COLLUSION,FLUCTUATING DEMAND,AND PRICE RIGIDITY*

We study an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which an i.i.d. demand shock occurs in each period. Each firm receives a private signal about the demand shock at the beginning of each period. At the end of each period, all information but the private signals becomes public. We consider the optimal symmetric perfect public equilibrium (SPPE) mainly for patient firms. We show that price rigidity arises in the optimal SPPE if the accuracy of the private signals is low. We also study the implications of more firms and firms' impatience on collusive pricing.     

RETAIL PRICE REGULATION AND THE OPTION TO DELAY

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper examines a two-period model of an investment decision in a network industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to invest early as well as the underlying overall welfare output. In a regulated environment, we consider a monopolist who faces no downstream (final good) competition but is subject to retail price regulation. We identify the welfare-maximizing regulated prices when the unregulated market outcome is set as the benchmark. We show that if the regulator can commit to ex post regulation – that is, regulated prices that are contingent to future demand realization – then regulated prices that allow the firm to recover its total costs of production are welfare-maximizing. Thus, under ex post price regulation there is no need to compensate the regulated firm for the option to delay that it foregoes when investing today. We argue, however, that regulators cannot make this type of commitment and, therefore, price regulation is often ex ante – that is, regulated prices are not contingent to future demand. We show that the optimal ex ante regulation, and the extent to which regulated prices need to incorporate an option to delay, depend on the nature of demand uncertainty.     

PRICE DYNAMICS WITH CUSTOMER MARKETS

Using microdata from a U.S. retailer we document that customer turnover responds to pricing. We study the optimal price setting of a firm when its demand has an extensive margin that is elastic to price due to customers' opportunity to search for an alternative supplier. The price pass‐through of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is incomplete, with the most productive firms passing through more. Firm demand is more persistent than price. Higher demand is associated with lower markups due to higher search intensity, despite flexible prices. We find empirical support for these predictions in microdata from the retail industry.     

Price adjustment in an atomistic market

This paper considers the price adjustment process in a market which retains the characteristics of a perfectly competitive market except that individual firms are price-setters. Buyers, unaware initially of what prices which firms are charging, indulge in search by contacting a sample of firms and buy (according to a demand curve) from the lowest-price firm encountered. Firms set prices to maximise profits over their perceived (or estimated) demand curve, and update their estimated demand curve in accordance with the observed change in demand between successive time periods. It is shown that the price distribution converges to a degenerate distribution centred on the monopoly price.     

Scale economies and existence of sustainable monopoly prices

The size of the firm relative to market demand is crucial to a determination of whether there exist sustainable monopoly prices. In the one product case the size of the firm is its minimum efficient scale. In the multiproduct case size is defined by a set of outputs at which cost complementarities are present. The analysis shows that when the size of the firm is sufficiently large, there exist anonymously equitable Aumann-Shapley prices. Further, at these prices natural monopoly is sustainable against rival entry. The Aumann-Shapley price are also shown to be quantity sustainable in the sense of Brock and Scheinkman.     

Intertemporal price cap regulation under uncertainty

This paper examines the intertemporal price cap regulation of a firm that has market power. Under uncertainty, the unconstrained firm 'waits longer' before investing or adding to capacity and as a corollary, enjoys higher prices over time than would be observed in an equivalent competitive industry. In the certainty case, the imposition of an inter-temporal price cap can be used to realise the competitive market solution; by contrast, under uncertainty, it cannot. Even if the price cap is optimally chosen, under uncertainty, the monopoly firm will generally (a) under-invest and (b) impose quantity rationing on its customers.     

RAMSEY TAXES MEET PRICE RIGIDITY

‘Ramsey taxes’ are commodity taxes that minimize deadweight loss. Evidence has shown dramatic differences in the extent of price rigidity across goods: while the prices of some goods change frequently, the prices of other goods seldom change. This paper examines Ramsey taxes in the presence of heterogeneous price rigidity. We find that, to minimize deadweight loss, lower (higher) tax rates should be imposed on goods with rigid prices if their relative prices are too high (low) relative to the would‐be situation of no price stickiness. Intuitively, Ramsey taxes remedy the relative price distortion caused by the price rigidity of some goods. We calibrate our model to data from Taiwan and the USA, showing a significant cut in welfare cost if Ramsey rather than uniform taxes are applied.     

Viscous demand

In many markets, demand adjusts slowly to changes in prices, i.e., demand is “viscous”. This viscosity gives each firm some monopoly power, since it can raise its price above that of its competitors without immediately losing all of its customers. The resulting equilibrium pricing behavior and market outcomes can differ significantly from what one would predict in the absence of demand viscosity. In particular, the model explains the importance of market share as an investment, as well as “kinked demand curves”. It also explains how apparently “competitive” pricing behavior can lead to outcomes that mimic those of collusion.     

