共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Optimal new-product pricing in regulated industries 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Intertemporal pricing issues faced by regulated monopolists in market settings characterized by high rates of innovation have received little attention in the regulatory economics literature. Most analyses of regulatory pricing have focused on monopolies characterized by a stable multiple-good product set. In a regulated industry characterized by technological change in the form of new products and services (such as telecommunications), optimal pricing decisions may also reflect intertemporal market and production factors. In this paper, two such intertemporal factors are modeled: learning curve effects on the firm's cost function, and customer demonstration effects on the demand side of the market. Inclusion of these factors leads to an intertemporal pricing rule that may conflict with the standard regulatory practice whereby each product or service must recoup its own resource costs period by period. Our results suggest that this regulatory practice can result in efficiency losses, since it results in a rate of technological diffusion that is too low. 相似文献
2.
Daniel R. Hollas 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》1994,6(3):227-245
State public service commission regulation of gas utility pricing is examined during the period of wellhead price deregulation. A model which incorporates asymmetry in price setting during a period of changing input costs is estimated. Statistical analyses suggest public service commission regulation slowed the increase in gas utility prices during periods of rising costs. Gas utility pricing was not monitored as closely when purchased gas prices fell, thereby altering the rate structure in favor of industrial customers. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission policies designed to promote competition by restructuring the transmission sector of the gas industry after 1985 appear to have suppressed retail prices in industrial markets. 相似文献
3.
Ramsey pricing in a hierarchical structure with an application to network-access pricing 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Ming Chung Chang 《Journal of Economics》1996,64(3):281-314
This paper studies a hierarchical structure where an upstream regulated industry sells an intermediate good to a downstream regulated industry. Some sufficient conditions for all Ramsey prices to exceed marginal costs are derived. This hierarchical structure is shown to decrease the profit margin of the intermediate good but preserve its sign. Further, the hierarchical structure also decreases the profit margin of the final good sold by the downstream regulated industry. This is because this final good is a hierarchical complement to the intermediate good sold by the upstream regulated industry. The impacts upon other publicly produced goods, however, could be said to be neutral. Therefore, the hierarchical structure has asymmetric impacts upon publicly produced goods. Accordingly, the equiproportional output-reduction statement of Ramsey rule does not survive. This paper ends with providing an application to the network-access pricing problem. 相似文献
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George Deltas Thanasis Stengos Eleftherios Zacharias 《The Canadian journal of economics》2011,44(3):907-929
Abstract This paper examines the joint pricing decision of products in a firm’s product line. When products are distinguished by a vertical characteristic, those with higher values of that characteristic will command higher prices. We investigate whether, holding the value of the characteristic constant, there is an additional price premium for products on the industry and/or the firm frontier, that is, for the products with the highest value of the characteristic in the market or in a firm’s product line. We also investigate the existence of price premia for lower‐ranked products and other product line pricing questions. Using personal computer price data, we show that prices decline with the distance from the industry and firm frontiers, even after holding absolute quality constant. We find evidence that consumer tastes for brands is stronger for the consumers of frontier products (and thus competition between firms weaker in the top end of the market). There is also evidence that a product’s price is higher if a firm offers products with the immediately faster and immediately slower computer chip (holding the total number of a firm’s offerings constant), possibly as an attempt to reduce cannibalization. Finally, a product’s price declines with the time it is offered by a firm, suggesting intertemporal price discrimination. 相似文献
7.
《Ricerche Economiche》1993,47(4):355-361
Predatory pricing is feasible only if the minimax profit of the prey is strictly smaller than the expected profit in the corresponding Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. We completely characterize the conditions for feasibility of predatory pricing in Kreps and Scheinkman's model of capacity-constrained duopoly. The predator must have a capacity larger than that of the prey, and also larger than the Cournot capacity. Surprisingly, predatory pricing may be infeasible not only if the prey is too large but also if it is too small. 相似文献
8.
企业发展的“伊卡洛斯悖论”使其难以适应迅速变化的环境,在新的竞争中失去优势。要突破“伊卡洛斯悖论”的限制,企业必须发展组织适应能力。针对企业内阻碍组织适应能力提高的若干障碍和传统解决方案的不足,提出了新的组织适应能力构建方案。 相似文献
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This paper investigates the welfare effects of firm location in a service industry. We consider the situation where firms determine their locations in either of two regions with a difference in market size. From the viewpoint of the consumers' welfare, there are too few firms in the large market and too many in the small market. However, from the viewpoint of the producers' and social welfare, the opposite is true. Further, an increase in the difference in market size is unambiguously unfavorable for the producers. On the other hand, such an increase is favorable for the consumers and the economy as a whole. 相似文献
10.
《Economics Letters》1987,25(2):105-109
A location-price equilibrium is derived for a market with a constraint on the number of different prices each firm can charge. The sequence of these equilibria is shown to converge to the equilibrium in a market with perfect price discrimination. 相似文献
11.
