The profitability of asset sales as an explanation of asset divestitures

Using Korean fixed asset divestiture data, I extend the investigation of the financing hypothesis of divestitures proposed by Lang et al. (Lang, L., Poulsen, A., Stulz, R., 1995. Asset sales, firm performance, and the agency costs of managerial discretion, Journal of Financial Economics 37, 3.37). In particular, I take into account the profitability of announced asset divestitures and I employ a unique sample constructed to avoid effects that might confound the results. I also take into account the financial condition of the selling firms. The results are consistent with the financing hypothesis proposed by Lang et al. and show that the financing hypothesis of divestitures is robust to controls for the profitability of asset sales and the financial condition of selling firms.     

Restructuring Using Operating Asset Exchanges: Issues and Evidence

This study examines restructuring in which a firm divests an operating asset in exchange for another operating asset. Since liquidity, capital structure, and distributional issues are not immediately associated with tax‐free asset‐for‐asset exchanges, they are well suited for examining the competing hypotheses related to divestitures. We find that the abnormal returns associated with asset exchanges are generally smaller than those associated with other divestiture restructurings except when indications of value are provided. Our analysis identifies positive valuation effects for firms undertaking focus‐enhancing exchanges, but a dominating consideration is whether the value of the units traded is indicated.     

Voluntary Divestitures and the Choice Between Sell-Offs and Spin-Offs

A voluntary divestiture may either be a sell-off or a spin-off. In a sell-off, the divesting firm receives cash (or cash equivalents) and gives up ownership and control of the divested asset. In a spin-off, the divested asset becomes an independent entity under a new management but ownership remains with the old stockholders of the original firm. The study investigates the divestiture decision and the choice between sell-offs and spin-offs by constructing a model of the multi-divisional firm. The results show that firms undertake voluntary divestitures because of low marginal return coupled with high joint operating and financial costs. The form of the divestiture is determined by the operating risk of the division being divested. The implications of the model are empirically tested for the period 1969–87 and the results support the postulates of the model.     

Voluntary Corporate Divestitures as Antitakeover Mechanisms

This paper examines the investor reaction to the use of corporate selloffs as antitakeover devices. The results show that firms subject to takeover speculations prior to the divestiture announcement experience insignificant changes in share prices while firms that have no takeover bid report significant wealth increases. The majority of the firms that undergo defensive divestitures remain independent one year after the selloffs. These findings are consistent with the authors' proposition that investors regard divestitures following rumors of takeover attempt as antitakeover strategies. On the other hand, investors perceive selloffs in a takeover-free environment as a positive net present value decision.     

Divestitures and Divisional Investment Policies

We study a sample of diversified firms that alter their organizational structure by divesting a business segment. These firms experience a reduction in the diversification discount after the divestiture. We show that the efficiency of segment investment increases substantially following the divestiture and that this improvement is associated with a decrease in the diversification discount. Our results support the corporate focus and financing hypotheses for corporate divestitures. We demonstrate that inefficient investment is partly responsible for the diversification discount and show that asset sales lead to an improvement in the efficiency of investment for remaining divisions.     

Managerial expertise,corporate decisions and firm value: Evidence from corporate refocusing

This paper investigates how managerial expertise—specifically, industry expertise—affects firm value through divestiture. Using CEOs’ managerial experiences in industries throughout their careers as a measure of their industry expertise, I find that CEOs in diversified conglomerates are more likely to divest divisions in industries in which they have less experience. This finding is consistent with CEOs who divest such divisions in order to refocus on those divisions in which they have specialized—that is, to achieve a better match between their expertise and their firms’ retained assets. Firms that divest for a better CEO-firm match experience significant improvements in operating performance, as well as significant abnormal stock returns that persist for an average of three years following a divestiture. Further, among firms that divest for a better match, those firms with more experienced CEOs realize greater gains in firm value. In contrast, divestitures that increase corporate focus, but do not improve the expertise-asset match, do not lead to long-run increases in firm value.     

