Alternative Corporate Governance Systems in Japanese Firms: Implications for a Shift to Stockholder-Centered Corporate Governance

In Asia, the recent catastrophic decline in regional stock markets, continuing currency crisis and failures of major financial institutions and industrial corporations have increased domestic and international interest in corporate governance. Nowhere is this greater than in Japan where financial institution reform has catapulted this to the fore. In this paper, we use agency theory and institutional theory, together with comparative case examples, to derive some propositions on the dynamics of changing corporate governance systems in Japanese firms. We argue for the co-existence of stakeholder and shareholder-centered corporate governance systems in Japan. This argument has an important implication for corporate governance research and agency theory. Namely, changes in ownership structure and institutional expectations would force firms to focus on maximizing shareholder value even where the interests of stakeholders are more emphasized. It suggests an environmental selection mechanism to ensure the emergence of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem. Further, the loss of competitiveness and the prolonged poor performance of firms can change the institutional norms to emphasize asset efficiency and transparency rather than stability and business ties.     

Mutual commitment to support exchange: relation‐specific IT system as a substitute for managerial hierarchy

This paper examines the effects of information technology (IT) on the governance of vertically related firms. We propose that a highly relation‐specific IT system in inter‐firm transactions plays a key role in the resulting inter‐firm governance as a mutual sunk‐cost commitment, in terms of leading to both less vertical integration (i.e., a change in governance mode as a first‐order effect) and a smaller number of suppliers (i.e., a change within a governance mode as a second‐order effect). As a result, this highly relation‐specific IT system (bilateral investment) can be an alternative governance mode of electronic integration that acts as a substitute for managerial hierarchy and vertical financial ownership. From a strategic management perspective, this paper provides transaction costs and resource‐based explanations on IT systems' impact on the organizational boundary decision and its impact on the likelihood of the firm achieving sustainable competitive advantage. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choice of organizational form in the life insurance industry: New Zealand evidence

Two forms of ownership structure characterize the insurance industry—the stock company owned by shareholders and the mutual form which is owned by its policyholders. The academic literature suggests that ownership structure is dependent upon the efficiency of the endogenous contracting mechanisms and governance structures in firms. Mutuals are predicted to exist and successfully compete with stock companies in insurance markets because they merge the ownership-customer functions and introduceex-ante contracting mechanisms andex-post modes of governance which restrict managerial discretion. Drawing a framework from transaction cost theory, this study tests empirically the proposition that choice of ownership structure in the life insurance industry is related to contracting mechanisms and governance structures in the firm. Individual cross-sectional logistic regression models are estimated using 1991–1993 data gathered from New Zealand's life insurance industry. Consistent with expectations our results suggest that mutuals are more likely to have higher asset specificity than stock companies. By contrast, stocks appear to be more reinsured and incur higher governance expenditures than mutual companies. Furthermore, contrary to what was hypothesized, our findings indicate that mutuals may be bigger than stock companies. Therefore, overall the empirical evidence does not support the predictions drawn from transaction cost theory.The authors are lecturers, Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Glasgow, and Department of Accountancy, Massey University, New Zealand, respectively.The authors thank Lars Hassel, Leung Hing-Man, Bill Maughan, Mike Pickford, Kulwant Singh and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on original drafts of this paper. However, they are solely responsible for any errors or omissions that remain. They also appreciate the cooperation of members of New Zealand's life insurance industry for supplying information. Finally, the financial support of Price Waterhouse (Wellington, New Zealand) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Corporate Social Responsibility and Governance: The Role of Executive Compensation

This article examines the relationship between corporate governance and corporate sustainability by focusing on an essential component of companies' governance structure: executive compensation programs. We propose an original empirical strategy based on a large set of the biggest capitalizations in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries over the period 2004–2018, with explicit measures of how companies integrate into executive managers' remuneration precise criteria of corporate social responsibility, an incentive scheme called corporate social responsibility (CSR) contracting. Our results show that proposing executive compensation programs including CSR criteria has a negative impact on financial performance, and a large positive impact on extra-financial performance based on the following dimensions: relationship with customers and suppliers, and community involvement. Second, we explore the moderating role of the corporate governance model by distinguishing the impact between firms with a shareholder or stakeholder corporate governance model and reveal significant differences in the impact of CSR contracting. For firms with a stakeholder corporate governance model, CSR contracting is no longer associated with a fall of financial performance and has a large positive impact on human resources, environmental, and human rights performance. On the other hand, CSR contracting has a negative impact on financial performance but no impact on extra-financial performance for firms with a shareholder corporate governance model.     

Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

The paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance reform in firms embedded in a relationship‐based governance system with less protection of minority shareholders. In such locations, ownership structure should be a key determinant of governance reform. Firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face agency problems but may lack sufficient ownership power in the hand of external owners for adoption to occur. Extensive ownership by external parties facilitates adoption but decreases the need and motivation to adopt governance reform. We examined the adoption of stock‐based incentive plans and transparent accounting regulations (e.g., greater disclosure to shareholders) among large German firms (DAX 100) during the late 1990s. We found an inverse ‘U’‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and governance reform. In addition, we found that firms adopting governance reform were more likely to engage in corporate divestitures and achieve higher levels of market performance than firms not adopting governance reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS

This paper advances understanding of corporate governance relationships with a longitudinal study of multiple antitakeover options. Prior analyses have been primarily cross-sectional, focused exclusively on a single provision ignoring provisions which require subsequent stockholder approval. The current study uses agency theory, and broadens this perspective by examining the differential impact of institutional investors stockholding, managerial stock ownership, and corporate board characteristics on the rate of adoption of six provisions, including provisions which do and do not require stockholder approval. Results of hazard analyses of the rate of amendment adoption of 185 firms between 1984 and 1988 indicate that the impact of governance variables on antitakeover provisions differ depending on whether these actions require stockholder approval or not. The pattern of differences indicates that institutional investors use their voting power when they are given an opportunity to vote and that substitution between direct shareholder control and managerial stock ownership exists.     

上市公司治理结构对信息性盈余管理的影响研究

为了有效监督公司内部利害关系各方的行为,有效降低基于各种委托代理关系的代理成本,在阐述国内外盈余管理文献的基础上,假设拥有健全公司治理结构的上市公司管理者更愿意进行信息性盈余管理,通过构建合理的并可度量的信息性盈余管理衡量方法,使用沪、深两市全部A股上市公司2014—2016年公司季度财务数据,实证研究了信息性盈余管理视角下公司治理对盈余管理的影响。结果表明,市场监管者和投资者需要关注两种不同的盈余管理行为,投机性盈余管理更倾向于误导投资者,信息性盈余管理则是通过盈余管理的手段向投资者传递有用的内部信息。股权制衡对上市公司的信息性盈余管理行为具有明显促进作用,促使管理层进行信息性盈余管理,就要优化股权结构,形成产权多样化的股东制衡机制,实现股权结构的合理优化。拥有健全公司治理结构的上市公司管理者更愿意进行信息性盈余管理,公司治理结构对管理者进行信息性盈余管理具有积极的影响,健全的公司治理结构能够提高财务报告透明度和盈余信息含量。因此,保障财务报告的真实性和可靠性,以信息性盈余管理为动机探究公司治理对盈余管理的影响具有现实意义。     

债务融资治理效应对两权分离的影响——基于我国上市公司数据

以2005年-2009年的上市公司为样本,研究了负债融资与两权分离之间的关系,研究结果表明:我国上市公司的负债融资能够抑制过度投资行为、降低公司代理人成本。由于该结论是基于财务杠杆作为唯一治理变量得出的,使其对于债务融资治理低效率的原因解释不够充分。今后应重视债权与股权治理的互动关系以及财务杠杆的内生性等问题的研究。     

The effect of cultural differences in perceptions of transactions costs on national differences in the preference for international joint ventures

This study presents a theoretical explanation of why the cultural trait of power distance represents greater perceptions of transaction costs and lower perceptions of governance costs across societies. It demonstrates that cultural differences in perceptions of transactions and governance costs as represented by Hofstede's (1980) power distance index explain national differences in the preference for international joint ventures after market size, government limitations on sole ownership and uncertainty avoidance have been controlled. The study concludes that cultural differences in transaction costs provide an important extension to the transaction costs theory of joint ventures.     

面向供应链的环境治理组织模式研究——基于交易费用视角的考察

环境治理的组织形式既可以是单个企业的末端治理，也可以是具有纵向关系的企业间合作治理。后一种环境治理组织方式在激励机制、节约信息成本和治理成本等方面具有的优势．已经越来越成为政府环境治理和企业提高竞争力的重要途径。本文试图借助交易费用理论．从供应链的视角考察具有纵向关系的企业间合作环境治理的组织形式与结构，并进一步探讨供应链上环境治理的驱动者与驱动方式的选择问题。分析表明．面向供应链的环境政策是末端治理政策一个很好的补充与替代。但面向供应链的环境政策必须能够降低供应链上企业环境治理的交易成本．并依据纵向关系或供应链的组织特征而有所差异．才能提高企业问协调环境治理效率。     

公司治理合约的制度基础、演进机理与治理效率

最优公司治理合约是人们在给定局限条件下理性选择的结果。社会制度基础就是公司治理合约选择的给定局限条件。社会制度基础主要影响产权界定类型和界定效率，进而决定包括内生交易费用和外生交易费用在内的总交易费用以及交易效率，导致人们所选择的公司治理合约形式不同。特殊关系治理合约和普遍关系治理合约是两种典型的治理合约形式，其内生和外生交易费用的值不同。内生和外生交易费用是相互替代的，科学选择治理合约形式可以有效降低总交易费用。社会制度基础发生变化，最优的治理合约形式也将随之发生相应变化。而制度演化具有明显的路径依赖特征，简单模仿他国的经验是不可取的。     

Corporate governance and national institutions: A review and emerging research agenda

We present a critique of corporate governance research grounded in agency theory and propose that cross-national comparison of corporate governance should consider how the nature and extent of agency relationships differ across different institutional contexts. Building on prior governance studies grounded in sociology and organizational theory we argue that performance outcomes of boards of directors, ownership concentration, and executive incentives may differ depending on the legal system and institutional characteristics in a specific country. Institutions may also affect the extent of complimentarity/substitution among different firm-level governance practices producing patterned variations in firm-level governance mechanisms. Our discussion suggests that researchers need to develop more holistic, institutionally embedded governance framework to analyze organizational outcomes of various governance practices.     

