Election cycles in mining licensing: theory and evidence from Albania

Most of the literature on political business and budgetary cycles (PBBC) has focused on fiscal and monetary policy variables in advanced-country contexts. We extend this literature by investigating political cycle effects in a non-monetary, non-fiscal policy regime (the allocation of mining licences) in a transition country context. We propose a model of mining licensing that allows for corruption and for both supply and demand effects to determine the outcome. We then estimate this model using time-series data from post-communist Albania. Relying on a dynamic Poisson model, we find evidence of both opportunistic and partisan effects. Based on our theory, we suggest a corruption interpretation of political cycles in non-fiscal/non-monetary variables. This interpretation, we suggest, may be more applicable to the context of developing and transition countries. Our study raises important questions about the unintended (and often pernicious) effects of transition politics on economic regulation and economic performance in post-socialist economies.     

Election cycles and mining-sector governance in post-conflict Kosovo

Political business cycles are typically linked to the manipulation of fiscal or monetary policy instruments. In a recent article, Imami, Lami and Uberti (ILU) argue that opportunistic politicians may also choose to manipulate non-fiscal/non-monetary policy instruments. Here, we extend ILU’s study using time-series data on mining-sector licensing from post-conflict Kosovo (2001–2018). We find robust evidence that is consistent with electoral opportunism in the allocation of mining permits, despite the checks-and-balance mechanisms introduced by Kosovo’s international administrators in an attempt to reduce the politicisation of licensing. That said, the cycle effect is only observed prior to scheduled, as opposed to early, elections. Disaggregating the data by licence type, in addition, we find that the observed election cycle is driven primarily by the manipulation of licences for the mining of construction materials. We argue that, in the context of post-conflict Kosovo, this is the category of licences whose strategic manipulation offers the greatest pay-off to the incumbent. The results raise some questions about the feasibility of fighting political opportunism (and, relatedly, corruption) by establishing formal check-and-balance mechanisms.     

A MODEL OF AN OPPORTUNISTIC-PARTISAN POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

According to political business cycle theory, separate opportunistic and partisan approaches exist. It is obvious, as seen from theoretical and empirical points of view, that politicians aim for both opportunistic as well as partisan goals. This paper presents a model of a pre‐election political business cycle that manifests an indication of competence and a post‐election political business cycle that occurs because of the uncertainty of an election's winner monetary policy. In the pre‐election period competent governments expand the economy. The post‐election cycle depends on whether a leftist or a conservative government is in power in the pre‐election period, and if they are re‐elected or not.     

Elections, Opportunism, Partisanship and Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries

We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations explain election‐period decisions by credit rating agencies (“agencies”) publishing developing country sovereign risk‐ratings (“ratings”). Analyses of 391 agency ratings for 19 countries holding 39 presidential elections from 1987–2000, initially suggest that elections themselves prompt rating downgrades consistent with opportunistic PBC considerations, that incumbents are all likely to implement election‐period policies detrimental to post‐election creditworthiness. But more refined analyses, integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations in a unified framework, suggest that election‐period agency downgrades (upgrades) are more likely as right‐wing (left‐wing) incumbents, become more vulnerable to ouster by challengers. Together, these results underscore the importance of integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations into any explanation of election‐period risk assessments of agencies and, perhaps, other private, foreign‐based financial actors important to the pricing and allocation of capital for lending and investment in the developing world.     

The influence of government ideology on monetary policy: New cross‐country evidence based on dynamic heterogeneous panels

Using data of 23 OECD countries over the 1980–2005 period, we examine whether government ideology affects monetary policy, conditional on central bank independence. Unlike previous studies in this line of literature, we estimate central bank behavior using forward‐looking and real‐time data in Taylor rule models and use estimators that allow for heterogeneity across countries. Our models with heterogeneous slope coefficients for the full sample do not suggest partisan effects. We also do not find evidence that central bank behavior is conditioned by the interaction of the ideology of the incumbent government and the electoral calendar.     

The effects of inter-municipal cooperation and central grant allocation on the size of the French local public sector

The analysis of French municipalities’ public personnel expenditures allows us to study the issue of the size of the local public sector. We concentrate on two paths that French authorities have followed to limit it, i.e., the promotion of inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) and the cut in grants received by municipalities. Our objective is to evaluate their respective role in the evolution of public personnel expenditures at the municipal level, in a context where local politics comes into play. We consider a large panel dataset of municipalities embedded in IMC structures between 2011 and 2018. Our main results, obtained using an original identification strategy, are threefold. We first find evidence that a substitution effect between municipal and IMC personnel expenditures is at work. Second, we find a partisan distorsion through the grant allocation: despite its formula-based definition, aligned and unaligned municipalities are treated differently by the central government. Third, we show that cuts in grants lead to cuts in municipalities’ public wage bills, while partisanship hinders such cuts.     

