Determinants of Financial Distress Costs

This paper provides international evidence on financial distress costs. To achieve this aim, we have developed a model where financial distress costs are determined, on the one hand, by making use of a more accurate indicator of the probability of financial distress and, on the other, by a set of variables that, according to financial theory, explain the magnitude of the costs borne by a firm in the case of financial distress. Our results reveal the relevance of our improved indicator of the probability of financial distress, since it positively affects financial distress costs in all the countries analyzed. Furthermore, since our model controls for the probability of financial distress, we can test the trade-off between the benefits and costs of debt. This allows us to verify that the benefits debt outweigh the costs. Our results also indicate that distress costs are negatively related to liquid assets; hence, their benefits more than offset their opportunity costs.     

The Corporate Acquisition Policy of Financially Distressed Firms

The paper examines a unique motive for corporate acquisitions among distressed firms: the desire to enhance creditworthiness by both the acquirer and the acquired firms. I develop a theoretical model of the creditworthiness conditions necessary for corporate acquisitions and identify the optimal policy in searching for an acquirer. I distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic acquisitions and find the necessary conditions and most favorable policy for a strategic acquisition to evolve. I demonstrate the importance of the cost of finding an acquirer, the impact of sharing bargaining leverage, and the economic significance of credit quality for the success of the accord.     

Investment Policy and Exit-Exchange Offers Within Financially Distressed Firms

This article examines the conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders in a setting in which firms can renegotiate the terms of existing debt with public debtholders. In particular, we consider one of the most common types of debt restructuring: the exit-exchange offer. Our analysis explores the relation between exit-exchange offers and investment choice by the manager, and it concludes that managers, acting strategically on behalf of shareholders, may select inefficient investment projects in order to enhance their bargaining position vis-a-vis creditors. Holding the upside potential of an investment project fixed, managers/shareholders prefer projects with lower payoffs in states of bankruptcy because it induces individual bondholders to accept poorer terms in a debt-for-debt exit-exchange offer, thus generating a greater residual for shareholders in states of solvency. Additionally, we show how the investment inefficiencies in our analysis depend on (i) the inability of bondholders to coordinate their actions; (ii) the ability of managers to commit to suboptimal investment projects; and (iii) the coupling of an individual bondholder's decision to tender and her decision to consent to allow the firm to strip fiduciary covenants. We suggest conditions under which a ban on coupled exit-exchange offers—or alternatively, constraints on “debt-for-debt” exchanges—would be efficiency-enhancing.     

Dividend Policy and Financial Distress: An Empirical Investigation of Troubled NYSE Firms

This paper studies the dividend policy adjustments of 80 NYSE firms to protracted financial distress as evidenced by multiple losses during 1980–1985. Almost all sample firms reduced dividends, and more than half apparently faced binding debt covenants in years they did so. Absent binding debt covenants, dividends are cut more often than omitted, suggesting that managerial reluctance is to the omission and not simply the reduction of dividends. Moreover, managers of firms with long dividend histories appear particularly reluctant to omit dividends. Finally, some dividend reductions seem strategically motivated, e.g., designed to enhance the firm's bargaining position with organized labor.     

Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms

This study provides evidence that transactions costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court. As a result, these firms remain highly leveraged and one-in-three subsequently experience financial distress. Transactions costs are significantly smaller, hence leverage falls by more and there is less recurrence of financial distress, when firms recontract in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 therefore gives financially distressed firms more flexibility to choose optimal capital structures.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Financial Distress on Trade Credit

This paper studies the use of supplier's trade credit by firms in financial distress. Trade credit represents a large portion of firms’ short‐term financing and plays an important role in financial distress. We find that firms in financial distress use a significantly larger amount of trade credit to substitute for alternative sources of financing. Firms that are smaller, with less market power, and with more unique products tend to use more trade credit financing when in distress. We also find that firms that significantly increase their trade payables when in financial distress, experience an additional drop of at least 11% in sales and profitability growth over the previously documented 21% average drop for financially troubled firms.     

