Public spending and growth: The role of government accountability

This paper examines the role of institutions in the nexus between public spending and economic growth. Empirical results based on a newly assembled dataset of 80 countries over the 1970–2010 period suggest that particularly when institutions prompt governments to be accountable to the general citizen does public capital spending promote growth. Taking account of the type of financing for this spending, we show that the growth-promoting effect under an accountable government appears to prevail for various financing sources, including a reallocation from current spending, an increase in revenue, and a rise in the budget deficit. However, government accountability does not seem to play a key role in the growth effects of current spending.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Financing Education in Europe: The Globalization Perspective

This paper examines the role of globalization on public spending on education in Europe. With the implementation of the Bologna process, the changes taking place in the educational structure in Europe have highlighted the importance of public education expenditures. Taking into account the effects of trade, income, and socio‐demographic factors, we study the impact of globalization on public education expenditure at preprimary, primary, secondary, and tertiary institutions using a panel data model for 25 EU countries for the 1998–2010 period. Our findings with different indices of globalization depict a positive effect on education financing. The use of legal and institutional variables, the inclusion of the crisis and euro dummies, and further control variables do not alter our main findings. The Bologna dummy variable is not found to have a significant effect on public education financing, indicating that the integration goals under this process have not translated into increasing levels of public expenditure for education.     

Fiscal institutions and public spending volatility in Europe

This work provides empirical evidence for a sizeable, statistically significant negative impact of the quality of fiscal institutions on public spending volatility for a panel of 23 EU countries over the 1980–2007 period. The dependent variable is the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy, which does not represent reactions to changes in economic conditions. Our baseline results thus give support to the strengthening of institutions to deal with excessive levels of discretion volatility, as more checks and balances make it harder for governments to change fiscal policy for reasons unrelated to the current state of the economy. Our results also show that bigger countries and bigger governments have less public spending volatility. In contrast to previous studies, the political factors do not seem to play a role, with the exception of the Herfindahl index, which suggests that a high concentration of parliamentary seats in a few parties would increase public spending volatility.     

Institutional Quality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Can Management Effort and Bribes Compensate for Low-Quality Institutions?

The industrial development in sub-Saharan Africa is perhaps more affected by the quality of institutions than that of other regions. We investigate what alternatives managers may have and what their firms would need to function in case the institutional furniture they encounter is of low quality. We find that, in high quality institutional environments, management spending effort to deal with the authorities and to navigate regulations negates the effect of the institutional environment. Managers do not need to spend such efforts. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the positive effect of high-quality institutional environments on firm performance is enhanced by making informal payments.     

Female political representation and substantive effects on policies: A literature review

The share of women in political offices has increased considerably over the past few decades in almost every country in the world. Does this matter for policy outcomes? This is the first paper to provide a literature review on the substantive effects of female representation on policies. In developing countries, the increase in female political representation has caused a better provision of public goods, especially with regard to education and health. In developed countries, higher female representation has not affected public policies as measured by spending patterns. However, more recent evidence shows that female representation has induced changes in parliamentary deliberations and specific policy choices (e.g. more public child care) that may not be reflected in the observable composition of public spending. Finally, higher female representation has improved institutional quality by reducing corruption and rent-extraction by those in power.     

Short- and long-term relation between economic development and government spending: the role of quality of institutions

ABSTRACT

This paper tests the Wagner’s assumption of the one-sided directional flow moving from economic growth to public spending considering an international database over the 1996–2012 period. By using indicators on the level of country control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law, regulatory quality and voice and accountability, the paper analyses the economic performance-public spending nexus controlling for the quality of the institutions. The empirical evidence supports the existence of the Wagner’s law, showing that, in the short-run, public spending positively reacts to a positive shock in national income, with a lower magnitude for democratic countries. In the long run, the error-correction model shows the convergence between public spending and national output occurring less quickly for non-democratic, low-income and to a smaller extent for non-OECD countries. Institutional quality, such as effort in controlling corruption and the presence of regulations that permit and promote private sector development, may help reducing the amount of per capita public spending and making it more productive. Higher expenses in compositional amenities such as public services for the elderly may explain why public spending per capita will increase the most in economies with a higher share of the population that need healthcare facilities.     

Determinants of institutional quality: an empirical exploration

ABSTRACT

Recent literature has underlined the role that institutions play in the process of development, making it essential to understand why differences exist in the quality of institutions across countries. The goal of this study is to investigate the determinants of institutional quality. Our results confirm that institutional quality is conditioned by variables that can be modulated by public policy, such as income per capita, international openness, education, taxation, and patterns of income (re)distribution. Our conclusions differ from the pessimistic outlooks of works highlighting deterministic factors, such as colonial or geographical factors, as determinants of institutional quality.     

