Do independent research analysts issue more or less informative recommendation revisions?

This paper studies whether independent research analysts issue more informative stock recommendation revisions than investment bank analysts. I find independent analyst recommendation upgrades and downgrades significantly less informative. I also investigate whether the identified differences in informativeness are the result of systematic cross-sectional variation in analyst ability, portfolio complexity, and brokerage firm resources. Including these variables reduces the disparity in information content between groups. However, independent revisions continue to have lower informativeness. I follow prior research and compute daily buy-and-hold abnormal returns to portfolios formed based on analyst firm type. I find that investment bank analyst portfolios generally outperform those of independent research analysts. Lastly, I examine market reactions before and after the Global Settlement Agreement that was enacted to limit the perceived conflicts in the industry. Lastly, investment bank analyst upgrades generate an 18.7% greater reaction in the post-regulation period, suggesting the Global Settlement helped mitigate biased research. Independent analysts continue to issue less informative recommendations.     

Independents�� day? Analyst behavior surrounding the Global Settlement

In this paper, we examine the impact of NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472, and the Global Research Settlement on the recommendation performance of independent, affiliated, and unaffiliated analysts. We find that analysts from all three types of institutions issued fewer strong buys following these regulations designed to separate investment banking and equity research. Affiliated analysts were less likely to issue innovative recommendations. While downgrades became more prevalent following the regulations, they were significantly less informative. Independent research firms set up after the Global Research Settlement are of inferior quality; they issue more optimistic and less innovative recommendations that generate lower announcement period returns than independent firms existing prior to the Settlement. Our overall findings question whether investors will be better served via the shift in equity research to analysts at independent research firms.     

Earnings Management and Analyst Following: A Simultaneous Equations Analysis

We use a simultaneous equations system to examine the relationship between earnings management and analyst following. We find that analysts’ decisions to follow firms and managerial decisions to manage earnings are jointly determined. Firms with lower levels of accrual‐based earnings management offer a better information environment to attract analyst following. Analyst following, in turn, has important monitoring effects on managerial behavior and results in lower levels of both accrual‐based and real earnings management. The information intermediary effect on analyst following is much weaker for expected “suspect firms” that manage their earnings continuously.     

Analyst rounding of EPS forecasts and stock recommendations

We examine the association between analysts' stock recommendations and their tendency to round annual EPS forecasts to nickel intervals (i.e. placing a zero or five in the penny location of the forecast). We find that prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), analysts were more likely to provide rounded EPS forecasts in association with unfavorable (underperform and sell) recommendations. However, after Reg FD, we find no significant association between rounded forecasts and unfavorable stock recommendations. Further, other regulations (NASD 2711, NYSE 472, and Global Research Analyst Settlement) have no impact on analyst rounding behavior. The findings in this study suggest that analyst rounding behavior is a particular form of forecasting optimism motivated, at least in part, by management relations incentives. Further, Reg FD appears partially successful at curbing the influence of management relations incentives on analysts' research.     

Under watchful eyes: Analyst site visits and firm earnings management

This paper investigates whether analyst site visits, where sell-side analysts visit corporate sites and interact with management, reduce earnings management by host firms. Taking advantage of the disclosure of analyst site visits by Chinese listed firms, we find that the intensity of analyst site visits is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, and this relation is robust to controlling for endogeneity. Furthermore, we find that site visits attended by star analysts and including factory tours are associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals than those without these features. We also report that the number and coverage of questions posed during site visits are negatively associated with discretionary accruals. Our results demonstrate that site visits by sell-side analysts perform a vital monitoring role and exert significant constraints on firms' opportunistic financial reporting.     

Management earnings forecasts and the quality of analysts’ forecasts: The moderating effect of audit committees

This study investigates whether effective audit committees influence the association between management earnings forecasts and the properties of analysts’ forecasts. We posit that this influence on the part of an audit committee would likely result from increased responsibility for monitoring voluntary disclosure. Using the four attributes that the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and prior research suggest as being indicative of audit committee effectiveness, we find that analysts’ forecasts exhibit higher accuracy and lower dispersion with the issuance of management forecasts for those firms employing audit committees that are composed exclusively of independent directors, include an accounting expert, and act with due diligence. We also find that effective audit committees strengthen the association between management and analyst forecast accuracy. Our evidence, therefore, supports the notion that effective corporate governance influences the reliability of voluntary disclosure, and thereby benefits the users of financial information.     

