国有企业经营者激励约束机制探讨

一、建立激励约束机制是现代企业制度的根本要求现代企业制度的根本特征是所有权和经营权的分离。由于所有权和经营权的分离，企业内部就产生所有者和经营者之间的委托——代理关系，当双方存在着因目标不一致而产生利益冲突时，代理人为追求自身利益而损害委托人利益，便产生了代理问题。因此，这就迫使委托人对代理人进行激励和约束，使得代理人的行为符合其利益要求，尽可能降低代理成本，以达到自身利益的最大化。激励与约束之间是相容而非对立的关系，激励和约束任何一方的过度都会导致代理成本的上升。     

经济适用房建设的委托

委托代理关系是指在信息不对称情况下，一方的目标要通过另一方的行动来实现。处于信息优势的一方为代理方，处于信息劣势的一方为委托方，双方的目标不一致，各自都在追求自己的利益最大化。当委托人赋予代理人一定的权利（如使用一种资源的权利时），他们之间就建立起了一种委托代理关系，代理人受正式或非正式契约的制约，代表着委托人的利益，并相应获取某种形式的报酬。在委托代理模型中，委托人想使代理人按照前者的利益选择行动，但委托人不能直接观测到代理人选择了什么行动，只能观测到另一些变量，这些变量由代理人的行动和其他外生的随机因素共同决定，充其量只是代理人行动的不完全信息。委托人的问题是如何根据这些观测到的信息来奖惩代理人，以激励其选择对委托人最有利的行动。     

企业经理人员激励约束机制探析

<正> 一、激励与约束:企业不可回避的管理命题 以所有权和经营权的分离为基本特征的现代企业制度,使企业的所有者(通称为股东)不必直接参与企业的经营,而是通过博奕的委托代理契约,将经营决策权授予代理人,即经理人员。但是,由于委托代理双方存在着信息不对称、契约不完备、目标不一致等原因,往往产生委托人与代理人之间存在着利益相悖现象,于是就需要委托人对代理人进行激励和约束,使代理人的行为符合其利益要求,尽可能降低代理成本,以达到自身利益最大化。     

研究型高校管理中的激励约束机制初步设计:基于多重委托代理机制

文章以研究型高校为对象,采用契约经济学理论,分析研究型高校管理中形成的委托代理关系及其特点、存在的问题,并分别设计外部激励约束机制和内部激励约束机制,以利于使代理人与委托人的目标函数相一致,从而实现研究型高校建设发展的最终目标。     

股权激励产生机制的文献述评

代理理论认为经济组织效率高低的关键在于能否设计一套激励机制以诱导代理人透露其私人信息,选择更高的努力水平,使公司资源分配符合帕累托最优或次优,也就是说激励是相容的.所以,授予经理人员(或代理人)一定数额的股权是激励代理人的一种有效方法,它能使代理人利益与公司的利益更趋一致,与委托人的目标相符.因此存在一系列的股权激励动因.     

税务人员机会主义行为倾向的博弈论解释

通过运用完全信息静态博弈分析税务人员机会主义行为的动机，发现信息不对称使得委托人和代理人目标函数不一致导致了代理人的机会主义倾向，仅通过加大对代理入的惩罚无益于防止其机会主义行为冲动，只有加大对委托人的惩罚以及加大对代理人的激励才能有效防止代理人机会主义行为倾向。因此，只有加大对税务部门委托人的惩罚以及加大对税务人员的激励才能减少代理人的偷懒行为，进而减少税收流失。     

委托代理关系与公司治理结构

两权分离引发了委托代理关系及内部人控制问题，为了解决代理人的道德风险和逆向选择问题，委托人必须建立一套有效的制衡机制来规范、约束并激励代理人，从而减少代理人问题，提高企业的经营效率和经济效益，更好地满足委托人的利益。本文从委托代理理论和内部控制问题入手，通过对委托代理关系的分析，论述公司治理结构的基本含义，并指出我国目前公司治理结构存在的主要问题是国有股本主体缺位，股东控制权残缺，更缺乏有效的激励监督约束机制，并提出改进我国公司治理结构的建议。     

