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1.
RAHUL KOCHHAR 《战略管理杂志》1996,17(9):713-728
The study of capital structure has increasingly gained importance in strategic management research. Paradigms derived from organizational economics have also gained popularity in explaining firm actions. Agency theory and transaction cost economics represent two such paradigms that rely on the notion of market imperfections. Notwithstanding the similarities between them, these two offer different explanations of the role of debt and equity in a firm. The governance abilities of the financing structures and the nature of assets of the firm provide two key sources of differences. Viewing capital structure from transaction cost economics gives rise to predictions that are contradictory to those presented by agency theory. It is argued that the extant evidence mainly supports the transaction cost viewpoint. Two organizational phenomena—leveraged buyouts and product diversification—are used to highlight the comparison. 相似文献
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When faced with the strategic choice of going direct to market versus the option of using intermediaries, a firm is posited to evaluate the benefits to customers from going direct to market, and the transaction costs involved in using intermediaries. In this paper, we discuss how these evaluations might differ depending upon the microcharacteristics of the exchange domain. Based on these theoretical considerations, specific propositions are offered regarding the conditions under which firms might rely more heavily on direct channels. These propositions are tested by conducting a cross'sectional empirical analysis using a large sample of manufacturing firms operating in diverse exchange domains. We also control for the impact of macrolevel environmental characteristics, as well as firm-level characteristics that may influence the direct to market decision. Our empirical results confirm that customer benefits and transaction costs are important considerations in going direct to market. 相似文献
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Massimo G. Colombo 《战略管理杂志》2003,24(12):1209-1229
This paper analyzes factors that influence firms' choice of the organizational form of strategic alliances. I consider arguments suggested by both the contractual and the competence perspectives. In order to distinguish empirically between them, I devote special attention to the role played by the similarity of partner firms' technological specialization. In the empirical section I consider a sample composed of 271 equity joint ventures, non‐equity bilateral and unilateral agreements established between each other in the period 1983–86 by 67 North American, European, and Japanese enterprises from the world's largest firms in information technology industries. I examine the effects on the choice of alliance form of a measure of firms' technological proximity based on patents count, while controlling for other variables that are usually considered in the empirical literature. The estimates of binomial and multinomial logit models support the competence‐based argument that in technological alliances divergence in partners' technological specialization results in a higher propensity to use equity forms. Overall, the findings suggest that both the contractual and competence perspectives provide valuable complementary insights into the determinants of alliance form. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Research summary : Two central issues in strategic management are the determination of a firm's internal delegation and its vertical boundaries. Despite the importance of these issues, there is scant analysis concerning their interaction. Using a comprehensive database of the construction industry, we show that vertical integration positively influences the centralization decision and that the main mechanism driving this relationship is an improvement in the hierarchically coordinated adaptation of firm activities when complexity and uncertainty are high. We also observe that centralization is negatively related to the extent of relational contracts between principals and agents, and positively related to an exogenous increase in the cost of employee layoffs. Our results suggest that managers cannot consider firm boundaries and internal organization to be independent decisions. Managerial summary : We ask whether a firm's decision about vertically integrating or outsourcing its activities affects the choice of centralizing or delegating its internal decision‐making process. Our statistical analysis shows that firms with more vertical integration tend to centralize the decision‐making process and that firms that outsource more tend to decentralize more. Why? Vertical integration enables the use of centralized authority to coordinate activities that interact intensively. Accordingly, we found that the positive influence of vertical integration on centralization is especially significant in more complex and uncertain environments, when the need for coordination is higher. Thus, our results suggest that managers should choose vertical integration considering its effect on internal decision‐making processes, particularly when coordination is important. