产品类别对企业合作广告与定价策略的影响

研究由一个制造商和一个电子零售商组成的供应链,分析产品类别对企业合作广告与定价策略的影响。本文先后考察了合作广告下Stackelberg主从博弈和Nash合作博弈模型的建立与分析,比较了两种博弈均衡下的策略选择及其系统期望利润,用数学仿真软件检验了产品网络适应度对两个模型的合作广告费用和利润的影响,最后利用Nash讨价还价理论对合作利益进行了分配,并确定了制造商在渠道合作广告合作联盟协调中的分摊率,基于这个结果获得最佳的市场策略。     

基于同质多零售商的逆向供应链协调策略研究

本文基于一个制造商和多个零售商组成的逆向物流系统,讨论了在逆向供应链中的废旧物品回收的定价问题,笔者应用了博弈论中的Stackelberg博弈和合作博弈对双方的定价策略进行了研究。通过比较双方的非合作博弈和合作博弈结果,我们以双方利润为评价目标进行了分析,提出了使双方达到利润最大化的协调方法,即使供应链系统的整体利润最大化,通过进行利润分配的协调,使制造商和零售商都能得到更多的利润,使资源得到充分地利用,得到最优化地配置。     

基于博弈论的供应链中技术创新激励机制研究

一个由制造商和供应商组成的两级供应链中,制造商通过价格补贴和转移支付的方式激励供应商进行技术创新的契约机制。在三种博弈形式下制造商与供应商的选择策略及利润函数,结果表明:协同创新时,供应链系统能够达到有效帕累托最优。同时Rubinslein讨价还价模型对供应链系统的剩余价值进行再分配。     

基于讨价还价博弈的供应链协调研究

本文对两级供应链系统进行研究,该系统由一个制造商和一个零售商组成。文章根据stackelberg博弈的分析框架,分析报童模型下两级供应链的双边际化效应,建立基于报童模型的分散式系统、集中式系统的制造商、零售商利润模型,讨论如何通过回购契约来消除"双边际化效应"。并且研究了在合作博弈的情况下,利用纳什讨价还价模型来讨论供应链的利益分配问题,确定回购契约的参数,最终实现供应链协调。     

零售商主导型供应链的订货模型构建

大型零售商在供应链中的地位越来越重要,垄断零售商控制了主要销售渠道.目前对于主导型供应链的研究大多集中在以制造商为主导的供应链,极少有针对零售商处于核心地位的供应链进行研究.在一个由制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链中,零售商处于主导地位,其所选择的订货策略使自身利润最大.本文通过建立相关模型,分析零售商最优订货参数,并同制造商主导供应链和纵向一体化的情况进行了对比.     

基于B2C背景下多渠道供应链的渠道选择及定价策略分析

本文对B2C背景下多渠道供应链的渠道选择与定价策略问题进行分析,首先对B2C以及多渠道供应链博弈问题的研究背景进行分析,然后对多渠道供应链的渠道竞争问题进行阐述,侧重对渠道选择与定价策略问题进行分析,通过相关分析得出以下几个方面的结论 ：第一,从制造商与零售商渠道策略偏好的角度上来说,无论多渠道供应链权力结构以零售商还是制造商占主导,对于制造商而言,多数情况下均偏向对第三方电商销售平台的引入。第二,从多渠道供应链均衡策略的角度上来说,供应链成员渠道策略均衡会同时受到平台费率以及渠道竞争水平这两个方面因素的影响,且平台费率、渠道竞争水平与均衡策略之间存在一定的正相关关系。在制造商占据领导地位的情况下,供应链均衡策略的选择对制造商而言更为有利;而在零售商占据主导地位时,供应链均衡策略有可能并非零售商;制造商的策略最优解。第三,在多渠道供应链中引入第三方平台会对供应链产生重大影响,对提升其整体绩效水平有重要意义,直接表现为对总利润以及消费者剩余的增加,且提高渠道竞争水平会减少多渠道供应链受第三方平台引入所产生的影响,对供应链利益水平也有相应的影响。     

三级供应链的利润分配策略研究

研究三级供应链利润分配策略,设定此三级供应链由单一供应商,制造商和销售商组成。通过定量的方法研究三级供应链的利润的分配机制,实现供应链的有效协调。分析三级供应链在非合作情况下独立进行决策、合作情况下集体进行决策时,供应链节点企业的获得的最优利润,及两种情况下供应链的整体利润。得出在合作情况下集体决策,供应链的整体利润要大于非合作下供应链的整体利润。对集体决策的供应链整体利润分配,节点企业获得的利润要优于非合作时节点企业获得的利润。供应链上的企业可以通过选择适当的分配系数,使供应链整体利润在节点企业间进行公平合理的分配,从而实现供应链利润的协调,达到供应链高效、稳定的运行。     

