Sunspot-like equilibria in an overlapping generations economy with strategic interactions

In this paper I analyze the effect of market uncertainty in an overlapping generations economy with strategic interactions among agents. I demonstrate the existence of sunspot-like equilibria, in which arbitrarily small amounts of intrinsic uncertainty in agents’ offers generate large fluctuations in equilibrium bids and prices. I would like to express my gratitude to Stephen Spear for his guidance during the realization of this project. I thank an anonymous referee for providing insightful comments and suggestions. I have benefited from comments by Alexander Elbittar, Cesar Guerrero, and Vivek Ramachandran.     

Non-stationary,stable Markov processes on a continuous state space

We extend our previous result on simple stable Markov (SSM) processes to the case where the state space is continuous. As anapplication we show the existence of a competitive general equilibrium of a cobweb model where price volatility is generated both by exogenous shocks and by stochastic, so called generating variables (that may be interpreted as sunspots) that govern the correlation of the rational beliefs of individual agents. I would like to thank Danish Social Science Foundation, The Carlsberg Foundation, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE) and Universita Cattolica for financial help. I would also like to thank Trinidad Casasus, Mordecai Kurz, an anonymous referee as well as participants at SITE, ESAM (2004) and ESEM (2004) for helpful discussions and comments. Peter Harremoes provided me with an illuminating counter example and Hiro Nakata provided many comments that helped improve the exposition of the paper. Part of this work is from a paper previously circulated under the title: “Sunspot rational belief structures: anonymity and endogenous uncertainty”.     

Environmental tax policy in a model of growth cycles

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to consider environmental taxation which would control emissions of firms in a model of growth cycles. In the model presented below, the economy may experience two phases of growth and environmental quality: “the no-innovation growth regime” and “the innovation-led growth regime”. Aggregate capital and environmental quality remain constant in the no-innovation growth regime, while they perpetually increase in the innovation-led growth regime. The paper shows that the tax plays a key role in determining whether the economy stably converges to one of the two regimes or fluctuates permanently between them. It also shows that there is a critical level of the tax and that the economy obtains higher growth rates of capital and environmental quality by raising (or reducing) the tax if the initial tax is below (or above) the critical level. Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This research reported here was conducted within the research project “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her insightful comments, which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Hiroshi Honda, Yasuo Maeda, Yuji Nakayama, and participants in workshops at Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, University of Tsukuba, Yokohama National University, and University of Tokyo for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine.     

Some benefits of cyclical monetary policy

We show that modeling monetary circulation and cyclical activity offers insights about monetary policy that cannot be had in representative-agent models. Two fundamental ideas emerge: (i) the reflux of money back to the hands of those making current expenditures can be inefficient, and (ii) expansionary policy may accommodate more trade during high-demand seasons, at the expense of less trade in low-demand seasons and a less valuable currency. The paper provides a foundation for the optimality of a cyclical monetary policy. We thank Steve Williamson and, especially, an anonymous referee for helpful comments, as well as insightful discussions in presentations at the Cleveland Fed (2003), University of Iowa (2004), Queen’s University (2004), and more recently at the Chicago Fed, the New York Fed, the Institute of Advanced Studies, Simon Fraser University and the Universities of Vienna, British Columbia, and Victoria.     

Deregulation and the competitive fringe: Owner-operators in the trucking industry

This paper assesses the direct and indirect effects of regulatory reform in the trucking industry on the employment of owner-operators. We utilize a probit estimation form derived from driver utility functions to estimate the change in the probability that a truck driver is an owner-operator following deregulation.We find that a representative driver with mean characteristics is 155.6 percent more likely to choose employment as an owner-operator in the deregulated environment. Thirty-six percentage points of this increase is due to the indirect effects of deregulation, which operate primarily through changes in wage differentials and unionization. The direct effect of deregulation accounts for a 120% increase in the probability of a driver choosing employment as an owner-operator.We are especially grateful to David Besanko, Ronald Braeutigam, Robert Drago, and John Heywood for insightful comments. For helpful discussions, we thank Marcus Alexis, Aaron Gellman, Leon Moses, Robert Porter, Ian Savage, Mark Shanley, Carol Simon, Paul Wolfson, and Christopher Udry. For their comments on an earlier draft, we thank Thomas Corsi, Curtis Grimm, and Theodore Keeler. We are grateful for information sent to us by Leon Witconis ofOwner Operator Magazine and William A. Coop ofRoad King Magazine. We acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation, Grant # SES-9111131 and from the Transportation Center of Northwestern University. We also thank two anonymous referees for their efforts in helping us to improve this paper.     

