Brexit and Trade: Between Facts and Irrelevance

This paper examines four claims made by Brexit supporters regarding the United Kingdom’s post-exit arrangement on trade with the EU. It reviews the nature and importance of UK-EU trade links and the possible impact on the UK of leaving the EU customs union. It argues that all four of the claims are based on incongruous arguments which are either logically inconsistent or ignore the extent of the commitment required by trade agreements that tackle regulatory barriers, not just tariffs and border restrictions. We demonstrate that the attractiveness of the UK market will progressively decline as the UK enters into additional bilateral agreements. We conclude by analysing the implications for the UK of “taking back control” of its trade policy.     

The economic effects of the UK government's proposed Brexit deal

The focus of our analysis is on how the UK government's proposed Brexit deal is likely to affect the economy. First, we assess how trade, migration, foreign direct investment, productivity and contributions to the EU budget might change by reviewing current proposals against historical evidence. Second, we use the National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) to analyse the macroeconomic effects. Our assessment is that trade with the EU, especially in services, would be more costly after Brexit. This would be likely to have adverse effects on living standards in the UK. Our central estimate is that if the government's proposed Brexit deal is implemented, then GDP in the longer term will be around 3% lower per head than it would have been had the UK stayed in the EU. If the UK were to stay in a customs union with the EU, or if the Irish backstop position was to be invoked, there would still be a hit to GDP per capita of 2%. These estimates represent our considered view of the economic impact of the government's proposed Brexit deal, but they are themselves uncertain as there is no historical precedent of a country leaving a major trading block such as the EU.     

Foreign multinationals in service sectors: A general equilibrium analysis of Brexit

We examine the role of foreign multinationals in service sectors in the context of Brexit, which is assumed to induce an increase in different types of barriers: (a) FDI barriers to multinationals in services; (b) non-tariff barriers to trade; and (c) import tariffs between the UK and the rest of the EU. We use a state-of-the-art Melitz approach in manufactures with multinationals operating in imperfectly competitive service sectors in a multiregional general equilibrium framework. We find that the increased FDI barriers in services explain about one third of the total welfare loss of Brexit. Furthermore, our decomposition analysis (by introducing each type of barriers separately) shows that the barriers against the EU service multinationals in the UK are harmful to British manufacturing sectors because they face a reduced (and more expensive) supply of intermediate services.     

Trade and foreign direct investment-related impacts of Brexit

We offer a general-equilibrium analysis of Brexit incorporating the state-of-the-art differences in productivity and firms' selection within manufacturing sectors à la Melitz (Econometrica, 2003, 71 , 1695) and multinationals in services. Our results suggest that trade, output and average productivity diminish across most sectors in the UK and the Rest of the European Union (REU), as well as GDP, welfare, wages and capital remuneration. However, the UK loses more due to the missing preferential access to the huge EU market. Significant welfare losses along the extensive margin occur in the UK due to the lost imported varieties produced by highly productive European firms. These cannot be compensated by the new varieties of less productive domestic firms that enter the British market due to increased protectionism and reduced import competition. In addition, the emergence of barriers against multinationals, which is often ignored in previous studies, explains approximately one third of the negative effect in both the UK and REU. Furthermore, we show that the Brexit impact is about only half if we do not include both foreign direct investment barriers and Melitz structure. Thus, previous studies without these important model features would underestimate the Brexit impact significantly.     

Wie geht es mit dem Brexit weiter?

The UK’s 2016 EU referendum may account for great income losses in the UK. Gabriel Felbermayr et al. use a “new” quantitative trade model to assess various Brexit scenarios. The results broadly show that all EU member states lose, and the relative losses in the UK are about five times those of the average remaining EU country. These findings have important implications for the EU’s negotiation strategy. The outcome depends largely on the decisions about trade relations. Michael Hüther thinks that the UK is heading for an extremely hard Brexit and that it already shows. Therefore, the UK government should work out a consistent industrial policy and make up its mind about its preferences on its future economic relationship with its neighbours. In light of the currently very close and mutually welfare-enhancing business relations between the EU27 and the UK, one of the central tasks and challenges of the Brexit negotiations is undoubtedly the creation of a new supportive post-supranational legal framework governing these economic transactions in the future. Andreas Grimmel argues that the EU’s crises are largely the result of a certain mode of integration that is based on actors’ interests rather than on a comprehensive constitutional framework.     

