非均衡的经济动态模型

本文旨在按现实世界的本来面目建立一个非均衡的内生经济动态模型。在这个模型中 ,源于部门内和部门间关系的内生变量导致资本市场、消费品市场上产量和价格的波动。市场的非均衡过程、存货调节机制以及经济人的最优行为和适应性行为是基于对现实世界的观察进行模拟的。静态性质及其稳定性是作为一般市场动态过程的特例加以讨论的。     

Dynamic Analysis of an Endogenous Growth Model with Investment‐specific Technological Change

This paper examines a dynamically optimal subsidy policy in a continuous‐time version of the endogenous growth model developed by Krusell (Krusell, P. (1998) “Investment‐Specific R&D and the Decline in the Relative Price of Capital”, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 131–141), in which investment‐specific technological progress occurs endogenously because of R&D performed by monopolistic firms. It is demonstrated that a combination of the time‐invariant subsidy for investment and the time‐variant subsidy for R&D enables the market equilibrium to replicate the socially optimal allocation.     

Dynamic Difference‐Form Contests

This study presents a multistage contest designed by an organizer who chooses the (indivisible) winner prize together with the ranking scheme. When the organizer's objective is to maximize efforts, the optimal ranking scheme that selects the prize recipient coincides with a version of the piecewise linear difference‐form success function postulated by Che and Gale (2000). Even if the organizer's objective is not necessarily to maximize agents' effort, a noisy ranking of the difference‐form remains optimal.     

A Dynamic Incentive‐Based Argument for Conditional Transfers*

We compare the long‐run effects of replacing unconditional transfers to the poor by transfers conditional on the education of children. Unlike Mirrlees’ income taxation model, the distribution of skill evolves endogenously. Human capital accumulation follows the Freeman–Ljungqvist–Mookherjee–Ray OLG model with missing capital markets and dynastic bequest motives. Conditional transfers (funded by taxes on earnings of the skilled) are shown to induce higher long‐run output per capita and (both utilitarian and Rawlsian) welfare, owing to their superior effect on skill accumulation incentives. The result is established both with two skill levels, and a continuum of occupations.     

Neutrality and Non‐Neutrality of Money In A Classical‐Type Model

Abstract. This paper modifies the simple classical model by introducing capacity utilization that varies across the course of the business cycle. By making the capacity usage a choice variable that turns out to be sensitive to changes in the price level, we show that the classical model loses its fundamental feature, namely the neutrality of money. In our generalized framework, a rise in money supply improves upon all the real variables if the economy suffers from excess capacity, as in recessions and depressions. We demonstrate that our model describes the various economic cross‐currents during the Great Depression extremely well. Thus, monetary policy emerges with an activist role even in a generally classical setting.     

A Dynamic Model of Network Formation

Network structure plays a significant role in determining the outcome of many important economic relationships; therefore it is crucial to know which network configurations will arise. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework, where self-interested individuals can form and sever links. We determine which network structures the formation process will converge to. This information allows us to determine whether or not the formation process will converge to an efficient network structure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: A14, C7, D20.     

A Dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin Model: The Case of Costly Factor Reallocation

The role of the static Heckscher–Ohlin model in providing general equilibrium comparative statics is emphasized. It is shown that (i) market-clearing dynamics can be constructed if and only if the costly reallocation of factors is accommodated, and (ii) the introduction of market-clearing and resource-using dynamics fails to sharpen (and may even blunt) the comparative statics. Thus, a new (non-)Correspondence Principle is derived.     

Dynamic Multi‐Activity Contests*

We develop a model of dynamic multi‐activity contests. Players simultaneously choose efforts in long‐run activities, observe each other's efforts in these activities, and then simultaneously choose efforts in short‐run activities. A player's long‐run and short‐run efforts complement each other in determining the player's probability of winning. We compare the outcomes of this two‐stage model to those of the corresponding model in which players choose efforts in all activities simultaneously. Interestingly, effort expenditures are always lower in the sequential multi‐activity contest than in the simultaneous multi‐activity contest. The implications of this result for the organization of military, litigation, innovation, academic, and sporting contests are highlighted.     

A Dynamic Model of Public Opinion Formation

In this paper, we seek to shed new light on the social process of public opinion formation. Drawing on previous contributions in cognition studies and political science, we propose and analyze a model in which heterogeneous agents (citizens) collectively learn and modify their opinions about a specific policy issue. The assumption of nonrationality on the part of agents gives core values, enduring general needs, social interaction, and the combination of the citizens´ intuition and occasional deliberate reasoning a key role in the dynamics of public opinion formation.     

有政府的动态资产定价模型

文章建立了一个有政府的动态资产定价模型.政府被模型化为具有垄断力量的市场参与者,它可以利用自己的税收和交易行为影响市场.我们求解了一个政府先行,私人跟随的均衡,得到了一个资产定价的双因子(总消费因子和税收因子)模型.文章证明:资产的超额收益不但取决于与总消费的相关性,还受与政府税收相关性的影响;资本市场的波动行为依赖于税收的随机模式.我们的模型预言,在一个政府作用比较大的经济体里,如果忽略政府的作用,单因子的ICAPM可能低估均衡的股权超额收益.同没有政府的经济相比,有政府经济中风险资产的波动率会更高.分析还表明:在动态资产定价模型中引入政府行为是可能的.     

