Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model

Summary. This paper describes optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model with stochastic monitoring. An agent operates a risky project on behalf of a principal who can observe the projects revenues at a cost. We show that an optimal contract exists such that, at any history, either the principal claims the projects entire revenues or promises to claim nothing in the future. In particular, the agents expected income rises with time. Moreover, except in at most one period, the principal claims all revenues when audit occurs. We provide conditions under which all optimal contracts satisfy these properties.Received: 4 February 2004, Revised: 4 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D8, C7. Correspondence to: Cyril MonnetWe wish to thank Patrick Bolton, Vitor Gaspar, Mark Guzman, Martin Hellwig, Narayana Kocherlakota, Thorsten Koeppl, Albert Marcet, Benny Moldovanu, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden and seminar participants at the University of Mannheim, the University of Minnesota, the Society for Economics Dynamics Meetings in New York and the Society for the Advancement in Economic Theory in Rhodos for helpful comments and discussions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and may not reflect the views of the European Central Bank, the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.     

Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example

Summary. We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less discriminating the optimal menu of contracts is.Received: 24 September 2004, Revised: 5 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C7, D8, G3.L. Renou: Correspondence toWe thank Anne Villamil for insightful comments.     

A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions

Summary. In simple models of borrowing and lending with ex-post asymmetric information, Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986) have shown that optimal debt contracts are simple debt contracts where borrowers repay a fixed interest rate whenever possible and lenders seize all the profit when borrowers default. In this note, we depart from their works by assuming that borrowers and lenders have heterogeneous beliefs, and show that simple debt contracts do not necessarily survive as optimal contracts.JEL Classification Numbers: G3, D8.     

Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume

This paper presents a critical review of the Costly State Verification framework starting from the basic model by Gale and Hellwig [Review of Economic Studies 52 (1985) 647] and further examining the most recent developments. It aims both at discussing the optimality of debt contract in alternative contexts and at offering a reply to the critiques usually moved to this approach within a unified framework.     

The fog of fraud – Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity

Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing strategy. The credible announcement of thoroughly auditing claim reports is a powerful deterrent. Yet, we show that uncertainty about fraud detection can be an effective strategy to deter ambiguity-averse agents from reporting false insurance claims. If, in addition, the auditing costs of the insurers are heterogeneous, it can be optimal not to commit, because committing to a fraud-detection strategy eliminates the ambiguity about auditing. Thus, strategic ambiguity can be an equilibrium outcome in the market. Even competition does not force firms to provide the relevant information. This finding is also relevant in other auditing settings, like tax enforcement.     

Optimal audit policies with correlated types

Summary. We propose a version of Townsends [17] model of costly audits where the agents types are correlated. Audits are used because agents have a limited ability to bear risk so that the Full Surplus Extraction (FSE) scheme á la Crémer and McLean [5,6] and McAfee and Reny [13] are suboptimal. It is shown that Townsends result is a special case of our model when agent types are uncorrelated. The performed numerical simulation of the model using two agents and two types offers interesting insights into what we call the Townsend Ridge. Indeed, the optimal contract which specifies wages to be paid and the audit strategy are remarkably different from one side of the ridge to the next. The observed discontinuity at the ridge reflects a discreet change from a single to a dual audit policy.Received: 11 November 2002, Revised: 10 September 2003JEL Classification Numbers: C63, D82.Correspondence to: M. Martin BoyerWe wish to thank seminar participants at the CEA-Toronto, SCSE-Montréal and WCES-Seattle meetings for discussions and comments on an earlier version of the paper, as well as an anonymous referee for this journal. This paper was financially supported by an Emerging Scholar grant from the American Compensation Association, and by the Fonds FCAR-Québec. The continuing financial support of CIRANO is also appreciated. We remain responsible for any error.     

What do information frictions do?

