商业银行构建虚拟股票期权激励模式初探

在中国加入WTO后,我国商业银行面临着前所未有的冲击。从当前情况看,激励机制不健全是是导致我国商业银行效率低下、活力不足的重要原因之一。美国股票期权的风靡,尤其是作为高层管理人员的激励方法,也许是过去十五年公司治理和公司激励制度最大的变革。但由于股票期权制度本身理论上的缺陷和我国银行业的实际问题,这一激励机制在我国商业银行中应用较为困难。为此,笔者提出了一种全新的激励制度,即将EVA(经济增加值)融入股票期权的虚拟股票期权激励体系。虚拟股票期权可以有效解决我国目前商业银行在激励制度中存在的问题。     

商业银行构建虚拟股票期权激励模式初探

在中国加入WTO后,我国商业银行面临着前所未有的冲击.从当前情况看,激励机制不健全是是导致我国商业银行效率低下、活力不足的重要原因之一.美国股票期权的风靡,尤其是作为高层管理人员的激励方法,也许是过去十五年公司治理和公司激励制度最大的变革.但由于股票期权制度本身理论上的缺陷和我国银行业的实际问题,这一激励机制在我国商业银行中应用较为困难.为此,笔者提出了一种全新的激励制度,即将EVA(经济增加值)融入股票期权的虚拟股票期权激励体系.虚拟股票期权可以有效解决我国目前商业银行在激励制度中存在的问题.     

管理层激励新概念:基于EVA的虚拟股票期权

由于股票期权制度本身理论上的缺陷和我国的实际问题，这一激励机制在我国应用较为困难。本文针对目前国内尚没有一套健全的激励机制，提出了一种全新的激励制度，即将EVA(经济增加值)融入股票期权的虚拟股票期权激励体系。虚拟股票期权可以有效解决我国目前在激励制度中存在的问题。     

国有企业实行股票期权激励机制有效性的探讨

股票期权激励制度对改善我国公司治理中的委托代理和内部人控制等一系列问题具有重要意义。然而,股票期权激励机制发挥作用有一定的约束条件．只有通过加快建立和完善证券市场及经理市场,规范公司治理结构,完善股票期权激励相关法规,才能使股票期权激励真正发挥作用。     

论企业高管股权激励有效性

企业高管股票期权激励制度已成为人们关注的焦点。依据股权激励的内在机理,结合我国股票期权激励的制度基础,在重新审视相关制约因素的基础上,从提升股票期权激励的有效性角度,提出了完善绩效评价体系、切实解决"内部人控制"与审慎处理期权费用化、尽快调整股权激励的税收政策等相关措施与政策建议。     

股票期权制度面临的两难境地

文章从股票期权制度的缺陷出发，简单讨论了美国的股票期权制度改革的一些政策。然后通过对中美股票期权制度进行比较分析，对中国当前的股票期权制度进行了讨论和评价，希望能够对我国的经理人激励制度改革有所借鉴。     

基于信息机制的股票期权制度的激励效果保障研究

股票期权制度作为一种长期有效的激励机制,可以将经营者与所有者的利益紧密联系起来,从而解决公司中经理人与股东之间的委托代理问题。本文从信息机制的角度对股票期权制度的正负效应进行了深入剖析,针对股票期权制度本身的设计、现行会计处理手段以及股票期权的信息传递路径三方面的不足进行了分析,并提出在我国实施这一制度的激励效果的保障措施。     

对经理股票期权激励效应及其缺陷的研究

经理股票期权是西方国家广泛采用的一种激励制度。本文简要分析了经理股票期权的含义理论基础,从它的激励效应进行分析,针对经理股票期权存在的缺陷,提出了完善的建议。     

公司治理结构与审计师的独立性

独立性一直是审计的本质特征和灵魂所在。然而，由于现阶段公司治理结构中的董事会制度、股票期权激励制度及审计师聘任制度存在缺陷，难以保证审计师的独立性。针对上述问题，笔者对公司治理的改革提出了自己的建议，以真正提高审计师独立性。     

基于委托代理理论浅析实行股票期权激励制度的必要性

随着起现代企业制度的逐步建立，委托代理的问题也随之而来。如何解决由于所有权和经营权的分离所带来的问题成为现代公司治理的一大难题，股票期权作为一种新型的激励制度，有效地解决了委托代理问题。本文将在分析股票期权的定义的基础上来进一步剖析实行股票期权激励制度的必要性。     

An investigation of causality between insider transactions and stock returns

Prior research shows that corporate insiders engage in profitable transactions by trading securities of their own firms. The main purpose of this study is to examine whether insider transactions and stock returns have causality relationships at the firm level for a sample of 2,521 firms during the period 1988 to 1998. We find a large impact of stock returns on subsequent insider transactions at both the aggregate and firm levels. The impact appears to be negative which suggests that insiders buy after stock price decreases and sell after stock price increases. Our findings on the predictive content of insider transactions for subsequent stock returns are primarily consistent with prior literature. We observe a positive but weak relationship between insider transactions and future stock returns.     

