货币薪酬能激励高管承担风险吗

有关“风险承担”（risk taking）的研究是近年来特别是全球金融危机背景下财务学研究的热点问题之一。本文研究结果表明：（1）货币薪酬激励的增加能提升高管承担风险的水平;（2）最终控制人性质和公司成长性会影响两者之间的关系,在国有企业以及公司成长性较低的公司,货币薪酬激励与风险承担之间的正相关关系较弱;（3）风险承担水平的提高能促进公司绩效的提升;（4）进一步研究发现,风险承担在高管薪酬激励与企业绩效之间发挥中介效用作用。这些结论在采用两阶段最小二乘法（2SLS）和三阶段最小二乘法（3SLS）处理内生性问题等稳健性测试后依然成立。因此,本文从“风险承担”这一新的视角深化了有关高管薪酬激励降低代理问题并提升公司绩效的研究,也为中国上市公司尤其是国有上市公司高管薪酬契约设计的有效性提供了借鉴和参考价值。     

The impact of privatization on firm performance in a transition economy

The Vietnamese privatization programme, launched in 1992, differs from the usual Western privatization programmes in terms of the residual percentage of shares owned by the state and the portion of shares owned by insiders. This begs the question whether these differences influence the effects of the programme on firm performance. This study measures the impact of privatization on firm performance in Vietnam by comparing the pre‐ and post‐privatization financial and operating performance of 121 former state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We find significant increases in profitability, sales revenues, efficiency and employee income. Results of applying the ‘difference‐in‐difference’ (DID) method, wherein a control group of firms is used to pick up the influence of other determinants of firm performance, suggest that the performance improvements may indeed be associated with equitization. Regression analyses reveal that firm size, residual state ownership, corporate governance and stock market listing are key determinants of performance improvements.     

Local Government Debt and Firm Leverage: Evidence from China

China's local government debt financing has been expanded aggressively to support infrastructure investment, especially since the enactment of four‐trillion‐yuan stimulus plan to stimulate the economy post global financial crisis. At the same time, the rapid increase of firm‐level leverage ratio of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and the decline of leverage ratio of non‐SOEs jointly deteriorated China's credit misallocation problem. In this study, we empirically test the effect of local government debton firm leverage in China. We find that an expansion of local government debt significantly crowded out the leverage of non‐SOEs, while crowded in that of SOEs. Moreover, the effect differed across industries and sectors.     

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOR STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES AS A MEANS TO MITIGATE POLITICAL INTERFERENCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TWO SWISS STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES

When governments act as owners of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), they are both principal and agent at the same time. The literature on steering SOEs has mainly focused on the government as the principal that must control SOEs. However, the government is also an agent, vis‐à‐vis the parliament, because democratic constitutions stipulate some form of parliamentary oversight of the government. This oversight includes checks on how the government steers SOEs. However, this oversight function gives the parliament the power and opportunity to interfere into steering SOEs, which may lead to parliamentary interventions that are not coherent with governmental steering. We draw on principal–agent literature and public‐accountability literature to show that arbitrary and hands‐on parliamentary interference pose problems for steering SOEs. We analyze whether strategic objectives for SOEs, as recommended by public corporate governance guidelines, are appropriate to minimize parliamentary interference. We hypothesize that the Swiss government avoids or mitigates parliamentary interference by mid‐term strategic objectives for SOEs, which counteract short‐term parliamentary requests. We find that the Swiss government uses mid‐term strategic objectives, particularly financial ones, to reject parliamentary demands for more intervention into SOE activities.     

