TAXES ON PAYROLL, REVENUES AND PROFITS IN THREE MODELS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Variations in company taxes are analysed for a right-to-manage model, an efficient bargaining setting and a seniority approach. Taxes cannot be shifted forward by the risk-neutral firm. Alternative income and bargaining power are allowed to vary with taxes. Employing asymmetric Nash solution it is found that changes in a payroll, revenue or profit tax can have differing implications for labour demand curve models and efficient bargaining solutions. This distinction might provide a novel basis for empirical work. Variations in bargaining power and-within a labour demand curve setting-the union's objective function do not change results.     

TAXES AND GROWTH: TESTING THE NEOCLASSICAL AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODELS

Changes in the tax rate alter real growth permanently in an endogenous growth model, but only temporarily in a neoclassical model, where the only permanent effect is a decrease in the steady-state level of output per capita. Using data from the 1960'1992 period for a panel of 11 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development economies, this paper's empirical results support the following conclusions. First, consistent with the tax smoothing hypothesis, tax rates have exhibited significant persistent changes while output growth rates have not. Second, a higher tax rate permanently reduces the level of output but has no permanent effects on the output growth rate. These findings are inconsistent with endogenous growth mechanisms and suggest that the relationship between output and the tax rate is best described by the neoclassical growth model. (JEL E62, 041)     

TAXES, GROWTH AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT TICK-CURVE EFFECT

This paper examines the dynamic and long run effects of a shift from income taxes to consumption taxes in a growing small open economy. We introduce a government sector that maintains a balanced budget and expenditure at a constant proportion of domestic income to a small open economy Swan-Solow model. Our framework provides a previously unidentified dynamic effect that is robust to endogenising the savings rate. Lowering the income tax rate promotes economic growth and has a tick-curve effect on the current account balance, characterised by instantaneous deterioration, a period of recovery and gradual convergence to an improved position in the long run.     

ON THE TREATMENT OF TAXES AND GOVERNMENT IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

Framed in the context of the ongoing revision of the 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA), this note proposes a new presentation of the National Accounts. While it does not require new information, nor difficult calculations, it is suggested to be conceptually clearer and practically simpler. The changes concern the treatment of taxes and government in the national accounts which imply that: (i) GDP, measured at basic price, is now exactly the sum of all value added, which is split in the compensation of employees and an enlarged operating surplus; (ii) the two functions of government are clearly distinguished in a modified sequence of accounts, that is, as producing non-market services up to the allocation of primary income account, and then as redistributing the national income; and (iii) with a conventional allocation of government services and GDP broken down between market GDP and non-market GDP, households remain the only final consumer and the so called question of consumption subsidies is resolved.     

MACROECONOMIC AND REDISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF CONSUMPTION TAXES IN THE USA*

This paper studies the effect of an increase in consumption taxes using a dynamic general equilibrium model of overlapping generations calibrated to the US economy. When the proceeds are used to reduce income taxes, the reform raises the aggregate capital and labour supply in the long run. Workers increase labour supply immediately in response to the reform, while consumption rises only gradually. The tax reform also transfers wealth from old consumers to young consumers. As a result, while future generations experience significant welfare gains, current generations, particularly old consumers, tend to experience sizable welfare losses. When the proceeds are used for a lump‐sum transfer, the aggregate capital and labour both decrease in the long run. This reform is welfare‐improving for the current low‐income households.     

THE BUILT-IN FLEXIBILITY OF INCOME AND CONSUMPTION TAXES IN NEW ZEALAND

This paper provides estimates of individual and aggregate revenue elasticities of income and consumption taxes in New Zealand, based on the 2001 tax structure and expenditure patterns. Using analytical expressions for revenue elasticities at the individual and aggregate levels, together with a simulated income distribution, values for New Zealand were obtained. Results using equi-proportional income changes suggest that the aggregate income and consumption tax revenue elasticities are both fairly constant as mean income increases, at around 1.3 and 0.95 respectively. This latter estimate assumes that increases in disposable income are accompanied by approximately proportional increases in total expenditure. If there is a tendency for the savings proportion to increase as disposable income increases, a somewhat lower total consumption tax revenue elasticity, of around 0.9, is obtained for 2001 income levels. However, non-equiproportional income changes are more realistic. Allowing for regression towards the geometric mean income reduces these elasticities, giving an elasticity for income and consumption taxes combined that is only slightly above unity. Examination of the tax-share weighted expenditure elasticities for various goods also revealed that, despite the adoption of a broad based GST at a uniform rate in New Zealand, the persistence of various excises has an important effect on the overall consumption tax revenue elasticity, especially for individuals at relatively low income levels.     

THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND TAXES AMONG HOUSEHOLDS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM*

This paper presents an analysis of the distributive impact of public expenditures and taxes in the United Kingdom. The analysis uses household level microdata from the 1971 Family Expenditure Survey, with tax and expenditure aggregates drawn from the national accounts. The analysis is the first to allocate all taxes and public expenditures for the United Kingdom, and the results are compared to those from the more restricted analyses carried out by the U.K. Central Statistical Office. Results are presented for individual taxes and benefits as well as for overall net benefits and they describe distributional effects with respect to income class, household size, number of earners and housing tenure. A final section of the paper compares the results to those from a similar analysis for the United States which were reported in the previous issue of this review.     

INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING

A solution to Rubinstein (1982)'s open‐ended, alternating‐offer bargaining problem for two equally patient bargainers who exhibit similar degrees of inequality aversion is presented. Inequality‐averse bargainers may experience envy if they are worse off, and guilt if they are better off, but they still reach agreement in the first period under complete information. If the guilt felt is strong, then the inequality‐averse bargainers split a pie of size one equally regardless of their degree of envy. If the guilt experienced is weak, then the agreed split is tilted away from the Rubinstein division towards a more unequal split whenever the degree of envy is smaller than the discounted degree of guilt. Envy and weak guilt have opposite effects on the equilibrium division of the pie, and envy has a greater marginal impact than weak guilt. Equally inequality‐averse bargainers agree on the Rubinstein division if the degree of envy equals the discounted degree of guilt. As both bargainers' sensation of inequality aversion diminishes, the bargaining outcome converges to the Rubinstein division.     

EFFICIENCY AND BARGAINING POWER IN THE INTERBANK LOAN MARKET

Using detailed transactions‐level data on interbank loans, we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no‐arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada's Large Value Transfer System, we show that although the market is fairly efficient, systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the Bank of Canada's operations as well as phases of the 2007–8 financial crisis. We find that bargaining power tilted sharply toward borrowers as the financial crisis progressed and (surprisingly) toward riskier borrowers.     

PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA OVER THE LONG RUN

The low pace of Latin American productivity growth in recent decades, despite extensive economic reforms, has yet to be understood in a longer‐run context where factors such as demographic changes, structural shifts, and investment levels can be taken fully into account. The OxLAD database provides comparable sectoral output and workforce series over 1900–2000 for the six leading economies in the region for the first time. Our analysis of this new dataset shows that: intersectoral resource reallocation reduced aggregate productivity growth in all three periods; total factor productivity growth was low throughout the century, and even negative in the closing three decades; and thus factor accumulation—investment in fixed capital and skilled labor—was the main source of productivity growth in Latin America during the twentieth century.     

THE SIZE AND GROWTH OF THE HIDDEN ECONOMY IN NORWAY

The present size of the hidden economy in Norway is between 4 and 6 percent of GDP, of which hidden labor income constitutes about half. A survey approach reveals that 4/5 of the population is of the opinion that people in general accept income from moonlighting that is not reported, and 2/3 believes that this share of acceptance is on the increase. Furthermore, surveys clearly show that hidden labor services are of satisfactory quality, that they mainly are paid for in cash, but with checks being increasingly used, and that buyers find it easier to obtain services from the hidden labor market than from the regular one. A shortening of the work week in order to alleviate unemployment may result in an increased supply of hidden labor.     

GROWTH AND CYCLES, IN THE MODE OF MARX AND SCHUMPETER

I propose a theory of endogenous growth and cycles under competitive conditions. Firms choose how many workers to hire, how much to invest, and which technologies to use. New capacity, embodying labor-saving technologies, is costlier than old one but allows for a lower wage bill. The interaction between labor-saving innovations and changes in the relative price of labor is the source of growth cycles.     

FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION

In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent‐holding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a cost‐reducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as follows. Royalty licensing is better than fixed fee licensing for both firms if the innovation is not drastic. So, royalty licensing is always carried out. Moreover, though there exists a case in which consumers prefer fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing from the social point of view.     

EFFECTS OF TAXES AND BENEFITS ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN KOREA

This paper examines the redistributive effects of Korea's fiscal policies, including consumption taxes and in‐kind benefits. Using the Household Income and Expenditure Survey of 2007, we find that taxes and transfers reduce income inequality in Korea by 13.8 percent. Contrary to the popular belief that direct taxes are the key tool for redistribution, in‐kind benefits, direct taxes, and social security contributions all decrease the Gini coefficient by 6.7, 4.7, and 2.9 percentage points, respectively. The redistributive effect of consumption taxes is small and negative (?0.5 percentage point). Policy simulations indicate that education spending financed by the personal income tax has a positive redistributive effect and that the lower 70 percent of households enjoy positive net benefits. Spending targeting the poor has a strong redistributive effect, which implies low popularity because the majority of households face net losses.     

SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE EFFECT OF UNEQUAL ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE ON SAME-SEX AND UNMARRIED DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES

Employers' health insurance coverage for legal spouses places unmarried couples at a disadvantage for obtaining coverage. Data from the Current Population Survey confirm that people with same-sex or different-sex unmarried partners are two to three times more likely to be uninsured than married people, even after controlling for factors influencing coverage. Universal partner coverage would cut that uninsured rate by as much as 50%. Employers offering domestic partner benefits would see a small enrollment increase: 0.1%–0.3% for gay and lesbian partners and 1.3%–1.8% for heterosexual partners. We find no evidence of adverse selection. (JEL J32 , J38 , J71 )