In search of WTO trade effects: Preferential trade agreements promote trade strongly, but unevenly

The literature measuring the effects of WTO membership on trade flows has produced remarkably diverse results. Rose (2004) reports a wide range of empirical specifications that produce no WTO effects. Tomz et al. (2007) use Rose's data but include de facto WTO membership, to find positive WTO trade effects. Rose (2005) also produced positive WTO trade effects after accounting for the diverse trade effects produced by individual preferential trade agreements (PTAs). When Subramanian and Wei (2007) emphasize general equilibrium trade effects by controlling for multilateral resistance, they find strong WTO trade effects only for industrialized countries. Subramanian and Wei (2007), however, account neither for unobserved heterogeneity among trading partners, nor for differences in trade effects across PTAs (which could inflate WTO estimates). We unify the Rose, Tomz et al., and Subramanian and Wei specifications in one comprehensive approach that minimizes omitted variable bias to show that all specifications produce one consistent result: WTO effects on trade flows are not statistically significant, while PTAs produce strong but uneven trade effects. Extending the gravity model to address specific avenues in which WTO may have affected trade flows, we find that WTO membership boosts trade prior to PTA formation and increases trade among proximate developing countries (at the expense of distant trade). An augmented gravity model that accounts for WTO terms-of-trade theory shows that countries with greater incentives to bargain for tariff reductions before WTO accession experience positive and significant subsequent WTO trade effects.     

The effects of cross-regional free trade agreements under a vertical industry structure

This paper examines the effects of a cross-regional free trade agreement (FTA) on tariffs, welfare, and the incentives for multilateral free trade in a three-country model with a vertical industry structure. We show that the FTA induces member countries to reduce their tariffs on nonmember countries. On the other hand, a nonmember country lowers its tariff on final-good imports, but raises its tariff on intermediate-good imports. Also, the FTA makes member and nonmember countries better off. After the FTA is enacted, member and nonmember countries have an incentive to support multilateral free trade, so an FTA acts as a building block for multilateral trade liberalization.     

The clash of liberalizations: Preferential vs. multilateral trade liberalization in the European Union

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are characterized by liberalization with respect to only a few partners and thus they can potentially clash with, and retard multilateral trade liberalization (MTL). Yet there is almost no systematic evidence on whether the numerous existing PTAs actually affect MTL. We provide a model showing that PTAs hinder MTL unless they entail accession to a customs union with internal transfers. Using product-level tariffs negotiated by the European Union (EU) in the last two multilateral trade rounds we find that several of its PTAs have clashed with its MTL. However, this effect is absent for EU accessions. Moreover, we provide new evidence on the political economy determinants of trade policy in the EU.     

Foreign direct investment and customs union: Incentives for multilateral tariff cooperation over free trade

The present article examines the implications of a customs union (CU) on the pattern of tariffs, welfare and the prospects for free trade when the non-member firm has an incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). First, I show that upon the formation of a bilateral CU, the non-member firm has greater incentives to engage in FDI. However, when FDI becomes a feasible entry option for the non- member firm under a CU, member countries have incentives to strategically induce export over FDI by lowering their joint external tariff. When fixed set-up cost of FDI is sufficiently low, this tariff falls below Kemp–Wan tariff and CU leads to a Pareto improvement relative to no agreement. Moreover, using an infinite repetition of the one-shot tariff game under a CU, I show that the presence of FDI incentive of the non-member firm makes the member countries more willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade while the opposite is true for the non-member country. Finally, I find that, unless fixed cost of having an additional plant is sufficiently low, multilateral cooperation over free trade is easier to sustain when FDI incentive is present.     

Trade-diverting free trade agreements,external tariffs,and feasibility

There has been a proliferation of preferential trade agreements within the last two decades. This paper analyzes the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on external tariffs in small economies where protection decisions are made politically. Our model determines tariff rates endogenously instead of assuming they are fixed during or after the formation of FTAs as commonly done in the literature. We show that when an FTA is established, the tariff rates that apply to non-members essentially decline. More importantly, we investigate the interaction between endogenous tariff determination and the feasibility of an FTA. We find that the expectation of tariff reductions under endogenous tariffs could make an otherwise feasible FTA if tariffs were fixed become infeasible. However, if domestic import-competing sectors are relatively smaller and the government places a significant weight on political contributions relative to social welfare, an FTA with endogenous tariffs may be more likely to be feasible than an FTA assumed to fix external tariffs.     