《Journal of public economics》1986,29(3):281-294
The relative efficiency of privately-owned and publicly-owned electric utilities is investigated using theoretical and econometric models that allow for the effects of both ownership type and regulation. The estimation results indicate that the two types of firms are equally cost inefficient in the United States. The average effect of inefficiency is to increase the cost of production by 2.4 percent. Holding output constant, inefficiency increases the average quantities demanded of capital and labor and decreases the average quantity demanded of fuel. 相似文献
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Jed Friedman 《Economics of Transition》2004,12(2):333-366
One feature common to many post‐socialist transition economies is a relatively compressed wage structure in the state‐owned sector. We conjecture that this compressed wage structure creates weak incentives for work effort and worker skill acquisition and thus presents adverse consequences for the entire transition economy if a substantial portion of the labour force works in the state sector. We explore firm wage incentives and worker training, as well as other labour practices and outcomes, in a transition setting with matched firm and worker data collected in one of the largest provinces of Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese state sector exhibits a compressed wage distribution in relation to privately owned firms with foreign ownership. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their wage policies result in flatter wage–experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work force is in greater need of formal training, a need that is in part met through direct government financing. In spite of the opportunities for government financed training and at least partly due to inefficient worker incentives, state firms, by certain measures, exhibit lower levels of labour productivity. The private sector comparison group to state firms for all of these findings is foreign owned firms. The internal labour practices of foreign firms are more consistent with a view of profit‐maximizing firms operating with no political constraints. This is not the case for Vietnamese de novo private firms that exhibit much more idiosyncratic behaviour and whose labour practices are often indistinguishable from state firms. The exact reasons for this remain a topic of on‐going research yet we conjecture that various private sector constraints, including limited access to formal capital, play an important role. 相似文献
13.
R. Agarwala 《Applied economics》2013,45(3):161-166
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《Journal of economic behavior & organization》1988,9(4):405-417
Isaac and Smith (1985a,b) present a strong behavioral case that predatory pricing is not an observable laboratory phenomenon. We propose several modifications of their design, resulting in a multiple-market experiment in which predatory pricing is present. The primary modification involves conducting several markets concurrently, providing an active ‘escape’ opportunity for any prey and a potential reward to a reputation for predation. These results provide a ‘behavioral existence proof’ for the predatory pricing phenomenon. They do not address the issue of the phenomenon's behavioral robustness. 相似文献
15.
Stability and bifurcation analysis of deterministic systems has been widely used in modeling financial markets. We develop a simple pricing model with two types of rational traders, fundamentalists and chartists, in order to study well price behavior in financial markets, we use student t distribution to replace traditional normal distribution to describe fundamental price process. We study the stability and bifurcation of the underling deterministic system and use numerical simulation to study the dynamic of the stochastic system, including autocorrelations structures and high kurtosis of the returns. It is found that the fundamental price becomes stable (unstable) when the activities from both types of traders are balanced (unbalanced). 相似文献
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This paper develops a Keynesian model of the Portuguese economy in which the prices of the sectors of final demand are derived from input-output relationships. This model is used for short-run simulation analysis of the Portuguese economy through 1977. It is seen that Portugal cannot simply rely on world demand for its exports to improve its balance of payments and to generate an export-led recovery. Simulation of a policy package which includes a devaluation and fiscal restraint indicates that this policy will improve the external current account and raise domestic savings. 相似文献
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Melvyn G Coles 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,109(1):70-89
We study an alternating offers bargaining model in which the set of possible utility pairs evolves through time in a non-stationary, but smooth manner. In general, there exists a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. However, we show that in the limit as the time interval between two consecutive offers becomes arbitrarily small, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Furthermore, we derive a powerful characterization of the unique (limiting) subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. We then explore the circumstances under which Nash's bargaining solution implements this bargaining equilibrium. Finally, we extend our results to the case when the players have time-varying inside options. 相似文献
18.
Ex Post Inefficiencies in a Property Rights Theory of the Firm 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Private information can lead to inefficient bargaining betweenmanagers. I develop a property rights theory of the firm toanalyze the optimal ownership structure that minimizes thisbargaining inefficiency. I first show that a change in the ownershipstructure that reduces the managers' aggregate disagreementpayoff increases the probability that they realize efficienttrades, but also increases the cost of disagreement and canlead them to trade "too often." I then show that joint ownershipis optimal if the managers' expected gains from trade are largeand that either integration or nonintegration is optimal ifthe expected gains from trade are small. 相似文献
19.
We present empirical evidence using daily data for stock prices for 17 real estate companies traded in the Sao Paulo, Brazil stock exchange, from August 26, 2006 to March 31, 2010. We use the U.S. house price bubble, financial crisis and risk measures to instrument for momentums and reversals in the domestic real estate sector. We find evidence of conditional premium persistence and conditional volatility persistence in the market. We find that the conditional risk-return relationship in the sector is consistent with the prospect theory of risk attitudes in this period. Certain companies seem to be operating on a perceived potential industry return above the target, while most others are below the target, and the whole sector is below target on average. 相似文献
20.
>Sudeshna Champati Bandyopadhyay 《Scottish journal of political economy》1997,44(3):280-297
This paper studies the implications of union deviation by reducing effort in the context of a repeated game model. We find that a failure to account for the possibility of union deviation may lead to an overestimation of the possibility of cooperation. In contrast to the existing literature, we find that unions may reach the efficient outcome despite wage hikes because they work harder under cooperation. We also find that when effort is an endogenous variable, the cooperative wage is likely to be higher than otherwise. Finally, our model predicts that if the union alone deviates, effort will fall as the endgame approaches. However, wages could either rise or fall. 相似文献