The dynamic effects of monetary policy and government spending shocks on unemployment in the peripheral Euro area countries

In this paper we study the response of unemployment to monetary policy and government spending shocks in the peripheral Euro-area countries. By applying the structural near-VAR methodology, we jointly model area-wide and national variables. Our main finding is that fiscal multipliers vary across countries and the results are consistent with the prediction of the standard New Keynesian model only in Italy and Greece. Instead, in Ireland, Portugal and Spain increases in government spending are recessionary. Thus we find that Keynesian results of fiscal policy seem to prevail in high public-debt countries, whereas non-Keynesian outcomes seem to characterize high private-debt countries. As for the monetary policy shock, we find that it plays an important role, jointly with the other area-wide shocks, as a long-term driver of national unemployment.     

Economic Power and the Firm in New Institutional Economics: Two Conflicting Problems

The objective of this study has been to undertake an analysis of the economic and institutional determining factors of fiscal pressure in a group of European countries with different levels of economic development, recent history, or level of cooperation and integration among them. We have used a panel of data from 40 countries and a time period of eleven years. Apart from the variables generally used, we have introduced additional ones such as governing party ideology, rate of economic freedom of Euro-area countries, together with another set of institutional variables. Results obtained show that the purely economic model improves when institutional and geopolitical variables are included and, in this way, it is possible to see which countries governed by the left, belonging to the Euro-area or having been members of the Soviet block, and with economic freedom, are more liable to increase fiscal pressure.     

How to tame two Leviathans? Revisiting the effect of direct democracy on local public expenditure in a federation

We explore how the presence of direct democracy across hierarchical levels of government in a federation affects the level of public expenditure. In so doing we revisit the effect of direct democratic institutions on public policies. Particularly, we are interested whether the effect of upper-level (state) direct democratic institutions on lower-level expenditure varies with lower-level direct democracy. Empirically, we exploit the large institutional variation in the degree of direct democracy both for state (cantons) and local governments (municipalities) in Switzerland. Considering 119 municipalities belonging to 22 cantons for the period 1993–2007, we find that the cantonal fiscal referendum increases local spending for those municipalities without fiscal referenda, while this effect is significantly reduced for municipalities that also avail of referenda. This suggests that upper-level fiscal restraint can be undone by lower-level profligacy if direct-democratic control is limited to the upper level.     

Public spending and outcomes: Does governance matter?

This paper studies the links between public spending, governance, and outcomes. We examine the role of governance–measured by the level of corruption and the quality of bureaucracy–in determining the efficacy of public spending in improving human development outcomes. Our analysis contributes to our understanding of the relationship between public spending, governance and outcomes, and helps explain the surprising result that public spending often does not yield the expected improvement in outcomes. We show empirically that the differences in the efficacy of public spending can be largely explained by the quality of governance. Public health spending lowers child mortality rates more in countries with good governance. Similarly, public spending on primary education becomes more effective in increasing primary education attainment in countries with good governance. More generally, public spending has virtually no impact on health and education outcomes in poorly governed countries. These findings have important implications for enhancing the development effectiveness of public spending. The lessons are particularly relevant for developing countries, where public spending on education and health is relatively low, and the state of governance is often poor.     

The Determinants of Location Choices of China's ODI: Institutions,Taxation and Resources

China has become the third largest source of outward direct investment (ODI). This paper studies how institutions in the host countries affect the location choices of China’s ODI. Based on a deal-level sample from 2002–2011, this paper empirically tests how political institutions, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and contrd of corruption in the host countries affect the location choices of China’s ODI. On top of these institutional factors, we study the effects of tax evasion and natural resources in host countries, and their interactions with institutional factors. We find that political institutions in the host countries are not major concerns of the ODI, while government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption have significant effects on the locations of ODI. In addition, China’s ODI tends to avoid countries with strict legal systems. Tax evasion and resources are also major motives of China’s ODI. General institutional quality and tax evasion are substitutes in China’s ODI location decisions.     

Oil shocks and fiscal policy procyclicality in Angola: Assessing the role of asymmetries and institutions

The aim of this article is to examine procyclicality in Angola, assess whether it behaves asymmetrically over the oil cycle, and test the hypothesis that institutions and fiscal rules can moderate procyclicality. Received wisdom suggests that in resource‐rich economies, fiscal policy tends to be procyclical albeit improvements in the past decades due to institutional reforms. Similar evidence is available for oil‐rich economies; however, we know little about how procyclicality behaves over the oil cycle; that is, whether spending (and revenue) grows faster during oil‐market booms, than during downturns. Further, evidence on institutions and fiscal rules in oil‐exporting economies is still ambiguous. We bridge both gaps by examining fiscal policy procyclicality in Angola, one of the largest oil‐producers in Africa, and a country that has experienced an intense process of institutional reforms since 2002. Therefore, it is an ideal candidate for our study. We use data for the 2004–2014 period to estimate a threshold vector error correction model that extends vector autoregressive and vector correction methods used up to date. Our results indicate that revenue and spending are generally procyclical to oil shocks, that revenue is more procyclical during booms, and that institutional quality, net inflows, financial openness, and fiscal rules affect procyclicality.     