Summary. We present an overlapping generations model in which a labor market friction (moral hazard) coexists and interacts with a credit market friction (costly state verification). Our main results are: (i) while credit market frictions have long- and short-run real effects, labor market frictions typically have only short-run effects unless they also affect the volume of investment per worker, (ii) the frictions amplify each other to produce higher long-run unemployment than would result from only labor market frictions, (iii) these distortions may prolong the effect of temporary shocks, and (iv) the dynamics of economies with both frictions are qualitatively similar to their frictionless counterparts.Received: 25 February 2003, Revised: 1 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: E13, E24, O41, O17. Correspondence to: Joydeep BhattacharyaWork on this paper began while Bhattacharya was visiting the University of Texas at Austin and was completed when Chakraborty was visiting the IMF Institute in Washington, DC. We are grateful to both institutions for their hospitality. For helpful comments and suggestions we thank Valerie Bencivenga, Dean Corbae, Scott Freeman, Rajesh Singh, participants at the Macro Tea in Austin, and especially, an anonymous referee of this journal. The usual caveat applies.     

Bounding the benefits of stochastic auditing: The case of risk-neutral agents

Summary. In the context of a costly-state-verification model with a risk-neutral agent having limited liability, it has been postulated that allowing stochastic auditing reduces the asymmetric information problem to a trivial one: i.e., the first best can be approached arbitrarily closely with feasible contracts. This paper proves the postulate to be false: the surplus from feasible contracts is bounded strictly below the first-best surplus level. The bound is straightforward to compute in examples. The paper thus removes a justification for the restriction to deterministic auditing commonly made in the literature. Received: July 18, 1997; revised version: February 23, 1998     

中国金融脱媒度量及国际比较

本文采用中介化比率和证券化比率两套指标体系从银行、金融部门两个层次以及资产和负债两个方向度量了1978-2007年中国的金融脱媒,并与美国、日本同期的金融脱媒指标进行了比较。结果表明:(1)我国银行业的金融脱媒将贯穿于金融市场发展的整个过程中;(2)中国金融部门的资产方很可能会出现一个中介化比例先下降,之后回调上升的过程,但回调到什么点是有待检验的问题;(3)我国非银行金融机构在吸纳资金、提供资金两方面都的作用都不明显,但考虑到我国在金融市场发展的阶梯上仍处于较低的阶段,未来我国非银行金融机构在吸纳经济中的盈余资金上可能会具有较大的潜力。     

Financial intermediation and endogenous risk in the banking sector

The paper revisits the impact of uncertainty on the decision problem of a bank. The bank extends risky loans to private investors and sells deposits to savers at fixed rates. The uncertainty under which deposit/loan-portfolios are chosen by banks is endogenized through an information system that conveys public signals about the return distribution of bank loans. Transparency in the banking sector is defined in terms of the reliability of these signals. We find that higher transparency always raises expected bank profits, but may lead to a higher or lower expected loan volume. Moreover, higher transparency may reduce economic welfare.     

A Game‐Theoretic Foundation for Competitive Equilibria in the Stiglitz–Weiss Model

Financial intermediaries are, by definition, engaged in two‐sided competition. Despite the well‐known problems of achieving competitive solutions under two‐sided price competition, models of financial intermediation are commonly solved for competitive equilibria. This article provides a game‐theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria in one of the most important models of financial intermediation, the seminal Stiglitz–Weiss (1981) adverse selection model of the credit market with a continuum of borrower types.     

Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle

Summary. We analyze the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric information. The model generalizes the Rothschild-Stiglitz pure adverse selection problem by including moral hazard. Entrepreneurs with unequal abilities borrow to finance alternative investment projects which differ in degree of risk and productivity. We determine the endogenous distribution of projects as functions of the amount of loanable funds, when lenders have no information about borrowers ability and technological choices. Then, we embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy and show that the average quality of the selected projects in equilibrium may be high in recessions and low in booms. This phenomenon may generate (a) multiple steady states, (b) a smaller impact of exogenous shocks on output relative to the full information case, (c) endogenous fluctuations.Received: 11 June 2001, Revised: 17 June 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: A10, G14, G20, E32.Correspondence to: Pietro ReichlinPietro Reichlin acknowledges financial support from MURST and Paolo Siconolfi acknowledges financial support from the GSB of Columbia University.     

