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1.
Abstract. The majority of Treasuries use discriminatory auctions to sell government debt. A few Treasuries use uniform auctions. The
Spanish Treasury is the only one that uses a hybrid format of discriminatory and uniform auctions. All Treasury auctions are
multiple-unit multiple-bid auctions, usually assumed to be common and unknown value auctions. Taking in account these features,
we analyze the Spanish auction format, taking a linear approximation to bidders' multiple bids, and characterize a parameter
set in which the Spanish format gives higher expected seller's revenue than discriminatory and uniform auctions. Policy implications
are obtained by calibrating theoretical results with data.
We thank S. Nu?ez, and seminar participants at GREQAM, CEFI, the 1999 CEF meeting in Boston and the 57th European Meeting
of the Econcometric Society for suggestions. We are especially grateful to two anonymous referees for detailed comments that
greatly improved the paper. Any error is our responsability. The authors express their thanks for financial support to Ministerio
de Ciencia y Teconologia from Proyecto SEC2000-0723, no 9114. 相似文献
2.
Summary. In a Bayesian model of group decision-making, dependence among the agents' types has been shown to have a beneficial effect
on the design of incentive compatible mechanisms that achieve the efficient choice associated with complete information. This
effect is shown here to depend as much upon the use of large monetary transfers among the agents as it does upon dependence:
if the transfers are bounded in magnitude, then nonexistence in the case of independence of an efficient, incentive compatible,
ex ante budget-balanced and interim individually rational mechanism is robust to the introduction of a small amount of dependence
among types. This robustness result supports the use of the simplifying assumption of independence in mechanism design.
Received: October 28, 1996; revised version: May 28, 1997 相似文献
3.
Paulo Klinger Monteiro 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):221-227
Summary. In this paper I prove that a quasiconcave separable utility function defined on an atomless space is concave.
Received: August 11, 1997; revised version: October 2, 1997 相似文献
4.
Summary. We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents,
maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by
optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given.
Received: October 23, 1995; revised version: June 25, 1997 相似文献
5.
Summary. In the social learning model of Banerjee [1] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] individuals take actions sequentially
after observing the history of actions taken by the predecessors and an informative private signal. If the state of the world
is changing stochastically over time during the learning process, only temporary informational cascades – situations where
socially valuable information is wasted – can arise. Furthermore, no cascade ever arises when the environment changes in a
sufficiently unpredictable way.
Received: December 5, 1996; revised version: February 11, 1997 相似文献
6.
Summary. A single condition, limited arbitrage, is shown to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core in economies with any number of markets, finite or infinite, with or without short sales. This extends earlier results of Chichilnisky [8] for
finite economies. This unification of finite and infinite economies is achieved by proving that in Hilbert spaces limited
arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the compactness of the Pareto frontier. Limited arbitrage has also been shown to
be necessary and sufficient for a resolution of the social choice paradox [9], [10], [12], [13], [14].
Received: August 4, 1995; revised version: April 11, 1997 相似文献
7.
Rafael Tenorio 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):247-260
Summary. I study a multiple unit auction where symmetric risk-neutral bidders choose prices and quantities endogenously. In the model,
bidders (a) may place non-linear valuations on the auctioned units, and (b) bid for several units at the same price (“lumpy”
bids). I characterize quantity-symmetric and strictly monotone-increasing price equilibria for discriminatory and competitive
auctions, and show that (i) if quantity strategy profiles are equal across auctions revenue- equivalence holds, (ii) expected
revenue is higher if bidders bid for the entire supply rather than for shares of it, and (iii) equilibrium allocations may
fail to be Pareto-optimal.
Received: April 14, 1995; revised version: September 3, 1997 相似文献
8.
Leonidas C. Koutsougeras 《Economic Theory》1998,11(3):563-584
Summary. We introduce a new core concept, called the two-stage core, which is appropriate for economies with sequential trade. We
prove a general existence theorem and present two applications of the two-stage core: (i) In asset markets economies where
we extend our existence proof to the case of consumption sets with no lower bound, in order to capture the case of arbitrary
short sales of assets. Further, we show that the two-stage core is non empty in the Hart (1975) example where a rational expectations
equilibrium fails to exist. (ii) In differential information economies where we provide sufficient conditions for the incentive
compatibility of trades. Namely, that no coalition of agents can misreport the true state and provide improvements to all
its members, even by redistributing the benefits from misreporting.
Received: December 20, 1995; revised version: December 6, 1996 相似文献
9.
This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline.
In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the
bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines
the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline
effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and,
moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition
between the buyers. 相似文献
10.
Ronel Elul 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):25-40
Summary. We show that at any equilibrium of almost every single-good incomplete markets economy, it is possible to find an asset which
when introduced makes every agent better-off. Diamond (1967) has shown, however, that such economies are constrained suboptimal, so it is of course impossible to find a new asset which makes all agents worse-off. This contrasts with the case of multiple
consumption goods, for which Cass and Citanna (1995) and Elul (1995) demonstrate that equilibrium utilities may be arbitrarily
perturbed via financial innovation. Proving our result requires us to exploit not changes in equilibrium prices, but rather
the gains to trading the new asset. In particular, we find an asset which when introduced does not change the existing asset
prices even though it is traded by every agent – by a revealed preference argument it must therefore make everyone better-off.
Received: May 28, 1997; revised version: July 1, 1997 相似文献
11.
Summary. Convergence of the cores of finite economies to the set of Walrasian allocations as the number of agents grows has long been
taken as one of the basic tests of perfect competition. The present paper examines this test in the most natural model of
commodity differentiation: the commodity space is the space of nonnegative measures, endowed with the topology of weak convergence.
