论资源税费管理体制的改革

进行适当的税费改革,通过提高征收资源税费的水平,对资源税实行从价征收、实行扬税抑费政策,把政府相关部门征收的资源开发费用合并为税费进行统一管理、扩大资源税的征收范围,这样就会形成良好有效的资源开发、环境治理、生态补偿等责任机制。     

中国政府土地相关收入的财政学属性分析——兼论土地出让收入与房地产税并存的理论依据

我国集体所有与国家所有并存的土地公有制,以及建设用地必须使用国有土地的制度安排,使得政府客观上存在大量的征地、出让行为,由此导致国有土地出让收入规模大,在政府土地租、税、费收入三者当中占比高.针对社会上对于房地产税与土地出让金存在重复征收税费等质疑,本文认为,对于土地增值收益要区分其增值属性和投资来源,既要通过税费实现“涨价归公”,又保障私人土地投资的合理回报和合法权益.研究认为,推进土地相关税费体系改革,应当明确土地租、税、费三者的财政学属性,处理好土地出让、征收房地产税、土地收费三者的关系,协调好政府土地相关收支行为,通过土地制度与财税体制等协同配套改革,促进土地资源的科学集约利用和经济社会可持续发展.     

进一步完善农村税费改革的思考

造成农民税费负担过重的原因是多方面的，农村税费改革的目的是通过改革减轻农民负担，规范国家、集体与农民的收入分配关系，积极促进农村经济的可持续发展。农村税费改革的基本思路是继续保留税、费两种形式并正确处理好二者间关系；合并农业税，取消城乡差别税制；乡镇政府收费应体现谁受益、谁付费的原则；强化税费征收过程的监管；正确处理好政府间分配关系。     

我国房地产税制改革问题研究综述

一、我国现行房地产税制中存在的问题 (一)房地产开发过程和交易环节税费复杂交叉,税费混乱,费挤税现象严重。 具体表现在:(1)以税代租。城镇土地使用税作为土地有偿使用的一项措施,税项中含有租的因素,征税混淆了税收与地租的界限。(2)以费代税。对以划拨方式取得土地的内资企业征收城镇土地使用税,对外资企业免征此税,但外资企业     

中国与发展中国家宏观税负水平比较

我国的宏观税负水平与发展中国家相比,其宏观税负率是比较低的,但预算外税外收费比重却很大,“费挤税”现象严重,结果造成分配秩序混乱,为此,必须调整税费关系,规范政府收入形式,形成良好的公共分配秩序。     

税费关系及税费改革的理论分析

税和费作为财政收收入的两种形式，均有其存在的客观性和必要性。它们各有所长，各司其职。在税费改革的过程中，应对税和费有个明确的认识，找出并针对不规范税费关系形成的原因，寻求治理规范的方法。     

对战国田税征收方式的一种新解读

学界一般认为战国田税是以顷为单位征收的 ,其根据有两点 :其一 ,云梦秦简《田律》之“入顷刍稿”条规定刍稿以顷为单位征收 ,其二 ,认为战国各国均以顷为授田单位。本文认为这种观点是不能成立的 ,其理由 :(一 )云梦秦简《田律》之“入顷刍稿”条只说明秦国刍稿是按顷征收的 ,但不能说明田税也是按顷征收的 ,因为该条没有规定田税的征收方式 ,恰恰说明田税征收方式与刍稿是不同的 ;(二 )战国各国并不是都以顷为单位授田的 ,即使象秦魏这样以顷为单位授田的国家 ,其田税也不是按顷征收的 ,因为农民的百亩之田并不单纯种植一种谷物 ,而是几种谷物并种 ,这决定着田税只能以亩为单位征收。     

当前房地产税费的主要问题和调整建议

我省房地产税费确实存在税(费)负过重、重复征收、变相收费、保证金多、欠缺规范等问题,而且经过几年的调整压缩还是收效不大,企业和消费者负担仍然过重,影响住房消费热的形成,影响企业的经营发展。我们谨对主要存在问题和对策建议报告如下: 1、解决重复收费问题,是降低税费     