The powers that are: central bank independence in the Greenspan era

This paper investigates political pressure from incumbent Presidents and Congress on US monetary policy during the period that Greenspan was the chairman of the Federal Reserve. We propose an expectations-augmented Taylor rule in which we replace realized values with expectations, and use the unemployment gap instead of the output gap. We apply a state-space framework that allows the use of mixed frequency data. Our findings suggest that the Federal Reserve under Greenspan did not create election driven cycles, but also did not strictly follow the Taylor rule. The deviations from the Taylor rule are not driven by partisan politics, but are rooted in the expected economic conditions.     

Does the expectation or realization of a federal election precipitate Canadian output growth?

Abstract This paper asks whether Canadian data is consistent with the predicted effects of political opportunism, partisanship, and political competition on real output growth since Confederation. Using annual data from 1870 to 2005 we find new support for an opportunistic electoral cycle in Canadian data but only if the actual election date used in most studies is replaced by an estimate of the incumbent governing party's subjectively held likelihood of an election arising. In our case the estimate is generated from a Cox‐proportional hazard model. The paper explores in detail the issues raised by using a generated regressor to approximate a subjectively held expectation versus an observable proxy and argues that these conditions are met in our case. Finally we also find evidence consistent with partisan cycles in the data but much less evidence consistent with the hypothesis that changes in the degree of political competition have affected real output growth.     

Taxation and political business cycles in EU economies

This paper examines whether incumbent national governments of 11 member states of the European Union manipulated the tax policy instruments at their disposal in order to create national political business cycles, opportunistic or partisan. The empirical evidence, based on data concerning the 1965 to 1997 period, does not support this hypothesis. Rather, it appears that governments have pursued stabilization policies.     

Partisan Cycles in Offshore Outsourcing: Evidence from U.S. Imports

The wage and employment effects of offshoring roil politics in the United States and around the world. Firms that offshore either outsource their activities to unaffiliated businesses, or internalize production by establishing subsidiaries from which they import intrafirm. We argue that the political environment in trade partner countries influences U.S. offshoring patterns in ways that have been ignored in the extant literature. Drawing on the political business cycle literature, we expect higher production costs and lower profits for firms in capital (labor) intensive sectors when the Left (Right) is in power. These partisan cycles, in turn, shape the sectoral composition of exports from the partner to the United States, and the degree to which trade is conducted intrafirm. Under a Left‐ (Right‐) leaning government in a partner country, U.S. intrafirm imports of capital‐ (labor‐) goods increase relative to total imports in these industries. Examining highly disaggregated U.S. import data, we find strong support for our argument. Our results indicate that the effect of partisan governments on offshore outsourcing depends on factor intensities of production, which vary across industries. The degree of internalization in global sourcing is shaped in part by the distributional objectives of partisan governments, and not by economic factors alone.     

How do voters perceive changes to the rules of the game? Evidence from the 2014 Hungarian elections

Voters often rely on partisan attachments as they evaluate new policy proposals, but does partisanship also color their interpretation of incumbent efforts to entrench themselves in power by changing the “basic rules of the political game”? We explore this question by taking advantage of a rare instance where a single party held a supermajority sufficient to unilaterally amend the constitution and overhaul the electoral system. We embedded a randomized experiment in a panel survey around the 2014 Hungarian elections, providing respondents with different information about recent changes to the Hungarian electoral rules. While respondents were largely pessimistic about the reforms, providing information yielded no significant effects on their views on the elections' legitimacy. But when information was presented alongside partisan cues, respondents became more negative in their views. Subgroup analysis shows that this effect is concentrated entirely among those not supporting the incumbent. Partisan differences in opinion dwarf any treatment effects we were able to induce. We provide evidence that these findings are unlikely the result of a well-informed populace. Rather, we provide the first experimental evidence that partisan-motivated reasoning applies not only to public policy under fixed institutions but also to changes to the institutional rules of a political system. Incumbents can exploit strong partisan attachments to reduce political competition.     

Direct Democracy and Local Public Finances under Cooperative Federalism

In this paper, we exploit the introduction of the right of local initiatives in the German state of Bavaria in 1995 in order to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy. Our identification strategy combines difference‐in‐differences and regression discontinuity methods: we compare municipal expenditure and revenue between pre‐ and post‐reform periods at population thresholds where the signatures needed to launch initiatives and minimum quorum requirements decrease discontinuously (difference‐in‐discontinuities design). The results suggest that stronger direct democratic institutions lead to an expansion of local government size.     

Political Accountability,Electoral Control and Media Bias

Are anti‐establishment mass media really useful in preventing politicians from behaving dishonestly? This paper models the direction of media bias, and shows that the probability of a dishonest action by an incumbent is higher (than that in the case of no media bias) if and only if the mass media have some degree of “anti‐incumbent” bias (i.e. information favourable to the incumbent is converted into unfavourable news about the incumbent with a positive probability), provided that the incumbent is less likely to be opportunistic than a challenger in the upcoming election. This result holds irrespective of the degree of “pro‐incumbent” bias.     

