A common pool theory of supranational deficit ceilings

The budget deficit bias is modeled as the result of a domestic common pool problem and of an international externality. Deficits can be used to finance both unproductive and productive public spending. An optimally set supranational deficit ceiling is examined and welfare is compared to the unconstrained outcome and to the case of nationally set deficit ceilings. The supranational deficit ceiling is found to be welfare improving relative to similar national arrangements, but does not fully eliminate the deficit bias unless combined with a domestic fiscal institution allowing for precommitment to productive public spending.     

Reducing CO2-Emissions Under Fiscal Retrenchment: A Multi-Cohort CGE-Model for Austria

The stabilization of budget deficit and budget debt ratios by fiscal retrenchment in order to fulfill the Maastricht criteria for the EMU is of central focus in most EU countries. At the same time the national policy dimension of acute environmental problems such as global warming has receded in the public eye. The environmental dimension nonetheless remains urgent, and a re-evaluation of the prospects of CO2-policy is needed against the background of fiscal retrenchment required by supranational obligations. We shall do this for the small, open, Austrian economy by constructing a dynamic multi-cohort CGE model enabling us to assess quantitatively the lifetime welfare impacts on the cohorts affected by three different options for using CO2-permit revenues. The distribution of welfare costs of (Toronto-) CO2-policy across cohorts significantly differs with use. This is explained by income, inheritance and price effects.     

Developing global champions: Why national oil companies expand abroad

National oil companies (NOCs) have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign oil and gas assets. Why have some governments increased their NOC outward investments, while others have not? I argue that domestic structures can influence a government's calculus that potential benefits, such as added revenues and fuel supply, outweigh potential costs, such as information asymmetries and inefficiencies associated with NOCs. Nationally, partisan competition limits democratic tolerance for failures by NOCs. Bureaucratically, overlapping authority in energy policy undermines coherent NOC governance. Based on investments by NOCs hailing from 79 countries, 2000–2013, I find robust evidence for the national hypothesis.     

A Model of Inequality and Interest Group Politics

In this paper we examine inequality of process and inequality of outcomes in interest group politics. The model has interest groups that compete for rents in a non-cooperative game. It allows for a self-interested rent-setting political decision-maker, and democratic or popular pressure as a check on that self-interest. We consider differences in the effectiveness and pre-commitment abilities of interest groups. We show that: (i) the costs of influence activities may be highest when groups are relatively equal in their effectiveness; (ii) if social welfare incorporates enough concern for equity of outcomes, that ranking is reversed; (iii) depending on voter responsiveness to rent-setting, the political decision-maker may set rents to be higher or lower, when increases in inequality of effectiveness lower the unit costs of rent-seeking.     

International monetary policy coordination in a new Keynesian model with NICE features

The authors provide a static two-country new Keynesian model to teach two related questions in international macroeconomics: the international transmission of unilateral monetary policy decisions and the gains coming from the coordination monetary rules. They concentrate on “normal times” and use a thoroughly graphical approach to analyze the questions at hand. In this setting monetary policy is conducted using interest rates rules and economic integration between nations does not necessarily create the case for the coordination of monetary policy. In particular, they show that the conduct of optimal national monetary policies does not make any difference with the coordination of national policies, as this creates a situation where the international monetary system operates “Near an International Cooperative Equilibrium” (NICE).     

Environmental policy in the European Union: Fostering the development of pollution havens?

A pollution haven occurs when dirty industries from developed nations relocate to developing nations in order to avoid strict environmental standards or developed nations imports of dirty industries expand replacing domestic production. The purpose of this study is to determine whether the European Union (EU) has increased its imports of “dirty” goods from poorer, less democratic countries during a period of more stringent environmental standards. Previous empirical studies such as those by Levinson and Taylor [Levinson, A., and Taylor, M.S., in press. Unmasking the Pollution Haven Effect. International Economic Review.], Ederington, Levinson and Minier [Ederington, J., Levinson, A., and Minier, J., 2005. Footloose and Pollution-Free. Review of Economics and Statistics., 87: 92-99.], Kahn and Yoshino (2004), and Ederington and Minier [Ederington, J., and Minier. J., 2003. Is Environmental Policy a Secondary Trade Barrier? An Empirical Analysis. Canadian Journal of Economics., 36: 137-54.] find evidence that United States imports are responsive to changes in environmental stringency, but the effects of EU policy have not been examined as thoroughly. Our study follows Kahn [Kahn, M.E., 2003. The Geography of Us Pollution Intensive Trade: Evidence from 1958 to 1994. Regional Science and Urban Economics., 33: 383-400.] and examines the impact of industry energy intensity and toxicity, measured by an energy index and a Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) index, on imports into the EU, at the 2-digit industry level from 1970 to 1999. We use the signing of the Maastricht Treaty to signify a period of more uniform and stringent community wide environmental standards (1993-1999), and identify the level of per capita GDP within an EU trading partner. We find an increased amount of EU energy intensive trade with poorer countries during the period with more stringent EU environmental standards. This result is not robust, however, when poorer countries are defined by OECD membership and geographic region. We do not find an increased amount of EU toxic intensive trade with poorer countries although there is some evidence of increased EU imports of toxic goods from poorer OECD and non-EU European countries. For our full sample of trading partners in all regions, the evidence supports the PHH for EU energy intensive trade, but not for toxic intensive trade. Results for regional trade analysis are less clear.     

