The effects of IMF conditional programs on the unemployment rate

The fundamental mission of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is to ensure global financial stability and to assist countries in economic turmoil. Although there is a consensus that IMF-supported programs can have a direct effect on the labor market of recipient countries, it remains unclear how IMF participation decision and conditionalities attached to IMF loans can affect the unemployment rate of borrowing countries. Using a world sample of countries from 1980 to 2014, we investigate how lending conditional programs of the IMF affect the unemployment rate. Our analyses account for the selection bias related to, first, the IMF participation decision and, second, the conditions included within the program. We show that IMF program participation significantly increases the unemployment rate of recipient countries. Once we control for the number of conditions, however, we find that only IMF conditions have a detrimental and highly significant effect on the unemployment rate. There is evidence that the adverse short-run effect of IMF conditions holds robust in the long-run. Disaggregating IMF conditionality by issue area, we find adverse effects on the unemployment rate for four policy areas: labor market deregulation, reforms requiring privatization of state-owned enterprises, external sector reforms stipulating trade and capital account liberalization, and fiscal policy reforms that restrain government expenditure. Our initial results are found to be robust across alternative empirical specifications.     

The political economy of participation in IMF programs: a disaggregated empirical analysis

What factors determine whether or not countries have programs with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? The existing literature suggests that a number of economic and political variables are important, but there is disagreement about their relative significance. Moreover, the fit of general participation models is not particularly good. An increasingly popular view in the recent literature is that the pattern of IMF lending is politically driven and that it reflects the interests of the Fund’s leading shareholders; the US is seen as exerting a powerful influence. Using both quantitative and qualitative techniques, and based on an informal analytical framework, we examine in detail the factors that may be at work. We cover the period from 1984 to 2008. We discover considerable variation across the nature of programs (concessional and non-concessional), income levels, geographic regions, and time periods. The degree of observed variation means that it is unsafe to use one general participation model as the basis for evaluating the effects of IMF programs. It also means that the design of policy needs to reflect the nuances that the data reveal.     

Tipping the (Im)balance: Capital inflows,financial market structure,and banking crises

An emerging consensus among scholars and policy‐makers identifies foreign capital inflows as one of the primary determinants of banking crises in developed countries. We challenge this view by arguing that external imbalances are destabilizing only when banks face substantial competition from securities markets in the process of financial intermediation. We assemble a dataset of banking crises covering the advanced industrialized countries from 1976 to 2011 and find evidence of a conditional relationship between capital inflows, a well‐developed securities market, and the incidence of banking crises. We further explore the impact of capital inflows on banks’ actual risk taking as indicated by their capital adequacy levels and measures of insolvency risk. Our results demonstrate that prudential capital cushions tend to decline with the combination of capital inflows and prominent securities markets. We highlight the political decisions—often made during the early days of a country's financial development—that determine the relative prominence of banks vs. non‐bank financial institutions and conclude with policy recommendations.     

Pre-commitment Mechanism and Policy Credibility in African Trade Reform

In the absence of a binding pre-commitment mechanism, a government has an incentive to renege on announced policy. This is a well-established result in the literature. The paper applies this theory to tariff policy by developing a two-game model to analyze the credibility of government tariff reform announcements. The pre-commitment solution is subgame-imperfect; therefore, government's announcement of tariff reforms is time-inconsistent. Using a sample of African countries operating under IMF structural adjustment programs, the study finds only weak evidence that countries implemented their announced tariff reforms. However, SAP agreements seem to enhance private sector confidence in government reforms.     

The liberalization of trade and foreign direct investment: a political economy analysis

Abstract

In theory, the IMF could influence fiscal and monetary policy via several channels, among them advice to policy makers, conditionality, and the moral hazard it induces with the borrowers. This article tries to disentangle those effects empirically. Using panel data for 98 countries over the period 1975–2000 it analyzes whether IMF involvement indeed influences fiscal and monetary policy in program countries. There is evidence that participation in IMF Standby and Extended Fund Facility arrangements improves economic policy. Money disbursed and the degree to which a program is implemented does not have any systematic influence. The same is true for future availability of resources as measured by exhaustion of a country’s quota with the Fund. The final section discusses policy implications.     