EU Migration to and from the UK After Brexit

In the 2016 referendum over the UK’s membership of the EU, the question of how Brexit would impact migration to the UK was a major point of contention. Those leading the campaign to leave the EU promised lower levels of immigration and the introduction of an “Australian type points based system” to regulate future inflows of EU nationals to the country, while at the same time maintaining access to the EU single market. At the same time, the status of EU nationals already living in the UK was not a key topic in the debate. The leaders of the campaign to leave the EU suggested that EU nationals already residing in the UK would be granted some form of residence permit and would retain most of their current rights. Likewise, there was little concern about the legal status of UK nationals in other EU countries and the argument that the “EU would be obliged to grant permanent settlement rights to Britons living in Ireland and mainland Europe”.     

Brexit and its economic consequences

As the formal process of Brexit has already started, there is much uncertainty about Brexit's impacts on Britain's social, political and economic future. This paper examines the economic impact. After briefly discussing some significant EU treaties that serve as the background materials, it presents the key arguments advocated by the leave and remain camps. The economic impact depends critically on the negotiation outcomes. Aside from the debate on the divorce costs, there are numerous issues that must be negotiated, such as immigration, trade in goods, services, agriculture, fisheries and financial regulations. We discuss various scenarios of possible new trade regimes, resulting in different impacts on the UK economy. With each side having its bargaining chips to play, the trade‐offs between “give and take” in the negotiation game are analysed. Considering various strategic options, this paper urges rationality and cooperation, especially weighing both sides’ entwined economic interests, in addition to their mutual security, defence, environmental and world concerns. The potential gains and losses in the event where the UK contemplates new trade arrangements with the non‐EU countries are analysed in the Appendix .     

Brexit: A Hard-but-Smart Strategy and Its Consequences

Intereconomics - Would the United Kingdom really apply high EU external tariffs in the case of a hard Brexit and carry out extensive physical checks at their border? Recent developments in London...     

Which manufacturing industries and sectors are most vulnerable to Brexit?

When the UK leaves the EU, trade arrangements between the UK and EU will change. Most of the options for future UK‐EU relationships currently under discussion imply increased trade barriers, which will reduce trade and also have effects on output and prices. In this paper, we use a multi‐market partial equilibrium model to analyse the vulnerability of 122 manufacturing industries to Brexit. In all five Brexit scenarios we model, there is an overall reduction in UK manufacturing output. Output grows in some industries but at the expense of higher consumer and intermediate goods prices. High tech and medium–high tech sectors are more at risk of a decline in domestic production than lower tech sectors. In most areas of the country, demand for high‐skilled workers falls more than for medium and low‐skilled workers.     

An examination of EU trade disintegration scenarios

This paper demonstrates the welfare implications of the differential disintegration of the EU. Using a structural gravity approach, our estimates suggest that the rest of the EU countries have much more to lose from the disintegration of the EU compared to a disorderly Brexit. At the same time, neighbouring high‐income and middle‐income countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Norway, are expected to benefit from EU disintegration under some scenarios because trade would be diverted from EU countries.     

Variable Trade Costs,Composition Effects and the Intensive Margin of Trade

We estimate the elasticity of extra EU French firm‐level exports with respect to applied tariffs – a variable trade cost. We implement a method controlling for unobserved firm characteristics driving selection in exports market, and controlling for the multilateral resistance terms. Results confirm a significant negative impact of tariffs on firm‐level exports, with one fifth of this impact falling on the induced adjustment in the exporters' product mix. When controlling for this adjustment and focusing on the core exported products, the elasticity of the product‐destination firm‐level exports with respect to applied tariffs is estimated at about −2.5.     

Welche Abstimmungsmuster liegen dem Brexit-Referendum zugrunde?

The Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016 is a key moment in British post war political history. This article describes the voting outcome and analyses the underlying explanatory factors. The vote was only weakly related to EU trade and economic policy. Instead, concerns about immigration seemed more important, in particular in areas that are characterised by low levels of immigration. Dissatisfaction with general economic circumstances and poor public service provision also played an important role.     