A realistic model for official interest rate movements and their consequences

This article extends the Vector Autoregression (VAR) methodology to examine the consequences of monetary policy decisions by considering two types of nonlinearities in the determination of official interest rates: (1) the asymmetry related to the different nature of the discrete and infrequent positive and negative interest rate movements determined by central bankers and (2) the convexity in the transmission of policy shocks induced by the nonnegativity constraint in interest rates. For the UK, we find some evidence of both types of asymmetries. In the US, responses to unexpected interest rate shocks are far more symmetric. Results highlight the importance of considering all types of asymmetries when studying monetary transmission.     

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments

This paper investigates the impact of political lobbying on the choice of environmental policy instruments. It is argued that the prevalence of pollution emission standards over more efficient policy instruments may result from rent seeking behaviour. The model further predicts that when an emission standard is used to control pollution, rival political parties have an incentive to set the same standard. There is therefore a convergence of policies. Moreover, it is shown that emission taxes are more likely to be supported and proposed by political parties which represent environmental interest groups. This feature appears to accord with the observed support for environmental taxes by Green parties in Europe, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere.     

Pricing Monitoring Uncertainty in Climate Policy

This article assesses the environmental and economic efficiency of three different approaches to treat monitoring uncertainty in climate policy, namely prescribing uncertainty, setting minimum certainty thresholds and pricing uncertainty through a discount. Our model of the behavior of profit-maximizing agents demonstrates that under the simplest set of assumptions the regulator has no interest in reducing monitoring uncertainty. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, monitoring uncertainty may hamper the economic and environmental performance of climate policy due to adverse selection. In a mandatory policy, prescribing a reasonable level of uncertainty is preferable if the regulator has enough information to determine this level. For voluntary mechanisms, such as carbon offsets, allowing agents to set their own monitoring uncertainty below a maximum threshold or discounting carbon revenues in proportion to monitoring uncertainty are the best approaches for the regulator to mitigate the negative effects of information asymmetry. These conclusions are much more pronounced when agents do not accrue revenues from their mitigation action, other than carbon. Our analysis of monitoring uncertainty under information asymmetry, which results in heterogeneity in the agents’ benefits from abatement, generalizes the classical trade-off between production efficiency and information rents.     

EVALUATING EU POLICIES ON PUBLIC SERVICES: A CITIZENS' PERSPECTIVE

ABSTRACT ** : This article evaluates EU policies on public services – particularly public network services – from the citizens' point of view. It is first argued that citizens' perceptions are important because the provision of fundamental services is at stake and because they constitute the infrastructure necessary for social and economic development. Citizens’‘voice’ can, therefore, be known, analyzed and used in the design of improved policy on public services along with other indicators. Changing EU policy on public services is synthesized and classified into two main phases in section two. Citizen satisfaction with public services as revealed through surveys from 1997 to 2007 is explored in the third section. In the discussion, the prospects for EU policy on public services are considered and, it is argued that, from the perspectives of subsidiarity and proportionality, policy towards strengthening the common market is being increasingly uploaded to the supranational level in the form of directives, whilst cohesion and redistribution policies are being downloaded to the national level or dealt with at the supranational level by ‘soft’ instruments.     

The US Trade Deficit and the Rate of Interest

It is well known that nations with high trade deficits normally have higher interest rates than those with surplus or balanced trade. However, such has not been the case with the USA, which has seen a relentless trade deficit since 1982. Its interest rates have been lower than those prevailing in many trade‐surplus nations. Furthermore, these rates fell even as the trade shortfall shot up, generating an interest‐rate paradox. This paper demonstrates that, unlike for other nations, the rising trade deficit itself became the cause of lower US interest rates, and this happened because of the world's strong interest in maintaining a high value of the dollar.     

