The Determinants of Nonperforming Loans Before and After the Crisis: Challenges and Policy Implications for Turkish Banks

This article examines the determinants of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the Turkish banking sector via panel data estimation techniques. In order to see the effect of the global crisis and whether this effect changes across ownership, the analysis is conducted in subperiods covering the precrisis and the postcrisis periods and estimations are repeated by an ownership breakdown. Findings show that the determinants of NPLs have changed, and macroeconomic and policy-related determinants have higher significance after the crisis. Accordingly, strong economic activity and sound fiscal policy improve loan quality, while higher policy rate induces NPLs. Meanwhile, the significance of bank-specific determinants depends on ownership. Yet, a common theme applies suggesting that asset size should grow in favor of loans, but this should be backed with efficient loan monitoring, while capital adequacy is stringent enough to limit NPLs.     

Banking Market Size Structure and Financial Stability: Evidence from Eight Asian Countries

Using commercial bank data from eight major Asian countries, we examine the relationship between the banking market size structure and the stability of financial institutions. We also analyze the effect of bank upsizing on the financial stability. Our results show that a rise in large banks’ market power, accompanying an increase in their market shares, lowers the capital adequacy of small banks. Small banks’ nonperforming loans and the possibility of their bankruptcy also increase as large banks’ market shares rise. We further show that larger banks tend to have lower capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, and distance-to-default ratios. Our study suggests that large banks’ greater market shares are associated with small banks’ financial instability. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion of the recent banking literature that has important antitrust policy implications.     

Financial Innovation,Basel Accord III,and Bank Value

I examine how financial innovation and Basel III capital requirements in Taiwan respond differently to banking crises and market competition. My panel data set comprises data from thirty-four banks for 2000-2012. I find a significant negative relationship between derivatives and the value of a bank and significant positive relationships among the capital adequacy ratio, bank-specific variables, and the value of a bank. Larger bank size and operational diversification tend to be positively associated with a bank's value, the holding of a relatively high amount of capital requirements, and nonperforming loans that are large. The latter result may simply reflect the scale of economy and improvement of efficiency in terms of financial innovation in the banking sector.     

Monetary Policy,Bank Lending,and the Risk‐Pricing Channel

This paper identifies a monetary policy channel through the risk pricing of bank debt in the market for jumbo certificates of deposit (jumbo CDs). Adverse policy shocks increase debt holder perceptions of bank default, increasing the risk premia for some banks, thereby decreasing their external funding of loans. The results show that contractionary policy increases the sensitivity of jumbo‐CD spreads to leverage and asset risk for small banks, and to leverage for large banks. The results also show a distributional and aggregate effect on banking system jumbo CDs and total loans, producing a risk‐pricing (or market discipline) channel. This channel has implications for monetary and regulatory policies, and financial stability.     

Economic capital for nonperforming loans

A portfolio of nonperforming loans requires economic capital. We present two models for forecasting the portfolio loss and its probability distribution. In the first model, the loss for each nonperforming loan entails a change in provision over the risk horizon. The risk determinants are the single-name concentration, measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschmann index, as well as a systematic factor and the idiosyncratic risk. Our second model allows for interportfolio diversification with a portfolio of performing loans because banks typically own both performing and nonperforming loans. In this model, the nonperforming loan is identified with its systematic risk. Both models allow for closed-form expressions of economic capital and for the capital charge of the single loan. We calibrate the macroeconomic model parameters statistically with a loss panel; the microeconomic parameters depend on the portfolio. The portfolio risk for nonperforming loans mainly depends on the volatility of the systematic economic factor. The dependence becomes more pronounced when interportfolio diversification is taken into account. The magnitude of interportfolio diversification is also marked. Finally, we calculate regulatory capital charges according to Basel II for past-due loans. The regulatory charges are on average smaller than our economic charges and, additionally, take the volatility of economic activity into account only implicitly.     

Loan growth and bank risk: new evidence

This study provides new evidence on the relationship between abnormal loan growth and banks’ risk-taking behavior using data from a rich panel of Colombian financial institutions. We show that abnormal credit growth during a prolonged period leads to an increase in banks’ riskiness, accompanied by a reduction in solvency and an increase in the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. We also show that abnormal credit growth played a fundamental role in the bank-failure process during the late 1990s financial crisis in Colombia. Our results have important implications for financial regulation and macro-prudential policy.     

Macroeconomic Impact of Bank Regulation and Supervision: A Cross-Country Investigation

Bank regulation and supervision (RS) is a formal institutional mechanism that aims to reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard risks in the banking sector. This paper offers an empirical exploration of the relationship between banking-sector performance and RS using data on the legal quality of bank regulation and supervision. The main channels via which RS affects bank performance are considered to be depositor trust, investment mobilization, and borrower discipline. An event study of up to fifty-three countries provides robust evidence that RS has significant positive effects on bank deposits and investment rate and significant negative effects on nonperforming loans.     