强零售商不确定性闭环供应链回收渠道的决策分析

本文为研究不确定性对强势零售商闭环供应链回收渠道决策的影响,应用多目标规划和非合作博弈解出了三种回收渠道(零售商回收、制造商回收和第三方回收)下多目标效用函数的均衡解,并与确定时的均衡解进行了比较.研究结果表明:不确定性使三种回收渠道的回收率降低、销售价提高以及制造商和零售商效用值减少;与制造商领头的确定性闭环供应链不同,制造商和零售商都会选择制造商直接回收渠道.     

废旧产品回收再制造供应链决策与协调研究——基于纵向持股的投资分析

废旧产品循环再利用,不仅能够再创废弃资源新价值,而且可减少企业对原生资源的依赖,有效缓解经济发展与资源环境的矛盾。本文针对供应商回收再制造过程中资金约束的问题,构建制造商投资持股与否的博弈模型与协调策略,探讨持股比例和讨价还价能力对供应链决策与协调的影响。研究发现：供应商建立废旧产品逆向回收模式,一定程度上可以增强企业可持续竞争优势。分散决策下,制造商投资并合理持股有助于提高废旧产品回收率和实现供应链帕累托改善;合作决策下,联合决策的协同优势可提高资源利用效率,实现供应链绩效最优。纳什讨价还价协调策略与供应链成员的讨价还价能力相关,讨价还价的能力越强,在议价中越占据优势。     

3PL服务提供商参与下的供应链定价及协调策略

基于单个制造商,单个3PL服务提供商和单个零售商组成的三级供应链系统,将第三方物流服务提供商定量的引入到供应链协调中来,并在物流服务价格由制造商和零售商共同分担的条件下,应用博弈论理论对供应链系统的定价、产量和利润进行了分析。联合定价时,运用相同利润总增长率的协调方式,确定了批发价和物流服务价格的大小;对独立决策和联合协调决策两种情形下均衡解的比较,得出协调定价不仅批发价、零售价和物流服务价都降低,而且还提高了供应链系统的整体利润;通过观察企业定价的大小,可以判断企业是否采取合作的态度,从而为决策者提供理论依据。     

具有服务策略的双渠道供应链定价问题研究

本文研究了零售商提供服务的双渠道供应链,分析了零售商在不同的服务成本下提供服务对于供应商和零售商定价策略的影响。研究发现提供服务对于零售商不仅可以扩大利润,还可以把提供服务当作一种有效策略,应对来自电子商务渠道的利润吞噬,通过利润分享从而延缓渠道之间的冲突;只有服务系数小于一个临界值时,提供服务才能使零售商和供应商同时得到帕累托改进。因此,零售商应不断提高服务效率,为消费者提供更高效的服务。     

Optimal Guaranteed Profit Margins for Both Vendors and Retailers in the Fashion Apparel Industry

Guaranteed profit margin (GPM) is one of the chargebacks that retailers frequently employ in the fashion industry. With this stipulation, the store demands a vendor's guarantee of its target mark-up rate, even in a markdown operation. This makes the retailer order too much and later liquidate a greater amount of leftovers. We propose a new GPM scheme for supply chain coordination. Specifically, if the retailer compensates the vendor for the same fraction of the joint costs as the guaranteed mark-up rate, the retailer's quantity choice results in profit maximization for the entire supply chain. Thus, the supply chain becomes fully coordinated and provides win-win outcomes for both retailer and vendor.     

Channel Selection and Coordination in Dual-Channel Supply Chains

This paper investigates the influence of channel structures and channel coordination on the supplier, the retailer, and the entire supply chain in the context of two single-channel and two dual-channel supply chains. We extensively study two Pareto zone concepts: channel-adding Pareto zone and contract-implementing Pareto zone. In the channel-adding Pareto zone, both the supplier and the retailer benefit from adding a new channel to the traditional single-channel supply chain. In the contract-implementing Pareto zone, it is mutually beneficial for the supplier and the retailer to utilize the proposed contract coordination policy. The analysis suggests the preference lists of the supplier and the retailer over channel structures with and without coordination are different, and depend on parameters like channel base demand, channel operational costs, and channel substitutability.     