The effect of the Uruguay round on the intensive and extensive margins of trade

Do tariffs inhibit trade flows by limiting the entry of exporters (‘firm extensive margin’) or by restricting the average volume exported by each firm (‘firm intensive margin’)? Using a gravity equation approach, we analyze how the decrease in tariffs promoted during the 90s by the Uruguay Round multilateral trade agreement affected the trade margins of French firms for 57 sectors and 147 countries from 1993 to 2002. Our main contribution is to estimate the elasticity of trade on both margins, controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity of trade flows thanks to a three-dimensional panel and to time-varying tariffs as a measure of variable trade costs. Our results show that the number of firms exporting in a given sector to a given destination is related to the level of tariffs. But they also show that the decrease in tariffs induced by the implementation of the Uruguay Round did not lead more firms to export and that it only induced incumbent exporters to increase their shipments. We control for two problems that may affect our basic specification: tariff changes may be endogenous and zero flows are not included. Our results are confirmed — even when the extensive margin is significant, its magnitude is very small.     

Tariff Liberalisation and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?

Theoretical models and intuition suggest that the amount of non‐traditional protection such as anti‐dumping duties will increase as more traditional forms such as tariffs are lowered under multilateral trade agreements. This paper is the first empirical study of the role of tariff liberalisation in the spread of anti‐dumping. Through both correlations and regression approaches we analyse the relationship between tariff concessions made during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations and the filing of anti‐dumping petitions, with particular interest in whether multilateral trade reductions have spurred the recent growth in new users of anti‐dumping policies. We find that, at least for developing economies, tariff reductions agreed to under the Uruguay Round not only increased the likelihood of a country using anti‐dumping protection but also the total number of anti‐dumping petitions filed by countries.     

Preferences,rent destruction and multilateral liberalization: The building block effect of CUSFTA

If a free trade agreement (FTA) is characterized by the exchange of market access with a large and competitive trading partner, the agreement can cause a leakage of protectionist benefits to domestic industry from lobbying against external tariff cuts. This rent destruction effect of an FTA can free policy makers to be more aggressive in multilateral tariff cuts. We argue that the Canadian–US free trade agreement (CUSFTA) provides an ideal policy experiment to link this mechanism to the data. Exploring the determinants of Canada's tariff cuts at the 8-digit HS product level, we find that CUSFTA acted as an additional driver of Canadian multilateral tariff reductions during the Uruguay Round.     

Reciprocated unilateralism in trade policy

Using the menu-auction approach to endogenous determination of tariffs and allowing additionally for lobby formation itself to be endogenous, this paper analyzes the impact of unilateral trade liberalization by one country on its partner's trade policies. We find that such unilateral liberalization may induce reciprocal tariff reductions by the partner country. Intuitively, unilateral liberalization by one country has the effect of increasing the incentives for the export lobby in the partner country to form and to lobby effectively against the import-competing lobby there for lower protection.     

Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade

We develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and the nature (bilateral or multilateral) of trade liberalization are endogenously determined. To determine whether and how bilateralism matters, we also analyze a scenario where countries pursue trade liberalization on only a multilateral basis. We find that when countries have asymmetric endowments or when governments value producer interests more than tariff revenue and consumer surplus, there exist circumstances where global free trade is a stable equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue bilateral trade agreements. By contrast, under symmetry, both bilateralism and multilateralism yield global free trade.     

Preference Erosion,Government Revenues and Non‐tariff Trade Barriers

Developing countries benefiting from developed country unilateral trade preferences fear that Doha Round tariff cuts will erode the value of those preferences. That these programmes confer significant benefits, however, is not clear. Studies indicate that the impact of preference erosion would be minimal for most developing countries. But for a small subset of middle‐income and least‐developed countries, concern may be warranted. WTO members, should address affected countries’ concerns, perhaps by tailoring WTO tariff negotiations to lessen adjustment pressures and providing development assistance. Developing countries also are anxious that lower tariffs will reduce government revenues. Dependence on tariff revenue is diminishing and trade liberalisation need not result in lower total tax revenues or even lower customs revenues. Much depends on a country's current tariff and trade regime, its tax structure and its overall economic structure. At some point, a country does need to broaden its tax base and look to other revenue sources to offset declining tariff revenues. Tax reform, therefore, complements trade reform. A third area of developing country concern is non‐tariff barriers (NTBs), which may limit market access even after tariffs are reduced. Despite prior WTO work in this area, NTBs remain a thorny issue for all WTO members.     

China-Auto Parts Dispute——China's First Legal Censure from the WTO

WTO rules against China in auto parts case On July 18,a panel from the World Trade Organization(WTO)concluded that China violated trade rules with its auto part import tariffs.The ruling marks China's first legal censure from the WTO since joining the global trade body in 2001. In April 2005,China issued rules to levy a 28% tariff on imported auto parts—China considers auto parts as a complete vehicle if they account for 60% or more of     

Third‐country Effects of Regional Trade Agreements

Does regionalism negatively impact non‐members? To answer this question, we examine the effect of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on imports from non‐members and the tariffs that they face. Using data from six RTAs in Latin America and Europe, we do not find evidence that implementation of the regional agreements is associated with trade diversion from third countries to regional members. Using detailed industry data on preference margins and most‐favoured nation (MFN) tariffs for three trade agreements in Latin America over 12 years, we find that greater preference margins do not significantly reduce imports from third countries. We also look at the effect of preferences on external tariffs. We find evidence that preferential tariff reduction tends to precede the reduction of external MFN tariffs in a given sector, offering evidence of tariff complementarity. Overall, the results suggest that regionalism does not significantly harm non‐members.     