Subsidiary divestiture and acquisition in a financial crisis: Operational focus, financial constraints, and ownership

We exploit parent- and subsidiary-level data for publicly listed firms in Thailand before, during, and after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to investigate the extent to which firms with different types of ownership restructure their business portfolios, in terms of divestitures and acquisitions. We compare restructuring choices made by firms mostly owned by (a) domestic individuals with block shares (family firms), (b) domestic firms and/or institutions (DI firms), and (c) foreign investors (foreign firms). We show that following the crisis (1) foreign firms' restructuring behavior is the least affected; (2) domestic firms owned by families and domestic institutions (DI) behave similarly to one another; (3) domestic firms do not increase divestiture in their peripheral segments to improve operational focus or to obtain cash in a credit crunch; they actually reduce divestiture in core segments; and (4) domestic firms also significantly reduce the acquisition of new subsidiaries. Our results challenge traditional explanations for divestiture such as corporate governance, operational refocus, and financial constraints. They indicate that in the great uncertainty of a crisis, domestic firms are able to hold onto their core assets to avoid fire-sale. In essence, they act more conservatively in churning their business portfolios.     

Analysing the wealth effects of UK divestitures: An examination of domestic and international sales

Here we analyse divestiture announcement effects for UK multinational corporations accounting for the location of the unit sold. We find some bias in market reactions with larger abnormal returns for UK divestitures when compared to overseas sales. US sales generate larger returns than those in Continental Europe or the Asia-Pacific region. We analyse the determinants of abnormal returns using accounting and transaction data, supplemented with country specific data for overseas sales. Abnormal returns for UK sales are explained by financial characteristics of the selling firm but the size of the transaction relative to the firm is the most significant factor in overseas divestitures.     

Write‐Down Timeliness, Line‐of‐Business Disclosures and Investors' Interpretations of Segment Divestiture Announcements

Abstract:   This paper examines investors' anticipation and subsequent interpretations of asset write‐downs accompanying segment divestitures. Examining long‐window returns cumulated over the two years preceding the year of divestiture, we hypothesize and find that investors anticipate write‐downs of segment operating assets before divestiture and recognition occurs, with anticipation conditional on the timeliness of the write‐down and prior disclosure of the segments' operating results under segment reporting rules. Short‐window returns cumulated over the three days surrounding the announcement of the divestiture confirm that investor interpretations of asset write‐downs are similarly contingent on write‐down timeliness and prior disclosure.     

Ownership structure and divestiture decisions: Evidence from Australian firms

Divestitures create shareholder value by helping firms to optimize their portfolio of assets. However, firms may forego value enhancing divestitures because of agency problems. More specifically, large controlling shareholders may prefer to retain the assets in order to extract private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders. In this paper, we explore the role that other blockholders play in constraining the largest shareholder's influence. The results indicate that divestiture activity decreases with the ownership of the largest shareholder. The presence of another significant blockholder appears to curb this negative bias towards divestitures. Our findings provide an economic rationale for the higher performance of firms characterized by more balanced ownership structures. Involvement of family owners also appears to provide similar benefits.     

Effect of auditing: Evidence from variability of stock returns and trading volume

Although the benefits of auditing are uncontroversial in developed markets,there is scant evidence about its effect in emerging economies.Auditing derives its value by increasing the credibility of financial statements,which in turn increases investors’reliance on them in developed markets.Financial statement information is common to all investors and therefore increased reliance on it should reduce divergence in investors’assessment of firm value.We examine the effect of interim auditing on inter-investor divergence with a large sample of listed Chinese firms and find that it decreases more for firms whose reports are audited compared to non-audited firms.This finding suggests that investors rely more on audited financial information.Results of this study are robust to variations in event window length and specification of empirical measures.     