Labor protection,information disclosure and analyst forecasts: Evidence from China’s Labor Contract Law

Labor protection increases employees’ stability and strengthens their monitoring role, improving firms’ information environment and increasing analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. Using the implementation of China’s Labor Contract Law as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that labor protection significantly improves analyst forecasts. This positive impact is stronger when agency problems are weaker, board independence is greater, corporate reputation is better and industry competition is more intense. Enhanced labor protection significantly reduces firms’ business risk and accrual-based earnings management, decreases stock price synchronicity and increases market pricing efficiency. Our findings of significant impacts of China’s Labor Contract Law on analysts’ forecasting behaviors offer important guidance for promoting the development of the Chinese capital market and policy making in labor protection.     

Analyst coverage,earnings management and financial development: An international study

Using data from 21 countries, this paper analyzes the relation among analyst coverage, earnings management and financial development in an international context. We document that the effectiveness of financial analysts as monitors increases with a country’s financial development (FD). We find that in high-FD countries, increased within-firm analyst coverage results in less earnings management. Such is not the case in low-FD countries. Our results are economically significant and robust to reverse causality checks. Our findings illustrate one mechanism through which financial development mitigates the cost of monitoring firms and curbs earnings management.     

Manager-analyst conversations in earnings conference calls

Prior research finds that intraday stock prices move considerably during the discussion period of earnings conference calls. In this study, we explore what features of the manager-analyst dialogue during the discussion drive these price movements. We textually analyze the tone of managers and analysts and find that intraday prices react significantly to analyst tone, but not to management tone, for the full duration of the discussion. This effect strengthens when analyst tone is relatively negative. We then present intraday visual evidence that analysts are more neutral than managers over the call and that the tones of both parties drift downward as the call progresses. Overall, our findings illustrate how manager-analyst information exchanges evolve on earnings calls and indicate that analysts are the participants on earnings calls whose comments move stock prices during the discussion.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

When does analyst reputation matter? Evidence from analysts’ reliance on management guidance

We investigate the joint effects of analyst reputation, uncertainty and guidance news valence on analysts’ reliance on management guidance. We find that, compared to less reputable analysts, reputable analysts rely less on guidance when they issue earnings forecasts. This analyst reputation effect is stronger when earnings and information uncertainty are higher or when the guidance contains good news. Further analysis suggests that both reputable and less reputable analysts sacrifice their forecast accuracy when they rely less on guidance; however, reputable analysts are compensated to a greater extent by the increased informativeness of their forecasts. Finally, we find that analysts’ future career advancement is enhanced when their reliance is low.     

Analysts’ Momentum Recommendations

We document that the likelihood of analyst recommendations following past stock returns decreased abruptly in 2003, coinciding with the Global Settlement and other regulatory changes designed to restrain analysts’ conflicts of interest. We also document that the likelihood of recommendations following past stock returns is abnormally high for recommendations issued after negative stock returns (but not for those issued after positive stock returns), among inexperienced and inaccurate analysts, among large brokerage houses, and for companies with high share turnover. Moreover, the recommendations that are more likely to follow past stock returns are accompanied by earnings forecast revisions that are larger in magnitude and less accurate ex post. Overall, our findings suggest that analysts with conflicts of interest and limited ability are more likely to base their recommendations on past stock returns. Finally, we document that the recommendations that are more likely to follow past stock returns (especially those that were issued before 2003 and those that are issued after negative stock returns) contribute to existing price momentum by generating incrementally stronger short‐term and long‐term stock returns.     

Do Managers Always Know Better? The Relative Accuracy of Management and Analyst Forecasts

We examine the relative accuracy of management and analyst forecasts of annual EPS. We predict and find that analysts’ information advantage resides at the macroeconomic level. They provide more accurate earnings forecasts than management when a firm's fortunes move in concert with macroeconomic factors such as Gross Domestic Product and energy costs. In contrast, we predict and find that management's information advantage resides at the firm level. Their forecasts are more accurate than analysts’ when management's actions, which affect reported earnings, are difficult to anticipate by outsiders, such as when the firm's inventories are abnormally high or the firm has excess capacity or is experiencing a loss. Although analysts are commonly viewed as industry specialists, we fail to find evidence that analysts have an information advantage over managers at the industry level. The two have comparable abilities to forecast earnings for firms with revenues or earnings that are more synchronous with their industries.     