Can good governance lower bank intermediation costs?

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that better governance practices can reduce the costs, risks and uncertainty of financial intermediation. Our sample covers 100 high-, middle- and low-income countries during 1996 to 2015. Using panel regressions accounting for endogeneity and cross-sectional dependance, we find that net interest margins of banks are lower if various governance indicators are better. Governance indicators range from comprehensive indices on the rule of law to more narrow indicators like ethics of private firms. The global financial crisis seems not to have had a strong impact except via credit risk. Finally, we estimate that potential annual savings from lower net interest margins could average almost 0,3 percent of GDP, had the governance indicators been at the top decile. These simulations lend credence to the intuition that better governance practices should reduce costs, risks and uncertainty.     

Profit strategy of Greek banks: cross-subsidization and diversification versus complementarity

This study analyses the profit strategy employed by banks in Greece using dynamic panel data techniques and a data set which includes proprietary supervisory data covering the whole Greek commercial banking system from 2004 to 2011. We provide evidence that banks use interest- and non-interest income (non-II) as substitutes rather than complements, with non-II representing an indirect competition instrument by the more efficient banks used in place of direct competition with their peers through prices on loans and deposits. This behaviour is explained by further decomposing the non-II into the relatively stable fees component and the volatile trading income. Moreover, we provide evidence that the net-interest income is primarily affected by the banks’ market power and their operating costs, while more efficient banks exploit their core deposit base to lever their non-II. Finally, macroeconomic developments affect both income components, which are found to be procyclical with respect to economic activity. In particular, the two income components are affected differently from inflation implying that non-II provides a natural hedge against adverse effects from deflation on interest income.     

How financial intermediation impacts on financial stability?

The great financial crisis widened the role of financial intermediation in financial stability. This study develops a new financial intermediation variable, credit cash flow (CCF), which enables measurement of the net financial flow resulting from loan activity. An analysis provides evidence that CCF affects the capital buffer via credit gap behaviour, thus indicating the existence of a channel between the CCF and the capital buffer. Such a link offers the policy-maker the possibility to monitor the behaviour of financial intermediation carried out by banks, in order to avoid the outbreak of financial instability events.     

Financial intermediation with credit constrained agents

This paper studies the effects of financial intermediation on aggregate levels and the distribution of resources in an economy with credit-constrained heterogeneous agents and occupational choice. Whether an agent becomes an entrepreneur depends on a realized entrepreneurial ability and accumulated assets needed to finance a business project with uncertain returns. I compare a steady state of an economy with financial intermediation to an economy in which entrepreneurs must finance their projects only from their savings. The simulated economy with financial intermediation matches well the US data on the distribution of occupations and resources. The steady state welfare and efficiency gains from financial intermediation are large.     

The challenge of rural financial inclusion – evidence from microfinance

Financial inclusion is said to foster development and growth. However, progress in financial inclusion has been slow in rural areas where poverty is most pronounced. This is often attributed to higher transaction costs, higher risks and a more unfavourable contracting environment which makes it more difficult for financial institutions to achieve and maintain sustainability in rural compared to urban areas. Based on data covering 772 microfinance institutions (MFIs) over the period 2008–2013, we test whether rural financial inclusion, notably lending to rural borrowers, is hampered by stronger sustainability challenges than inclusion in urban markets. Our results suggest that a higher share of rural borrowers has no direct effect on MFI sustainability. However, we find that MFIs with a higher share of rural borrowers are less able to exploit economies of scale and productivity effects. Thus, our results provide support for the view that sustainability challenges make it more difficult to achieve progress in financial inclusion in rural than in urban areas.