WELFARE EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC PRICE SETTING IN ANTICIPATION OF PRICE REGULATION

A single product monopolist with constant unit costs, in a simple two-period model, is aware that price regulation will be imposed in the second period. The form of the regulation is such that price in period 2 may not exceed 100 ; per cent of price in period 1, where 0 < < 1. The period 1 price will be set higher than it would be in the absence of anticipated regulation. However, it is not always the case that pre-regulation price will be raised as falls. The welfare effects are crucially dependent on the form of the demand function. Under constant elasticity of demand a reduction in will reduce both consumers' and the producer's welfare. Under linear demand, consumers benefit and the producer loses as is reduced and the resultant effect on aggregate welfare is ambiguous.     

Firms' Market Power,Endogenous Preferences and the Focus of Competition Policy

Conventional neoclassical views of dominance are generally restricted to a concern for a firm's market power seen in terms of the ability to raise and maintain prices above their marginal costs of production. A prime example of this approach is the application of dominant firm price leadership models, which has led to a restricted theoretical perception of the nature of market power and to an incomplete view of the social costs of monopoly power. This paper argues that a broader conception of a firm's market power leads to a quite different perspective on its conduct. In particular, if we allow dominance to involve the ability to influence product demand patterns, then the theoretical analysis of firm behaviour changes significantly. Specifically, it implies the endogeneity of preferences which, it is argued, represents an important alternative to mainstream analysis. It is suggested that we need to consider a firm's dominance not so much in terms of its pricing in the context of a particular market structure but to focus on its ability to gain advantage over its rivals in terms of 'creating' an asymmetry in the demand for its products. This has important implications for competition policy, for it suggests a need to concentrate on the 'power' of firms and less on the effects of a change in market structure. Likewise, we need to reconsider the adequacy of defining markets in terms of product demand characteristics.     

Rationing rule, imperfect information and equilibrium

Summary. The impact of imperfect information on the price setting behaviour of firms is analysed. Specifically, consumers support an information cost to become informed about prices. Firms are endowed with U-shaped average cost curves. If a firm does not supply more than its competitive supply as determined by its marginal cost schedule, then we show that the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is conditional on the rationing rule employed. If uninformed consumers are served first then the monopoly price is the sole equilibrium whenever consumers' information costs are high enough. Otherwise, a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist contrary to the results of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) or Braverman (1980) who implicitly suppose that firms supply all the demand at a given price. Received: May 17, 1999; revised version: September 15, 2000     

PRICE ANALYSIS AND A SYSTEM OF PRICE STATISTICS

For some considerable time the interest in price statistics has mainly been focused on their use as "intermediate goods". The requirements of a system of price index numbers which have to be established in this connection are largely in the field of statistical coordination (integration of statistics on quantities, values and prices).
Recently the inflation problem has given rise to an increased interest in price statistics as "final goods". A meaningful analysis of inflation will devote attention to the relation between input prices and output prices. In this article several versions of an analysis of prices of final demand categories based on an ordinary Leontief input-output scheme are presented and the needs for price statistics are discussed. In fact a self-contained system of price statistics emerges from the price analysis.
There is a difference in the nature of the price index numbers required in compiling input-output tables in constant prices (Paasche) and that in the case of price analysis (Laspeyres). However the need for price observation runs largely parallel because in both cases the same detailed information on price developments will probably be used.
Price analysis gives the possibility of a step-by-step approach in building up a system of price index numbers.     

PRICE CONSTRAINTS,FORWARD MARKETS AND THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER PRICE UNCERTAINTY*

This article proposes a model of the competitive firm simultaneously facing price constraints and forward markets under price uncertainty. The incorporation of a forward market is shown to be very important because a risk-averse firm will set its production decision to the forward price regardless of its attitude toward risk. In addition, we show that risk aversion is a sufficient condition for a decrease in risk to reduce the amount hedged when risk is reduced through a mean-preserving price squeeze.     

The effect of size on prices

We present here an analysis of the effects that the firm's size, in the sense of the quantity of its assets, has on the price charged per asset. We show that the larger the firm is, the higher the price it charges. Our argument is not based on the traditional monopoly power associated with size but rather on the ability to bear risk.     