中国矿产资源税费体系重构

高速增长和增速减缓的不同经济状态下暴露出的矿产资源税费制度缺陷,迫切需要构建新的矿产资源税费制度。依据福利经济学和国家权利理论,矿产资源优化配置要求在产权明晰的前提下矫正各种市场失灵。政府是矫正市场失灵的主体,政府通过行使矿产资源所有权和政治权收缴权利金及矿业权费,征收资源税和特别收益金,建立收益调节基金,将外部性内部化,矫正市场失灵。     

中国房地产税改革取向研究

自中共十八届三中全会提出"加快房地产税立法并适时推进改革"以来,房地产税成为社会的热点和焦点问题。房地产税制度设计是一种零和博弈,即民众缴纳房地产税的个人损失即为政府收入。当前我国房地产税的首要功能应定位于筹集地方财政收入,依据民众房地产税收实际负担能力和地方政府基本公共服务职能,寻求政府与民众对房地产税的意愿契合度。政府应厘清租、税、费界限,理顺房地产收入分配关系,合理调整房地产税费结构,适时开征保有环节房产税,增强地方政府财政自给能力,建立房地产税制改革长效机制,构建政策支撑体系,营造适宜房地产税改革的制度环境。     

Attracting private investment: Tax reduction,investment subsidy,or both?

This paper uses a real-option model to examine the net benefit to a government from using tax cut and/or investment subsidy as incentives to induce immediate investment. Although earlier papers generally concluded that investment subsidy dominates tax cut, it is observed that many governments use a combination of subsidy and tax cut. We show that, when the government uses a different discount rate from private firms, and when it has to borrow money to provide an investment subsidy, it is possible to get an internal optimum; that is, it might be optimal for the government to provide an investment subsidy as well as charge a positive tax rate on the profits from the project. Thus, we provide an explanation for the puzzling fact that many governments provide an investment subsidy to a firm while simultaneously taxing its profits.     

财政级次与优化政府间税种配置

我国过多的财政级次与彻底分税制之间存在不相容性,难以在各级政府间合理配置税种,因而需要简化财政体制级次.本文结合政府层级变化趋势,提出推出两项行政体制变革,将政府层级从五级精简为三级,使得政府层级与财政级次对应,并以中央、省、市(县)这三级政府财政为架构,来优化各级政府间税种配置,形成各自的主体税种.     

Optimal Redistribution with Heterogeneous Preferences for Leisure

This paper examines the properties of the optimal nonlinear income tax when preferences are quasi–linear in leisure and individuals differ in their ability and their preferences for leisure. The government seeks to redistribute income. It can perfectly observe the level of endogenous income but cannot observe either ability or preferences. The heterogeneity of preferences leads to problems of comparability between individual utilities which challenge the design of redistributive schemes. We analyze the consequences of adopting a utilitarian social welfare function where the government is allowed to give different weights to individuals with different preferences. Under this particular social objective and given the quasi–linearity of preferences, we are able to obtain closed–form solutions for the marginal tax rates and to examine the progressivity of the tax system according to the weights used.     

Cigarette demand and tax policy for race groups in South Africa

This paper calculates cigarette demand for race groups in South Africa. Elasticities are the most important information a tax policy analyst can have. Elasticities determine how the tax base will change with a change in the tax rate and thus how government revenues will respond to the tax. Elasticities also determine the excess burden that consumers will bear as a result of the tax. As such, own price, crossprice, and expenditure elasticities are calculated along with government revenue maximizing tax rates, and total and excess burdens. Parametric and semiparametric estimation techniques are used and compared. Results show that a tax on cigarettes will discourage nonsmokers from starting to smoke and mainly raise revenue from current smokers. Furthermore, it is found that consumption behaviours between groups are different implying different government revenue maximizing tax rates for each group affecting the distribution of income.     

