A DEFENSE OF THE FOMC*

We defend the forecasting performance of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) against the criticism of Christina and David Romer (2008, American Economic Review 98, 230–235) by assuming that the FOMC’s forecasts depict a worst‐case scenario that it uses to design decisions that are robust to misspecification of the staff’s model. We use a simple macro model and a plausible loss function to illustrate how such an interpretation of the FOMC’s forecasts can explain the findings of Romer and Romer, including the pattern of differences between FOMC forecasts and forecasts published by the staff of the Federal Reserve System in the Greenbook.     

SHORT-RUN MONETARY POLICY AND THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

This study investigates factors influencing monetary policy decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) over the period 1960–1998. Competing perspectives regarding the process of monetary policy making exist, with some researchers contending the FOMC makes short-run policy decisions based solely on "objective" macroeconomic considerations and others arguing that political and other nonmacroeconomic considerations significantly influence monetary policy voting. Empirical studies support both views in varying degrees. This article presents a model of FOMC decision making which posits that (1) the current/prospective macroeconomic environment at the time of FOMC meetings is the most important consideration of monetary policy makers, and (2) nonmacroeconomic variables receive little attention unless macroeconomic conditions are difficult for policy makers to assess. Probit results support the implications of the model.     

SCREENING FOMC MEMBERS FOR THEIR BIASES AND DEPENDABILITY

This paper develops conjectures regarding the process by which the President as a principal selects Federal Reserve Governors and Bank Presidents as his agents on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). It first establishes that FOMC members can be grouped into sets which are marked by ease and tightness biases in voting behavior. It then identifies certain career characteristics of FOMC members which are correlated with each of these biases. The paper goes on to isolate reliable partisan subsets within the ease and tightness sets and identifies a career characteristic which is highly correlated with membership in these subsets; that characteristic is a career as an economist.     

Reactions of real yields and inflation expectations to forward guidance in the United States

We study the impact of forward policy rate guidance by the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) used as an unconventional monetary policy tool at the zero lower bound of the policy rate on real and breakeven US Treasury yield curves. We find that explicit FOMC policy rate guidance announcements led to a significant reduction in real yields at horizons of 2 to 5 years ahead. By contrast, long-term breakeven inflation rates were little affected, suggesting that inflation expectations have remained well anchored, and that explicit FOMC policy rate guidance has not adversely affected central bank credibility.     

DID TIME INCONSISTENCY CONTRIBUTE TO THE GREAT INFLATION? EVIDENCE FROM THE FOMC TRANSCRIPTS

We use evidence from detailed records of FOMC deliberations to argue that time inconsistency theory can help explain the excessive monetary expansion that characterized Arthur Burns's tenure as Federal Reserve Chairman (1970–1978). The records suggest that the Fed perceived a Phillips curve tradeoff and political pressures that made it difficult to adopt disinflationary policies; the tendency toward excessively expansionary policy was exacerbated by the short-run planning horizon the Committee faced in each of its meetings. We argue that comparative static predictions of the time inconsistency model are consistent with the rise of inflation during the Burns years and its subsequent fall.     

MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES: MEETINGS AND OUTCOMES

Monetary Policy Committees (MPCs) differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper, we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behavior of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on preprepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) under Chairman Bernanke. (JEL E58, D71, D78)     

THE ASYMMETRIC IMPACT OF “INFORMATIVE” AND “UNINFORMATIVE” FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE STATEMENTS ON ASSET PRICES

This paper examines the effect of the information content of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statements on the level and volatility of Treasuries and stock returns. Statements are separated into “informative” and “uninformative” groups with informative statements delivering important information which was not previously anticipated by the consensus. We find evidence that the information content of FOMC statements tends to generate an asymmetric response, with informative statements having a larger effect than uninformative statements. Asymmetries tend to be more pronounced for the conditional mean than conditional volatility. The behavior of volatility is tent‐shaped, spiking during policy announcements and declining before and after the release. We also find that the evolution of the language of the FOMC statements does matter to market participants and that joint releases of target rate changes and informative statements have a distinctly more pronounced impact than other types of announcements. (JEL E52, E58, E65, G12, G14)     

EFFECTS ON INTEREST RATES OF IMMEDIATELY RELEASING FOMC DIRECTIVES

Prior to February 1994, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) did not officially release its current Domestic Policy Directives to the public until after the next FOMC meeting, a lag of approximately 45 days. Thus, the public never knew the FOMC's latest decisions about short-run monetary policy. On 11 occasions between early 1989 and May 1993, however, the essence of the directives was "leaked" to the Wall Street Journal within one week of an FOMC meeting. This study tests Federal Reserve officials' original assertion that early release of directives would increase volatility in financial markets by creating announcement effects. The study finds some evidence of announcement effects in certain instances, but the assertion that an immediate release would "roil the markets" appears unfounded .     

The effect of FOMC statements on asset prices

Given their increased importance during recent years, FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) statements can have a significant impact on asset prices. To capture the effect of FOMC statements on asset prices, an indicator variable is created that takes into account the information content of policy statements. Results show that both ‘interest rate surprises’ and ‘FOMC statements’ affect the mean and the volatility of asset prices. The volatility impact is tent-shaped, jumping within the policy announcement interval and declining before and after the release. FOMC statements have a much more pronounced impact on stock returns, intermediate and long-term yields, while short-term rates are largely driven by target rate decisions. We also find that the evolution of the language of the FOMC statements does matter to market participants and, in particular, the ‘forward-looking’ language adopted in mid-2003 has reduced market volatility associated with ‘interest rate surprises’ on announcement days.     

