企业家人力资本外部性及其内在化路径研究

具有创新型生产力形态的企业家人力资本,在社会实践中的运用呈现出较强的正向外部性,这源于企业家人力资本的私人收益率与社会收益率的极大不一致。由于外部性的存在,阻碍了企业家创新精神的发挥及企业家人力资本的生成和供给．故完整界定企业家人力资本产权是克服外部性的有效手段．企业家人力资本的股权化是其外部性内在化的具体路径选择。     

Two-sided Markets,Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts

We provide a framework for analyzing two-sided markets that allows for different degrees of product differentiation on each side of the market. When platforms are viewed as homogenous by sellers but heterogeneous by buyers, we show that “competitive bottlenecks” arise endogenously. In equilibrium, platforms do not compete directly for sellers, instead choosing to compete indirectly by subsidizing buyers to join. Sellers are left with none of the gains from trade. Despite this, it is sellers who choose to purchase from multiple platforms (multihome). Finally, the role of exclusive contracts to prevent multihoming is explored. We are very grateful to Jose Miguel Abito for research assistance, and to the editor and a referee for helpful comments.     

我国海洋资源性资产流失与产权管理问题探讨

海洋资源性资产的流失是海洋资源开发利用过程中存在的重要问题之一。本文在分析海洋资源性资产流失的特点、渠道和类型的基础上,对我国海洋资源性资产的产权调整、产权体系及产权管理策略等进行了探讨。     

The Paper River Revisited: A Common Property Externality Exercise

The author describes a modified version of the Paper River exercise that appeared in this journal in the Spring 1999 issue. The original game was designed to illustrate the application of the Coase theorem for solving an externality problem. In the Paper River, pairs of students share a single productive resource: small pieces of paper. At question is who has the rights to the paper. The author presents a modified version of the game that retains many of the same elements from the original, but the students work in groups rather than in pairs. Doing so increases the transaction costs associated with negotiating a solution. In addition, the productive resource is common property, so property rights are difficult to establish. These difficulties make a Coasian solution more difficult but make the simulation more realistic.     

Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem

We generalize the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over a divisible good, with two-sided private information on the valuations. For concave quasi-linear preferences, the ex ante most efficient Bayes equilibrium of any mechanism always exhibits a bias toward the status quo. If utility functions are quadratic every Bayes equilibrium is ex post inefficient, with the expected amount of trade biased toward the disagreement point. In other words, for the class of preferences we study, there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the Coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D23, D62, D82.     

科技型中小企业知识产权融资模式选择研究

随着知识产权运用的深化,知识产权融资已成为科技型中小企业融资的新途径。文章基于资源基础论,对知识产权融资能力进行了分析,将其分解为知识产权财务能力和知识产权战略能力。现有知识产权融资模式偏重政府自上而下的推动,忽视了中小企业对知识产权融资的承接能力,由此导致企业对知识产权融资的认可度不高。科技型中小企业知识产权融资模式需要从企业能力出发,以知识产权财务能力和战略能力为抓手,建立知识产权融资模式的选择模型,厘清企业知识产权融资的需求和特点,针对企业情况合理配置各类知识产权融资方式。科技型中小企业知识产权融资模式只有建立在企业自身能力基础之上,才能推动企业积极投入,进而吸引相关主体参与并推广知识产权融资活动。     

A Comparison of Emission Taxes and Permit Markets for Controlling Correlated Externalities

This paper provides an answer to the question: Are emission taxes an efficient and self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems? By “correlated externalities” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but cause differentiated regional and global externalities. By “self-enforcing” we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. This mechanism incorporates sequential decision making among the jurisdictions and therefore determines an equilibrium based on the concept of subgame perfection. We find that, unlike joint domestic and international tradable permit markets, joint emission taxes and a hybrid scheme of permits and taxes are neither efficient nor self-enforcing.     

生态产权制度建设与我国生态环境保护

文章认为,我国生态资源效率低下根源于＂公＂权,但提高其效率的出路未必就在于＂私＂权化。因此,在我国生态产权制度改革中,既要引入激励性机制,建立市场化的生态环境公共产权规制,又要打破传统＂公有＂—＂公用＂—＂公营＂中的＂公用＂、＂公营＂生态资源运行范式,把使用权和经营权按生态资源公共性、外部性做技术性分离,明确使用权和经营权各自的权能,引入民营企业、外资企业等非国有企业参与生态产权的经营和竞争,使国有企业从部分生态资源的经营领域退出,形成多元化、市场化的生态资源经营制度和生态产权混合型管理模式,实现我国生态环境的有效保护。     

Forestland rights institutions and forest management of Vietnamese households

This article aims to unbundle the influence of prevailing forestland rights institutions on the forest management behaviours of Vietnamese households. Based on a sample of 398 observations, we investigate the impact of two dimensions of forestland rights institutions (i.e. the formality and the duration) of two types of forest (i.e. production and protection forests) on two types of forest management behaviours (i.e. clearing and improving forest). We find that different dimensions of forestland rights institutions have different impacts on the forest management behaviour of households.     

The Emergence of Market Power in Emission Rights Markets: The Role of Initial Permit Distribution

This paper offers an analytical model of emission permit markets in which a large number of regulated emitters participate, and derives formulae that estimate the degree of market distortion. These formulae clearly show the entire dependence of the ratio of market prices to competitive levels on the permit initial distribution as well as the existence of a threshold for effective market power. While the findings challenge a well-known conception of the Coase Theorem, they have significant policy implications vis-à-vis the Kyoto Protocol and the related policy debates on excess emission rights known as hot air.     