On Corporate Divestiture

This paper investigates why firms choose to divest their units/segments, and how firms choose among the three divestiture mechanisms (equity carveout, spinoff, and asset selloff). A direct comparison is conducted on firms viable choices on a comprehensive sample of corporate divestiture transactions in the period of 1985-1998. Our multinomial logit analysis provides a complete picture on corporate divestitures. We find that, in support for the focusing hypothesis, highly diversified firms are more likely to divest units when suffering from low operating efficiency. Our results are also consistent with the proposition that firms are divesting to relax their credit constraint, as firms with higher leverage ratios and low cash income are more likely to engage in carveouts or selloffs. We find limited evidence of information asymmetry as the major determinant of divestitures. We provide new findings on firms choice among the three divestiture options. We report that, conditioned on the decision to divest, firms mainly use asset selloffs in divesting smaller units operating in the same industry. Firms with larger divested units are more likely to use spinoff or carveout transactions. Parent firms having high revenue growth, high book-to-market ratio, and divesting unit when market sentiment is high are less likely to use spinoffs. Firms having high dividend yield, less information asymmetry, and divesting units operating in different industries are more likely to use carveout as an exit mechanism. Alternative specification of an ordered logit analysis generates consistent findings.JEL Classification: G34     

Industry aspects of takeovers and divestitures: Evidence from the UK

This paper examines takeover and divestiture activity at the industry level for the population of UK firms over the period 1986–2000. Consistent with US research, takeovers in the UK cluster both across industries and over time. The evidence for divestitures indicates clustering across industries only. The paper further investigates whether broad and specific industry shocks (e.g., growth, free cash flow, concentration, deregulation, foreign competition, technology, stock market performance) explain takeover and divestiture clustering at the industry level. The results suggest that broad shocks increase (decrease) the likelihood of takeovers (divestitures), although not significantly for takeovers. Specific industry shocks that increase the likelihood of takeover activity include low growth, the threat of foreign competition and high stock market performance. For divestitures, high industry concentration and deregulation increase activity. Little evidence is found for deregulation as a significant factor in explaining takeover activity.     

Comparing acquisitions and divestitures

We study the acquisition and divestiture activity of a sample of 1305 firms from 59 industries during the 1990–1999 period. Consistent with the importance of restructuring activity during the 1990s, we find that half of the sample firms are acquired or engage in a major divestiture. Consistent with the notion that economic change is a source of the observed restructuring activity, we find significant industry clustering in both acquisitions and divestitures. We also study the announcement effects of the two forms of restructuring and find that both acquisitions and divestitures in the 1990s increase shareholder wealth. Moreover, the wealth effects for both acquisitions and divestitures are directly related to the relative size of the event. The symmetric, positive wealth effects for acquisitions and divestitures are consistent with a synergistic explanation for both forms of restructuring and are inconsistent with nonsynergistic models based on entrenchment, empire building and hubris.     

Death spiral PIPEs: a reconsideration of the evidence

We challenge the view that PIPEs lead to unfavourable outcomes for issuing firms. We show that structured PIPEs do not have significant negative CARs when a matched firm benchmark is used for computing CARs and when sample selection bias is taken into account. Indeed, structured PIPEs have significantly higher positive skewness, indicating superior optionality, consistent with the real option argument. We also show that the 2002 intervention by the Securities and Exchange Corporation (SEC) has led to unintended consequences, with the substitution of ‘mom and pop’ investors for hedge fund investors in the structured PIPE market.     

Do Foreign Investors Encourage Value-Enhancing Corporate Risk Taking?

This paper examines whether foreign investors in Korea affect incentives for firms to take risks in corporate investment. The short-term focus of foreign investors encourages managers to engage in conservative investment behavior. On the other hand, foreign investors encourage managers to focus on long-term value rather than short-term returns as active participants in corporate governance. These competing views are examined by testing for the association between foreign ownership and variations in corporate cash flow, a proxy for the risk of chosen investments. Furthermore, we examine whether risk taking is positively associated with firm growth, which is a primary concern in debates regarding the myopic behaviors of foreign investors. The results show that firms with high foreign ownership are less likely to avoid risk taking—and that risk taking is, in turn, positively associated with firm growth, implying that foreign investors perform a monitoring function in encouraging value-enhancing risk taking.     