POLITICAL ASYMMETRY AND COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFFS IN A CUSTOMS UNION

This paper examines the effect of political and economic asymmetries in the formation of common external tariffs (CETs) in a customs union (CU). We do so by introducing possible cross‐border lobbying and by endogenizing tariff formation in a political economic model for the determination of CETs. The latter allows us to consider asymmetries among the member nations in their susceptibilities to lobbying. We also consider asymmetries in the influence of the member nations in CU‐wide decision‐making. A central finding of this paper is that, in the absence of economic asymmetry, the CET rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry in country influences if the two countries are equally susceptible to lobbying. If influences are the same, the CET also rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry in susceptibilities. These results hold irrespective of whether the lobby groups in the two member countries cooperate or work non‐cooperatively.     

INTEREST RATES, RATE SPREADS, AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Interest rates and the spreads between interest rates are widely regarded as useful indicators of the future level of economic activity. This paper shows that when these series are divided into (i) an ordinary time series process and (ii) the effects of extraordinary disturbances, only the extraordinary disturbances predict economic activity. These disturbances are associated with periods of monetary policy intervention. Most of the predictive power is in contractionary disturbances that have persistent effects over time. The results imply that the predictive power of interest rates comes primarily from periods of contractionary monetary policy and is not due to ordinary movements in interest rates.     

Public expenditure,income distribution,and growth in OECD countries

Economic growth and the several topics related to it have been studied by economists since their earliest publications. Two different approaches to this area can be found in Neoclassical and Endogenous growth models. The economic growth analysis has focused its attention on the factors that influence the growth of nations, such as fiscal policy or improvement of human capital. Nevertheless, it is also interesting to study the effects of income distribution on economic growth to determine if it has positive effects on growth. The aim of this paper is to study these effects. The authors will develop a theoretical model in which they will introduce public capital in a typical Cobb-Douglas production function. They will estimate OLS, GLS, and SUR fixed effects models for time series and cross-sectional data.     

Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve

In the political discussion, it is often emphasized that the environmental service industry (which produces a clean factor of production) benefits from an early and strong environmental policy. This is especially likely if the costs of production are decreasing over time due to learning curve effects. Surprisingly, the environmental service industry has not been integrated into the theory of strategic environmental policy yet. Our main question is whether a national leadership in environmental policy can pay off if profits of the environmental service industry are taken into account. We consider a two-period model with one firm in each country competing on a third market. Emissions can be substituted by the clean factor when deciding upon the production technology. The unit costs of producing the clean factor in the second period are decreasing in the quantity produced in the initial period. We derive the optimal environmental policy for both periods from a national point of view and show that the presence of the environmental service industry can indeed lead to a national leadership in pollution control.     

Direct democracy: obstacle to reform?

Swiss direct democracy is often accused of being an obstacle to reforms, with the strong influence of interest groups being the reason. Actually, the referendum has a retarding effect: it implies a status quo bias. On the other hand, the initiative has an accelerating effect. The influence of interest groups is hardly larger in direct compared to representative democratic systems. Thus, it is highly questionable whether the abolition of Switzerland’s direct democracy (at the federal level) would—in the long-run—really lead to political decisions which are more open to reforms.     

REGIONAL EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY IN CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA'S PROVINCES

This study examines the provincial effects of monetary policy from 1978 to 2011 in China. We used the SVAR method to measure the magnitude and timing of each province's response to monetary policy shocks when considering the influences of spillover effects among provinces. Then we also explored the regional effects of monetary policy employing multiple linear regressions. The results confirm that provinces respond differently to monetary policy actions. It was found that in the short run, the influence of spillover effects on a province's response is very important, but in the long run, the negative influence of deposit transfers overtake the positive impact of the spillover effect. For the factors causing the regional effects on monetary policy, the results show that the interest rate channel is rather weak at the regional level in China. The bank lending channel can explain the regional effects of monetary policy to some extent. Thus in China, the bank lending channel is more effective than the interest rate channel at the regional level.     

Equilibrium, stability, and deficit financing in a simple nonlinear monetary model under perfect foresight

This paper shows how the nonlinearities associated with inflation taxes and interest payments give rise to problems of nonexistence and nonuniqueness of equilibria. For any choice of fiscal and monetary policy parameters, two sets of steady state equilibria are identified. One of these is associated with a nonzero rate of inflation and depends upon both the monetary and fiscal policy parameters. The other is associated with a stable price level and is independent of the monetary policy parameter. The stability properties resulting from the interaction between the sign and size of the budget deficit and alternative modes of deficit financing are analyzed. These depend critically upon the associated steady state and a variety of types of behavior may result.