财务困境成本理论与实证研究综述

本文对财务困境成本的存在性、分类、计量以及经验估计等相关理论和实证研究进行综合评述,最后探讨财务困境成本的未来研究方向,指出基于公司财务特征、公司治理和股权结构等多维视角研究财务困境成本的影响因素,并提出构建预期财务困境成本指数具有理论意义和应用价值。     

Estimating Risk‐Adjusted Costs of Financial Distress

The search for the optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure involves weighing the expected benefits of higher leverage against the expected “costs of financial distress.” These costs include not only the direct costs of reorganization, but less quantifiable effects of financial trouble such as damage to the firm's reputation, the loss of key employees and customers, and the loss of value from forgone investment opportunities. This article proposes a new method for valuing expected financial distress costs. While researchers have provided estimates of the costs associated with financial distress when it takes place, whether or when these costs will be incurred is, of course, unknown at the time the financing decision. As a result, the “correct” discount rate for valuing expected distress costs is difficult to derive. Instead of adjusting the discount rate to reflect historical default rate probabilities, the authors' method uses “risk‐neutral” probabilities of encountering distress that allow for discounting at the risk‐free rate. The risk‐neutral probabilities of default are derived by incorporating the systematic risk premia implicit in corporate bond yield spreads. This method results in a significant increase in estimates of financial distress costs. In a simple example presented by the authors, distress costs estimated at about 1.6% of firm value using the conventional method turn out to run about 5% after adjusting for the increased systematic risk associated with financial distress.     

Strategy and Financial Policy in UK Small Firms

There is growing evidence that capital structure and firm strategy are linked but most studies to date have focused on large, publicly quoted firms, with little attention given to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). A major proposition of the study is that both strategic and financial factors are necessary to explain chosen debt levels. The empirical question adopted for this work, given the best financial model of capital structure, is – does strategy provide any additional explanatory power? Hence strategy and financial variables are seen as complementary rather than competing determinants of capital structure. There appears to be strong evidence supporting the proposition that competitive strategy affects the capital structure of SMEs, but there is little evidence of any impact from corporate strategic factors. The study also supports the notion that there is a 'pecking order' in SME financing and that variability in profits results in 'distress' borrowing. This study provides important empirical evidence to support work on the capital structure puzzle and the funding problems of SMEs.     

An Analysis of the Underreported Magnitude of the Total Indirect Costs of Financial Distress

In this paper we examine 1,041 ongoing firms over the time period 1982–92. Using quarterly data for the detection and measurement of the magnitude of the indirect costs of financial distress, we find three important explanatory factors: (a) the distinctiveness of the pattern of increasing financial distress over time, (b) the degree of leverage in the capital structure and (c) the size of the firm. For those firms with a distinctive pattern of increasing financial distress over time, the average annual losses as a percentage of market value is –10.3%. The maximum loss is –76%. Even if the firm never fails, its market value can be severely impacted by the presence of the indirect costs of bankruptcy over time. This study finds a significantly positive relationship between Altman's Z-score and the firm capital investment growth rate. This relation holds after controlling for other variables such as leverage, firm size and market/book ratio. This implies that lost investment opportunities may be also an important part of the total indirect costs of financial distress, which appear now to be much larger than previously recorded.     

Financial Distress Costs and Delayed Calls of Convertible Bonds: An Empirical Analysis

Theoretical analysis implies that optimal call policy would be to call the bonds as soon as the conversion value equals the call price. Empirical studies, however, report that firms appear to systematically delay the call and the difference between the conversion value and the call price is large at the time of the call. This study examines convertible bond calls between 1977 and 1993, with a view to explain the large difference between the conversion value and the call-price at the time of the call. A large majority of the firms calling the bonds have cash-flow incentive to call the bonds in that the after-tax interest payments are higher than the dividends on the converted shares. The large difference between the conversion value and the call price is positively related to the risk characteristics of the firm. Evidence seems to support the view that risk aversion and fear of potential financial distress may explain the large difference at the time of call between the conversion value and the call price.     

融资成本、房地产价格波动与货币政策传导

本文建立一个带有房地产市场的多部门DSGE模型,同时在模型中引入带有金融摩擦的银行部门,研究货币政策影响房地产价格的传导机制,以及降低社会融资成本的政策对房地产市场中金融加速器效应的影响。数值模拟结果显示:(1)当社会融资成本较高时,降低利率的货币政策冲击使得房地产价格显著上升;(2)政府降低社会融资成本,能够明显地弱化房地产市场的金融加速器效应;(3)央行采取盯住房地产价格波动的货币政策,能够改善社会福利,但是政策效果会因社会融资成本的降低而削弱。     

自由贸易港建设中的发展模式与金融政策研究

党的十九大报告提出"赋予自由贸易试验区更大改革自主权,探索建设自由贸易港",自由贸易港建设成为我国加快构建开放型经济新体制的一项重大举措。本文阐述我国特色自由贸易港建设的背景,将世界主要自由贸易港的重要功能进行"抽离",通过纵向发展与横向比较视角相结合,提炼出四种典型发展模式;立足国际视野分析自由贸易港的金融功能定位与离岸金融制度安排等金融发展经验,并就金融如何支持我国自由贸易港建设进行战略思考和政策探索。     

The Effect of Decimalization on Trade Size and Adverse Selection Costs

Abstract:   We examine adverse selection costs around NYSE decimalization. Further, we analyze the relation between adverse selection costs and trade size. We find a significant increase in the percentage adverse selection cost and a reduction in dollar adverse selection cost (percentage adverse selection multiplied by the spread) following complete decimalization on the NYSE. On estimating the adverse selection components by trade size classes, we find a decline in dollar adverse selection costs in trades of all sizes, with the strongest evidence coming from medium size trades, followed by small and large size trades. One implication of our findings is that there appears to be less stealth trading following complete decimalization and less institutional trading overall.     