An examination of the effects of management earnings forecast form and explanations on financial analyst forecast revisions

Using a sample of 978 quarterly management earnings-per-share forecasts made during the period 1993 to 1999, we document that financial analyst revisions to management earnings forecasts are a function of management forecast form. More precise forecasts (measured three different ways) lead to greater revision of financial analyst consensus EPS forecasts for a given level of unexpected earnings as predicted by Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Bayesian adjustment models. Also, consistent with our arguments, maximum forecasts are interpreted as bad news by analysts. Our results, while consistent with theory, are inconsistent with recent experimental studies which do not reject the null hypothesis of no effect of management earnings forecast form on the association between unexpected earnings and financial analyst forecast revisions. We also re-examine Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough's (2004) finding that attributions used to explain management forecasts affect the reaction to the forecast using analyst data. Consistent with their findings using stock prices, the attribution presence (especially external attributions) increases financial analyst revisions pursuant to management forecasts.     

Sell‐Side Analyst Research and Stock Comovement

We document that a stock's price around a recommendation or forecast covaries with prices of other stocks the issuing analyst covers. The effect of shared analyst coverage on stock price comovement extends beyond analyst activity days. A stock's daily returns covary with the returns of other stocks with which it shares analyst coverage. These links between stock price comovement and shared analyst coverage are consistent with the coverage‐specific information we find in earnings forecasts; analysts who cover both stocks in a pair expect future earnings of the stocks to be more highly correlated than do analysts who cover only one stock from the pair. Collectively, our evidence indicates that analyst research produces coverage‐specific spillovers that raise price comovement among stocks that share analyst coverage. The strength of these spillovers is comparable to spillovers from broad industry and market information in analyst research.     

Analyst Pessimism and Forecast Timing

In this study, we show that on average relatively pessimistic analysts tend to reveal their earnings forecasts later than other analysts. Further, we find this forecast timing effect explains a substantial proportion of the well‐known decrease in consensus analyst forecast optimism over the forecast period prior to earnings announcements, which helps explain why analysts’ longer term earnings forecasts are more optimistically biased than their shorter term forecasts. We extend the theory of analyst self‐selection regarding their coverage decisions to argue that analysts with a relatively pessimistic view–compared to other analysts–are more reluctant to issue their earnings forecasts, with the result that they tend to defer revealing their earnings forecasts until later in the forecasting period than other analysts.     

Causal language intensity in performance commentary and financial analyst behaviour

We use automated techniques to measure causal reasoning on earnings‐related financial outcomes of a large sample of MD&A sections of US firms and examine the intensity of causal language in that context against extent of analyst following and against properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. We find a positive and significant association between a firm's causal reasoning intensity and analyst following and analyst earnings forecast accuracy respectively. Correspondingly, analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion is negatively and significantly associated with causal reasoning intensity. These results suggest that causal reasoning intensity provides incremental information about the relationship between financial performance outcomes and its causes, thereby reducing financial analysts’ information processing and interpreting costs and lowering overall analyst information uncertainty. Additionally, we find that decreases in analyst following are followed by more causal reasoning on performance disclosure. We also find that firms with a considerable increase of causal disclosure especially attract new analysts who already cover many firms. Overall, our evidence of the relationship between causal reasoning intensity and properties of analyst behaviour is consistent with the proposition that causal reasoning is a generic narrative disclosure quality characteristic, able to provide incremental information to analysts and guide analysts' behaviour.     

Do local analysts know more? A cross-country study of the performance of local analysts and foreign analysts

This paper examines whether analysts resident in a country make more precise earnings forecasts for firms in that country than non-resident analysts. Using a sample of 32 countries, we find an economically and statistically significant local analyst advantage even after controlling for firm and analyst characteristics. The local advantage is high in countries where earnings are smoothed more, less information is disclosed by firms, and firm idiosyncratic information explains a smaller fraction of stock returns. It is negatively related to whether a firm has foreign assets and to market participation by foreign investors and by institutions, and positively related to holdings by insiders. The extent to which U.S. investors underweight a country's stocks is positively related to that country's local analyst advantage.     

Access to management and the informativeness of analyst research

We examine whether access to management at broker-hosted investor conferences leads to more informative research by analysts. We find analyst recommendation changes have larger immediate price impacts when the analyst?s firm has a conference-hosting relation with the company. The effect increases with hosting frequency and is strongest in the days following the conference. Conference-hosting brokers also issue more informative, accurate, and timely earnings forecasts than non-hosts. Our findings suggest that access to management remains an important source of analysts? informational advantage in the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure world.