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Focusing on proving or disproving transaction cost economics has led to a relative neglect of some key drivers of vertical scope, such as differences in productive capabilities (as opposed to capabilities of governance). We consider how productive capability differences can shape vertical scope through gains from trade. Using highly detailed data from the mortgage banking industry, we find productive capabilities to be a key determinant of the make‐vs.‐buy decision. Our analysis also suggests firms' attempts to leverage a comparative advantage can also lead to the use of mixed governance modes (both ‘make’ and ‘buy’ in a particular part of the value chain). We conclude that the distribution of productive capabilities along the value chain, catalyzed by transaction costs, ultimately drives vertical scope. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Extant theories agree that debt should inhibit diversification but predict opposing performance consequences. While agency theory predicts that debt should lead to higher performance for diversifying firms, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that more debt will lead to lower performance for firms expanding into new markets. Our empirical tests on a large sample of Japanese firms support TCE by showing that firms accrue higher returns from leveraging their resources and capabilities into new markets when managers are shielded from the rigors of the market governance of debt, particularly bond debt. Furthermore, we find that the detrimental effects of debt are exacerbated for R&D intensive firms and that debt is not necessarily harmful to firms that are either contracting or managing a stable portfolio of markets. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Firms boundary choices have undergone careful examination in recent years, particularly in information services. While transaction cost economics provides a widely tested explanation for boundary choice, more recent theoretical work advances competing knowledge-based and measurement cost explanations. Similar to transaction cost economics, these theories examine the impact of exchange attributes on the performance of markets and hierarchies as institutions of governance. These theories, however, offer alternative attributes to those suggested by transaction cost economics or offer alternative mechanisms through which similar attributes influence make–buy choices. Traditional empirical specifications of make–buy models are unable to comparatively test among these alternative theories. By developing and testing a model of comparative institutional performance rather than institutional choice, we examine the degree of support for these competing explanations of boundary choice. Hypotheses are tested using data on the governance of nine information services at 152 companies. Our results suggest that a theory of the firm and a theory of boundary choice is likely to be complex, requiring integration of transaction cost, knowledge-based, and measurement reasoning. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Prior empirical research has documented a large cross-sectional correlation between the level of executive pay and firm size. In contrast, this paper examines the association between percentage changes in executive compensation and percentage changes in organizational size. We analyze compensation and size data for executives at several levels of the corporate hierarchy for a sample of 303 firms. Our results indicate that the correlation between compensation and size is much smaller, although still statistically significant, in changes than in levels. This suggests that changes in an executive's compensation are not primarily driven by changes in organizational size. 相似文献
10.
A large literature has successfully employed transaction cost economic theory to describe how exchange conditions affect the optimal form of organization. However, this approach has historically not accounted for the influence of firm‐specific attributes on the governance decision. This paper develops a model based on insights from transaction cost economics, the resource‐based view, and real options theory to examine how transaction‐level characteristics, firm‐specific capabilities, and product‐market scope influence the governance of production. Empirical evidence derived from analysis of 469 make‐or‐buy decisions involving 117 semiconductor firms indicates that decisions regarding the governance of production activities are strongly influenced by both transaction‐ and firm‐level effects. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
11.
战略采购的过程模型及其作用模式 总被引：10，自引：0，他引：10
基于交易成本／交易效益双边动态理论，本文发展了战略采购的过程模型，提出战略采购是一个由市场替代企业、优化网络节点、固化网络联结和整合网络能力四个环节构成的过程．目的是推动企业和市场向网络变迁以获得交易成本的持续降低和交易收益的持续创造。文中还指出了不同条件下的战略采购作用机理。在买方优势条件下．采购战略贡献高的能力可以通过发展单联网络来实现．而采购战略贡献低的能力可以通过发展并联网络来实现；在供方优势条件下，采购战略贡献高的能力可以通过发展外拓网络来实现．而采购战略贡献低的能力可以通过发展外联网络来实现。最后，根据我国战略采购实践和理论现状提出提高我国战略采购水平的对策和进一步理论研究的建议。 相似文献
12.
