Monetary policy and systemic risk-taking in the euro area banking sector

Available empirical evidence on the significance of the (micro) risk-taking channel of monetary policy is not enough to indicate a threat to financial stability. Evidence of risk-taking with systemic risk implications is necessary. Statistical measures that capture systemic risk in all its forms within a structural factor-augmented vector autoregressive model suggest that conventional and unconventional monetary policies have resulted in systemic risk-taking in the euro area banking sector. Systemic risk has taken the form of an increase in the banking sector’s vulnerability via contagion and interconnectedness. Banks’ balance sheets, however, do not account for the full transmission from (micro) risk taking to systemic risk-taking. The main policy implication is that a persistently accommodative monetary policy may drive a monetary authority with a price stability mandate to consider a possible trade-off with financial stability. At a minimum, coordination between monetary and macro-prudential policies requires serious consideration.     

Taxes,risk taking,and financial stability

After the global financial crisis, the use of taxes to enhance financial stability received new attention. This paper analyzes the corrective role of taxes in banking and compares two instruments, namely, an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which mitigates the debt bias in corporate taxation, and a Pigovian tax on bank debt (bank levy). We emphasize financial stability gains driven by lower bank asset risk and develop a principal-agent model, in which risk taking depends on the bank's capital structure and, by extension, on the tax treatment of debt and equity. We find that (i) the ACE unambiguously reduces risk taking, (ii) bank levies reduce risk taking if they are independent of bank performance but may be counterproductive otherwise, and (iii) taxes are especially effective if regulatory capital requirements are constrained to low levels.     

International Financial Contagion: Why are Eastern Europe's banks not failing when everybody else's are?

While the Asian financial crisis spread to Russia and Brazil, the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) are largely unaffected by international financial contagion. This is the more surprising considering that most economies have experienced severe banking sector problems in the past, that large bad loan ratios are still prevalent, that banking regulation and supervision are only slowly improving, and that stabilizing policies have slowly been eliminated. What insulated the CEECs from the recent wave of financial instability? To consider the counterfactual, we first provide a framework that links banking crises to financial deregulation. We then focus on a number of macro- and microeconomic factors, using data compiled from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, from the World Bank's World Debt Tables, and from the BIS's Consolidated International Banking Statistics. We first compare past experiences in CEECs with those in other emerging economies as a cross-sectional reference point. We then consider whether the situation in CEECs has changed since the last banking sector problems, in order to establish a reference point across time. Our results indicate that the factors leading up to past banking crises are generally different in CEECs from those in other emerging economies. However, in recent years, the characteristics of CEECs have become more similar to those of other emerging economies.     

The welfare cost of banking regulation

The Basel Accords promote the adoption of capital adequacy requirements to increase the banking sector's stability. Unfortunately, this type of regulation can hamper economic growth by shifting banks' portfolios from more productive, risky investment projects toward less productive but safer projects. This paper introduces banking regulation in an overlapping-generations model and studies how it affects economic growth, banking sector stability, and welfare. In this model, a banking crisis is initiated by an aggregated shock (in the risky sector) in a banking system with implicit bailout, and banking regulation is modeled as a constraint on the maximal share of banks' portfolios that can be allocated to risky assets. This model allows us to evaluate quantitatively the key trade-off, inherent in this type of regulation, between ensuring banking stability and fostering economic growth. The model implies an optimal level of regulation that prevents crises but at the same time is detrimental to growth. We find that the overall effect of optimal regulation on social welfare is positive when productivity shocks are sufficiently high (for example, in the subprime banking crisis episode) and economic agents are sufficiently risk-averse. Finally, we find that there is a trade-off between regulating the economy upfront (i.e. before the shock) and facing the challenge of making a huge bailout after the crisis.     

Cyclical behavior of the financial stability of eurozone commercial banks

In light of the financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, we investigate the cyclical behavior of the financial stability of banks of the Eurozone, using an unbalanced dynamic panel of 722 commercial banks covering the period 1999–2013, and the generalized method of moments system. We find a negative relationship between business cycle and bank risk-taking, indicating that financial stability is procyclical. In addition, the study shows that lending activity increases risk-taking while rising capital requirements boost financial stability. Moreover, our findings suggest positive co-movements between the business cycle and lending, compared to bank's capital, whereby the procyclicality of lending and bank capital have negative effects on the financial stability of commercial banks in the Eurozone. We notice then that the cyclical behavior of commercial banks, in terms of capital requirements and lending activities, depends on their size. Therefore, lending and capital of smaller banks are procyclical while lending and capital of larger banks are countercyclical. Finally, we find the Troika institutions’ bailouts programs significantly impacted banking stability in the Eurozone.     