Structural estimation and solution of international trade models with heterogeneous firms

We present an empirical implementation of a general-equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous manufacturing firms. The theory underlying our model is consistent with Melitz (2003). A nonlinear structural estimation procedure identifies a set of core parameters and unobserved firm-level trade frictions that best fit the geographic pattern of trade. Our estimation model is consistent with the specified general equilibrium model, and we conduct general equilibrium counterfactual analyses to illustrate model responses. We first assess the economic effects of reductions in measured tariffs. Taking the simple-average welfare change across regions the Melitz structure indicates welfare gains from liberalization that are four times larger than in a standard trade policy simulation. Furthermore, when we compare the economic impact of tariff reductions with reductions in estimated fixed trade costs we find that policy measures affecting the fixed costs are of greater importance than tariff barriers.     

If Nothing is Achieved: Who Pays for the Brexit?

The United Kingdom will depart from the European Union in March 2019. Numerous open questions remain about details and conditions especially with regard to post-Brexit EU-UK trade relations. In case of a negotiation failure, a “hard Brexit” could cause considerably high costs on both sides of the Channel. In the short run, companies will be charged more than 15 billion euro as tariffs. In the long run, UK-EU trade could be reduced up to 50 percent.     

Do tariffs matter for the extensive margin of international trade? An empirical analysis

With disaggregate tariff data we study the impact of changing tariffs on the range of goods countries export to the United States. Our probits with country and good effects show tariffs tend to have a statistically significant but small impact: at best 5% of the increasing extensive margin for 1989-1999 and 12% for 1996-2006 is explained by tariff reductions. This suggests the extensive margin has not amplified the impact of tariffs on trade flows to such an extent that the relatively moderate tariff reductions since WW II can explain the strong growth of world trade.     

Network externalities,transport costs,and tariffs

This article formulates a reciprocal market model of international duopoly with network externalities to reconsider welfare effects of reductions in transport costs and tariffs. Depending on the magnitude of network externalities, we show two possibilities. One of them, which emerges under strong network externalities, illustrates that freer trade unambiguously improves welfare for any initial level of trade barriers. This finding provides an affirmative evaluation of freer trade.     

欧盟动物福利壁垒与中欧贸易发展

欧盟是动物福利最积极的倡导者,已经建立了一套完整的动物福利保护体系。近年来,欧盟将动物福利与贸易相挂钩,构筑了动物福利壁垒体系。本文研究了欧盟关于动物福利的标准和规定,分析了中国动物福利的现状以及动物福利壁垒对中欧贸易发展的影响,并提出中国应对欧盟动物福利壁垒的措施。     

Welfare implications of trade liberalization and fiscal reform: A quantitative experiment

This paper studies the welfare implications of revenue-neutral trade liberalization and fiscal reform programs for developing economies using a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy. We analyze how different combinations of tariffs – on imported consumption goods, intermediate inputs, and capital goods – and taxes – on consumption, labor income and capital income – affect the transitional and long-run welfare. We report three main findings. First, trade liberalization programs financed by consumption and labor income taxes tend to result in substantial welfare gains, but financing the lost tariff revenue through capital income taxes can have an adverse impact on welfare. Second, a significant fraction of welfare changes is due to transitional effects stemming from the allocation of resources in response to changes in tariffs and taxes. Third, trade liberalization and fiscal reform programs often translate into much larger welfare gains in countries that are more open to international financial markets.     

Das deutsche Russlandgeschäft im Schatten der Krise: gefährliche Abhängigkeiten?

In view of the Russian annexation of Crimea and its ongoing efforts to destabilise Ukraine, political decision-makers in the EU and the US are considering economic sanctions against Russia. The article analyses whether the German economy would be affected by restrictions on trade and investment relations. As a result, German exporters would suffer from restrictions on business relations with Russia, but they would be able to compensate for possible losses. Russian gas export interruptions, however, would be a more severe problem. Due to Russia’s dependence on revenues from the export of natural resources as well as on technology imports from Western countries, the Russian economy would be hit particularly hard.