The price of size and financial market allocations

A positive equilibrium price of size exists when size is a scarce productive resource. This paper articulates a costly-state-verification model of financial contracting with heterogeneous lender sizes. We find that in a non-rationing direct lending equilibrium, (1) Financial contract is nonlinear in that expected rates of return on loans increase with loan sizes; (2) Endogenous asset indivisibility arises; (3) The total social surplus under a nonlinear contract is less than that under a linear structure; (4) Average debt size affects the market value of a firm. We also extend analysis to the case of credit rationing and financial intermediation.I thank James A. Mirrlees, Yi Jin, Charles Ka Yui Leung, and seminar participants in the 2004 Royal Economic Society Conference and the Chinese University of Hong Kong for helpful comments. Suggestions from Stephen D. Williamson (the co-eidtor) and an anonymous referee are especially acknowledged.     

Engel’s curve and product differentiation: A dynamic analysis of the effects of quality on consumer’s choice

The application of Engel’s Curve in a single-product perspective may dramatically change the role of quality in affecting the dynamics of economic performance. This paper introduces a specification of preferences that regards quality as luxury, and quantity as necessary. The analysis is carried out by using a framework similar to Grossman’s and Helpman ’s (1991), while quality is defined as in Stokey (1988). The resulting consumer’s demand crucially depends on quality. Quality is potentially able to prevent the process, implied by neoclassical models, that leads the value of consumption goods to decline over time. By doing so, quality also affects the consumption bundle shares and the variety-specific consumption growth rates, thus influencing all dynamic quantitative variables of the economy. I thank Professor Beniamino Moro for his guidance and encouragement. I thank Stephen Wright for his comments and suggestions. I have benefited from the support of Alessio Moro, Dario Unali, Debora Fletcher, Emilio Merella, Esteban Jaimovich, Francesca Lamanna, Matteo Bellinzas, Mauro Merella and all my friends. I am also indebted to Professor Cuong Le Van and Professor Stephen Parente for their advice. I thank two anonymous Referees for their useful remarks.     

Environmental Externalities in the Presence of Network Effects: Adoption of Low Emission Technologies in the Automobile Market*

The paper considers a market currently dominated by a dirty technology that imposes significant environmental costs. A clean technology, with zero environmental costs, is introduced after the maturity of the dirty technology’s network. Adoption of the clean technology is not possible due to the network benefits in favour of the dirty technology. The paper considers two types of policy intervention to correct for the environmental externality. First, we find that the tax necessary to induce adoption of the clean technology is very high implying that a tax equal to the marginal environmental damage would not resolve the externality problem in many cases. Second, if tax revenues are earmarked towards subsidizing the clean technology, the tax is lower than in the previous case and can be set equal to the marginal external damage. *The authors are indebted to two anonymous referees for their insightful comments. We would also like to thank Robert Androkovich, Jim Seldon, Gordon Tarzwell, Christos Constantatos, participants of the EAERE 2002 conference, and the Sevilla Workshop on Public Economics and the Environment 2004 for their suggestions. Financial support by the Scholarly Activity Committee of the University College of the Cariboo is acknowledged by both authors. Eftichios Sartzetakis acknowledges also financial support by the Pythagoras I research grant of the Greek government.     

Distributional assumptions and a test of the dual labor market hypothesis

Recent application of the switching regression model to allocate workers into the primary and secondary labor markets is considered to be the best solution to the classification problem of the empirical testing of the dual labor market theory. In such models, normality of the error terms is assumed. This paper adopts the switching regression model to test the dual labor market theory by assuming different distributions of the error terms. The test results strongly support the dual labor market theory regardless of the assumption one makes about the error terms. However, the results indicate that different distribution can lead to different percentage distributions of workers in the two segments. In particular, the normal distribution generates more workers in the primary segment than the non-normal distributions. Therefore, care must be taken not to generalize the type of industries or occupations that fall under the primary and secondary segments. First version received: October 2000/Final version received: March 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  I would like to thank Kevin Lang, Robert Marshall, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. I am grateful for comments received from the session participants of the Western Economic Association International Conference, San Francisco, CA, June 28–July 2, 1996, and the Midwest Economic Association Conference, Kansas City, 1997. I thank George Bonney, the Chief Statistician of Fox Chase Cancer Center, Philadelphia for his comments. Any remaining errors are my responsibility. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Penn State Research and Development Grant, 1995.     

