THE TWO‐WAY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

The existing empirical evidence suggests that in low‐income economies, an increase in government spending leads to a reduction of growth. This article aims to explain this empirical fact by considering a growth model that incorporates a two‐way relationship between corruption and government spending. That is, government spending gives rise to corruption and rent seeking, which feeds back by distorting the structure and size of government spending. In addition, the cost of corruption depends on the wage rate. Therefore, in low‐income economies, increases in government spending tend to generate larger social losses caused by a higher level of rent dissipation and a concomitant rise in corruption and government inefficiency. Consequently, in such economies, an increase in government spending is more likely to result in a decline of economic growth. (JEL H3, O11, O41)     

A Case Against Zero Capital-Income Taxation

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate the optimal level of capital income taxation in light of stochastic endogenous economic growth. Although endogenous human capital is incorporated into our model, we restrict our investigation to the issue of optimal physical capital income tax; and the labor supply is also endogenously determined. This paper proves that the optimal capital income tax should be zero provided exogenous government expenditure on production; however, capital income should be taxed if we consider endogenous government consumption.     

The Response to Reform in a Growing Economy: The Role of Rent-Seeking Technology

Individuals engaged in rent seeking accumulate sector-specific human capital through learning-by-doing. If agents specialize, small reforms of the trade regime may fail to reduce the level of the rent-seeking activity. The size of the reform necessary to induce movement out of rent seeking is increasing in the time that controls have been in place. If rent seeking and production are complementary activities, agents will not specialize in either, and will fully respond to a small reform of the trade regime. This is true even though they accumulate human capital specific to rent seeking.     

From rent seeking to human capital: a model where resource shocks cause transitions from stagnation to growth

Abstract.  We present a growth model where agents divide time between rent seeking in the form of resource competition and working in a human capital sector. The latter is interpreted as trade or manufacturing. Rent seeking exerts negative externalities on the productivity of human capital. Adding shocks, in the form of fluctuations in the size of the contested resource, the model can replicate a long phase with stagnant incomes and high levels of rent seeking, interrupted by small, failed growth spurts, eventually followed by a permanent transition to a sustained growth path where rent seeking vanishes in the limit. The model also generates a rise and fall of the so-called natural resource curse: before the takeoff, an increase in the size of the contested resource has a positive effect on incomes; shortly after the takeoff, the effect is negative; and on the balanced growth path the growth rate of per capita income is independent of resource shocks.     

On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contests

There can be three types of heterogeneity among players in a rent‐seeking contest. First, effectiveness of player's effort on the winning probabilities may differ among players. Secondly, players may evaluate the rent or prize of the rent‐seeking contest differently. Thirdly, players may face different financial constraints. This article proves under standard assumptions in the literature that there exists a unique pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium in a general asymmetric rent‐seeking contest with these three types of heterogeneity among players.     

Education,Rent seeking and the Curse of Natural Resources

Empirical evidence suggests that natural resources breed corruption and reduce educational attainments, dampening economic growth. The theoretical literature has treated these two channels separately, with natural resources affecting growth either through human capital or corruption. In this article, we argue that education and corruption are jointly determined and depend on the endowment of natural resources. Natural resources affect the incentives to invest in education and rent seeking that in turn affect growth. Whether natural resources stimulate growth or induce a poverty‐trap crucially depends on inequality in access to education and political participation, as well as on the cost of political participation. For lower inequality and higher cost of political participation, a high‐growth and a poverty‐trap equilibrium coexist even with abundant natural resources.     

Bargaining with Rent Seekers

Consider a rent‐seeking game, which has government bargain with firms over dividing the rents. In period 1, each firm can invest to increase the probability that the rent will appear. In period 2, the parties bargain. In equilibrium, though firms will invest more than the socially optimal level, rent‐seeking expenditures may be low. Firms that collude to restrict investment maximize joint profits by investing at a positive, non‐infinitesimal level, and restrict investment even if the cost of rent‐seeking effort is zero.     

Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers

This paper incorporates rent seeking from state coffers into a general equilibrium model of economic growth and endogenous policy. Self-interested individuals try to extract, for personal benefit, part of tax revenues that could be used to finance public investment. We solve for a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in individual agents' behavior. The determinants of rent seeking in general equilibrium are identified and we consider the efficient size of public sector given the rent-seeking activity. Cross-country data from 108 rich and developing countries provide support for our predictions.     