Net equity issuance effect in the UK

Net equity issuance (NEI) by firms has predictive power for US stock returns. This paper examines the NEI anomaly for UK stocks, using regression on firm characteristics and sorted portfolios with several factor models. The anomaly generalises to the UK only in part. We confirm the existence of a large NEI effect for small and midsize stocks, but not for large stocks. The repurchase effect, of positive abnormal returns following repurchases, is absent in the UK. We also find that the NEI effect in smaller stocks is not exploitable by investors, allowing for transaction costs.     

Foreign institutional investors,information asymmetries,and asset valuation in emerging markets

This study investigates the effects of information asymmetries and asset valuation model differences (investor heterogeneity) between foreign and domestic investors on their distinct portfolio holdings in an emerging market setting. I argue that information asymmetry and investor heterogeneity views significantly interact in explaining the different asset allocation decisions of foreign and domestic investors. Employing a large dataset from Turkey, the findings suggest that both information asymmetry and investor heterogeneity view play a key role in explaining the investment decisions of different investor groups. Specifically, different from domestic investors, foreign investors are more likely to invest in firms with a higher global market performance which supports the investor heterogeneity view. However, this relationship only holds for firms with high information asymmetries. The difference in valuation models between foreign and domestic investors converge when asymmetric information problems between these investor groups weaken. This study contributes to the international finance literature by providing a new explanation of why foreign and domestic investors invest in different assets.     

Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance

This paper investigates the causes and consequences of activist block share purchases in the 1980s. We find that activist investors were most likely to purchase large blocks of shares in highly diversified firms with poor profitability. Activists were not less likely to purchase blocks in firms with shark repellents and employee stock ownership plans. Activist block purchases were followed by increases in asset divestitures, decreases in mergers and acquisitions, and abnormal share price appreciation. Industry-adjusted operating profitability also rose. This evidence supports the view that the market for partial corporate control plays an important role in limiting agency costs in U.S. corporations.     

Exchange Rate Exposure at the Firm and Industry Level

Previous work on the exposure of firms to exchange rate risk has primarily focused on U.S. firms and, surprisingly, found stock returns were not significantly affected by exchange‐rate fluctuations. The equity market premium for exposure to currency risk was also found to be insignificant. In this paper we examine the relation between Japanese stock returns and unanticipated exchange‐rate changes for 1,079 firms traded on the Tokyo stock exchange over the 1975–1995 period. Second, we investigate whether exchange‐rate risk is priced in the Japanese equity market using both unconditional and conditional multifactor asset pricing testing procedures. We find a significant relation between contemporaneous stock returns and unanticipated yen fluctuations. The exposure effect on multinationals and high‐exporting firms, however, is found to be greater in comparison to low‐exporting and domestic firms. Lagged‐exchange rate changes on firm value are found to be statistically insignificant implying that investors are able to assess the impact of exchange‐rate changes on firm value with no significant delay. The industry level analysis corroborates the cross‐sectional findings for Japanese firms in that they are sensitive to contemporaneous unexpected exchange‐rate fluctuations. The co‐movement between stock returns and changes in the foreign value of the yen is found to be positively associated with the degree of the firm's foreign economic involvement and inversely related to its size and debt to asset ratio. Asset pricing tests show that currency risk is priced. We find corroborating evidence in support of the view that currency exposure is time varying. Our results indicate that the foreign exchange‐rate risk premium is a significant component of Japanese stock returns. The combined evidence from the currency exposure and asset pricing analyses, suggests that currency risk is priced and, therefoe, has implications for corporate and portfolio managers.