碳关税:新的绿色贸易壁垒抑或WTO环境保护豁免

有鉴于国际气候变化谈判和条约制定屡遭挫折这一事实,WTO现行法律规则和争端解决机制能够成为判断并纠正单边环境立法行使贸易保护主义之实的有力救济。在判定碳关税是否构成隐形的"绿色壁垒"时,GATT第20条(g)款以及前言部分的规定最有可能成为争端解决机构运用的根本性指标。要获得WTO环境保护条款的豁免,碳关税在设置和实施过程中需符合一系列严格的法律要求。同时,中国出口产品在遭遇发达国家碳关税壁垒时,亦可根据该条款有针对性的质证该措施的立法动机和具体实施环节。归根结底,中国应积极运用WTO法律规则和争端解决机制,保障本国出口产品市场的稳定性和可预期性。     

Feasible multilateralism and the effects of regionalism

Recent research shows that the GATT/WTO negotiating rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is, however, economically inefficient. Global free trade, in particular, is unattainable even in a fully cooperative world, if governments have political motivations. In such a context, we show that regional trade agreements can help move the world towards a welfare-superior equilibrium. The reason is that, when members of regional trade agreements lower trade barriers against one another, they tend to reduce their multilateral tariffs as well. Once we account for these endogenous changes—and only then—we find that regionalism can raise world welfare even in a fully cooperative (but political) world. Regional integration can, however, harm outsiders.     

Do countries free ride on MFN?

The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause has long been suspected of creating a free rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations. To address this issue, we model multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation. We show that an optimal mechanism induces only the largest exporters to participate in negotiations over any product, thus providing a rationalization for the Principal supplier rule. We also show that, through this channel, equilibrium tariffs vary according to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of export shares: higher concentration in a sector reduces free riding and thus causes a lower tariff. Estimation of our model using sector-level tariff data for the U.S. provides strong support for this relationship.     

On the conservation of distance in international trade

Using disaggregated bilateral trade data, we find that the elasticity of trade to distance increased (in absolute value) by about 10% since 1985. To explore the reasons for this shift, we decompose the change in the distance elasticity of trade into the part due to a shift in the composition of trade among industries and the part due to a change in the distance sensitivity within industries. We find that adjustment in the composition of trade had little effect, but for 40% of industries distance became more important, with nearly all of the remaining industries showing no significant change. We explore alternative hypotheses as to why the elasticity of trade to distance increased in some industries. We find that homogeneous goods, bulky goods, and high tariff goods became significantly more distance sensitive. In contrast, the evidence implies that changes in tariffs and freight costs have reduced the importance of distance on trade. We conclude that the increase in the importance of distance over time is related to the substitutability of goods and the level of trade costs, but not to changes in tariffs or freight costs.     

Formula Approaches for Market Access Negotiations

Most of the large tariff reductions achieved in multilateral trade negotiations have involved tariff–cutting formulas such as the ‘Swiss’ formula. However, wide variations in initial tariff rates between active participants call for new approaches under the Doha Development Agenda. This paper surveys a range of formula options and examines both targeted and flexible applications of the Swiss formula that target tariff escalation and peaks, and would allow policy makers to directly target how far they will move towards free trade, while providing some flexibility for trading off reductions in peak tariffs against reductions in lower–tariff sectors.     

The WTO,the Doha Round Impasse,PTAs, and FTAs/RTAs

Beginning in 2001, the Doha Rounds afforded World Trade Organization (WTO) members the opportunity to develop equitable trade rules between the developed and developing member states. The WTO has been successful in advancing multilateral international trade; however, since the Doha Rounds stalemate, it has witnessed the development of more than 300 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and over 500 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). This article attempts to answer two questions: (1) has the failure of the Doha Rounds contributed to the proliferation of PTAs and FTAs, and (2) are these agreements threatening the regulatory authority of the WTO, which, in turn, reduces its ability to effectively promote and govern free trade, and its mission?     

Endogenous tariffs and trade adjustment assistance

This paper examines whether trade adjustment assistance is an effective tool for blunting political opposition to trade liberalization. The traditional argument is that adjustment assistance bribes labor unions so that they will accept reduced tariff protection. In this way, a trade adjustment assistance program should help the government lower tariffs and increase social welfare. This paper introduces trade adjustment assistance into a political economy model of endogenous tariff formation. The model shows that adjustment assistance reduces policy makers’ incentives to press for trade liberalization and may slow down the pace of reform and lower social welfare under certain plausible conditions.