幸福感、社会资本与代理成本

幸福感是社会学和经济学领域关注的热点问题,但较少研究幸福感对公司治理行为影响的经济后果。本文运用中国A股上市公司的经验数据,在对幸福感与代理成本的关系进行理论分析的基础上,首次检验了幸福感与代理成本之间的关系。研究发现:地区幸福感能够显著降低地方政府控制上市公司的代理成本,与之相反,地区幸福感加剧了民营控制上市公司的代理成本,并从幸福感的社会资本视角对地区幸福感与代理成本的关系进行了解读。本研究在一定程度上增进了企业代理成本问题的研究积累,研究结论对国民福利的公共政策和企业员工福利计划的制定具有一定的启示意义。     

代理问题、公司治理与企业价值--以民营上市公司为例

本文运用代理理论对2002年在上海、深圳证券交易所上市的122家民营上市公司治理与企业价值进行理论分析与实证检验,发现民营上市公司治理包括在股权集中度、债务融资比重、金字塔式控股、控制权与现金流权偏离、流通股与非流通股价偏离等五个方向上存在着代理冲突,并指出引发民营上市公司代理冲突的首要原因是现行流通股与非流通股的股权割裂。     

Government Ownership and Financial Performance in a Competitive Environment: Evidence from the Corporatization of the New Zealand Government Computing Services

This paper examines the financial performance of Government Computer Services (GCS) from 1985 to 1994. During this period GCS moved from a government department to an autonomous agency and was subsequently organized as a limited liability corporation. In 1994, GCS was sold to the private sector. This setting provides a quasi-experiment in which to examine the effect of different governance mechanisms on financial performance, while holding ownership constant. The role of government ownership and its impact on financial performance is an important issue, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region where governments play a significant role in economic development. The financial performance of GCS improves, which is consistent with the hypotheses concerning the deregulation of the product and labor markets and changes to the governance structure.     

公司融资结构与委托代理机制设计研究

以现代财经理论为出发点,建立了非对称信息条件下基于融资结构的委托代理模型,并将财务风险和经理持股两个因素纳入模型中,对模型进行了求解,研究了在此背景下的激励机制的设计,并通过对模型的分析,阐述了经理在股权激励和债务约束两种背景下的行为特征。     

公司治理和破产关系的理论与实证研究——基于董事会结构和国有股比例的分析

本文应用代理模型系统地论述了公司治理与破产之间的关系,并在理论分析的基础上,基于中国上市公司的样本数据,运用实证方法直接对董事会结构和国有股比例等公司治理变量与破产(而不是财务困境)之间的关系进行了研究。研究结果表明:公司治理变量对公司破产有显著的解释和预警作用,但是,公司治理发挥作用的程度和用于预警的信息含量具有一定的时效性;公司治理变量与公司破产之间的关系比较复杂,但是国有股持股比例对公司破产概率有显著的影响,要注意董事长—总经理的两职合一与较低国有股持股比例的交叉作用对上市公司价值所可能带来的负面影响。     

The effects of ownership concentration and corporate debt on corporate divestitures in Chinese listed firms

This study examines how ownership concentration and corporate debt impact corporate divestitures in China. Corporate divestitures reduce the asset base of a company and the opportunity for expropriation by majority shareholders. In emerging economies, weak legal institutions, combined with equity ownership concentration and high corporate debt, allow majority shareholders to avoid such disciplines. Consequently, the relationship between these governance mechanisms and divestiture activity exhibits a pattern that is different from that in developed economies. Using archival data collected from 1,210 Chinese listed companies during 1999–2003, we found that ownership concentration by the largest shareholder depressed corporate divestitures both in state-controlled and in non-state-controlled firms. The negative effect of corporate debt on divestitures only existed for state-controlled firms. Our finding provides corroborating evidence for principal–principal conflicts in emerging economies. It suggests that corporate strategy in these countries can be better explained by taking into account the unique agency problems that are prevalent in these economies.     

企业理论的演进逻辑及其发展方向

现代企业理论强调资本所有权(产权)的决定作用,因而企业治理遵循“资本雇佣劳动”的逻辑。但这一逻辑越来越受到理论和实践两方面的挑战,客观上需要一个替代的企业理论。实际上,一些新的“资本”范畴的提出,预示着新的企业理论的发展方向。纵观企业理论发展的历史,我们发现有其自身发展规律:物质资本的所有权决定论—资本所有权逻辑的否定—资本所有权逻辑的回归。这是一个完整的“否定之否定”的过程。企业理论的这一发展规律从企业理论中“市场”与“生产”的关系看,理论重心经历了“市场交易合约”到“生产中的资源”,再到“市场交易与生产结合”的过程。企业理论发展逻辑的最后一个环节尚处于萌芽之中,需要我们加以深入研究。