西方银行贷款定价理论评述

作为金融中介理论的重要组成部分，银行贷款定价理论围绕对银行行为的探讨而展开，已形成了较完整的理论体系。本文选择三种有代表性的银行贷款定价理论——基于市场结构的贷款定价、基于关系型贷款的定价和最前沿的基于风险的贷款定价理论进行介绍与评价，以期为我国银行贷款定价实践提供理论指导。     

Political Connection,Ownership, and Post-Crisis Industrial Upgrading Investment: Evidence from China

This article investigates the effect of political connections, along with government ownership and family control, on the intensity of investment in industrial upgrading, including the intensity of R&D, facility upgrading, and marketing, in the context of post-crisis recovery through industrial upgrading in emerging economies. Based on empirical evidence in China, the article finds that political connections of top executives are positively associated with investment in upgrading. The effects of political connections on the intensity of investment in R&D and marketing are negatively moderated by both government ownership and family control, whereas the relationship between political connections and the intensity of investment in facilities upgrading is positively moderated by government ownership and negatively moderated by family control.     

Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.     

Firm Size Dependence in the Determinants of Bank Term Loan Maturity

Abstract:   We examine the hypothesis that firm size affects the sensitivity of bank term loan maturity to its underlying determinants. As borrower size increases, negotiating power with the lender and information transparency increase, while the lender is able to spread the fixed costs of loan production across a larger dollar value of the loan. We find strong evidence of firm size dependency in the determinants of bank term loan maturity and show that this is unrelated to syndication. Only large borrowers can manipulate bank loan contract terms so as to increase firm value.     

Bank Relationship and Firm Performance: Evidence From Thailand Before the Asian Financial Crisis

Abstract:   This study examines the relation between bank relations and market performance in Thailand, an economy in which commercial banks play a crucial role through lending relationship and, for a number of companies, equity ownership. Overall, bank relationships, both equity‐based and debt‐based, positively affect capital investment. However, there is a negative relation between lending relationships, both short‐term and long‐term, and market performance indicating that bank lending may not always be consistent with value maximization. There is also evidence of a positive marginal effect of bank monitoring through equity ownership on market performance. Further, the relation between bank equity ownership and market performance appears to be non‐linear with a concave function. Ownership by corporate insiders is also negatively related to bank equity ownership. Overall, the findings highlight the detrimental effects of excessive short‐term debt usage, one of the factors believed to contribute to the financial crisis in Thailand, and the marginal benefit of the equity‐based relationship on firm value.     

贷款利率市场化前后商业银行股票网络拓扑性质分析

运用复杂网络方法,构建商业银行股票收益率网络,考量贷款利率市场化前后商业银行股票网络的拓扑性质变化.结果表明:贷款利率市场化前后,16家商业银行股票收益率相关系数没有发生显著变化,网络的平均路径长度及聚集系数也未发生明显变化,但贷款利率市场化后国有五大行股票收益距离更近,彼此相关性更强,网络中心节点变化较大.     

Does Diversification Improve the Performance of German Banks? Evidence from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios

Should banks be diversified or focused? Does diversification indeed lead to increased performance and therefore greater safety on the part of banks as traditional portfolio and banking theory would suggest? Recently, Acharya et al. (J Bus, 79:1355–1412, 2006) have found that for Italian banks the answers to these questions depend on the level of risk that a bank has taken. In this paper we investigate whether this result is robust to the choice of the sample and to the calculation of the risk variable. To this end we use a unique data set of the individual bank loan portfolios of 983 German banks for the period from 1996 to 2002 and calculate a Value-at-Risk based risk variable. We then investigate the link between banks’ profitability and their portfolio diversification across different industries, broader economic sectors and geographical regions. We find little evidence of large performance benefits associated with diversification: For the majority of our data, diversification tends to be associated with reductions in bank returns, even after controlling for risk. Only in a few cases (e.g., high-risk banks and industrial diversification) do we find statistically significant positive relationships between diversification and bank returns. Our findings contradict both the empirical findings of Acharya et al. (J Bus, 79:1355–1412, 2006) and the theoretical findings of Winton (Don’t put all your eggs in one basket? Diversification and specialization in lending. Working Paper No. 00-16, University of Minnesota, 1999).     

Political Connections and Government Subsidies: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms in China

Previous studies report mixed evidence regarding the effect of political connections on firm value. We seek new evidence in China, an important emerging market with a hallmark of a relationship-based economy. Using financially distressed firms (special treatment or ST firms) as a unique sample, we identify a direct channel through which political connections enhance firm value by showing that politically connected firms receive more government subsidies. Moreover, such effect becomes stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for firms with a better chance of survival, and after the government implemented a new policy to more strictly enforce the delisting in 2012.     

Enhancing Loan Quality Through Transparency: Evidence from the European Central Bank Loan Level Reporting Initiative

We explore whether transparency in banks’ securitization activities enhances loan quality. We take advantage of a novel disclosure initiative introduced by the European Central Bank, which requires, as of January 2013, banks that use their asset‐backed securities as collateral for repo financing to report securitized loan characteristics and performance in a standardized format. We find that securitized loans originated under the transparency regime are of better quality with a lower default probability, a lower delinquent amount, fewer days in delinquency, and lower losses upon default. Additionally, banks with more intensive loan level information collection and those operating under stronger market discipline experience greater improvement in their loan quality under the new reporting standards. Overall, we demonstrate that greater transparency has real effects by incentivizing banks to improve their credit practices.     