The Interaction of Financial Fragility and the Business Cycle in Determining Banks’ Loan Losses: An Investigation of the Italian Case

The Basel II capital accord and the recent crises have fostered the debate over the financial stability of the aggregate banking sector. Because loan losses are an important factor for banking stability, this paper aims to gauge the impact of real and financial fragility on default losses of Italian banks. To this end the ratio of non‐performing loans to total loans is regressed on the business cycle and indebtedness. In addition, to capture the joint effect of real and financial fragility, the analysis considers an interaction term, which to our knowledge has never been applied before to Italian default data. Based on the interaction model, results show that the actual impact of financial fragility on default losses depends not only on the business cycle phase but also on the firm's size, whereby in adverse economic conditions, small firms are more significantly affected by financial fragility.     

Financial innovation,systematic risk and commercial banks’ stability in China: theory and evidence

We are dedicated to revealing the impacts of financial innovation and systematic risk on commercial banks’ stability in China, both theoretically and empirically. We established a theoretical model and derived a theoretical mechanism from this model revealing two distinctive patterns of the impacts determined by the profitability of financial derivatives: the impacts of financial innovation and systematic risk on banks’ stability in China are linear under the circumstances of a positive expected risk premium of financial derivatives; conversely, the impacts can be linear, U-shaped or cubic when the expected risk premium is negative. We make three propositions to analyse the patterns and conditions of these impacts in detail. In the empirical analysis, we do not focus only on the banking industry but also on individual commercial banks. The empirical results demonstrate that the impact of financial innovation on both the banking industry’s and most individual commercial banks’ stability are U-shaped, and the impact of systematic risk on the banking industry’s and on only one commercial bank’s stability are significantly linear, which confirms certain conditions mentioned in the theoretical propositions. Finally, the study’s conclusions are presented, and the contributions of the article to future study are also mentioned.     

Financial imbalances and gradualism

In the last years, in the major OECD economies, while inflation has become lower and more stable, episodes of financial instability and large cycles in asset prices have shown up with (often) non-negligible effects on economic activity. These facts should call for a larger concern with financial imbalances by the central bank. Adapting the model by Caplin and Leahy (1996)—where a central bank, which is uncertain about the state of the economy and its reaction to policy, seeks an optimal search strategy to influence private agents' responses—by substituting the central bank's price stability objective with a financial stability one, we find that the monetary authority should follow a less aggressive policy than the one suggested by the original model. However, initial conditions play a crucial role in determining the degree of gradualism by the policy maker with the policy becoming more and more aggressive as the initial interest rate shrinks.     

A dynamic approach to analysing the effect of the global crisis on nonperforming loans: evidence from the Turkish banking sector

This article analyses the effect of the global crisis on the determinants of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the Turkish banking sector by using dynamic panel estimation techniques. Empirical findings suggest that NPLs present persistence, which is more evident after the crisis, while other regressors have also persistent effects in the post-crisis period. Moreover, NPLs are mostly shaped by bank-specific variables before the crisis, whereas, after the crisis, NPLs are also driven by macroeconomic and policy-related variables. In particular, the post-crisis significance of GDP, policy rate and sovereign debt shows that robust economic activity, tight monetary policy and strong fiscal balances restrict NPLs, thereby enhancing financial stability. The significance of inflation in both sub-periods shows that commitment to price stability objective is indispensable for limiting NPLs and promoting financial stability. In the period ahead, the speed and the direction of normalization in global monetary policies may determine the course of financial conditions, which, therefore, have implications regarding NPL dynamics and financial stability.     

Banking structure and financial stability: a comparison of Chinese and German banking systems

In the process of financial globalization and diversification, the issue of financial stability has become heated all over the world. This paper attempts to uncover the delicate relationship between banking structure and financial stability by comparing and analyzing the situation of the Chinese and German banking systems. This paper suggests that (i) the trade-off between competition and concentration in banking industry is a vital factor to maintain financial stability and (ii) concentration is not always a bad thing for financial stability, especially in banking systems with discontent bank performance.     