Institutional monitoring,coordination and corporate acquisitions in China

Within the context of corporate acquisition decisions of China’s Publicly Listed Corporations (PLCs), this paper investigates the monitoring and coordination behaviour of institutional shareholders. Institutional shareholders are divided into four groups: large outsider, large insider, small outsider and small insider. The outsider and insider categorization, respectively, represents the absence of significant business links with relevant PLCs. In China, institutional shareholders tend to either monitor the acquisitions decisions of PLCs or coordinate their response with the controlling shareholders (coordination in the present context amounts to cooperation). Using micro data from China’s stock market over the 2003–2008 period, we find that (through ex-ante coordination with the controlling shareholders) the insider institutional investment tends to increase the likelihood of PLC acquisitions. However, through ex-ante monitoring of the PLC acquisition offers, the outsider institutional investment tends to decrease the acquisition likelihood. We find that, through ex-post monitoring of PLC acquisitions, institutional investors with large shareholdings can help improve the post-acquisition performance of Chinese PLCs. On the other hand, institutional investors with small shareholdings tend to coordinate their actions with the controlling shareholders. Accordingly, small institutional shareholders cannot affect the post-acquisition performance of China’s PLCs. Finally, we find that the so-called ‘cherry-picking effect’ exists only in the case of large outsider institutional investors.     

信息披露与内部人股票交易获利策略——以六起内部人股票交易为基础的案例研究

本文以近期A股市场内部人股票交易活跃的六家公司为例,通过考查信息披露与内部人股票交易间的关系,解释内部人股票交易的获利策略。研究发现,在允许内部人交易本公司股票的情况下,信息披露与内部人股票交易关系密切,内部人存在利用私有信息和策略性信息披露两类获利策略。信息权力是内部人股票交易的获利基础,公司业绩是影响内部人股票交易获利策略选择的重要因素,而法律诉讼风险并没有对我国内部人股票交易和信息披露产生明显约束作用。这些发现对完善我国资本市场内部人股票交易行为规范具有一定借鉴意义。     

Insider trading in a two-tier real market structure model

This paper investigates the real and financial effects of insider trading in the spirit of Jain and Mirman (2000). Unlike the existing literature, the production of one real good is costly and depends mainly on the price of an intermediate good produced locally by a privately owned firm. The results show that the output level of the final good chosen by the insider as well as the price of the intermediate good set by the privately owned firm are both higher than it would be in the absence of insider trading. Furthermore, the parameters of both real markets affect the stock price. Next, a second insider, operating in the firm producing the final good, is added to the benchmark model. Competition among insiders decreases the production of the final good by the publicly owned firm and the price of the intermediate good with respect to the benchmark model. Moreover, it affects the insiders’ trades and increases the amount of information revealed in the stock price.     

重大事件披露、股价异常波动与内幕交易——基于重大信息披露违规公司的经验证据

规范化的信息披露是证券市场正常运转的基石。本文利用重大事件披露违规公司研究信息披露违规背后是否存在股价异常波动与内幕交易现象，并将样本公司按照处分类型和公司类型分类检验。研究表明，总体样本公司的股票存在显著的内幕交易行为，并呈现出牛市背景下的新特征：受到公开谴责的公司股票内幕交易程度显著高于受到公开处罚的公司股票，ST公司股票的内幕交易程度显著高于非ST公司股票。     

Reputation and Managerial Truth-Telling as Self-Insurance

We investigate truth-telling by an informed insider, or manager, who repeatedly forecasts cash flows to competitive investors in a standard message game. The insider cannot trade on or sell private information, but faces imperfectly hedgeable nonwage income shocks. When compensation depends on the current stock price, a partially revealing equilibrium may exist in which the manager manipulates his reports, and hence the stock price, to reduce consumption variance. Intuitively, the manager builds reputation in good times when honesty is affordable, and exploits reputation in times of need. Endogenous reputation for honesty thus follows from a self-insurance motive.     

Seniority, external labor markets, and faculty pay

We estimate the returns to seniority (the wage-tenure profile) for university faculty, and the degree to which these returns respond to entry-level salaries (or opportunity wages)—a relationship unexplored in work to date. Using data on faculty at a Big Ten university (ours), we estimate elasticities of senior-faculty salaries with respect to entry-level salaries, and find that these elasticities decline with seniority. The evidence provides an explanation of faculty salary compression and suggests the importance of controlling for entry-level salaries in obtaining estimates of the returns to seniority.     

Insider trading around open-market share repurchases

We examine insider trading around open-market share repurchases and find that insiders trade passively in 3 months prior to repurchase announcements and in up to 12 months following the announcements. Furthermore, both pre-announcement and post-announcement abnormal insider trading is unrelated to short-term announcement returns but correlated with long-term post-announcement returns. Our results indicate that corporate insiders trade passively around repurchase announcements in accordance with their perceived undervaluation to exploit the long-run abnormal stock returns related to the events.     

Filtration enlargement-based time series forecast in view of insider trading

This survey reviews filtration enlargement models in view of insider trading. Although filtration enlargement aptly models insiders' informational advantage, the theoretical results have not attracted the attention of the empiricists, owing mainly to the lack of a bridge transforming the results to testable hypotheses, and/or the absence of econometrics method linking the hypotheses and the data. This survey provides a feasible avenue to estimate insider information and to detect trading from a relatively sophisticated theoretical model, where the dynamics of publicly available data (e.g., stock price) implies insider information before the information is completely digested. We complete the survey with an empirical illustration based on simulated data.     

Insider ownership and firm performance in Taiwan's electronics industry: a technical efficiency perspective

This paper applies agency theory to explore the relationship between insider stock ownership and firm performance, particularly in terms of technical efficiency. Insiders are further classified into executives, outside directors, and large shareholders to conduct a detailed study. Six‐year (1996–2001) panel data of 416 Taiwanese listed electronics firms are examined by the stochastic production frontier approach. It is observed that raising the executive‐to‐insider holding ratio first causes a decrease and then an increase in technical efficiency, forming a U‐shaped relationship. However, the board‐to‐insider holding ratio is negatively associated with technical efficiency. The results indicate that equity ownership of top officers in high‐tech firms should be encouraged to enhance firm productivity. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.