A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures

This note considers a two-sided multi-issue bargaining problem in which players that belong to the same “side” may have conflicting priorities regarding the different negotiated issues. The note examines different bilateral bargaining procedures and shows the different equilibrium settlements that they yield. In particular the note examines the possibility that group heterogeneity (conflicting priorities) may be exploited in order to gain a better settlement. The different potential outcomes that are implied by the different procedures explain why we often observe such intense negotiation over bargaining procedures. Moreover, the conflict over procedure can be substantial, among parties with common interest as well as between opposing players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.     

Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information: Does the Use of Final Offer Arbitration Impede Settlement?

We identify two features of final offer arbitration (FOA) whichmay impede settlement in a bargaining game where asymmetricinformation drives the failure to settle. First, under FOA theinformed party has an incentive to conceal private informationabout the expected outcome in arbitration from his bargainingpartner. Revealing this information allows the previously uninformedparty to submit a more advantageous offer to the arbitratorto the detriment of the informed party. Second, in a two-typemodel, the uninformed player may choose to arbitrate all cases,a result which never occurs in a simple litigation game. Eachplayer's offer directly affects the outcome of arbitration underFOA, and it is this feature that generates impediments to settlementthat are not observed in a simple litigation game. Both impedimentsto settlement are removed if bargaining is allowed to take placeafter potentially binding offers have been submitted to thearbitrator.     

Bargaining over an Uncertain Value: Arbitration Mechanisms Compared

This article explores the theoretical and behavioral impactof conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration (FOA)when parties are bargaining over an uncertain value. In thiscontext, one player receives a fixed payment while the otherplayer receives the uncertain residual. Although both formsof arbitration have identically sized contract zones, we showtheoretically that in FOA the contract zone shifts in favorof the residual claimant. In addition, as the variance of thepossible values rises, the contract zone shifts further in favorof the residual claimant. In laboratory testing, the contractzone roughly reflects the central tendencies of behavior; however,both forms of arbitration increase conflict relative to a no-arbitrationbaseline. This is caused by residual claimants being more aggressivewhen arbitration is available while fixed-payment recipientsare not. However, both parties play a role in the conflict escalationdue to the increased proposal variation.     

A Model of Final Offer Arbitration in Regulation

I study a regulatory process in which both the regulator and the regulated firm propose prices that, in case of disagreement, are settled through final-offer arbitration (FOA)—a practice currently used in Chile for setting prices in the water sector. Rather than submitting a single offer, each party simultaneously submits an offer for each of the firms cost units (e.g., cost of raw water, capital cost). While a multiple-offers scheme allow the arbitrator to better approximate her ideal settlement, it may induce parties to submit widely divergent offers. This divergence, however, does not affect the arbitrators ability to learn from the offers.     

Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees

In typical experiments on ultimatum bargaining, the game is described verbally and the majority of subjects deviate from subgame-perfect behavior. Proposers typically offer significantly more than the minimum possible and Responders reject “unfair” offers. In this work, we show that when the ultimatum bargaining game is presented as an abstract game tree, the vast majority of behavior is consistent with individualistic preferences and subgame-perfection. This finding raises doubts about theories that ignore the potential influence of social context and experiments that do not control for social context.     

Competitive bargaining equilibrium

In a simple exchange economy we propose a bargaining procedure that leads to a Walrasian outcome as the agents become increasingly patient. The competitive outcome therefore obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is determinate and depends only on preferences and endowments. Our bargaining procedure involves bargaining over prices and maximum quantity constraints, and it guarantees convergence to a Walrasian outcome for any standard exchange economy. In contrast, without quantity constraints we show that equilibrium is generically inefficient.     

Civil Society and Investor–state Dispute Settlement: Assessing the Social Dimensions of Investment Disputes in Latin America

Investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) has come to the forefront of debate over corporate rights in the contemporary era. While proponents laud ISDS as a neutral and efficient means of dispute resolution, critics claim that it shields transnational corporations from the oversight of national legal systems while enhancing their ability to interfere in host state policy matters. Moreover, because dispute settlement is carried out in international tribunals, ISDS is argued to disable citizen-driven politics. Governments have called on arbitration bodies to enhance the transparency of ISDS procedures and open spaces for civil society involvement. This reflects a desire to increase the legitimacy of ISDS in the face of mounting contestation. In this paper, I examine the multiple ways in which civil society actors intervene in investor–state arbitration inside and outside of formal channels. I focus specifically on two disputes involving foreign investors active in the water and hydrocarbons sectors of Argentina and Ecuador, respectively. I find that political pressure exerted by civil society actors influenced government decisions to break with investment rules and helped to shape government positioning within arbitral processes. Civil society actors must therefore be recognised as important participants in investor–state disputes.     

Amended final-offer arbitration over an uncertain value: A comparison with CA and FOA

Arbitration is increasingly employed to resolve disputes. Two arbitration mechanisms, conventional arbitration (CA) and final-offer arbitration (FOA) are commonly utilized, but previous theoretical and empirical research has found that they are unsatisfactory. Several alternative mechanisms have been proposed, but ultimately laboratory research has found that they do not offer an improvement. An exception is amended final-offer arbitration (AFOA), which not only has desirable theoretical properties but also has been demonstrated to outperform FOA in the laboratory. This study provides a direct laboratory comparison of AFOA with CA. Also, by utilizing an environment with an uncertain payoff to one of the parties, this study tests the robustness of AFOA’s performance relative to FOA. The results indicate that AFOA does outperform FOA, but that AFOA is only weakly better than CA. JEL Classification C7, C9, J5, K4     

Bargaining with a possibly committed seller

We consider negotiations with an open time horizon where a buyer has private information about his valuation and does not know whether the seller is committed to the advertised price. This setting combines two common specifications made in the non-cooperative bargaining literature: one side is privately informed about its valuation, which is drawn from a continuum, and the other side is possibly committed to a fixed offer. We analyze the game both in discrete and in continuous time and show convergence of the two settings, which extends results from Abreu and Gul [2000. Bargaining and reputation. Econometrica 68, 85–117]. One interesting result is that as time proceeds, the non-committed seller becomes less likely to concede in a given period, i.e., it appears as if he becomes more “stubborn.” We further show that a seller may prefer to negotiate with a “worse” buyer as this enhances the value of his possible commitment.     