A barrier option framework for rescue package designs and bank default risks

Rescue packages adopted to stabilize the banking system are generally divided into three categories: government purchases of distressed assets, government guaranteed debt issuance programs, and direct equity capital injections. Countries afflicted by the recent financial crisis launched general programs in one or two, and even in three different categories. In this paper, we examine that the design of a government rescue package for a distressed bank depends on the expected reduction of the default risk in the bank's equity returns. We find that the bank's default risk is negatively related to distressed loan purchases, and to capital injections, but positively related to guaranteed debt issuance. We also find that the rescue package including all three categories is not guaranteed to increase stability for the rescued bank. Specifically, the combination of distressed loan purchases and capital injections is superior to the package of the three categories in addition to the solo instrument. This suggests that an effective design of a government rescue package for the financial services industry largely depends on its targets.     

Refinancing and decentralization: Evidence from China

Decentralization can complement market liberalization by strengthening incentives of agents to respond to market signals. However, in China banks centralized lending authority following financial reforms in the mid-1990s. We present a new theory of financial decentralization in which centralization provides a credible commitment not to refinance bad projects by reducing available information. Using data from Chinese rural financial institutions, we empirically assess the determinants of decentralization and the likelihood of collateral seizure, strongly confirming the predictions of the refinancing model. We conclude that weak institutional environments may limit the efficiency of financial intermediation despite financial market liberalization.     

Liquidity risk and financial competition: Implications for asset prices and monetary policy

This paper studies the implications of banking competition for capital markets and monetary policy. In particular, I develop a two-sector monetary growth model in which a group of agents is exposed to liquidity shocks and money is essential. Banks insure depositors against such risk and invest in the economy's assets. In this setting, I compare an economy with a perfectly competitive banking sector to an economy with a fully concentrated financial sector. Unlike previous work, banks can have market power in both deposits and capital markets. Compared to a perfectly competitive financial sector, I demonstrate that a monopolistic banking system can have substantial adverse consequences on capital formation, assets prices, and the degree of risk sharing. Furthermore, multiple steady-states can emerge and the economy becomes subject to poverty traps. More importantly, market power in financial markets may overturn the Tobin effect present under a perfectly competitive financial sector. This necessarily happens in economies with high degrees of liquidity risk and low levels of capital formation.     

How diverse are national banking systems? An analysis on banking business models,profitability, and riskiness

In this paper, we apply an algorithm developed by Martin Weitzman to quantify the extent of diversity among the business models of financial intermediaries at an international level. In particular, we investigate the relationship between the diversity of the business models of EU national banking systems and their profitability and riskiness. We show how Weitzman's approach can be generally applied to the issue at hand; as a by-product, the analysis allows us to assess whether the diversity among banking systems was affected by the imported systemic financial crises of 2007/8 as well as its domestic sequel centered on the sovereign debt crisis that occurred in 2010–12. The motivation for this paper is twofold. First, we provide an operational measure of the diversity of business models among banking sectors. Second, we enrich the economic literature relating to banking business models by providing a macro-founded analysis. To this end, we highlight the range of diversity of national banking business models correlated with high performances in terms of profitability and riskiness.     

Inter-linkages between competition and stabilisation policies in the banking sector and stock market development in Europe

The banking sector and the stock market in Europe have been adversely impacted by a series of global financial crises over the last two decades. Major financial reforms were implemented to enhance the stability and competition within the banking sector. Measures were also implemented to create a vibrant stock market in Europe to stimulate economic growth in Europe. This study examines the interactions between stock market development, banking competition, and banking stability in European countries from 1996 to 2016. The purpose of the study is to understand the inter-linkages between these variables to ascertain the spillover impact of policy reforms in the banking sector on the stock market and vice-versa. Using a vector error-correction model, the study finds long-run and short-run inter-linkages between banking competition, banking stability, and stock market development in European countries. The study’s most robust result is that banking competition and banking stability stimulate stock market development in the long run. There is also some evidence that healthy competition in the banking sector and stock market development instils greater stability in the banking sector. The results suggest that policy measures put in place to create a vibrant stock market must include elevating banking competition and banking stability, with policymakers being cognizant that causality may be bidirectional.     

The relevance of supply shocks for inflation: the spanish case

A retrenchment in crossborder credit is under way, the product of both market forces and political pressure on international banks to lend at home (Economist, 2009). In addition, banks, particularly the largest, have also dramatically expanded their retail banking operations over the past few years (Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007). Our goal, in this article, is to study the effects of default risk on equity returns through bank interest margin management under a renewed focus on domestic retail banking, a trend often attributed to the stability of banking activities. Specifically, this article explores the determinants of optimal bank interest margins based on an option-based firm-theoretical model with multiple sources of structural breaks due to political pressure. The model demonstrates how capital regulation and political pressure on foreign lending return and risk conditions jointly determine the optimal bank interest margin decision. We show that a more stringent capital requirement is linked with lower equity return, but higher default risk of the bank in the return to domestic retail banking. An increased focus on the political pressure on foreign lending return is linked with higher equity return and default risk of the bank. It is also showed that an increased focus on the political pressure on foreign lending risk decreases the bank's equity return and default risk. We conclude that the return to domestic retail banking may be a relatively stable activity when the political pressure decision impacts only the expected risk of the bank's foreign lending and not the return.     