BEN BERNANKE AND THE ZERO BOUND

From 2000 to 2003, when Ben Bernanke was a professor and then a Fed Governor, he wrote extensively about monetary policy at the zero bound on interest rates. He advocated aggressive stimulus policies, such as a money‐financed tax cut and an inflation target of 3%–4%. Yet, after U.S. interest rates hit zero in 2008, the Fed under Chairman Bernanke took more cautious actions. This paper asks when and why Bernanke changed his mind about zero‐bound policy. The answer, at one level, is that he was influenced by analysis from the Fed staff that was presented at the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting of June 2003. This answer raises another question: why did the staff's views influence Bernanke so strongly? I seek answers to this question in the social psychology literature on group decision‐making. (JEL E52, E58)     

FOMC VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELECTORAL CYCLES: PARTISAN IDEOLOGY AND PARTISAN LOYALTY

The influence of partisan and electoral considerations on the monetary policy voting behavior of Federal Reserve Governors is investigated in the context of a model permitting the estimation of reaction functions on the basis of FOMC voting records. The results suggest that once we have controlled for the state of the economy and for the prevailing stance of monetary policy, both partisan ideologies and partisan loyalties appear to play an important role in the Governors'voting calculus.     

International spillovers from US forward guidance to equity markets

We quantify the international spillovers of explicit Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) policy rate guidance used as an unconventional monetary policy tool at the zero lower bound of the policy rate on international equity markets, considering equity indices of both advanced and emerging economies. We find that stimulatory explicit FOMC policy rate guidance announcements at the zero lower bound led to higher equity prices in a number of advanced and emerging economies. Moreover, we find that equity indices of economies with lower sovereign ratings rose by more, consistent with the risk-taking channel of monetary policy.     

Forecast combination for discrete choice models: predicting FOMC monetary policy decisions

This paper provides a methodology for combining forecasts based on several discrete choice models. This is achieved primarily by combining one-step-ahead probability forecasts associated with each model. The paper applies well-established scoring rules for qualitative response models in the context of forecast combination. Log scores, quadratic scores and Epstein scores are used to evaluate the forecasting accuracy of each model and to combine the probability forecasts. In addition to producing point forecasts, the effect of sampling variation is also assessed. This methodology is applied to forecast US Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decisions regarding changes in the federal funds target rate. Several of the economic fundamentals influencing the FOMC’s decisions are integrated, or I(1), and are modeled in a similar fashion to Hu and Phillips (J Appl Econom 19(7):851– 867, 2004). The empirical results show that combining forecasted probabilities using scores generally outperforms both equal weight combination and forecasts based on multivariate models.     

Bayesian forecasting of federal funds target rate decisions

In this paper we examine which macroeconomic and financial variables have most predictive ability for the federal funds target rate decisions made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). We conduct the analysis for the 157 FOMC decisions during the period January 1990–June 2008, using dynamic ordered probit models with a Bayesian endogenous variable selection methodology and real-time data for a set of 33 candidate predictor variables. We find that indicators of economic activity and forward-looking term structure variables, as well as survey measures are most informative from a forecasting perspective. For the full sample period, in-sample probability forecasts achieve a hit rate of 90%. Based on out-of-sample forecasts for the period January 2001–June 2008, 82% of the FOMC decisions are predicted correctly.     

Does Partisan Heritage Matter? The Case of the Federal Reserve

Received evidence suggests that changes in appointer- and overseer-preferencesinfluence monetary policy (i.e., partisan heritage matters).Evidence presented here, on the other hand, is consistent withchanges in the cost of pursuing a common preference influencingpolicy. I draw this evidence from a panel of Federal Open MarketCommittee (FOMC) votes and find support for the following conclusions:(1) Federal Reserve Board (FRB) governors who were nominatedand confirmed by the same party (Republican or Democrat) prefersignificantly looser policy than do other FOMC members. (2)Monetary policy is significantly looser when either party controlsthe oversight mechanism (i.e., the presidency and Senate) thanwhen control is split. (3) Oversight acts less forcefully ondistrict bank presidents than on FRB governors. In short, thepresent evidence suggests that political agents from both partiesprefer loose money and pursue this preference more efficientlywhen their parties are aligned.     

Evaluating FOMC forecast ranges: an interval data approach

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve publishes the range of members’ forecasts for key macroeconomic variables, but not the distribution of forecasts within this range. To evaluate these projections, previous papers compare the midpoint of the range with the realized outcome. This paper proposes an alternative approach to forecast evaluation that takes account of the interval nature of projections. It is shown that using the conventional Mincer–Zarnowitz approach to evaluate FOMC forecasts misses important information contained in the width of the forecast interval. This additional information plays a minor role at short forecast horizons but turns out to be of sometimes crucial importance for longer-horizon forecasts. For 18-month-ahead forecasts, the variation of members’ projections contains information that is more relevant for explaining future inflation than information embodied in the midpoint. Likewise, when longer-range forecasts for real GDP growth and the unemployment rate are considered, the width of the forecast interval comprises information over and above the one given by the midpoint alone.