金融衍生品使用与企业价值、风险:来自中国有色金属类上市公司的经验证据

本文基于企业使用金融衍生品的发展趋势,以中国有色金属类上市公司为样本,对上市公司使用金融衍生品是否有利于提升公司价值;使用金融衍生品究竟增加了企业的风险还是降低了企业的风险?企业价值和企业风险关系如何?对这些问题进行了实证检验。结果发现,公司使用金融衍生品提升了公司价值,但未必能提升经营业绩;合理运用金融衍生品在某种程度上能够降低公司的内生性风险,有利于企业价值提升,而系统性风险与企业价值之间不具有因果关系。本文研究结论对中国上市公司合理使用金融衍生品进行风险管理提供了有益的借鉴。     

The impact of privatization on efficiency and profitability

Over the past three decades, China has undergone tremendous economic and social change as a consequence of the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. This paper examines a key feature of this transition – the privatization of the state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) – through both a theoretical model and empirical analysis. Using newly collected primary data from a variety of sources, we study how privatization of listed SOEs affects employment, wages, profits and other aspects of economic performance at the firm level. Our major finding is that privatization results in substantial downsizing of employment, increased labour productivity and rising profitability.     

股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性

以相对净资产收益率和主营业务利润率为被解释变量 ,以股权构成为解释变量 ,本文系统考察了股权结构对上市公司业绩的影响。在对行业、公司规模和宏观经济条件等因素加以控制后 ,使用来自电子电器、商业和公用事业三个行业上市公司的数据 ,我们的回归分析和假设检验表明法人股和流通股对企业业绩有正面影响、国有股有负面影响的预期只在竞争性较强的电子电器行业成立 ,在竞争性相对较弱的其他两个行业则不成立。这一研究发现的政策含义在于 ,为了使通过上市实现国有企业股权结构多元化的政策发挥所期望的作用 ,首先应尽量提高行业的竞争性。     

“严监管”下审计监督的个体治理效应*——基于地方国有企业高管超额在职消费的研究

本文基于地方国有企业高管超额在职消费的视角研究审计监督对国有企业发挥的个体治理效应。采用2007—2017年地方国有上市公司样本,本文以地方审计机关负责人的监督背景为切入点实证考察“严监管”背景下审计监督对地方国有企业高管超额在职消费的个体治理效应。研究发现,地方审计机关负责人的监督背景能够显著抑制地方国有企业高管超额在职消费,并且这一现象主要体现在2013年开始的“严监管”时期。这一结果在多种内生性和稳健性检验后依然成立。进一步研究发现,地方审计机关负责人的监督背景与地方国有企业高管超额在职消费的负向关系不仅受到审计监督的动机和能力的影响,而且受到国有企业内外部治理机制的影响。最终,地方审计机关负责人的监督背景能够有效缓解地方国有企业因高管超额在职消费引致的公司价值减损和股价崩盘风险。     

Why does China protect its labour‐intensive industries more?*

China's tariff structure favours labour‐intensive sectors, and this is at odds with traditional theory of comparative advantage. The paper argues that tariffs in China are a mechanism for protecting technology‐backward domestic – especially state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from competition technology‐advanced foreign enterprises producing in China. With relatively integrated labour markets and cross‐firm technology differences, SOEs’ subsistence is supported by subsidized credit and limited access of foreign firms’ local production to tariff‐protected domestic markets. Labour market integration and capital subsidies increase the relative cost of labour in SOEs compared to their foreign competitors, hurting more domestic firms in industries that use labour more intensively. Restrictions to FIEs’ (foreign‐invested enterprises) access to tariff‐protected product markets, which protect more labour‐intensive industries, compensate for the greater cost disadvantage of SOEs in labour‐intensive sectors.     

China’s secondary privatization: new evidence on controlling shareholders tunnelling

This article utilizes the 2005 split-share structure reform (SSSR) in China as a natural experiment and conducts difference-in-differences (DID) tests to analyse corporate governance changes among Chinese SOEs compared to POEs. We show that tunnelling significantly reduced in both POEs and SOEs after the SSSR. More importantly, we find a significant and positive ‘privatization effect’ on SOEs’ tunnelling activities during the post-reform period suggesting the reductions of tunnelling were smaller among SOEs than POEs following the SSSR. In contrast, excess returns around the SSSR indicate that investors expected a negative ‘privatization effect’ on SOEs’ tunnelling. These findings suggest that the quality of corporate governance did not improve among SOEs as a result of the secondary privatization as the stock market expected without fundamental changes to firm ownership and control following the SSSR. The benefits of privatization accrue to the government controlling shareholders rather than minority investors.     