Little research has examined the performance implications of the parent‐child relationship post spin‐off. Although the parent provided oversight of the child prior to the spin‐off, effects of post spin‐off links to the child remain unclear. Applying transaction cost and agency theories, our study of 142 firms spun‐off between 1986 and 1997 examines how oversight and ownership by the parent firm influence stock market performance post spin‐off. We find that while child firms benefit from some links to the parent, having too many links is negatively related to performance. The findings suggest that there is a balance between having too much parental involvement and not enough. Our study extends understanding of post spin‐off child firm performance and provides valuable insights for both parent and child firms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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杨青龙 《地质技术经济管理》2010,(7):67-72
传统贸易理论所讨论的形成比较优势的成本,主要为生产成本。但是,在现实国际贸易活动中,交易成本在塑造一国比较优势时也发挥着重要作用。通过回顾国际贸易中的交易成本及其与生产成本和贸易成本的关系、国际贸易中的交易成本的影响因素及其度量、引入交易成本分析的国际贸易变化之相关文献,指出：现有文献未严格区分＂贸易成本＂和＂交易成本＂,迄今为止新制度经济学中对交易成本的测度与贸易理论中基于引力模型的贸易成本测度还缺乏必要的沟通和融合。 相似文献
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中小企业是推动国民经济发展,构造市场经济主体,促进社会稳定的基础力量。特别是当前,在确保国民经济适度增长、缓解就业压力、实现科教兴国、优化经济结构等方面,均发挥着越来越重要的作用。但也应看到,融资问题已成为制约中小企业发展的最大障碍和瓶颈。基于制度经济学的研究视角,通过交易费用理论、产权理论及强制性制度变迁理论对中小企业融资难问题进行剖析。 相似文献
17.
Anoop Madhok 《战略管理杂志》2002,23(6):535-550
In this paper, three points are argued. The first is that Ronald Coase, best known as the forefather of transaction cost theory, foresaw many of the critical questions that proponents of the resource‐based view are concerned with today. The second is that resource‐based theory plays a potentially much more critical role in economic theory and in explaining the institutional structure of production than even many resource‐based scholars recognize. The last point is that a more complete understanding of the organization of economic activity requires a greater sensitivity to the interdependence of production and exchange relations. The arguments presented in this paper highlight important, but relatively ignored, elements in Coase's work that inform strategy research. More importantly, this paper makes the case for a triangular alignment between the triumvirate of governance structure, transaction, and resource attributes and demonstrates how the identity and strategy of a particular firm influences how its resources interact with the transaction and how the firm chooses to govern it. The general argument is then applied to the context of interfirm collaborative relations, where the key focus is broadened from just cost to also include skills/knowledge and the interdependence between cost and skills with respect to firm boundaries, both in terms of choice and nature. Such a broadening of focus enables us to additionally examine the transacting process as a productive endeavor, which underpins the co‐evolution of the competencies of partner firms. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
18.
We combine the formalism of a principal–agent framework with a value‐based analysis in order to investigate the micro‐foundations of business partner selection and the division of value in contracting relationships. In particular, we study how the key contracting parameters such as efficiency, transactional integrity, incentive alignment, and gaming affect outcomes when buyers face competing suppliers. We show that integrity and efficiency increase value creation and capture for all parties and are complements. While incentive gaming is unambiguously bad for value creation, and reduces buyers' value capture, it can benefit some suppliers. For alignment, we find that neither party has an incentive to use fully aligned performance measures that maximize total value creation. We conclude by analyzing buyers' and suppliers' incentives to invest in integrity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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To develop further insight into antecedents of the CEO's psychological orientation toward the firm, we investigate what might lead CEOs to identify with their firms. Although research suggests that CEO organizational identification can be quite consequential for the firm, little research attention has been paid to its determinants. To predict how the special context of the CEO position might lead to identification, we consider a set of motives that members have for identifying with their organizations and consider how unique features of the CEO position might be relevant to those motives. Our theory and supportive findings help explain how the context of the CEO position, including variables often conceptualized as control mechanisms in agency theory research, can have important effects on subsequent CEO organizational identification. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Firms simultaneously face the need to cooperate with and control an alliance partner. To complement the transaction cost perspective's emphasis on the need to control and limit opportunistic behavior, we examine the sources and impact of the cooperation costs incurred in order to work with a partner. We propose that these costs increase with greater joint task complexity and interpartner diversity, and perceptions of equitable behavior affect the perceptions of these costs. Hypotheses derived from the framework are tested in a sample of 231 contractual alliances between architects and general contractors in the Hong Kong construction industry. We find that both cooperation costs and transaction costs affect the level of time and effort a manager expends on an alliance, supporting our fundamental proposition that the costs of cooperation and control are conceptually and empirically distinct. We argue that cooperation costs should be incorporated into studies that compare the choice of alternative partners and alliance structures, as well as among the broader categories of market, hierarchy, and hybrid governance forms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献