第三类代理成本及其度量研究——基于我国上市公司拉克尔系数的分析

一、代理成本及其分类1976年,詹森(Jensen)和麦克林(Meckling)在《企业理论:管理行为、代理成本与所有权结构》一文中正式提出了代理成本理论。所谓代理成本,是指由于两权分离,代理人有机会损害委托人的经济利益而产生的相关成本。根据Jensen & Meckling(1976)的研究,代理成本的总和由委托人的监督成本、代理人的担保成本和剩余损失三部分组成。其中,委托人的监督成本是指委托人计量或观察代理人行为的成本,以及对代理人实施控制的成本;代理人的担保成本是指代理人实施自我约束,以保证为委托人利益尽职勤勉的成本;剩余损失是指委托人因代理人代行决策而产生的一种价值损失,等于代理人决策和委托人在同等条件下采取的效用最大化决策之间的企业价值差异。     

浅析委托代理中的动力机制

在存在委托代理关系的组织中,解决委托人与代理人之间的动力问题实质上是建立一套有效的激励机制。在现代公司制企业,构建公司治理结构就是要解决委托人与代理人之间的动力问题,即通过一套激励机制促使各利益相关方采取适当行动,在最大化自己利益时,最大化公司价值。建立激励机制,需要在组织内设立监督者,由他们负责监督、激励。但监督者也必须有某种激励来开展监督活动。办法是使他们有剩余利益索取权。拥有剩余利益索取权的监督者越是努力工作,团队的效率就会越高,监督者获得的剩余利益就越大,进而监督者越有积极性,这又反过来促进团队生产的效率。而既拥有企业监督权,又拥有企业剩余利益索取权,实质上就是拥有企业所有权。     

国有资产委托代理制的完善

委托代理制是伴随资产所有权与经营权相分离而出现的一种资产经营制度。其内涵在于：所有者是委托人，经营者是代理人；委托人和代理人的权、责、利通过事先的契约明确界定；委托人享有资产最终所有权、剩余索取权和对资产的最终控制权；代理人在委托人授权范围之内依据法人制度享有对企业资产的占有、使用、支配等权力和相应的利益。其目的在于，既保证委托人和代理人的权利，协调双方的利益矛盾，又能对双方实施充分的激励和约束。规范的委托代理制本身必须满足四个基本要求：其一，具有统一的、规范的委托人行为主体；其二，委托人对代理…     

Intrametropolitan planning for community-based residential care: a goals programming approach.

Small community-based residential facilities have increasingly supplanted large-scale institutions as treatment settings for mentally and physically disabled, indigent, elderly and ex-offender populations in the United States. Because the intrametropolitan assignment of these service-dependent populations and their community care facilities has not been purposively planned, most facilities and clients have clustered in inner cities, resulting in the formation of service-dependent population ghettos. This paper outlines a goals programming approach to the client/facility assignment problem. The model provides a basis for an intrametropolitan distribution of residential service facilities that balances equity and efficiency goals and that protects both client and community rights. A regional fair-share plan that incorporates negotiation and arbitration techniques is offered as an institutional mechanism for implementing the goals programming framework.     

Incorporating a “no claim bonus” in insurance agency contract

A bonus received by an agent from an insurer when the insured does not make a claim is called a “no claim bonus” (NCB). An NCB rewards the agent's risk‐management (RM) effort that reduces the probability that the insured suffers a loss. This paper designs an incentive compatible contract that induces the agent to choose an RM effort. If the agent's RM effort cost is lower than a threshold, feasible ranges of NCB and premium values exist such that the insurer can offer an incentive compatible agency contract with an NCB that is acceptable to the agent.     

工程施工中承包商索赔的基本程序

介绍了工程施工中承包商向业主索赔的程序。该程序包括：提出索赔要求，报送索赔资料，谈判协商，邀请中间人调解，提交仲裁机构或法院。实践中，并不是在每次索赔中这些程序都会全部出现。比如，邀请中间人调解成功之后，就没有必要再提交仲裁机构或法院了。采取文中所提出的程序，可以有效地维护承包商的合法权益。     

Knowledge‐intensive firms: the influence of the client on HR systems

HR systems play a critical role in growing knowledge‐intensive firms (KIFs) by facilitating the conversion of human capital into intellectual capital, which has market value. However, the choice of HR system is constrained by the relatively small number of clients they have in business‐to‐business relationships. This article seeks to understand how and why these client relationships affect the choice of HR practices in these firms. We address this issue by drawing on extensive empirical research currently under way in KIFs. Our research shows that HR practices can be influenced strongly by the client, both directly and indirectly. However, some KIFs will use their HR practices as a means of managing the relationships they have with their clients by shaping their boundaries with their clients and building organisational, professional and client identities. The varying client influence can be understood by examining the nature of the power relationship between the client and supplier, which is influenced by the uniqueness of the services provided. This has implications for our understanding of the factors affecting the exercise of a constrained choice of HR systems.     