On indeterminacy and growth under progressive taxation and productive government spending

We examine the theoretical interrelations between equilibrium (in)determinacy and economic growth in a one‐sector representative‐agent model of endogenous growth with progressive taxation of income and productive flow of public spending. We analytically show that, if the demand‐side effect of government purchases is weaker, the economy exhibits an indeterminate balanced‐growth equilibrium and belief‐driven growth fluctuations when the tax schedule is sufficiently progressive or regressive. If the supply‐side effect of public expenditures is weaker, indeterminacy and sunspots arise under progressive income taxation. In sharp contrast to traditional Keynesian‐type stabilization policies, our analysis finds that raising the tax progressivity may destabilize an endogenously growing economy with fluctuations driven by agents’ self‐fulfilling expectations.     

Educated Bandits: Endogenous Property Rights and Intra‐Elite Distribution of Human Capital

This article presents a simple model of endogenous institutions linking property rights to the distribution of human capital between political and economic elite groups. In the absence of institutional constraints, the commitment problem of the political elites is intensified, because their human capital can turn out to be a double‐edged sword raising their efficiency in predation as well as in production. In general, the more human capital the political elites have, the stronger the institutional concessions they are ready to offer to attarct investment. Provided that predation depends sufficiently on human capital, the political elites can credibly commit to respect property rights by specializing in fields that are relevant for the priavte sector. Brain drain can undermine the transition to stable property rights even when the political elites are well‐educated. Comparative narratives from Malaysia and Zimbabwe are presented to motivate the theoretical discussion.     

Endogenous technological change,income distribution,and unemployment with inter-class conflict

This paper presents a Kaleckian growth model that incorporates endogenous technological change. The model endogenously determines the rate of capacity utilization, the rate of economic growth, income distribution, and the employment rate in addition to technological change. The paper shows that whether or not an increase in the relative bargaining power of workers raises the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate depends on which regime is realized in the long-run equilibrium. If, for example, the long-run equilibrium corresponds to the wage-led growth regime, a rise in the relative bargaining power of workers leads to a decline in the unemployment rate. This result is never obtained from the mainstream NAIRU model.     

What to stabilize in the open economy*

We consider the question how “best” to maintain price‐level stability in an open economy, and evaluate three possible policy choices: (a) a constant money growth rate rule; (b) a fixed exchange rate; and (c) a policy of explicit commitment to a price‐level target. In each case we assume that policy is conducted by injecting reserves into or withdrawing reserves from the “banking system.” In evaluating the three regimes, we adopt the criterion that the “best” policy should leave the least scope for indeterminacy and “excessive” economic volatility. In a steady‐state equilibrium, the choice of regime is largely irrelevant; any steady‐state equilibrium under one regime can be duplicated by an appropriate choice of the “control” variable under any other regime. However, we show that the sets of equilibria under the three regimes are dramatically different. When all countries follow the policy of fixing a constant rate of money growth, there are no equilibria displaying endogenously arising volatility and there is no indeterminacy of equilibrium. Under a regime of fixed exchange rates, indeterminacies and endogenously arising fluctuations are impossible if and only if the country with the low “reserve‐to‐deposit” ratio is charged with maintaining the fixed rate. Finally, when one country targets the time path of its price level, under very weak conditions, there will be indeterminacy of equilibrium and endogenously arising volatility driven by expectations.     

Rent‐Seeking,Market Structure,and Growth

We study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth, in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets. Specifically, firms compete for market share through cost‐reducing technological innovation, and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent‐seeking activities. We find that rent‐seeking affects growth in two ways: it allows firms to ignore economic competition, leading to less innovation, and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium. The former effect is negative, while the latter is ambiguous. We show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets.     