RACIAL REDISTRICTING FOR MINORITY REPRESENTATION WITHOUT PARTISAN BIAS: A THEORETICAL APPROACH

Scholars of American politics have expressed the concern that concentration of minority voters into limited districts in order to promote minority representation induces the partisan “perverse effect” of reducing the number of seats won by Democrats. Our theory explains how the perverse effect can occur and demonstrates that racial redistricting generates a tradeoff between the number of minority legislators and the number of Democratic legislators. Our theory suggests that in light of this tradeoff, the diversification of districts as well as the concentration of minorities (“second‐order diversity”) may be essential for the proportional representation of minorities without partisan electoral bias.     

The electoral budget cycle on municipal waste collection expenditure

This article analyses the determinants of municipal waste collection expenditure, specifically the effects of electoral cycles on municipal waste collection expenditure. We use a database with information on Spanish municipalities with more than 1000 inhabitants for the period 2002–2011. Our results reveal that incumbents adopt an opportunistic behaviour, increasing spending on waste in the preelection year and reducing it in the election and post-election years. Therefore, we confirm an electoral budget cycle on waste collection expenditures in Spain. Additionally, we find that the levels of income, unemployment and upper-level governments’ transfers have a positive impact on waste collection spending. Finally, population density, level of urbanization, average age of the population of the municipality and less fragmented governments negatively influence waste collection spending.     

THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT PARTISANSHIP: AND THE SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

This paper explores the existence of partisan cycles in foreign direct investment performance. Our theoretical model predicts that the incumbent government's partisanship should affect foreign investors' decision to flow into different sectors of the host country: pro-labor governments would encourage the inflow of the type of investment that complements labor in production; pro-capital governments would promote the entry of investment that substitutes for labor. Empirical evidence from a sample of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries reveals a pattern of foreign investors' response to partisan cycles consistent with the predictions of the model. First, foreign investment systematically flows into different sectors of the host economy under left- and right-leaning incumbents. Second, we find a positive correlation between foreign investment and changes in average wages under left-leaning incumbents, but no effect on wages under right-leaning governments.     

ECONOMIC VOTING AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: HOW DO INDIVIDUAL,LOCAL, AND NATIONAL FACTORS AFFECT THE PARTISAN CHOICE?

What impact do income and other demographic factors have on a voter's partisan choice? Using post‐election surveys of 14,000 voters in 10 Australian elections between 1966 and 2001, I explore the impact that individual, local, and national factors have on voters' decisions. In these 10 elections, the poor, foreign‐born, younger voters, voters born since 1950, men, and those who are unmarried are more likely to be left‐wing. Over the past 35 years, the partisan gap between men and women has closed, but the partisan gap has widened on three dimensions: between young and old; between rich and poor; and between native‐born and foreign‐born. At a neighborhood level, I find that, controlling for a respondent's own characteristics, and instrumenting for neighborhood characteristics, voters who live in richer neighborhoods are more likely to be right‐wing, while those in more ethnically diverse or unequal neighborhoods are more likely to be left‐wing. Controlling for incumbency, macroeconomic factors do not seem to affect partisan preferences – Australian voters apparently regard both major parties as equally capable of governing in booms and busts.     

Partisan Social Happiness

We use a new approach to study questions in political economy that relies on data on the subjective well-being of a large sample of people living in the OECD over the period 1975{1992. Controlling for the personal characteristics of the respondents, year and country fixed effects and country-specific time trends, we find that the data describe social happiness functions for left-wing and right-wing individuals where inflation and unemployment enter negatively. We use these functions to test the root assumption of partisan business cycle models. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that left-wing individuals care more about unemployment relative to inflation than right-wingers. Interestingly, we find that individuals declare themselves to be happier when the party they support is in power, even after controlling for macroeconomic variables. The effect of politics is large. Finally, we find that these partisan differences cannot be traced back to income differences. That is, it is misleading to assume|as it is done in the previous literature|that the poor (rich) behave similarly to the left (right). For example, inflation and unemployment do not have differential effects across rich and poor and the happiness levels of these two groups are unaffected by the identity of the party in power. Our findings are hard to explain using median voter models but are to be expected in a partisan world.     

Political budget cycles revisited: Testing the signalling process

A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive and perceive the signal in that way. To empirically assess the relevance of the signalling channel at the municipal level, we conducted a survey among 2000 representative German citizens in 2018. Only a small fraction of voters feel well-informed about the fiscal budget signal and use the information it contains to decide whether to vote for the incumbent politician. Persons paying more attention to the signal sent by local politicians live in smaller municipalities, are more satisfied with their economic situation, are more educated, and do not feel that they are being electorally manipulated. Our analysis raises doubt about the relevance of budget composition as a signalling mechanism for voters at the local level.     

Politics and entrepreneurship in the US

There is a strong belief that Republicans are more pro‐business than Democrats. In this paper, we investigate the causal impact of partisan allegiance of governors (Republican or Democratic) on entrepreneurial activity by exploiting random variation in close gubernatorial elections in 50 states over the last three decades in a regression discontinuity design. We find that Republican governors are no different than Democratic governors in their effects on entrepreneurship. Our findings are robust to several sensitivity checks.