In Anderson and Zame [12], we gave counterexamples to core convergence in L
1, a space in which core convergence holds for replica economies and core equivalence holds for continuum economies; in addition,
we gave a core convergence theorem under the assumption that traders' utility functions exhibit uniformly vanishing marginal
utility at infinity. In this paper, we provide two core convergence results for the commodity differentiation model. A key
technical virtue of this space is that relatively large sets (in particular, closed norm-bounded sets) are compact. This permits
us to invoke a version of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem for compact subsets of an infinite-dimensional space. We show that,
for sufficiently large economies in which endowments come from a norm bounded set, preferences satisfy an equidesirability
condition, and either (i) preferences exhibit uniformly bounded marginal rates of substitution or (ii) endowments come from
an order-bounded set, core allocations can be approximately decentralized by prices.
Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: January 14, 1997 相似文献
12.
Carmen Herrero 《Spanish Economic Review》2002,4(1):19-40
We face the problem of allocationg a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked
preferences. We survey the three different cases studied in the literature: the pure distribution case, the redistribution
case, and the gerneral case. The so called general case provide with a natural framework to analyze the idea of path-independence. In this framework, we explore the existence of
rules fulfilling this property. Our first result is negative: a strong version of this property cannot be fulfilled together
with efficiency. Nonetheless, some restricted versions of the path-independence property are compatible with interesting properties,
in particular no manipulability, and no envy. We then identify two solutions satisfying this sort of property: the equal distance
rule, and a new extension of the uniform rule. 相似文献
13.
Summary. We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial endowments of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with
single-peaked preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we propose a solution which satisfies many appealing properties,
describing the effect of population and endowment variations on the outcome. The central properties which are studied in this
context are population monotonicity, bilateral consistency, (endowment) monotonicity and (endowment) strategy-proofness.
Furthermore, the uniform reallocation rule is Pareto optimal and satisfies several equity conditions, e.g., equal-treatment
and envy-freeness. We study the trade-off between properties concerning variation and properties concerning equity. Furthermore,
we provide several characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule based on these properties.
Received: August 29, 1995; revised version June 26, 1996 相似文献
14.
Summary. We offer an alternative approach to the study of representability of choice behavior in a competitive framework that is based
on recent advances in utility theory (cf. Alcantud and Rodrí guez-Palmero (1999)). Our technique enables us to tackle this
classical problem efficiently in fairly general situations, thus obtaining alternative sufficient conditions as well as different
proofs and generalizations of prior results.
Received: July 14, 1999; revised version: February 15, 2001 相似文献
15.
In-Uck Park 《Economic Theory》1998,11(2):413-426
Summary. In a novel formulation of revealed preference analysis, Green and Osband [8] show that for expected-utility maximizers, acts
partition the state-simplex into linear polyhedral blocks. The question naturally arises whether this characterization distinguishes
expected utility theory from non-expected utility theories. This paper investigates the weighted utility theory of Chew [2]
and shows that the corresponding partition is systematically different from the expected utility theory: the boundaries of
the partition blocks are quadratic rather than linear. This result contains useful empirical contents.
Received: May 15, 1995; revised version: November 22, 1996 相似文献
16.
Summary. We show that when bankruptcy, subject to penalties, is allowed, it is possible to prove the existence of equilibrium in a model with a continuum of states without imposing any assumptions on ex-post endowments.Received: November 20, 1995; revised version: September 16, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
17.
Julio Dávila 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):213-223
Summary. It is shown in this note that in an incomplete markets economy with uncountably many states of the world there may be uncountably
many isolated equilibria as well as uncountably many non-isolated equilibria. Moreover, both subsets can be simultaneously
of second category. Therefore, none of the subsets can be considered negligible with respect to the other, neither from a
cardinality point of view nor from a topological one. Unfortunately, this fact prevents from claiming that these economies
may have “typically” determinate equilibria – even though uncountably many of them – as would have been desirable for comparative
statics exercises.
Received: May 19, 1995; revised version: March 24, 1997 相似文献
18.
Axiomatic characterizations of the Choquet integral 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. The Choquet integral is an integral part of recent advances in decision theory involving non-additive measures. In this article
we present two new axiomatic characterizations of this functional.
Received: January 27, 1997; revised version: April 28, 1997 相似文献
19.
Firm reputation with hidden information 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Steven Tadelis 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):635-651
Summary. An adverse selection model of firm reputation is developed in which short-lived clients purchase services from firms operated
by overlapping generations of agents. A firm's only asset is its name, or reputation, and trade of names is not observed by
clients. As a result, names are traded in all equilibria regardless of the economy's horizon The general equilibrium analysis
links the value of a name to the market for services. This causes a non-monotonicity that precludes higher types from sorting
themselves through the market for names, and leads to “sensible” dynamics: reputations, and name prices, increase after success
and decrease after failure.
Received: July 31, 2001; revised version: December 20, 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank Jon Levin, Eric Maskin and Drew Fudenberg for valuable discussions, and Heski Bar-Isaac for comments on an
earlier draft. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (NSF grants SBR-9818981 and SES-0079876) is gratefully
acknowledged. This paper replaces an older (and incomplete) working paper titled “Reputation with Hidden Information”. 相似文献
20.
Summary. This article characterizes all of the continuous social welfare orderings which satisfy the Weak (resp. Strong) Pareto principle
when utilities are ratio-scale measurable. With Weak Pareto, on both the nonnegative and positive orthants the social welfare
ordering must be representable by a weakly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function while on the whole Euclidean space
the social welfare ordering must be strongly dictatorial. With Strong Pareto, on the positive orthant the social welfare ordering
must be representable by a strictly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function but on the other two domains an impossibility
theorem is obtained.
Received: July 31, 1995; revised version August 7, 1996 相似文献