Financial System and Housing Price

The 2007/2008 US financial crisis is related to the securitization of mortgage loans and the housing-price boom and bust. In this article, we test the hypothesis that housing-price change is related to the development of the financial system. Using panel data for 23 countries from 1988 to 2012, we have found that the housing-price growth rate increases as the financial system moves a bank orientation to a market orientation. The policy implication is that the government should beware sudden increases in the capital market relative to the banking sector. Especially, more sophisticated financial supervision with respect to housing-price movement is required when a bank-based financial system progresses quickly to a market-oriented financial system.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Policy in Turkey

This article investigates the bank-specific characteristics of risk-taking behavior of the Turkish banking sector as well as the existence of risk-taking channel of monetary policy in Turkey. Using bank-level quarterly data over the period 2002–2012 a dynamic panel model is estimated. We find evidence that low short-term interest rates reduce the risk of outstanding loans; however short-term interest rates below a theoretical benchmark increase risk-taking of banks. This result holds for macroeconomic controls and external factors as well. Furthermore, in terms of bank-specific characteristics, our analysis suggests that large, liquid, and well-capitalized banks are less prone to risk-taking.     

中国影子银行的经济学分析:定义、构成和规模测算

2008年国际金融危机以后,中国金融体系发生的重大变化之一是影子银行的较快发展,其规模迅速膨胀,交易结构日趋复杂,各类市场主体都牵涉其中。这些变化吸引了政策制订者和学术界的广泛关注。本文给出了中国影子银行的功能性定义,即依赖于银行信用、从事银行业务、但又没接受严格的银行业监管的金融业务,具体指传统的银行表内贷款和债券投资以外的,具备完整的信用转换、期限转换和流动性转换功能的金融业务。本文逐项分析影子银行业务,详细总结各类型业务的交易结构、业务主体、业务实质、资金来源、法律基础、资产负债表表示,准确测算了2002年至今影子银行总量和资产负债表结构月度数据。只从资产负债表的负债端着手加总,既完整地涵盖了影子银行的全部业务,得到其宏观总量,又剔除了重复计算。本文测算数据为后续研究打下了基础。     

房贷集中度管理如何影响房地产与银行业?

过去十余年,房地产市场因上下游产业链条长,且横跨生产、消费、流通等领域,对经济增长发挥了拉动作用,但房地产资金与金融体系绑定较重,使其成为现阶段我国金融风险方面最大的"灰犀牛"。2020年12月31日,央行、银保监会联合发布《关于建立银行业金融机构房地产贷款集中度管理制度的通知》,明确建立银行业金融机构房地产贷款集中度管理制度,并对房地产贷款集中度管理制度的机构覆盖范围、管理要求和调整机制等做出明确要求,对房地产市场和银行业务影响深远。     

Institutional development and bank stability: Evidence from transition countries

This paper takes advantage of the dynamic nature of institutional reforms in transition economies and explores the causal effects of those reforms on bank risk. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we show that banks’ financial stability increases substantially after these countries reform their legal institutions, liberalize banking, and restructure corporate governance. We also find that the effects of legal and governance reforms on bank risk may critically depend on the progress of banking reforms. A further examination of alternative risk measures reveals that the increases in financial stability among banks mainly come from the reduction of asset risk. Banks tend to have lower ROA volatility and fewer nonperforming loans after reforming the institutional environment. Finally, we split our sample into foreign and domestic banks and find that the enhancement of financial stability is more pronounced for domestic banks.     

Panacea,Pandora's box,or placebo: Feedback in bank mortgage-backed security holdings and fair value accounting

We examine the relation between bank holdings of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and MBS prices. Theory suggests feedback between MBS holdings and underlying asset markets can be aggravated by mark-to-market accounting. We measure feedback by the relation between asset returns and the changes in bank MBS holdings. Consistent with the existence of feedback effects related to mark-to-market, we find that for banks with high MBS, more nonperforming loans, and lower total capital ratio, changes in bank MBS positions are positively associated with changes in MBS prices and that this relation is reduced after the April 2009 mark-to-market rule clarification. To assess the effect of feedback on shareholder value, we test whether the stock-price response of banks to the announcement of the mark-to-market accounting rule clarification is associated with the intensity of feedback behavior. We find that the stock market reaction to the rule change is more positive for banks with more MBS, higher nonperforming loans and higher pre-rule-change feedback. We also find positive bond-price reactions to the rule change. Overall, our results suggest feedback related to mark-to-market accounting had a measurable effect on shareholder value.     

Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non‐bank financial institutions and products—or what we now refer to as the “shadow banking system.” Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank‐ and market‐based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non‐bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct. Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re‐pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private‐label mortgage‐related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one—and very much a two‐way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset—corporate loans—and regained confidence in shadow‐banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically. This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization— namely, the role of non‐bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.     

我国产险公司个险产品与银行对接的创新方向

本文分析了我国产险公司与银行在个险产品上的合作现状,研究了西方国家保险业发展的相关经验,然后结合实际提出了我国产险公司个险产品与银行对接的若干创新方向.主要包括:在产品相对简单的大型个险市场与银行网站和电话银行对接;与银行业务类似或互补或利用银行结算等功能对接的产品创新;与保护银行和消费者利益及建立有效的风险共担机制对接的产品创新;与银行追求高额利润和以"问题解决者"面貌出现的产品及金融服务创新;与银行卡及楼宇按揭客户等银行核心资源对接的分散业务的批发化创新;与保险交易的便利性对接的保单标准化组合化及卡式保单创新;等.     

Can banks default overnight? Modelling endogenous contagion on the O/N interbank market

We propose a new model of the liquidity-driven banking system focusing on overnight interbank loans. This significant branch of the interbank market is commonly neglected in the banking system modelling and systemic risk analysis. We construct a model where banks are allowed to use both the interbank and the securities markets to manage their liquidity demand and supply as driven by prudential requirements in a volatile environment. The network of interbank loans is dynamic and simulated every day. We show how the intrasystem cash fluctuations alone, without any external shocks, may lead to systemic defaults, and what may be a symptom of the self-organized criticality of the system. We also analyze the impact of different prudential regulations and market conditions on the interbank market resilience. We confirm that the central bank’s asset purchase programmes, limiting the declines in government bond prices, can successfully stabilize banks’ liquidity demands. The model can be used to analyze the interbank market impact of macroprudential tools.     

存贷款季末“冲时点”：成因、途径与对策

在存款增速趋缓、贷款需求不足的背景下,“季末冲高”现象呈现出新特点。存贷款季末“冲时点”主要由经济波动、考核机制、贷款规模管理、银行报表修饰以及市场竞争压力等因素推动;它主要通过高息获取存款、存贷挂钩、运作理财产品、增加保证金存款以及季末突击放贷等途径实现;“冲时点”对银行经营管理、企业财务成本、货币政策研判、金融监管要求等有较大影响,需采取措施减少或避免“冲时点”现象,以促进银行业务合规稳健发展。     

中国银行业竞争与非金融企业影子银行化

本文结合非金融企业影子银行化的形成机制以及中国金融市场发展的特征事实,从“供给侧”和“需求侧”双重视角探究银行竞争如何抑制非金融企业影子银行化。以2003—2019年中国非金融上市企业为研究样本,分析发现,银行竞争能够显著降低非金融企业影子银行化。进一步以放松中小商业银行分支机构市场准入为标志事件构造准自然实验,基于双重差分法的计量结果为识别银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制效应提供了稳健的经验证据。机制分析发现,银行业竞争通过弱化“信贷扭曲”和“监管套利”两个维度的作用机制抑制非金融企业影子银行化。异质性分析表明,银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制作用在融资约束较高和投资机会较少的样本中尤为明显。     

Open-bank assistance transactions and prompt corrective action

Open-bank assistance (OBA), provided to troubled banking institutions by the FDIC to prevent their failure, has been criticized extensively on grounds that closed-bank transactions, especially early closed bank transactions, are less expensive to the FDIC. This article analyzes a case in which OBA makes public policy sense, under conditions in which uncertainty is introduced into the valuation of a bank's nonperforming assets. Under such uncertainty, the FDIC may play a role by providing to the acquiror of the troubled institution essentially costless (to the FDIC) standby insurance on the ultimate workout values of the nonperforming assets. If properly structured, such an OBA transaction would meet critics' objections by minimizing FDIC cost and creating incentives for the early recapilization of troubled banks.     

Banking Relationships and Syndicated Loans during the 2008 Financial Crisis

The research shows that banking relationships are important to lending. However, few studies focus on the banking relationships in syndicated loans, although these loans have became a major source of financing. The last financial crisis clearly shows the impacts of credit rationing and tightening credit conditions, even in the syndicated loans market. We investigate whether banking relationships help firms to benefit from better terms for syndicated loans in a chaotic financial environment. Using a sample of syndicated loans arranged from 2003 to 2008 in North America and Europe, we find that firms with a previously developed relationship with a lead bank obtained a lower spread and a longer maturity during the financial crisis but did not benefit from larger loan facilities.