房地产税、市场结构与房价

本文在住房流量模型的基础上,构建了一个购房者和开发商的住房市场局部均衡模型,考察了完全垄断和完全竞争情形下房地产税与房价之间的关系。结果表明,无论何种市场结构,提高房地产税均导致房价下降;住房市场垄断性越强,房价越高,房地产税对房价影响越大。笔者对1996-2008年中国33个大中城市数据的检验发现,市场结构对房价影响大于房地产税。房地产税增长率每增加1%,房价增长率将减少0.03%;勒纳指数每增加1%,房价增长率将增加0.16%。房地产税与市场结构相互作用将使房价上涨,但影响微不足道。因此,对住宅开征房地产税,将对房价上涨有一定限制作用,但不能有效抑制房价上涨,而增强住宅市场竞争性、降低开发商垄断具有显著效果。     

Corporate social responsibility and marketing channel coordination

We analyze a simple linear demand bilateral monopoly situation where one of the firms, either the up-stream manufacturer or the down-stream retailer, is socially concerned in terms of its desire to enhance its end-customers’ welfare in addition to the traditional profit motive. Two cases are explored: the up-stream producer exhibits corporate social responsibility (CSR) in one case and the down-stream retailer in the other. In the two-stage game, the retailer makes their quantity-setting decision in stage-two, given the two-part tariff (wholesale price and fixed franchise fee) set by the stage-one producer. In this setting, among other things, we find that the optimal channel-coordinating tariff is very different from the standard pure profit-maximizing two-part tariff. For example, if either firm in the supply/marketing chain exhibits CSR, we show the optimal wholesale price does not equal the manufacturer’s marginal production cost, nor does the fixed fee equal the monopoly profit earned by the retailer. Finally, we find that our two-part tariff CSR model provides a theoretical rationale for the empirical finding of little to no correlation between CSR and firm profits.     

THE IMPACT OF FOOD PRICE SHOCK ON HETEROGENEOUS CREDIT CONSTRAINED FIRMS

ABSTRACT 1 : The paper analyzes how rising food and energy prices affect heterogeneous firm access to inputs and production under credit market imperfections. We estimate a firm credit constraint equation using a unique firm level panel data and find that, on average, small individual firms (IF) are more credit constrained than large corporate firms (CF). Using the estimated parameters, we simulate the effect of the recent food price shock on the world markets. Our results suggest that in the presence of credit market imperfections, the less credit constrained CF benefit relatively more from food price increase than IF, as they are able to expand their production more flexibly. These findings have important policy implications for countries with significant market imperfections. In the case of the food price shock, not only consumers but also producers, which on average are more credit constrained than producers in developed countries, may lose their market shares and hence their income in the long run.     

Market Power with Interdependent Demand: Sale of Emission Permits and Natural Gas from Russia

With implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia will most likely be able to exert market power in the emission permit market. But, as Russia is also a big exporter of fossil fuels, the incentives to boost the permit price may be weak. However, a significant share of Russia’s fossil fuel exports is natural gas. If a high permit price boosts the demand for natural gas through substitution from more polluting fuels and thus increase gas profits, this may increase the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, a large fossil fuel exporter may use its market position to influence the effective demand for permits. Hence, the relationship between permit income and fossil fuels exports runs in both directions. In this article, we explore the interdependence between the revenues from permit and fossil fuel exports both theoretically and numerically. A computable general equilibrium model suggests the fact that Russia as a big gas exporter has small effect on the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, Russia’s monopoly power in the permit market has a small, but non-negligible impact on the optimal level of Russian gas exports.     

Technical change and market structure

This paper investigates the ceteris-paribus effects of labor reducing technical progress on industry-wide employment under different market regimes. We distinguish between a contestable market, a monopoly, and a market with bounded supplier power. Under a constant wage rate, employment will not decrease only if the elasticity of demand on a contestable market exceeds one. The same thing holds for markets with bounded supplier power. Under a monopoly, price elasticity must even be more than three. Ceteris paribus we thus have to expect a higher probability of employment reduction under a monopoly than under other market regimes. Raising wages proportional to productivity leads to an employment reduction on stagnating markets with supplier power. Here a raise in wages without layoffs is only possible if the growth in demand is at least as high as the growth in productivity.The author is indebted to Alfred E. Ott, Sabine Böckem, Rolf Wiegert and Ulf Schiller for valuable comments. Of course, I take responsibility for all remaining errors.     

Bertrand–Edgeworth Duopoly with Buyouts or First Refusal Contracts

In this game the players are firms involved in a Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly market. Payoffs to the low priced firm depend only on the own price, whereas the payoff to the high priced firm depends on both its own price and the price of the opponent. The price of the opponent enters the payoff function of the high priced firm through buyout or a first refusal contract. Only when the total capacity in the market is less than the output in a monopoly situation, there is an equilibrium in pure strategies.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D43, L12.