A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements

In this paper we develop a model that uses a dynamic framework to analyze the process through which countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, while all countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of total global emissions, non-signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing their own welfare, whereas signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. It is assumed that signatory countries will be able to punish non-signatories, at some cost to themselves. When countries decide on their pollution emissions, they account for the evolution of the stock of pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations characterized by partial cooperation within an IEA that is stable over time. It also captures situations where all countries participate in a stable agreement, and situations where no stable agreement is feasible. Where more than one possibility coexist, the long-term outcome of the game depends on the initial conditions (i.e., the initial number of signatory countries and pollution level).     

A Closed‐form Solution of a Two‐sector Endogenous Growth Model with Habit Formation

This paper determines a closed‐form solution of the two‐sector endogenous growth model with habit formation. Differently to the paper of Hiraguchi, but similar to other approaches as those of Gomez, Turnovsky and Monteiro, we consider that the habits are formed in an external manner and enter additively into the utility function.     

How ‘Little’ Outsourcing Creates A Large Skill Premium: A Model of North‐to‐South Manufacturing Outsourcing

This paper develops a general equilibrium model that shows that a small volume of North–South ¹ trade (i.e. 2% of Northern GDP) could have caused the observed rise in the skill premium, thus resolving the ‘small trade volume paradox’ in the skill premium debate. We apply the concept of ‘trade in tasks’ of Grossman and Rossi‐Hansberg to analyze the nature of North‐to‐South manufacturing outsourcing. As a conceptual innovation, we carefully distinguish two different implicit assumptions of the Heckscher–Ohlin model: ‘factor immobility’ versus ‘task inseparability’. We show that outsourcing, as a form of trade in tasks, essentially attains ‘task separability’ while apparently retaining factor immobility, thus rendering the traditional Heckscher–Ohlin framework obsolete for analyzing current North–South trade. We argue that this change in the nature of trade calls for new thinking in economics and public policy‐making.     

A Two-Country Dynamic Trade Model with Multiple Groups

The paper addresses a dynamic interdependence between economic growth and trade patterns within a multi-group framework. The labor force of each country is classified into two groups, according to human capital and preferences. We show how difference in preferences and human capital of the four groups affect trade patterns and the world economy. [F11, 041].     

Dynamic Contractual Enforcement: A Model of Strikes

This paper provides a theory of strikes as part of a constrained efficient enforcement mechanism for an implicit contractual agreement. A firm possessing contemporaneously private information about demand engages in an enduring relationship with its workforce. If the information becomes perfectly observable subsequently, then, modulo discounting, the first-best is implementable, but strikes are always off the equilibrium path. If the observations of the workforce are imperfect strikes occur in equilibrium. The dynamic contracting problem is modeled as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring. The equilibrium exhibits production inefficiency and incomplete insurance to mitigate the inefficiencies caused by strikes.     

区域企业集群动态演化模型分析

通过建立数学模型研究区域企业集群的动态演化规律,探讨集群企业演化的空间动态行为和反馈机制。依据kti-gti/rti与kt(i 1)-gt(i 1)/rt(i 1)之间关系的不同情况,分别对区域企业集群动态演化模型进行系统分析。研究表明:区域企业集群是由区域生态系统和区域经济系统耦合而成的复杂系统,其演化和发展遵循生态学的基本机制,与其他有生命体的增长十分相似。区域企业集群非线性正反馈机制与区域生态集群非线性负反馈机制构成一个以企业为中心的耗散结构。     

Tariffs,Offshoring and Unemployment in A Two‐Country Model

This paper develops a two‐country model that incorporates offshoring opportunities, and analyses the effects of tariffs under economic stagnation in a liquidity trap that causes unemployment. We find that a rise in tariffs on imports of outsourced goods contributes to an increase in employment by inducing a shift in production, but also leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate that tends to reduce employment. The effect of real exchange rate appreciation dominates the effect of the production shift, and accordingly employment and consumption fall. The effects of tariff adjustments are reversed, however, when there is no liquidity trap and hence no unemployment.     

A Finite‐Time‐Horizon Model of Suicide When a Person's Income is at Risk: A Research Note

The risk of income fluctuations affects the suicidal behaviour. First, an increase in this risk makes risk‐averse individuals more likely to commit suicide by reducing their expected utility. Second, the increased risk makes them less likely to commit suicide by creating a value to waiting for the economic conditions to improve. I lay out a theoretical model of suicide to assess the net impact of income fluctuations on suicidal behaviour by taking into account an individual's ability to delay the action. I also address the question of whether there are generational differences in the suicidal behaviour.     

Labor Skills and Foreign Investment in a Dynamic Economy: Estimating the Knowledge‐capital Model for Singapore

Singapore is an interesting example of how the pattern of foreign investment changes with economic development. This paper studies inbound and outbound investment between Singapore and a sample of industrialized and developing countries over the period 1984–2007. Singapore's investments from industrialized nations shifted into skill‐seeking activities, while its investments in developing countries became concentrated in labor‐seeking production. The knowledge‐capital model is used to analyze the determinants of these shifts. The estimates suggest that a 10% increase in Singapore's skill differences with developing countries resulted in a 15.2% increase in outbound stocks of investment to the average recipient nation. A 10% decline in skill differences with industrialized countries after 1995 resulted in a 3.6% increase in inbound stocks from the average parent nation.