Competitive sustainable processes and pricing decisions in omnichannel closed-up supply chains under different channel power structures

In recent years, omnichannel retailing and remanufacturing issues have rapidly emerged in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). The omnichannel is a combination of online and in-store retailing, and it affects supply chain relationships and channel power structures by changing value creation processes. It allows consumers a hybrid shopping experience where they can order products online and pick them up in the store or test in-store and buy online (TSBO). Despite this practice, no studies exist on CLSC considering omnichannel retailing under different channel power structures. We investigate the TSBO retailing strategy and its impact on CLSC profit considering price competition between manufacturer and remanufacturer under Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), Retailer Stackelberg (RS), Vertical Nash (VN), and cooperation (CO) models game settings. In this paper, mathematical models are developed to drive the optimal solution. A two-part tariff coordination mechanism (i.e., IS model) is also used to integrate all supply chain members. The proposed models examine the environmental and social welfare benefits of adopting green innovation products and remanufacturing processes in omnichannel retailing. A numerical study is carried out to illustrate the proposed models' application. The results show that the IS model can synchronize the economic, environmental, and social aspects leading to significant increases in performance. Total supply chain profit under the CO model is the highest. The manufacturer and remanufacturer generate higher profits in the MS model, whereas the retailer makes higher profits in the RS and VN models. When a manufacturer only wants to increase profit with green processes and is not concerned about omnichannel processes, more resources must be allocated for green innovation.     

Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.     

转移价格的供应链激励机制与道德风险问题研究

考虑一个由制造商与分销商组成的供应链,制造商通过广告投入拉动产品销售,分销商通过促销活动推动产品销售。如果用一个制造商和两个分销商构成的供应链模型,来研究供应链中的博弈关系、激励机制和道德风险问题。只有给出两分销商的Nash均衡结果以及制造商与两分销商间的Nash均衡结果,才能解决供应链中的激励机制的设计。然后通过支付函数的全微分,来揭示供应链中的道德风险问题,从而证明供应链内部存在囚徒困境现象。     

基于共享契约的供应链合作伙伴收益分配协调机制

基于制造商共享契约前后的收益分配模型,根据Stackelberg动态博弈思想,从整个供应链收益最大化视角,分析制造商与零售商的共享收益合作区间,提出了基于共享契约的供应链合作伙伴收益分配协调机制。研究结果表明,制造商采用共享收益分配机制可使整个供应链系统得到协调,并在实践中具有可操作性。     

供应链成员企业投资RFID技术的激励机制：共享收入与谈判批发价的比较

许多已有研究发现供应链成员投资RFID技术的动机是一致的，它们假定投资前后的批发价能以相同方式制定。然而，供应链成员在投资前可能已达成固定的批发价。考虑包含一个制造商(她)和一个零售商(他)的供应链系统，成员可采用如分享销售收入(RS)、重新谈判批发价格(WR)、二者并用(B)的激励机制。结果发现在WR和B下，当制造商的谈判权力中等且标签成本较小时，投资RFID能实现双赢，但两家企业的投资动机不总是完全一致；当初始批发价足够高时，若制造商的谈判权力足够强，制造商和零售商对WR的偏好都高于N，对B的偏好都高于RS；当初始批发价较低时，若制造商的谈判权力中等，双方对RS的偏好都高于WR。若制造商的谈判权力较强，供应链系统在B下的收益比WR下的高；若制造商的谈判权力中等或较弱，供应链系统在B或WR下的收益都比N和RS下的高。     

Information asymmetry, pricing strategy and firm's performance in the retailer- multi-channel manufacturer supply chain

In this research paper, we assume a retailer-multi-channel manufacturer (with online and traditional retail channels) supply chain where both the multi-channel manufacturer and the retailer have private information about the state of consumer demand. In this setting, we examine the effect of an information sharing strategy on both firms' performance. Our results show that the multi-channel manufacturer always benefits from an information sharing strategy. When the product is highly compatible with the online channel, information sharing becomes much more valuable to the multi-channel manufacturer. On the other hand, the retailer's performance is not impacted by an information sharing strategy. Thus, a bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing for the multi-channel manufacturer and retailer so that an information sharing equilibrium can be reached. Based on our results, we derive optimal market strategies and identify probable paths of future research.     

Retailer's decoy strategy versus consumers' reference price effect in a retailer-Stackelberg supply chain

Decoy strategy for bundling is an important marketing option because it can reflect the behavior resulting from consumers' reference price effect. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of a dyadic supply chain to study the joint decisions on pricing and decoy strategies in the presence of consumers' reference price effect. The retailer chooses one of the decoy strategies (phantom decoy-mixed bundling, decoy-mixed bundling) and selling prices to maximize her profit. Our study shows that: under both decoy strategies, the retailer and the manufacturer benefit from consumers' low reference price effect; however, the high reference price effect hurts their profits.