IMF conditionality and central bank independence

This paper studies the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in promoting central bank independence (CBI). While anecdotal evidence suggests that the IMF has been playing a vital role for CBI, the underlying mechanisms of this influence are not well understood. We argue that the IMF has ulterior motives when pressing countries for increased CBI. First, IMF loans are primarily transferred to local monetary authorities. Thus, enhancing CBI aims to insulate central banks from political interference to shield loan disbursements from government abuse. Second, several loan conditionality clauses imply a substantial transfer of political leverage over economic policy making to monetary authorities. As a result, the IMF through pushing for CBI seeks to establish a politically insulated veto player to promote its economic policy reform agenda. We argue that the IMF achieves these aims through targeted lending conditions. We hypothesize that the inclusion of these loan conditions leads to greater CBI. To test our hypothesis, we use a recently available dataset on IMF programs that includes detailed information on CBI reforms and IMF conditionality for up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012. Our findings indicate that targeted loan conditionality plays a critical role in promoting CBI. These results are robust towards varying modeling assumptions and withstand a battery of robustness checks.     

State capacity and the quality of policies. Revisiting the relationship between openness and government size

Countries with different levels of state capacity have access to different sets of policies. In particular, countries with strong state capabilities are able to draw from a broader menu of policies than countries with lower capabilities. We apply and test this insight to the case of exposure to trade‐related risk. So far, most of the literature has considered that only one type of policy—the one that increases government size—can help to overcome the challenge imposed by openness. However, there are a number of policies that can mitigate trade‐induced risks, many of which do not have the necessary implication of increasing public spending. Yet, many such policies require governmental capabilities not available to any country. For that reason, while the choice of a particular policy within a menu depends on political conditions, the relationship between openness and the size of government might be mediated by the capabilities of states. This paper provides reduced form evidence confirming that the empirical relationship between openness and government size is conditional on state capabilities. Therefore, public policies cannot be assessed independently of the capacity of the State that would have to implement them.     

EXTERNAL MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

We employ relative size of International Monetary Fund (IMF) credit as a proxy for interdependent macro variables that are associated with external macroeconomic imbalances or balance of payment (BOP) crisis to investigate how they impact foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Relative size of IMF credit as a share of gross domestic product sends two mixed signals to multinational enterprises (MNEs). First, it is a signal that a country is facing an actual or potential BOP crisis. Second, countries that seek IMF credit typically agree to implement a set of “IMF conditionality” before financial credit is disbursed. This may signal to MNEs that policy reforms that must accompany IMF financial credit may result in ex ante positive economic outlook and stability. We find that relative size of IMF credit is negatively (positively) correlated with FDI inflows to developing countries below (above) a threshold value of economic freedom. The main implication of these findings is that MNEs may view developing countries with below average index of economic freedom as lacking institutional capabilities to implement recommended IMF policy reforms when faced with an actual or potential BOP crisis. Our results are robust across alternative model specifications and consistent with the theory of catalytic finance. (JEL F21, F23, F33)     

Non-cooperative and cooperative policy reforms under uncertainty and spillovers

When countries need to implement costly economic policy reforms, these often imply uncertainties about their effectiveness for the home country and their spillovers to other countries. We develop a model to show that under these circumstances countries implement too few or too many policy reforms. From a social perspective, too many reforms follow if the spillover effects of reforms become sufficiently uncertain. Since centralization of policies to correct inefficient policies is often not possible, we look for alternative instruments that can restore the efficient level of reforms. We compare subsidizing reform efforts with insuring against bad outcomes, and argue that subsidies are advantageous in terms of requiring less information for implementation.     

Canada’s dependence on natural capital wealth: Was Innis wrong?

Canada has abundant natural resources—its stock of natural capital wealth. A recurring debate in the literature is whether resource rich countries benefit in the form of higher sustained growth rates or not from the export of their natural resources. Canada's Harold Innis wrote extensively on this subject over 80 years ago and argued for the “no” side in the debate. Was he was right or wrong? I begin with the foundations of natural resource theory then turn to empirical work in recent decades. I agree with the literature that Canada overall has benefited from the export of its natural resources, but question whether that can continue given the focus on short term growth and the failure to account for the social costs of resource extraction and use—the environmental externalities that degrade and reduce stocks of natural capital. These externalities increasingly threaten our water and land resources and without more effective policy, the ability of resources to sustain growth and well‐being is questionable. Was Innis wrong? Yes in that the evidence supports the counter argument—resources have helped Canada become a developed economy with relatively high incomes and sustained growth rates. Innis was right that the uneven distribution of resources causes different impacts regionally especially during booms and busts and recognized the need to find substitutes for declining and degrading resource stocks. But Innis, like many after him, focused more on the intrinsic features of natural resources than policy to address the social costs of their development, a legacy that leaves us in a precarious position today.     