Determinants of corporate default risk in China: The role of financial constraints

Corporate default risk can affect financial stability and the macroeconomy. However, the determinants of corporate default risk in China are not well defined in the literature. We address this issue by using a rich credit event dataset of 981 Chinese listed firms over the period 1998–2013 and study the factors that affect default risk. We demonstrate that leverage, liquidity, firm size are the key firm-specific factors in determining default risk in China, along with macroeconomic factors like interest rate and stock return. Moreover, ‘Too big to fail’ only applies to non-SOEs, as default risk of SOEs is not affected by the firm size. We further find that high liquidity fails to reduce firms default risk, because small-sized firms which are financially constrained have limited cash to prevent financial distress, whereas large firms with greater cash holdings are able to mitigate their default risk as they are unconstrained.     

Male–female wage discrimination in Chinese industryInvestigation using firm‐level data1

We use firm‐level data to analyze male–female wage discrimination in China's industry. We find that there is a significant negative association between wages and the share of female workers in a firm's labour force. However, we also find that the marginal productivity of female workers is significantly lower than that of male workers. Comparing wage gaps and productivity gaps between men and women, we notice an intriguing contrast between state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms. The wage gap is smaller than the productivity gap in SOEs, while the converse is true for private firms. These results suggest that women in the state sector receive wage premiums, whereas women in the private sector face wage discrimination.     

税负抑制了公司投资吗?——基于国有股权私有收益的解释

文章分析了税负对公司投资决策的影响.与民营控股股东不同,作为国有企业的最终股东,政府不仅可以获得与股权投资相关的收益,而且可以获得独占性的税收,独占性的税收收入越高,政府控股的私有收益越大.因此,国有企业在投资决策时不仅考虑税后现金流量,而且会关注相关的预期税负,这提高了国有企业的投资?预期税负敏感性;政府对税收的需求越大,国有企业的投资?预期税负敏感性越高.实证结果表明:(1)与民营控股上市公司相比,国有控股上市公司的投资与预期税负之间的负相关关系更弱;(2)随着注册地基础设施投资回报率的增加,国有控股上市公司的投资与预期税负之间的负相关性显著下降.因此,最大化税收收入也是国有企业投资决策的重要考虑因素.文章为我国股权结构在公司财务决策中的作用提供了新的研究视角.     

企业社会责任与企业价值——组织惰性与行业敏感度的调节作用

以2012—2016年沪深两市A股上市公司的数据为依据,通过实证分析研究了企业社会责任对企业价值的影响,并从组织层面和行业层面的视角探讨了组织惰性和行业敏感度对该影响的调节作用。研究结果表明,企业社会责任对企业价值具有显著的促进作用;组织惰性减弱了企业社会责任对企业价值的促进作用;行业敏感度阻碍了企业通过履行社会责任进而提升企业价值的过程。     

Present bias and corporate tax policies

Two major forms of corporate tax policies are dividend and profits taxes. Based on conventional corporate theory, these tax policies distort the firm's investment decisions and decrease firm value. However, this paper shows that under hyperbolically discounted preferences, dividend taxation is capable of boosting firm investment in a value‐enhancing way. The hyperbolically discounted present value can be interpreted as reflecting irrational myopic preferences or, as we demonstrate, reduced‐form implications of corporate agency issues. Both cases result in an underinvestment problem for the firm, but the firm valuation criteria differ. The optimal taxation issue is discussed under a Cobb–Douglas production function setting.     