On justifying a minimum welfare state

Since anarchy is not viable, limited government is the best that the realistic libertarian can hope for. But limited government will itself always be threatened by an inherent tendency to transgress its limits. In modern western societies the regulatory and redistributive welfare state is the major threat to a constitution of liberty. However, a “minimum welfare state” which redistributes personal income among its citizens may comply with the same principles of individual liberty and the rule of law that are embodied in the protective state. Since any state, including the minimal state, necessarily incorporates regulation and redistribution and thus is a welfare state of sorts the non-anarchist liberal should turn against welfare state privileges rather than against redistribution and regulation per se. He may even have good reason to go beyond the minimal state to found a “minimum welfare state” if this is instrumental in securing liberty under the rule of law. I am grateful to the Center for the Study of Public Choice, George Mason University for hospitality both during the period in which this paper was written and on other occasions. I am deeply indebted to the people at the Center for their criticisms and comments. As far as this paper is concerned Geoffrey Brennan's and Richard Wagner's comments were particularly helpful. I should also like to acknowledge helpful oral comments from Kevin Mulligan and Philip van Parijs, who of course is much more of an expert on demogrant schemes than I am. I also wish to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. The general caveat applies.     

Firm heterogeneity and Ricardian comparative advantage within and across sectors

This paper incorporates Melitz’s Econometrica (71:1695–1725, 2003) heterogeneous-firm trade model in the Ricardian model of comparative advantage with a continuum of sectors introduced by Dornbusch et al. (Am Econ Rev 67(5), 823–839, 1977). In particular, we characterise the equilibrium outcomes when neither sectors nor countries are symmetric. We find that trade patterns can follow Ricardian comparative advantage, while wage rates are proportional to market size due to a home market effect. Interestingly, trade liberalisation hurts the large country but benefits the small one by reducing the number of sectors with two-way trade and expanding those with specialised (one-way) trade. I would like to thank Mike Artis, Richard Baldwin, Frederic Robert-Nicoud, Matthias Helble, Giovanni Facchini, Thierry Verdier and a referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. Also I would like to thank Mike Artis for his excellent proof reading.     

The Shapley Value of a Patent Licensing Game: the Asymptotic Equivalence to Non-cooperative Results

We consider a game in characteristic form played by firms and an outside patent holder of a cost-reducing innovation. The worth of a coalition of players is the total Cournot profit the coalition can guarantee to obtain when it operates an optimal number of its firms while the complement operates any number of its firms as to minimize the profit of the coalition. Only firms in a coalition with the patent holder are allowed to use the efficient technology. We prove that when the number of firms is large, the Shapley value of the patent holder approximates the payoff he obtains in the non-cooperative auction game traditionally studied in the literature.We thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments that significantly improved the paper. The second author is being partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Grant-in-Aid for 21 Century COE Program. He wishes to thank his advisor Yair Tauman and co-advisor Pradeep Dubey for their intellectual guidance, Akira Okada and Haruo Imai for their encouragement, and Shigeo Muto for his helpful comments to the first draft of this paper at the autumn meeting of the Japanese Economic Association in 2003.     

Quasi-fundamental exchange rate variation

Summary. This paper uses a general equilibrium model to study the determination of the exchange rate in an economy with fundamental uncertainty. The model has steady state equilibria in which the exchange rate is constant. These equilibria may coexist with “quasi-fundamental” equilibria – nonstationary equilibria in which the exchange rate displays stochastic fluctuations that are correlated with the fluctuations in fundamental random variables. The quasi-fundamental equilibria are Pareto dominated by the corresponding constant-exchange-rate steady states. They also converge to these steady states, inevitably or with positive probability. Received: October 2, 1999; revised version: March 26, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This paper began as a joint project with Alex Mourmouras, who has made many helpful comments and suggestions but is not responsible for any errors or deficiencies. In addition, I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization

This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework to discuss the costs and benefits of privatization using the recent advances of Incentive Theory. I begin by presenting a simple model in which the State (the principal) delegates a task (e.g., the production of a public good) to the private sector (the agent). I give and discuss conditions for the “Irrelevance Theorem” due to Sappington and Stiglitz [Sappington, D., & Stiglitz, J. (1987) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 6, 567–582] to hold under complete contracting. I then show how various contract incompletenesses can make either public or private ownership optimal. Finally, I provide critical assessments of these results. I thank Patrick Rey and Wilfried Zantman for useful comments on an earlier draft. The excellent comments of two referees have also improved substantially the presentation and organization of the paper. I am deeply indebted to Denis Gromb for his extremely detailed comments.     

