking if migration costs are relatively low; and that worker mobility tends to amplify pre-existing welfare differences in income and welfare across regions.     

Wage-distance regulation in social-welfare programs: An option-theory perspective

It is often argued that low-skilled workers have an incentive to escape to the unofficial sector if welfare benefits come too close to the net wage in the official sector. Upper limits of welfare benefits often serve as an instrument to ensure a sufficiently high income differnetial between sectors. However, if unofficial-sector income is insecure, and if a change of sectors is costly, an option value of working in the official sector has to be taken into account. This option value reduces the incentive for lowly skilled workers to give up official-sector jobs. Upper limits of welfare benefits might therefore be defined less restrictively.