Does democracy affect taxation and government spending? Evidence from developing countries

Focusing on developing countries in three geographical areas (South-East Asia, Latin America and European Union), we explore the relation between political variables and tax revenue, public spending and their structure. We build a new dataset for the 1990–2005 period with fiscal, political and socio-economic variables. Since democracy is a complex and multidimensional concept, we measure it using two variables, the political strength of democratic institutions, and the protection of civil liberties. We perform three sets of estimates: (i) cross-country pooled OLS regressions with region fixed effects, (ii) country fixed effects regressions and (iii) region specific regressions with country fixed effects. While the first model delivers some significant correlations between political variables and tax items, when controlling for country fixed effects we find that tax revenue and tax composition are in general not significantly correlated with the strength of democratic institutions and the protection of civil liberties. The only exceptions are indirect, trade and property taxes. A similar result applies to public spending, with the exception of defense expenditure. Overall, our findings cast some doubt on the exact public policy channels through which political institutions affect economic development.     

Factors of production,productivity, institutions,and development: Evidence from Brazil

The economic growth and development literature emphasizes that investment in technology and physical and human capital is essential for achieving higher levels of development. Political and economic institutions are also relevant in this process. With a sample of 5,503 Brazilian municipalities, this study carries out a development accounting exercise and measures the effects of institutional quality on per capita gross domestic product (GDP), physical capital intensity, human capital stock, and productivity. The empirical results indicate that institutional quality affects GDP per capita mainly through human capital accumulation and total factor productivity.     

Do better institutions offset the adverse effect of a financial crisis on investment? Evidence from East Asia

We extend the neoclassical investment theory to capture the deviation of current institutional quality from its ideal level. We show that an improvement in institutions increases the speed of adjustment towards desired capital stock and the marginal product of capital and hence enhances the investment demand. Next, we apply our theoretical model to East Asia. Using Generalized Method of Moments, we estimate a dynamic panel data model to investigate the effect of alternate measures of institutional quality on investment dynamics in this region. Our findings underline the role of institutions as a deep determinant of investment. We also conclude that the East Asian countries with better institutional quality are less prone to the adverse effects of financial crises on their fixed capital formation. Our results are robust to the estimation methods and changes in institutional measures and hence might have important policy implication for policymakers and investors in East Asia.     

What drives inequality and poverty in the EU? Exploring the impact of macroeconomic and institutional factors

Employing panel data techniques, we investigate the macroeconomic and institutional determinants of inequality and poverty in the EU over the period 1994–2008. We pay particular attention to the effects of macroeconomic environment, social protection and labour market institutions. The empirical analysis shows that the social transfers in cash, and principally the transfers that do not include pensions, exert a prominent impact on inequality and poverty. Also significant is the effect of the GDP per capita. The impact of employment on inequality and poverty is not empirically sound. The same holds for the labour market institutions; an exception is the union density, which appears conducive to a less dispersed personal income distribution. Importantly, the results support the view that the social protection system acts as a catalyst in determining the effectiveness of social spending and the distributive role of economic growth and employment.     

Religious and Economic Preferences: An Empirical Analysis of State Tax Rates and Public Spending

In an attempt to examine the role of religion and religious institutions in the formation of economic and political preferences, we empirically test the relationship between religious and economic variables in the context of the 50 US states. Specifically, we test whether changes in the religious composition of states over time influences state tax rates (public revenue), and state spending patterns (public expenditure). We use church membership rates and religious contributions as alternative measures of a state's religiosity level. The results report a weak relationship between state tax rates and the religiosity of the state population over time. However, a negative relationship was observed between religiosity and public welfare spending, and a positive relationship between religiosity and public education spending. Variations arise when Catholics are included in the analysis of public spending.     

The role of institutions in finance curse: Evidence from international data

This paper investigates the effect of banking sector development on economic growth in a panel of 87 countries, paying particular attention to the role of institutions in reducing the finance curse phenomenon. The dynamic generalized method-of-moments (GMM) results indicate that institutions play an important role in mediating the positive relationship between banking sector development and growth. This suggests that the marginal impact of financial development on growth depends on institutional quality. Using the four-way partition of institutions classified by Rodrik (2005), we also find that resilient market-regulating, market-stabilizing, and market-creating institutions act as mediators to the financial market in facilitating growth. The results are robust to using alternative institutions indicators, estimation strategies, and stopping the sample before the 2007-2008 global financial crisis.