海南自由贸易港金融政策框架与实践

自由贸易港作为当前世界最高水平的开放形态,跨境资金流动自由便利是其主要特征之一.金融支持海南自由贸易港建设政策框架从顶层设计、法律基础、实施路线图等多维度构建与自由贸易港制度体系相适应的金融制度"四梁八柱",聚焦跨境资金流动自由便利,服务贸易投资自由化便利化和实体经济发展.本文深入阐释了海南自由贸易港金融政策框架的主要...     

The Exploitation of Relationships in Financial Distress: The Case of Trade Credit

This paper develops optimal pricing, lending, and renegotiation strategies for companies in relationships where one firm is highly dependent on the other. Long-term trade–creditor firm relationships induce dependent trade creditors to grant more concessions in debt renegotiations than nondependent creditors. Anticipating these larger renegotiation concessions, not only do less financially stable firms prefer trade credit, but all firms agree to pay a higher interest rate for trade credit. The model also explains the existence of "teaser" interest rates and convenience classes. Findings are consistent with those of the relationship-lending literature.     

The Determinants of Leveraged Buyout Activity: Free Cash Flow vs. Financial Distress Costs

This paper investigates the determinants of leveraged buyout (LBO) activity by comparing firms that have implemented LBOs to those that have not. Consistent with the free cash flow theory, we find that firms that initiate LBOs can be characterized as having a combination of unfavorable investment opportunities (low Tobin's q) and relatively high cash flow. LBO firms also tend to be more diversified than firms which do not undertake LBOs. In addition, firms with high expected costs of financial distress (e.g., those with high research and development expenditures) are less likely to do LBOs.     

Theory and Evidence on the Resolution of Financial Distress

We analyze a financially distressed owner-managed project. Themain results of the model are: (1) borrower default is an endogenousresponse to the anticipated restructuring–foreclosureoutcome; (2) the lender’s restructuring–foreclosuredecision depends critically on the interaction between projectvalue and industry liquidity; and (3) the lender waits for theindustry to recapitalize before selling assets obtained throughforeclosure. Empirical analysis of a large sample of defaultedcommercial real estate loans supports many of the model predictions,including restructuring–foreclosure outcomes that areconsistent with endogenous borrower default and firesale discountsthat vary depending on industry market conditions at the timeof foreclosure. (JEL G33)     

CDS and the Resolution of Financial Distress

The dramatic growth of Credit Default Swaps (CDS)—contracts that allow creditors to hedge their default exposure or take leveraged credit positions—threatens to complicate the resolution of financial distress in ways that existing reorganization methods and institutions have yet to adapt to. CDS contracts undermine a major premise that underlies current reorganization methods—namely, that the holder of legal rights has, and is motivated by, corresponding economic interests. Because hedging in the CDS markets immunizes creditors from the debtor's financial condition, they effectively separate their legal rights and economic interests. In this article, the authors discuss the challenges this separation poses for the resolution of distress both in and out of bankruptcy, and consider ways in which “on‐ground” realities may be reconciled with the legal structure that underlies the resolution of distress. At a minimum, disclosure of CDS positions in times of financial distress—along the lines of the disclosures presently required of equity investors under the Williams Act—are an essential first step toward a solution.     

基于合并报表与母公司报表的财务危机预警效果比较研究

本文选择了2009年至2014年的ST企业,及因欠款未还被提起诉讼、因债务重组低价出售资产、资不抵债和因虚构利润被违规处理的企业作为财务危机样本,运用Logistic回归建立财务危机预警模型,实证对比了合并报表与母公司报表的财务危机预警效果差异。研究结论显示,合并报表的总体预警效果略优于母公司报表;但当母公司采用经营主导型战略时,母公司报表数据的财务预警效果优于合并报表;当母公司采用投资主导型战略时,随着合并报表包含的增量信息增多,其财务危机预警效果较明显的优于母公司报表。论文进一步拓展了合并报表与母公司报表信息有用性的比较研究,丰富了债权人视角下财务危机预警有效性的研究。