Public investment,taxation, and long-run output in economies with multi-level governments

This paper examines the dynamic effects of taxation and investment on the steady state output level of an economy. A simple neoclassical growth model with different tiers of government is developed. The initial focus is on governments that aim to maximise their citizens' welfare and economic performance by providing consumption goods for private consumption and public capital for private production. It is shown that a long-run per capita output maximising tax rate can be derived and that there also exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation. The analysis then extends to the case where governments attempt instead to maximise their own tax revenue to fund expenditures which do not contribute to the utility of their citizens. Three different cases of taxation arrangement are considered: tax competition, tax sharing, and tax coordination. The modeling shows that intensifying tax competition will lead to an increase in the aggregate tax rate as compared to the cases of sharing and coordination amongst governments. These tax rates are both higher than the long-run per capita output maximising rate that was implied under the welfare maximising government scenario.     

Why are tax revenues of local governments so low?

Using a unique data set on federal grants and tax revenues of more than 5000 Brazilian cities, we find that the federal government imposes an implicit tax of almost 10% on city governments’ tax revenues: for every dollar that a city collects from its residents, the federal government withdraws grants worth 9 cents from the city. Our findings suggest that local government tax revenues are low not because federal grants crowd out tax revenues, but because tax revenues crowd out federal grants.     

试论调控个人收入分配的财税政策选择

根据实际情况，我国政府调控个人收入分配，在财政政策方面，应加快完善社会保障制度，加大转移支付力度，缩小地区经济差距，加大扶贫投入的力度；在税收政策方面，应进一步完善个人所得税制度，适时开征遗产税与赠与税，加强特别消费税的作用，建立个人财产税制，适时开征社会保障税。     

On the timeliness of tax reform

This paper analyzes efficient government reactions to unanticipated tax avoidance. Quickly reforming tax laws to reduce the effectiveness of new tax avoidance techniques prevents widespread adoption, but indirectly encourages the rapid development of new avoidance methods if prior users are permitted to retain their tax benefits. Tax reforms that immediately prevent new avoidance mean that innovators need not fear imitation by competitors, and cannot rely on copying the innovations of others. Such an activist reform agenda diverts greater resources into tax avoidance activity, and might thereby lead to a faster rate of tax base erosion, than would a less reactive government strategy. Efficient government policy therefore entails either the retroactive elimination of tax savings, with possible associated costs, or else a deliberate pace of tax reform in response to taxpayer innovation.     

Taxation and market work: is Scandinavia an outlier?

This paper argues that it is essential to explicitly consider how the government spends tax revenues when assessing the effects of tax rates on aggregate hours of market work. Different forms of government spending imply different elasticities of hours of work with regard to tax rates. I illustrate the empirical importance of this point by addressing the issue of hours worked and tax rates in three sets of economies: the US, Continental Europe and Scandinavia. While tax rates are highest in Scandinavia, hours worked in Scandinavia are significantly higher than they are in Continental Europe. I argue that differences in the form of government spending can potentially account for this pattern. An early version of the paper was presented at the 2003 conference in honor of Prescott being award the Nemmers Prize in Economics, held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. I have benefitted from the comments of numerous seminar participants, but would like to particularly thank Robert Lucas, Ed Prescott, and Nancy Stokey, as well as two anonymous referees, Stephen Parente and Anne Villamil for useful comments. I thank the NSF for financial support.     

中国省级税收竞争与环境污染——基于1998-2006年面板数据的分析

文章利用1998-2006年面板数据分析了中国省级税收竞争与环境污染之间的关系,实证结果表明:(1)地方政府在税收竞争中对污染治理采取了骑跷跷板策略,并存在趋劣竞争现象;(2)增加地方政府可支配财力有利于外部性不大的污染物的治理;(3)排污费制度对工业固体废弃物和工业废水的排放强度有一定的抑制作用,但对工业二氧化硫排放强度并未起到应有的缩减功能;(4)中央政府颁布的环境标准对促进地方环境质量改善效果甚微。