政府公共资本投资的长期经济增长效应

本文首先建立一个包含政府公共资本投资的两部门内生增长模型,并把公共资本投资分为政府物质资本投资和人力资本投资,从而对公共资本投资的长期经济增长效应进行理论分析。结论是,两种形式的公共资本投资对长期经济增长都可能具有正效应也可能具有负效应,取决于民间经济主体消费跨时替代弹性大小。其次,我们利用向量自回归分析框架,对我国1978—2004年间公共资本投资对长期经济增长的影响作实证分析。结论是,我国两种形式的公共资本投资与经济增长之间存在着长期均衡关系,其中政府公共物质资本投资对长期经济增长的正影响更为显著,而政府公共人力资本投资对长期经济增长的正影响较小,且在短期内不利于经济增长。这一结论对我国今后科学制定财政政策和选择公共投资领域都具有重要意义。     

REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN A BORROWING‐CONSTRAINED ECONOMY

We develop a two‐period, three‐class of income model where low‐income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where the constrained low‐income and the unconstrained high‐income agents favour low levels of government debt and redistributive expenditure; these agents form a coalition against the middle. In this equilibrium, the levels of government debt and expenditure might be below the efficient levels, and the spread of income distribution results in a lower debt‐to‐GDP ratio.     

Fiscal policy,rent seeking,and growth under electoral uncertainty: theory and evidence from the OECD

Abstract. We construct a general equilibrium model of economic growth and optimally chosen fiscal policy, in which individuals compete with each other for a share of government spending and two political parties alternate in power according to exogenous electoral uncertainty. The main prediction is that uncertainty about remaining in power results in increased fiscal spending, which in turn distorts incentives by pushing individuals away from productive work to rent‐seeking activities; then, distorted incentives hurt growth. This scenario receives empirical support in a dataset of 25 OECD countries over the period 1982–96. In particular, uncertainty about remaining in power leads to larger government shares in GDP, which in turn exert an adverse effect on the ICRG index measuring incentives and this is bad for growth.     

Debt Policy Rules in an Open Economy

In a small open economy model of endogenous growth with public capital accumulation, we examine the effects of a debt policy rule under which the government must reduce its debt–GDP ratio if it exceeds the criterion level. To sustain public debt at a finite level, the government should adjust public spending rather than the income tax rate. The long‐run debt–GDP ratio should be kept sufficiently low to avoid equilibrium indeterminacy. Under sustainability and determinacy, a tighter (looser) debt rule brings welfare gains when the world interest rate is relatively high (low).     

Government spending and growth in second-best economies

This paper extends public spending-based growth theory along three directions: we assume a logistic trajectory for the ratio of government expenditure to aggregate income, self-limiting population change, and exogenous technological progress. By focusing on the choices of a benevolent social planner we find that, if the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is sufficiently high, the ratio of consumption to private physical capital converges towards zero when time goes to infinity. Depending on the form of the underlying aggregate production function and on whether, for given production function, technological progress equals zero or a positive constant, our model may or may not yield an asymptotically balanced growth path (ABGP) equilibrium. When there is no exogenous technological progress, an equilibrium where population size, the ratio of government spending to aggregate income and the ratio of consumption to private physical capital are all constant does exist and the equilibrium is a saddle point. In case of positive technological progress numerical simulations show that the model still exhibits an ABGP equilibrium.     

Education and growth with endogenous debt constraints

When future human capital cannot be alienated, households are allowed to borrow up to the point where it is in their own interest not to default. In such a framework, endogenous borrowing limits arise as the outcome of individual rationality constraint. In a model where education is the engine of growth, we show that endogenous borrowing constraints imply global indeterminacy. Comparing outcomes across the various equilibria we show that the relation between growth and yields is hump-shaped. Maximum growth can arise in an equilibrium with binding borrowing constraints, specially if the elasticity of human capital to education spending is large. Deepening financial markets promotes long-run growth in the case of a poverty trap, but not necessarily otherwise. On the methodological side, our approach stresses the importance of studying borrowing limits in general equilibrium, not only in small open economies. Philippe Michel passed away on July 22, 2004. His death is a great loss for his friends and for the overlapping generations and optimal control community.     

Endogenous growth, welfare and budgetary regimes

Within an optimizing endogenous growth model with productive public capital and government debt, we derive and characterize on the balanced growth path a set of welfare-maximizing fiscal rules under different budgetary regimes. It is shown that optimal fiscal policy depends on the specific budgetary stance considered.