混业经营与金融体系稳定性:基于银行危机的全球实证分析

银行混业经营不仅关系到自身效率的提高,更关系到银行体系乃至整个金融体系的稳定性。对全球范围内61个国家的跨国数据进行的实证分析表明,一个国家对银行混业经营的限制越少,该国的金融体系越趋于稳定,发生银行危机的概率也越小。不仅如此,在宏观经济越不稳定的国家,其一般性银行危机演变为系统性银行危机的概率也越大。     

The effect of financial liberalization on banking sector stability

Several studies indicate that financial liberalization increases likelihood of a financial crisis without distinguishing between a normal period, unstable period preceding the onset of banking panics and crisis/post period. We explain in this paper the relationship between financial liberalization and banking sector vulnerability. Then, we argue that banking sector turmoil is most likely to occur after an intermediate degree of liberalization. Using a recently updated dataset for financial reforms, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between liberalization and the likelihood of banking crisis for a sample of 49 countries between 1980 and 2010. We used a multinomial logit model in order to take into account what is called the ‘post crisis bias’. We ask whether the relationship remains when institutional characteristics of countries and dynamic effects of liberalization are considered. The empirical results indicate that the relationship between liberalization and banking sector stability depends strongly on the strength of capital regulation and supervision. With very weak regulation and supervision, the probability of banking crises is increasing with liberalization but this relationship is reversed as regulation and supervision become significant. The most important type of liberalization in relation to banking crises seems to be operational. A policy implication is that positive growth effects of liberalization can be achieved without increasing the risk of a banking fragility if appropriate institutions are developed.     

Learning from Japan: The European Central Bank and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

What shapes central banks’ learning from the policy experiments of their peers? Both economic ideas and organizational interests play important roles. Thus, New Keynesian ideas led central banks to interpret Japan's experience with quantitative easing (2001–2006) through the impact on risk spreads, although the Japanese central bank never intended such effects. In turn, scholars and policy-makers alike ignored one critical lesson: successful policy innovations depend on banks’ funding models. It is argued here that this was a crucial omission because the shift to market-based funding impairs the effectiveness of the traditional crisis toolkit. Central banks must intervene directly in asset markets of systemic importance for funding conditions, as the Bank of Japan did by buying government bonds. Hence, market-based finance engenders a trade-off between financial stability and institutional stability defined through central bank independence. During critical periods, central banks cannot preserve both. The ECB illustrates this trade-off well. Early in the crisis, it outsourced financial stability to a (largely) market-dependent banking system to protect its independence. With the introduction of Outright Monetary Transactions in September 2012, the Bank recognized that the market-based nature of European banking required outright purchases of sovereign bonds. This new instrument gave the ECB additional powers to shape national fiscal decisions in the name of an independence that no longer has theoretical justifications.     

Universal banking,asymmetric information and the stock market

This paper aims to explore the role of the universal banking system in contributing to the stock market bust in the wake of the financial crisis 2008–2009 when bankers might have incentive to hide information from shareholders. We set up a stylized model of consumption smoothing involving universal banks that undertake both investment and commercial banking activities. Banks have private information about the outcome of a project that it funds. In the wake of bad news about the project, the banker has an incentive to sell lemon shares in a secondary market with the pretence of a liquidity crunch. Our model shows that such an incentive results in (i) a sharp discounting of stock prices, (ii) greater loan demand (iii) higher fraction of bank ownership of the borrowing firms, and (iv) heightened consumption risk resulting in precautionary savings by households. The magnitude of these effects depends on the market's perception about the preponderance of lemons in the stock market. A credible punishment scheme implemented by the government in the form of fines may moderate the stock market decline and consumption volatility due to information friction. However, it imposes a deadweight loss on private citizens because of a fall in all banks' expected profit. On the other hand, a “ring-fenced” banking arrangement along the way suggested by the Vickers Commission may entail a first order welfare loss due to the lack of diversification opportunities.