Monetary,fiscal, and structural drivers of inflation in Ethiopia: new empirical evidence from time series analysis

This study empirically investigates the drivers of inflation in Ethiopia using monthly data over the period July 1998 to September 2020. It explores short-run and long-run effects of domestic and external determinants of inflation—including demand-side, supply-side, and structural factors—using the cointegration and vector error-correction methodology. Four measures of inflation are considered: cereals, food, nonfood, and all-items Consummer Price Index (CPI) inflation. A key contribution to the existing literature is the investigation of the role of the fiscal sector in modeling inflation, a topic that has been neglected in the existing studies on inflation in Ethiopia. The empirical results show that disequilibria in the monetary sector, grains sector, and food markets have long-run effects on inflation. In the short run, inflation is driven by structural factors (notably, cereal output gaps and imported inflation) as well as demand-side factors (notably, money growth and public sector borrowing). The results hold when analysis is limited to the high growth period from 2005 onward, following the end of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program in the country. The evidence provides valuable insights in the context of ongoing macroeconomic policy reforms in Ethiopia.     

Financial and Corporate Sector Restructuring in South Korea: Accomplishments and Unfinished Agenda

Following the Asian financial crisis, South Korea has undertaken wide-ranging, economic structural reforms under IMF conditionality while receiving IMF assistance. This paper describes Korean accomplishments in restructuring the financial and corporate sectors, and also addresses the unfinished agendas. It suggests ongoing reforms in a knowledge-based economy, in which the financial sector serves as the "brain" of market economy by allocating scarce capital to the most profitable firms within South Korea. It also recommends that subsidiary companies of Korean chaebols become independent viable business units, and that new sources of growth be found by promoting Korean SMEs and venture businesses. JEL Classification Numbers: E44, F34, G18, G32, G34, L11, L22, O16, O53.     

Government policy in the formal and informal sectors

The paper quantitatively investigates, in general equilibrium, the interaction between the firms' choice to operate in the formal or the informal sector and government policy on taxation and enforcement, given a level of regulation. A static version of Ghironi and Melitz's (2005) industry model is used to show that firms with lower productivity endogenously choose to operate in the informal sector. I use cross-country data on taxes, measures of informality, and measures of regulation (entry and compliance costs, red tape, etc.) to back out how high the enforcement levels must be country by country to make the theory match the data. The welfare gains from policy reforms are on average 1.2% (measured in terms of consumption) for OECD countries. I also find that the welfare gains from reducing regulation are on average 2.1%. Finally, performing a similar decomposition to that of Hall and Jones (1999), I find that distortions associated with informality account for a factor of 1.5 of the output per capita difference between the richest and the poorest countries.     

The Political Economy of India's Economic Reforms*

This paper analyzes the history of the relationship between the state and the private sector in India. It concludes that India's economic reforms, which made development policy more dependent on international trade and private initiative, depended on the evolution of technocratic and political conviction. Reformers needed the support of financial crises for overcoming the powerful vested interests opposed to reforms. Successful reforms involved largely homegrown strategies of policy and institutional change. They have produced impressive growth rates and have benefited the rich and the middle class. The challenge for development and sustainable reforms is to make it more inclusive for poor farmers and unorganized workers.     

A Political Economy Application of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons”: The Greek Government Debt Crisis

The tragedy of the anticommons unfolds when separate social agents—be they private owners of a property who intend to use the property for their own economic benefit or political actors who pursue their political objectives—do not hold effective rights to use their economic or political power for their own purposes without consent of the other players of the economic or political game. I shall discuss the Greek government debt crisis and the Eurozone countries’ policies toward Greece within the analytical framework of the tragedy of the anticommons in this paper. I do not intend to dig deep into the structure and long-term trends of public and private finances in Greece. I shall only show that the successive bail-out programs of the Eurozone countries were doomed to fail because of these countries’ competitive and non-cooperative approach to the Greek financial problems. I shall also show that a coordinating agency, say the IMF, can foster the coordinated outcome only under strict informational conditions.     