On planning procedures which are locally strategy proof

We consider planning procedures which generalize the MDP procedure in the sense that, at each step, the planning bureau asks the agents their marginal rates of substitution, and uses the answers to revise the previously announced feasible programme. Such a procedure is “locally strategy proof” if, at each step, answering one's true marginal rate of substitution is the best myopic strategy for each agent. We give a general characterization of the family of locally strategy proof procedures and study its neutrality properties.     

Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration

I analyze an alternating-offer model that integrates the common practice of having an arbitrator determine the outcomes if both playersʼ offers are rejected. I assume that the arbitrator uses final-offer arbitration (as in professional baseball). I find that if the arbitrator does not excessively favor one player, then the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium always coincides with the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome in Rubinsteinʼs infinite-horizon alternating-offer game. However, if the arbitrator sufficiently favors the player making the initial offer, then delay occurs in equilibrium.     

Unions and the share economy

This paper contrasts share bargaining and wage bargaining in the context of a “monopoly” model of union bargaining. In the example considered here, employment levels are identical under wage and share systems, but total compensation is higher under share bargaining than under wage bargaining, underscoring the importance of the broader ontext within which a share system is introduced.     

Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game

This paper explores the effects of a “selective acceptance” rule on the outcome of two-issue negotiations. The alternating-offer game introduced here allows for the possibility that settlement may be reached on one issue while negotiation continues about the other. This model captures features of laws that are generally believed to increase efficiency. The analysis shows that if one issue is indivisible, there are inefficient subgame perfect equilibria with no Pareto-improving alternative equilibria. With opposing valuations, rapid communication guarantees inefficiency. These are unique examples of this strong form of inefficiency in an alternating-offer bargaining game with complete (and perfect) information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, J30.     

Interest rate convergence, capital controls, risk premia and foreign exchange market efficiency in the EMS

This paper examines interest rate convergence between Germany and the other EMS countries. We argue that earlier tests of convergence based on cointegration are not informative, because cointegration only implies that a linear combination of interest rates is stationary. We show that a conclusive judgment about convergence can be made if interest rate differentials exhibit a trend towards zero during the period when convergence occurred, and if the cointegrating vector has unit coefficients. We then establish that convergence has taken place in the “hard” EMS period. We also attempt to identify the sources of nonstationarities in interest differentials by examining the existence of stochastic or deterministic trends in the expected rate of depreciation and in the risk premium. Finally, the possibility of market inefficiencies is discussed.     

The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms

We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. A friction parameter is τ, the length of the time period until the next meeting. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of mechanism outcomes to perfect competition at the linear rate in τ, which is shown to be the fastest possible among all bargaining mechanisms. The condition requires that buyers and sellers always retain some bargaining power. The bargaining mechanisms that satisfy this condition are called nonvanishing bargaining power (NBP) mechanisms. Simple random proposer take-it-or-leave-it protocols are NBP, while k-double auctions (k-DA) are not. We find that k-DAs have equilibria that converge to perfect competition at a linear rate, converge at a slower rate or even do not converge at all.     

Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley–Shubik index

In this paper we explore the noncooperative foundations of the bargaining power that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee that bargains in search of consensus over a set of feasible agreements under a voting rule. Assuming complete information, we model a variety of bargaining protocols and investigate their stationary subgame perfect equilibria. We show how the Shapley–Shubik index and other power indices can be interpreted as measures of ‘bargaining power’ that appear in this light as limit cases.     

BARGAINING WITH OPTIMISM: IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF A MODEL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

We study a model of bargaining with optimism where players have heterogeneous beliefs about the final resolution. Beliefs and bargaining surplus are identified from the settlement probability and the distribution of accepted transfers. Using data from medical malpractice lawsuits in Florida, we estimate doctor and patient beliefs and the distribution of potential compensation. We find that patients are more optimistic and doctors more pessimistic when the severity of injury is higher, and the joint optimism diminishes as severity increases. We quantify the increase in settlement probability and the reduction in accepted settlement offers under counterfactual caps on the total compensation.     

The “greening” of trade unions and the demand for eco-taxes

By embedding labour market bargaining considerations in an influence-seeking framework, we show how a union's stance on environmental policy depends on the exposure of their members to the risk of job loss. With a risk of unemployment, unions lobby with employers to resist stricter environmental policies. When employment is secure, unions may support policies that reduce employment opportunities for nonunion workers. “Environmentalism” can therefore arise without explicit environmental concerns among workers. Consequently, pollution taxes may yield a negative welfare dividend in the form of inefficiently high unemployment.     

International arbitration of investment disputes: are poor and badly governed respondent states more likely to lose?

Compelling empirical evidence on whether investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) is systematically biased against poor respondent states hardly exists. We focus on disentangling the effects of the respondent state’s per-capita income and the strength of domestic rule of law on ISDS outcomes. We find that both higher income and stronger than ‘normal’ rule of law reduce the probability of investor wins in international arbitration of disputes.