跨国基金的产权关系:一种新诠释

本文在假定基金产权划分为直接产权与间接产权、物质产权与价值产权的基础上,以离岸基金为例探讨跨国基金的产权关系.基金产权相互分离,且归属于相对独立的不同产权所有者,是基金实施跨国经营和跨国融资的产权基础,其中关键是,基金的国家间接物质产权与国家间接价值产权相分离并分别归属于不同国家的政府.实现跨国基金的制度创新和管理创新需要,规范各类基金产权所有者的权利和行为,降低基金内部的交易费用,重新构建基金治理机制.     

产权改革社会化趋势的理论分析

经济体制转型国家的产权制度改革往往与经济市场化密切相关,在这一过程中,社会生产方式从封闭走向开放化、社会化,一切生产要素都要通过市场为全社会所用。产权的社会化,实现了资本的社会运营,形成了财产权利的社会分解、经济利益的社会分享和风险责任的社会分担,这是现代市场经济发展的必然要求。     

高校知识产权保护与管理问题及对策

高校不仅是人才培养基地,也是知识、技术和专利的发源地,因此,高校应该高度重视加强知识产权的保护与管理。虽然高校在知识产权的保护和管理方面作出了许多的成绩,但还存在许多的问题,在此基础上,提出了我国知识产权保护与管理的建议。     

浅议校企合作中的知识产权管理

进入知识经济时代,中国高校与企业合作开发利用知识产权成为一种趋势。但其中存在诸多问题和隐患,应该引起重视。对这些问题应着重从高校的知识产权管理入手解决,并提出一些看法和建议。高校肩负推动技术创新和将科技成果转化为现实生产力的双重任务,科技与经济相结合,高校与企业相结合,这是中国改革开放以来出现的新形势,也是顺应世界发展潮流的新趋势：所以高校与企业合作发展对双方而言是互惠互赢的。     

The Commons with Capital Markets

We explore a dynamic commons problem and assess the welfare consequences of access to capital markets. The commons has a high intrinsic rate of return but its fruits cannot be secured by individual agents. Capital market access allows resources to be held securely and intertemporally transferred, but at a lower rate of return. In a two period model, we completely characterise symmetric consumption and extraction behaviour in four environments: under a strategic and a competitive equilibrium concept, and with and without market access. Strategic equilibria dominate competitive ones: while agents disagree over how to divide the resource, all would prefer it to be larger; the strategic concept allows them to anticipate returns to their conservation. As the number of agents becomes infinite, the strategic outcome converges to the competitive; as the number of agents falls to one, it converges to the planner’s. Market access has a positive effect on welfare owing to its consumption and extraction smoothing properties and a negative effect owing to its creation of an outside option to the commons, encouraging its depletion. A sufficient condition for autarky to dominate market access for some levels of communal endowment is that the world market discount factor exceed the subjective discount factor. Multiple equilibria may arise: these result from market access, not the equilibrium concept. The authors thank Ralph Bailey, Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Matthew Cole, Carl Devore, Felix Kubler, Chirantan Ganguly, Martin Jensen, Indrajit Ray, Celine Rochon, Dave Rusin, participants at the Royal Economic Society 2005 and an anonymous referee for valuable comments. They are grateful for funding under the ESRC’s World Economy and Finance programme (RES-156-25-0022).     

产权缺陷与伦理冲突

本文认为,在各种社会制度中,产权制度是最基本的,产权制度如果存在缺陷必然引致道德秩序上的混乱。在产权依附于特权的条件下,不可能产生真正的市场经济;在垄断制度下,在效率上损失了资源利用水平;在权能分离条件下,即在由古典企业向现代企业制度转换过程中,至少有三种诱发败德现象发生的可能。     

论私有产权的限制

私有产权的限制可从两个层次看:一是立宪层次上的限制,它是私有财产所有者被动接受的限制,包括禁止侵害他物权的限制和保护公共利益与实现政治需求的限制;二是法律上的私有产权界定后,私有产权所有者主动选择的限制,包括行使权利成本的限制和设立他物权的限制.保护公共利益与实现政治需求的限制抑制了私有产权、市场交换作为调节资源稀缺性与人类欲望无限性矛盾手段的力量;其他限制则是发挥市场机制配置资源,实现产值最大化的要求,为不是限制的限制.     

论行政机关国有资产管理

行政性国有资产在没有统一明确的监管机构和制度制约的情况下,管理混乱,漏洞很大,如账外资产大量存在、国有资产产权混乱、管理方式落后等。为此,制定国有资产管理原则是非常重要的,因为借助它我们才能为行政机关国有资产管理制定正确的目标。     

获益能力理论及其在自然资源管理领域的应用

获益能力(access)指各种经济主体获得、维持和控制利益的各种能力,获益能力理论关注现实环境中自然资源利益的分配,谁是既得利益者,凭借什么获得、维持利益和控制其他参与者的利益。获益能力理论可以为我们理解现实情境中诸多资源产生的利益的分配不公问题提供理论框架,也可以作为有力的资源政策分析工具。获益能力由自然资源、技术、知识、资本、劳动等内层能力,法律政策、国际政治力量、文化、社会地位和关系以及习惯风俗等外围能力构成。与产权理论相比,获益能力理论新颖之处在于不仅关注价格或产权这样的单一控制和积累机制,而且拓展到分析市场运行中的经济、政治和社会相互作用机制,产权尚不足以保护资源产权所有者获得公平的资源利益分配。     

The commons,common property,and environmental policy

The conceptual confusion among property, common property, open access resources, and the tragedy of the commons is identified and rectified. Property rights are defined and clarified. From that it is possible to understand the traditional confusion between open access resources and common property resources. It is urged that common property regimes be used in place of common property resources. This will emphasize that institutional arrangements are human creations and that natural resources can be managed as private property, as common property, or as state property. It is the property regime — an authority system — that indicates the rules of use of a variety of natural resources.