Political Connection and Stock Returns: A Longitudinal Study

A stock market should display informational efficiency and, therefore, should appropriately reflect the value of political connections, if any value exists. Using a comprehensive data set that incorporates both obvious and less obvious political connections to firms in Thailand, we provide a longitudinal study which shows that higher realized stock returns are systematically associated with political connectedness. Consistent with the view that such a relationship provides economic rents, this finding is particularly prominent in more regulated industries. The politically connected premium is higher for higher level political connections and when the political bodies hold an equity stake in the firm.     

Competition,Financial Intermediation,and Riskiness of Banks: Evidence from the Asia-Pacific Region

From a sample of commercial banks in the Asia-Pacific region over the 1994–2009 period, this study highlights that banks in less competitive markets exhibit lower loan growth and higher instability. Such instability is further followed by a decline in deposit growth, suggesting that Asian banks are also subject to indirect market discipline mechanisms through bank competition. This study therefore sheds light on the importance of enhancing bank competition to overcome bank risk and strengthen financial intermediation. Likewise, this study advocates the importance of strengthening market discipline to reduce bank riskiness regardless of the degree of competition in the banking industry.     

Bank Funding,Securitization, and Loan Terms: Evidence from Foreign Currency Lending

We examine how bank funding structure and securitization activities affect the currency denomination of business loans. We analyze a unique data set that includes information on the requested and granted loan currency for 99,490 loans granted to 57,464 firms by a Bulgarian bank. Our findings document that foreign currency lending is at least partially driven by bank eagerness to match the currency structure of assets with that of liabilities. Our results also show that loan currency, as well as loan amount and maturity, are adjusted to make loans eligible for securitization.     

Star CEOs or Political Connections? Evidence from China's Publicly Traded Firms

This paper studies China's “star CEOs” defined as members of the National People's Congress (NPC) or the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and “politically connected” CEOs who have previous government or military experience. We evaluate the effect of “star CEOs” and “politically connected” CEOs on firm performance and CEO compensation. We find that announcement date returns, CEO compensation and incentives are all higher in firms that appoint “star CEOs”. However, the mechanism explaining these various premiums is largely political connectedness of these star CEOs. Our study finds only modest evidence that star‐CEO status directly determines firm performance. Our analysis strongly suggests that compensation and performance premiums are mostly driven by CEO political connections, as opposed to CEO talent/star effects.     

银行信贷、非效率投资与僵尸企业——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据

利用2009－2017年中国沪深A股上市公司数据,探究企业非效率投资与僵尸企业的关系,以及银行信贷对非效率投资与僵尸企业之间关系的影响。结果表明：企业的非效率投资与僵尸企业正相关,特别是企业过度投资中耗费的资源、形成的产能具有不可逆性,将直接增加经营风险和财务风险,导致企业沦为僵尸企业;银行信贷对企业僵尸化具有负向调节效应,相对于过度投资来说,银行信贷对于抑制投资不足导致的企业僵尸化问题更加有效;从贷款期限来看,短期贷款能够给债务企业形成流动性压力和再融资压力,迫使企业经理人提高投资效率,从而对企业僵尸化问题的调节效应更显著。     

The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis

We analyze the roles of bank ownership, management, and compensation structures in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that failures are strongly influenced by ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower‐level management and non‐chief executive officer (non‐CEO) higher‐level management increase failure risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of banks’ CEOs do not have a direct impact on bank failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce non‐CEO managers to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may result in bank failure. We identify tail risk in noninterest income as a primary risk‐taking channel of lower‐level managers.     

全球金融危机下投资银行发展模式研究

美国华尔街危机是包括银行、保险公司、对冲基金等机构在内的全面危机,是各类机构以高杠杆进行金融市场交易类业务并导致巨额亏损的后果.美国独立投行的消失也并不意味着投行实体的消失,以大型银行为主体的金融控股集团确实具有更强的抗风险能力.承销、并购、财务顾问等投行业务在中国仍然前景广阔,但金融市场交易领域的创新确需谨慎.在重塑...     

Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Originations

Low-cost deposits and increased balance sheet liquidity raise banks' supply of illiquid loans more than loans easily sold or securitized. We exploit the inability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase jumbo mortgages to identify an exogenous change in liquidity. The volume of jumbo mortgage originations relative to nonjumbo originations increases with bank holdings of liquid assets and decreases with bank deposit costs. This result suggests that the increasing depth of the mortgage secondary market fostered by securitization has reduced the effect of lender's financial condition on credit supply.     

Determinants of Bank Debt in a Continental Financial System: Evidence from Spanish Companies

We test hypotheses about the structure of corporate debt ownership and the use of bank debt by firms in a civil‐law country, Spain. We focus on bank debt effects in the presence of information asymmetries and agency costs, and on efficient versus inefficient firm liquidation. We find that the relation between growth opportunities and bank financing is not as strong as the one found in common‐law countries, that there is a positive relation between firm size and the proportion of bank debt used, and that firms closer to bankruptcy and highly leveraged are more likely to use bank debt.