家族创始人职业经历与企业风险承担*

基于创始人自身特征的异质性,本文研究家族创始人职业经历与企业风险承担的关系。研究发现,相对于家族创始人具有公共部门职业经历的企业,创始人具有企业部门职业经历的企业风险承担水平更高。进一步地,在产品市场竞争激烈的行业,家族创始人的企业部门职业经历与企业风险承担水平的正相关关系更强。研究表明,具有企业部门职业经历的家族创始人更偏好风险,其所掌控企业的风险承担水平也更高。本文发展了基于代理理论和控制权理论的家族企业风险承担研究,论证了家族创始人职业经历特征对企业风险承担的重要作用。同时,本文研究结论有助于投资者识别企业风险。     

How much of the world economy is state-owned? Analysis based on the 2005–20 Fortune Global 500 lists

This paper analyzes the share of state-owned enterprises on the Fortune Global 500 lists from 2005 to 2020. The purpose is to answer two research questions—what is the share of SOEs among the world's largest companies, and is this share increasing over the years? Regarding studies of large sets of companies, the novelty of this article is the method in which SOEs were identified—based on the criterion of actual corporate control of the state and not the threshold of state ownership. The results show that the share of SOEs in the group of the world's largest companies is higher than indicated in previous similar studies, and this value has increased significantly over the last 15 years. In 2005, there were 64 SOEs on the list; in 2020, there were 141 (with the highest number—142—in 2015). In this period, the share of SOEs in revenues doubled (to almost 30%), in assets more than tripled and the total number of employees from SOEs from the list more than doubled. However, these increases were almost solely due to the growth of the Chinese economy, which resulted in more Chinese SOEs being included on the list.     

Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration,identity and board composition

We examine and analyze the post-privatization corporate governance of a sample of 52 newly privatized Egyptian firms over a period of 10 years, from 1995 to 2005. We look at the ownership structure that results from privatization and its evolution; the determinants of private ownership concentration; and the impact of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition on firm performance. We find that the state gives up control over time to the private sector, but still controls, on average, more than 35% of these firms. We also document a trend in private ownership concentration over time, mostly to the benefit of foreign investors. Firm size, sales growth, industry affiliation, and timing and method of privatization seem to play a key role in determining private ownership concentration. Ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors, prove to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employee ownership concentration has a negative one. The higher proportion of outside directors and the change in the board composition following privatization have a positive effect on firm performance. These results could have some important policy implications where private ownership by foreign investors seems to add more value to firms, while selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to employees is not recommended. Also, the state is highly advised to relinquish control and allow for changes in the board of directors following privatization as changing ownership, per se, might not have a positive impact on firm performance unless it is coupled with a new management style.     

人力资本产权安排与国有企业制度改革

人力资本产权在企业所有权安排中具有一种特殊决定性的地位和作用,国有企业人力资本产权制度安排的根本问题在于无视人力资本产权自主或决定属性,不承认人力资本个人产权及其向非人力资枰权转化的合法通道,以及由此在市场化过程中所引发的人力资本运营危机,国有企业改革要进行下去并最终取得成功,那就绕不开下面认可和弘扬企业职工个人的人力资本产权权能权益这个“结”。国有企业改革的未来走向,首要的是突破国有企业的“主体”观念,加大国有企业的“退出”力度和范围;然后才是对被界定了“特殊性质和职能”的少数国有企业采取特殊“监管”,实行以人为本的人力资本运营模式,真正使少数国有企业发牢固“主导”国民经济运行的“特殊”作用。     

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN JAPAN

Since the beginning of the 2000s, institutional investors in Japan have become active in strengthening corporate governance, with the aim of achieving long‐term corporate value. The present paper examines the relationship between institutional investors and corporate governance, and also the relationship between institutional investors' shareholdings and firm performance. The results suggest that corporate governance has been enhanced by institutional investors. However, it is found that there is not a statistically significant difference between institutional investors' shareholdings and firm performance.