Meaningful involvement of municipal purchasing departments in the procurement of consulting services: Case studies from Ontario, Canada

This paper describes the types of activities that were associated with meaningful involvement of municipal purchasing departments in the procurement of consulting services in Ontario, Canada. Included is a discussion of some of the key contextual factors found to enable meaningful involvement and the type of value that results as it relates to the needs of the client department and the overall goals and objectives of the municipalities as a whole. Ten case studies were conducted that involved in-depth interviews with twenty case study informants including ten purchasing agents, nine client department managers, and a consultant. The findings provide a basis for increasing the involvement of municipal purchasing departments in acquisition processes for these services and address some very important gaps in a particularly arid body of research related to local government purchasing. A number of testable hypotheses and research questions that may enable future researchers to address some of the gaps identified by this work are also presented.     

Lies,damned lies and statistics: the accuracy of survey responses

That survey research is error prone is not a new idea and different varieties of non-sampling error have been investigated in the literature as well as consideration being given in many statistics textbooks to the issue of sampling error. The paper here considers research upon corporate environmental reporting. It compares information provided by corporate environmental reports with information that survey respondents claim their organization’s environmental report contains. This enables the accuracy of the claims to be assessed. Consideration is given to two different industries the Water industry and the Energy industry. Errors due to inaccurate reporting by survey respondents are shown to be relatively infrequent and respondents appear just about as likely to claim they report information that they do not, in fact, report as to fail to indicate that they report information that is, in fact, actually reported.     

论监理单位的“独立性”及“代理人”角色

监理单位对业主的独立性问题在我国目前监理理论、实践中有很多的争议。监理单位的独立性有两种含义：责任意义上的独立性和组织意义上的独立性。应该否定其责任意义上的独立性而强调其组织意义上的独立性。监理单位的“代理人”问题则是与“独立性”问题紧密相关的，应该重视其经济学意义上的代理角色。     

论违约之诉的精神损害赔偿问题——以旅游合同为视角

在侵权法中允许受害人在符合法定条件下要求精神损害赔偿,无论是大陆法系和英美法系各国法律及学理上均不持异议,我国也有学者指出,精神损害赔偿是侵权责任法中的一种责任方式①。违约之诉中是否允许精神损害赔偿仍是一个争议的问题,本文运用比较的分析方法对此予以分析。     

A Map of Neverland: The role of policy in strategic environmental management

Emerging environmental management system standards and environmentally conscious academics promote the strategic planning role of environmental policies, but frequently ignore their strategic visioning role. It is argued in this paper that an environmental policy should based on strategic visioning and act as a starting point of strategic planning. Thus an environmental policy could link strategic visioning and planning. The policy should also communicate the environmental goals of a company and the means to reach those goals. To contribute to the fulfilment of the company's mission, the environmental goals and means (strategies) need to be integrated into and co-ordinated with general business goals and strategies. It is claimed here that an environmental policy has multiple strategic roles: strategic visioning, communicating, strategic planning, linking strategic visioning and planning, and integrating and co-ordinating. To support this claim, these five potential roles of an environmental policy are explored at the corporate, divisional and operating unit levels of Shell and Texaco. It is maintained that environmental policies have an enormous inherent strategic potential which can be released by building, maintaining and implementing the policies in such a way that they can fulfil all their strategic roles. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Optimal wage contracts under asymmetric information and moral hazard when investment decisions are delegated

I derive an optimal wage contract when risky investment decisions are delegated by riskaverse owners/investors to risk-neutral agents. The owners/investors do not know the probability distribution over the returns of any investment made by an agent. They know only the mean and the variance, and the upper and lower bounds of the return realizations of the different positive net present value (NPV) investment opportunities that can be discovered by their agents. They observe only the returns realized at the end of the period. Moral hazard with respect to investments made by agents, who are protected by limited liability, is also possible: an agent can falsely claim to have invested in one type of positive NPV investment opportunity and invest in another, or the agent can falsely claim to have invested in a positive NPV investment and invest in a negative NPV investment. I show that an optimal wage contract is simple under such conditions of severe asymmetric information and moral hazard. (JEL G20, G31)