Moving markets? Government bond investors and microeconomic policy changes

Do sovereign bond markets react systematically to microeconomic policy reforms? Some observers suggest that investors are very attentive to supply‐side policies such as those related to labor markets, corporate taxation, and product standards. They argue that, along with macroeconomic outcomes and broad financial market conditions, such reforms affect sovereign bond premiums, for developed as well as emerging economies. In contrast, we predict few systematic effects of supply‐side policy reforms on sovereign bond market outcomes. Our theory draws on a standard three‐equation model of the economy, widely accepted among economic and finance professionals. That model makes few clear predictions regarding the anticipated effects of microeconomic policy changes; as a result, we expect that such reforms will not generate systematic market reactions. Our analyses, based on daily data from 37 countries from 2004 to 2012, indeed reveal little evidence of a systematic bond market reaction to the 47 most significant reforms to corporate taxation and labor market regulation. These results call into question the notion that “bond market vigilantes” play a central role in compelling governments to enact specific microeconomic policy changes.     

Initial endowments and economic reform in 27 post-socialist countries

This study explores how initial endowments at the start of transition have shaped reform outcomes and reform trajectories in 27 former communist countries in Europe and Central Asia. Countries of the former Russian Empire that had a large resources sector at the start of transition underperformed other countries in terms of the speed and the depth of economic reforms. The effect is particularly strong for privatization, enterprise restructuring and competition policy. Within country, Ottoman or Russian provinces that had a large natural resources sector in 1989 have a lower share of entrepreneurs and of small and medium sized enterprises today and also experience endemic corruption. Our results indicate that the propensity, or ability, of special interest groups to capture the reform process that would erode their rents were facilitated by the quality of institutions whose foundations go back centuries; and that the effects on the local economy are real.     

Are Armington elasticities different across countries and sectors? A European study

CGE models are widely used for policy evaluation and impact analysis especially with respect to trade reforms, tax reforms, energy sector reform and development policy analysis. However, the results of such models are often argued to be sensitive to the choice of exogenous parameters such as trade elasticities. Several authors show that the choice of the so-called Armington elasticities in the demand function has a strong influence on the simulation results. Most existing estimates of Armington elasticities are only for the US. The few studies for other countries find substantially differing results. Nevertheless, many CGE modelers simply adopt the elasticities from other studies disregarding specific country and model characteristics. This paper aims at providing estimated elasticities based on recent data for a larger group of European countries. Using cointegration and panel fixed effects analyses we estimate the first order condition resulting from cost minimization or utility maximization subject to the CES utility or cost function in imports and domestic goods. The results show a rather large variation across sectors and countries and the magnitude is only partly comparable to the US elasticities. Moreover, in a small CGE application we are able to show that changing the elasticity set has a quantitative and even qualitative impact on CGE model results, which confirms the concern that one might end up with biased results due to a misspecification of the elasticities.     

The Market Response to Restructuring: A Behavioral Model

In this paper, I model the behavior of producers, consumers, and regulators in deciding to restructure the electricity sector and estimate their equilibrium response to the newly restructured market. The empirical model consists of simultaneous price and restructuring equations with endogenous switching and cross-equation correlation in the errors. This approach allow me to account for the influence of special interest groups and potential selection bias in which countries choose to restructure. I estimate distinct shifts from restructuring in both industrial and residential prices, and for English speaking, Scandinavian, and South American countries. I find that in all countries, it is industrial consumers that experience the price effects of restructuring, while residential consumers remain largely unaffected. In English speaking and Scandinavian countries, industrial prices decrease while in South American countries they increase. This is consistent with the political–economic environment in which these countries have considered restructuring.     

The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence

International organizations (IOs) often drive policy change in member countries. Given IOs' limited political leverage over a member country, previous research argues that IOs rely on a combination of hard pressures (i.e., conditionality) and soft pressures (i.e., socialization) to attain their political goals. Expanding this literature, we hypothesize that IOs can enhance their political leverage through loan conditions aimed at enhancing the political independence of key administrative units. Studying this mechanism in the context of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that through prescribing structural loan conditions on central banks (CBI conditionality), the IMF empowers central banks to gain more political leverage with the aim to limit a government's ability to (ab)use monetary policy for political gain. Divorcing monetary authorities from their respective government, the IMF intends to alter political dynamics towards achieving greater program compliance and enhance long-term macro-financial stability. Relying on a dataset including up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012, we find that the IMF deploys CBI conditionality to countries with fewer checks and balances, a less independent central bank, and where the government relies more heavily on the monetization of public debt.