Financial development and economic growth in Australia: An empirical analysis

The paper empirically examines the dynamic relationship between financial development and economic growth in Australia in terms of bank-based and market-based financial structure. A time-series approach using the VAR Model is used to provide evidence for the dynamic relationship. The paper provides empirical evidence on the causal impact of the financial market on the economic growth of the Australian economy. The results suggest that financial intermediaries and financial markets have different impacts on economic growth given their diverse roles in the domestic economy. In particular there is evidence of causality from economic growth to the development of the financial intermediaries. On the other hand, development in the financial markets causes economic growth but there is no evidence of any causality from economic growth to financial markets. The sensitivity test using different interest rates does not change the results.I Jel classification: O16, G18, G28I We would like to thank Tilak Abeysinghe and Rajagurn Gunasekaran for their helpful comments on the first draft. Also, we would like to thank the Editor, Prof. Baldev Raj, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.First version received: October 2001/Final version received: October 2002     

On the choice of functional form in stochastic frontier modeling

This paper examines the effect of functional form specification on the estimation of technical efficiency using a panel data set of 125 olive-growing farms in Greece for the period 1987–93. The generalized quadratic Box-Cox transformation is used to test the relative performance of alternative, widely used, functional forms and to examine the effect of prior choice on final efficiency estimates. Other than the functional specifications nested within the Box-Cox transformation, the comparative analysis includes the minflex Laurent translog and generalized Leontief that possess desirable approximation properties. The results indicate that technical efficiency measures are very sensitive to the choice of functional specification. Perhaps most importantly, the choice of functional form affects the identification of the factors affecting individual performance – the sources of technical inefficiency. The analysis also shows that while specification searches do narrow down the set of feasible alternatives, the identification of the most appropriate functional specification might not always be (statistically) feasible. First version received: November 1999/Final version received: July 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  The authors wish to thank Almas Heshmati, Robert Romain, and an anonymous referee for insightful comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to the associate editor who handled the paper, and whose careful reading and suggestions have improved the paper substantially. The second author wishes to acknowledge the financial support from “President SSHRC” from the University of Saskatchewan. The usual caveats with respect to opinions expressed in the paper apply. Senior authorship is shared. This is University of Nebraska-Lincoln Agricultural Research Division Article No. 13270.     

The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies

We provide an evaluation of the measure of privately blocking coalitions in differential information economies. In the case of atomless economies, it is proved that for a Pareto optimal allocation that is not a Walrasian expectations equilibrium, to any symmetric profile there corresponds a ball such that "almost half” of the profiles it contains are privately blocking. Analogous results are proved in the case of finite differential information economies for generalized coalitions and social coalition structures. From a different point of view, the paper can be considered as a contribution showing private core equivalence theorems under restrictions on coalition formation. We thank an anonymous referee for observations and comments improving an earlier version of the present paper.     

Communication in financial markets with several informed traders

This paper investigates the incentives for informed traders in financial markets to reveal their information truthfully to the public. In the model, a subset of traders receive noisy signals about the value of a risky asset. The signals are composed of a directional component (“high” vs. “low”) as well as a precision component that represents the quality of the directional component. Between trading periods, the informed agents make public announcements to the uninformed traders. With a sufficiently large number of informed traders, an equilibrium exists in which the directional components are credibly revealed, but not the precision components. Even though the informed traders retain some of their rivate information, the post-communication estimate of the asset value converges in probability to the full-information estimate as the number of informed traders increases. The paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Western Ontario and was circulated previously under the title “Public Communication Devices in Financial Markets.” I thank my dissertation committee Arthur Robson, Hari Govindan, and Al Slivinski for their guidance and support. I also thank Murali Agastya, Roland Benabou, Philippe Grégoire, Rick Harbaugh, Mike Peters, an anonymous referee and an associate editor, and seminar participants at various universities and conferences at which this paper was presented.