Price discrimination: A classroom experiment

In this article, the authors describe a classroom experiment aimed at familiarizing students with different types of price discrimination (first-, second-, and third-degree price discrimination). During the experiment, the students were asked to decide what tariffs to set as monopolists for each of the price discrimination scenarios under consideration. The objective was to allow the students to work empirically, through trial and error, selecting tariffs for each type of discrimination that would maximize a monopolistic entrepreneur's profits. The purpose of the exercise also was to enable the students to differentiate each type of price discrimination and to set tariffs in each case, as well to help them understand the repercussions in terms of welfare for each type of price discrimination.     

Employment discrimination in a former Soviet Union Republic: Evidence from a field experiment

We provide the first experimental evidence about ethnic and gender discrimination in the labor market of a former Soviet Union country, Georgia. We randomly assign Georgian and non-Georgian, male and female, names to similar resumes and apply for jobs as advertised on help-wanted websites in Georgia. We find that gender has no effect on the probability of callback, but a job applicant who is ethnically Georgian is more than twice as likely to be called for a job interview than an equally skilled ethnic non-Georgian (Azerbaijani or Armenian). The 113% ethnic gap in callbacks (167% among males and 79% among females), which is substantially larger than the gap typically documented in the existing literature for both developed and developing countries, is statistically significant and cannot be abridged by having more experience or education. There is no evidence of gender discrimination in callbacks, both within the Georgian group and the non-Georgian group.     

Weight discrimination in the German labour market

We explore the effects of higher body mass index (BMI) or obesity on different labour market outcomes. We extend the present literature by investigating the effect of obesity on (i) promotion likelihood and (ii) unemployment duration, in addition to the effect on (iii) wages and (iv) probability of being employed. We find an obesity penalty on wages, employment likelihood, promotion likelihood and unemployment duration among females in Germany taking into account of endogeneity of BMI and sample selection. We are also able to identify an unexplained effect of obesity on wages, employment and promotion likelihood for females using decomposition techniques that can be attributed to weight discrimination.     

Cheating in markets: A laboratory experiment

We develop a two-market model under three conditions: autarky, frictionless free trade, and free trade with cheating. With cheating, buyers can underpay by π% in cross-market trades and sellers can deliver π% of full value. We solve for competitive equilibrium with cheating and obtain novel testable predictions on price, volume and surplus. We test these in a laboratory experiment using parameters intended to challenge the theory. The results are generally consistent with competitive equilibrium. We find evidence of price unification, market segmentation, a cross-market volume of trade lower under cheating than in frictionless free trade, but a higher overall volume.     

Sex discrimination and competition in product and labour markets

Theoritical explanations for wage discrimination collapse in the long run, because competition should drive discriminations firms out of the market. In product markets with imperfect competition employes with a taste for discrimination might survive, None the less inthis case long-run efffects are also unclear, unless some monopsonistic power in the labour market is involved. Monopsony in the labour market, on the other hand, has received very little attention in the literature. The paper tries to pick up this long negleted issue, looking at the impact of concentration in output markets and local labour markets on wage discrimination by sex in Austria. As limited workers' mobility enables employers to define their own local labour markets,special attention is given to married women, whose geographical mobility is known to be very low.     

Labour market discrimination against former juvenile delinquents: evidence from a field experiment

In view of policy action to integrate ex-offenders into society, it is important to identify the underlying mechanisms of the negative relationship between criminal record on the one hand and later employment and earnings on the other hand. In this study, we identify hiring discrimination against former juvenile delinquents in a direct way. To this end, we conduct a field experiment in the Belgian labour market. We find that labour market discrimination is indeed a major barrier in the transition to work for former juvenile delinquents. Labour market entrants disclosing a history of juvenile delinquency get about 22% less callback compared to their counterparts without a criminal record. This discrimination is heterogeneous by the occupation for which one applies.     

Ethnic discrimination in hiring,labour market tightness and the business cycle - evidence from field experiments

Several studies using observational data suggest that ethnic discrimination increases in downturns of the economy. We investigate whether ethnic discrimination depends on labour market tightness using data from correspondence studies. We utilize three correspondence studies of the Swedish labour market and two different measures of labour market tightness. These two measures produce qualitatively similar results, and, opposite to the observational studies, suggest that ethnic discrimination in hiring decreases in downturns of the economy.     

History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis

We analyze history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry, where an incumbent, protected by switching costs, faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. We demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history-based price discrimination. We find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform pricing. This implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. Finally, we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history-based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers.     

Training opportunities in monopsonistic labour markets

This paper studies the empirical relationship between the extent of monopsonistic power observed in occupational labour markets and the training opportunities available to workers in those markets; using data from the American National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979. The results reveal a positive and significant association between monopsony power and training availability. The estimated association is found to be stronger for individuals with a college degree, with longer tenure in their jobs, and higher wages. These results are consistent across several econometric specifications that control for time, occupation, and individual fixed effects.     

Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment

Ambiguity about the chances of winning represents a key aspect in lotteries. By means of a controlled field experiment, we exogenously vary the degree of ambiguity about the winning chances of lotteries organized to incentivize the contribution for a public good. In one treatment, people have been simply informed about the maximum number of potential participants (i.e. the number of lottery tickets released). In a second treatment, this information has been omitted as in all traditional lotteries. Our general finding shows that simply reducing the degree of ambiguity of the lottery leads to a sizable and significant increase (67%) in the participation rate. This result is robust to alternative prize configurations.     

Hidden benefits of reward: A field experiment on motivation and monetary incentives

We conducted a field experiment in a controlled work environment to investigate the effect of motivational talk and its interaction with monetary incentives. We find that motivational talk improves performance only when accompanied by performance pay. Moreover, performance pay reduces performance unless it is accompanied by motivational talk. These effects also carry over to the quality of work. Performance pay alone leads to more mistakes. Adding motivational talk makes the difference. In treatments with performance pay, motivational talk increases output by about 20 percent and reduces the ratio of mistakes by more than 40 percent.     

Searching for religious discrimination among childcare workers

We implement a lab‐in‐the‐field experiment among childcare workers in Chandigarh, India, to evaluate discriminatory attitudes of the Hindu workers toward Muslim children. We use a third‐party allocation game that controls for selfish payoff‐maximizing preferences across the treatments and focus exclusively on distributional attitudes. Our results indicate that the workers in our sample are primarily motivated by welfare‐based criteria in making their allocation decisions and do not practice discrimination based on religious identities.     

A classroom experiment in monetary policy

The authors propose a classroom experiment implementing a simple version of a New Keynesian model suitable for courses in intermediate macroeconomics and money and banking. Students play as either the central bank or members of the private sector. The central banker sets interest rates to meet twin objectives for inflation and the output gap or to meet only an inflation target. In both settings, private sector agents are concerned with correctly forecasting the inflation rate. The authors show that an experiment implementing this setup is feasible and yields results that enhance understanding of the New Keynesian model of monetary policy. They propose alternative versions where the central bank is replaced by a policy rule and provide suggestions for discussing the experimental results with students.     

Suffrage,labour markets and coalitions in colonial Virginia

We study Virginia's suffrage from the early-17th century until the American Revolution using an analytical narrative and econometric analysis of unique data on franchise restrictions. First, we hold that suffrage changes reflected labour market dynamics. Indeed, Virginia's liberal institutions initially served to attract indentured servants from England who were needed in the labour-intensive tobacco farming but deteriorated once worker demand subsided and planters replaced white workers with slaves. Second, we argue that Virginia's suffrage was also the result of political bargaining influenced by shifting societal coalitions. We show that new politically influential coalitions of freemen and then of small and large slave-holding farmers emerged in the second half of the 17th and early-18th centuries, respectively. These coalitions were instrumental in reversing the earlier democratic institutions. Our main contribution stems from integrating the labour markets and bargaining/coalitions arguments, thus proving a novel theoretical and empirical explanation for institutional change.     

Native-immigrant wage differentials in Greece: discrimination and assimilation

This article applies the Blinder–Oaxaca methodology in order to dissect the average earnings differentials between Greek workers and three different groups of immigrants into a part attributed to differences in characteristics and a part due to discrimination. It also seeks to identify the effect of assimilation (i.e. postmigration human capital) on immigrants’ earnings. We use information about 8429 individuals, of which 1185 are immigrants. The data are drawn from the Greek Labour Force Survey (2009). Our results suggest that discrimination is significantly higher for immigrants originating from non-EU countries than it is for EU foreigners, while it is negative for those who terminated education in Greece. Also, there is evidence that (i) post-migration human capital is a significant determinant of immigrants earnings, (ii) there is limited transferability of skills between sending countries and Greece and (iii) education is the main determinant of the wage gap between natives and immigrants.     

Tax reforms under market distortions in product and labour markets

Using a two-agent model comprised of capitalists and workers, this paper examines the importance of imperfect competition in product and labour markets in determining the welfare effects of tax reform. The reform considered consists of eliminating the capital tax alongside a concurrent rise in the labour tax. In contrast to the perfectly competitive model, models with product or labour market failures each result in welfare losses for the workers in the long-run. In a realistic calibration to the UK economy, combining these imperfections implies that this tax reform will be Pareto improving in the long-run. However, these welfare gains over longer time horizons come at the cost of short-run losses, which, consistent with previous research, result in welfare losses for workers post-reform.     

Third-degree price discrimination in a short-stay accommodation industry

This article analyses the pricing in the short-stay accommodation industry in Tasmania. It utilizes a novel 2008 survey of Tasmanian short-stay accommodation firms in which business managers were asked about their perception of the elasticity of their firm’s demand in each of the market segments that their firm supplied. This direct observation of elasticity allows us to demonstrate that firms’ price across market segments act in a manner consistent with the Lerner index and the theory of third-degree price discrimination. Further we show, in line with expectations based on the literature, that increased quality of the accommodation lowers the elasticity of demand, while the elasticity of demand is higher in winter. Surprisingly, Internet sales channels do not exhibit a different elasticity of demand to other sales channels.     

A controlled field experiment on corruption

This paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues: the experimenter's scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption. In the experiment, a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade. We find that graders respond more favorably to bigger bribes, while the effect of higher wages is ambiguous: it lowers the bribe's acceptance, but it fosters reciprocation. Monitoring and punishment can deter corruption, but we cannot reject that it may also crowd-out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified. Finally, our results suggest several micro-determinants of corruption including age, ability, religiosity, but not gender.     

A new test for analysing hysteresis in European unemployment

This article proposes a new unit root test to analyse unemployment hysteresis. The test is able to incorporate cross-sectional dependence, unattended nonlinearity and unknown structural breaks in the time-series data. This study used data on unemployment in five European countries. The findings indicated that conventional unit root tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of hysteresis for all countries. However, the newly proposed unit root test was able to reject the null hypothesis for the Spanish unemployment rate.