Price,Programming and Potential Competition in US Cable Television Markets

Potential competition in the US cable television industry is empirically examined for 385 markets. Predicted entry probabilities are included in a supply-demand model to permit empirical investigation of the effect of potential competition on incumbent cable operators price and channel programming decisions. Estimation results show incumbents offer more channels to consumers in markets facing greater potential competition from broadband service provider (BSP) wireline overbuilders and/or incumbent local exchange carriers. In particular, when the probability of entry rises to about 42 the average cable system provides six more channels, and price per channel declines from US$ 0.77 to US$ 0.66.JEL Classification: L8, L9, L11We thank Ben Compaine, Shane Greenstein, Anne Hoag, Donald Waldman, Bradley Wimmer, the editor of this journal, an anonymous referee, and participants at the 30th Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC 2002), September 28–30, 2002, Hilton Hotel, Alexandria, Virginia, for comments. Armando Galarraga and Nana Puangpathumanond provided research assistance, and Jane Frenette and Jonathan Levy provided excellent help with FCC cable entry and competition data. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Gender, Labor Markets and Welfare States

Books reviewed:
Review of Gender and the Labor Market: Econometric Evidence of Obstacles to Achieving Gender Equality , edited by Siv Gustafsson and Danièle Meulders; and Gender and the Welfare State: Care, Work and Welfare in Europe and the USA , by Mary Daly and Katherine Rake Reviewed by Martha MacDonald     

Welfare Effects of Transparency in Foreign Exchange Markets: the Role of Hedging Opportunities

The paper studies the impact of more transparency on the risk‐sharing opportunities in the foreign exchange market and the associated implications on ex ante welfare. Transparency is measured in this model by the informational content of publicly observable signals about exchange rate developments. The authors find that in this model more transparency improves welfare in economies that are poorly endowed with capital and/or where investors are not very risk‐averse, while welfare is reduced in economies with large capital endowments and/or where investors are highly risk‐averse.     

Incomplete Markets, Transitory Shocks, and Welfare

Although equilibrium allocations in models with incomplete markets are generally not Pareto-efficient, it is often argued that quantitative welfare losses from missing assets are small when time horizons are long and shocks are transitory. In this paper we use a computational analysis to show that even in the simplest infinite horizon model without aggregate uncertainty welfare losses can be substantial. Furthermore we show that in this model welfare losses from incomplete markets do not necessarily disappear when one considers calibrations of the model in which agents become very patient. We argue that when the economic model is calibrated to higher frequency data, the period persistence of negative income shocks must increase as well. In this case the welfare loss of incomplete markets remains constant even as agents' rate of time preference tends to one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D58, D60.     

Market Power and Welfare in Electricity Markets Employing Tradable Green Certificate Systems

Within the last 25 years, liberalization (deregulation) of electricity markets around the world has been undertaken with the goal of replacing long-standing monopoly rights with fully competitive markets. In addition, many nations have begun employing “tradable green certificate” systems to promote electricity generation from renewable (“green”) energy sources (wind, solar, biomass, hydroelectric, etc.), with the primary objective of mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel (“black”) producers. In this paper, we examine some welfare implications of the use of green certificate systems in electricity markets under alternative market structures. We demonstrate that under a wide variety of scenarios, an oligopolistic market structure may perform better in terms of welfare than a competitive market structure. We also demonstrate that there will typically be an optimal level of market power summarized by a conjectural variations parameter that depends on the cost structure of both green and black firms. Our model provides insights into the policy challenge of electricity market design and suggests an approach that could be applied in a more general model.     

Heterogeneous Mortgage Markets: Implications for Business Cycles and Welfare in the EMU

This paper evaluates business cycle effects of asymmetric cross‐country mortgage market developments in a monetary union. By employing a two‐country New Keynesian DSGE model with collateral constraints tied to housing values, we show that a change in institutional characteristics of mortgage markets, such as the loan‐to‐value (LTV) ratio, is an important driver of asymmetric developments in housing markets and economic activity. Our analysis suggests that the home country where credit standards are lax booms, while the rest of European Monetary Union faces a negative output gap. Overall welfare is lower if LTV ratios are higher.     

The Second Welfare Theorem in Economies with Non‐Walrasian Markets

The standard version of the second welfare theorem assumes that market operations produce Walrasian outcomes. Therefore, if there are individuals who can manipulate prices, the conclusion of the second welfare theorem is questionable. In this paper, we address the decentralization of a Pareto‐optimal allocation, when markets are non‐Walrasian. Our objective in this paper is to develop a game which can implement Pareto‐optimal allocations as Nash equilibria of strategic exchange in markets. In this way, we develop a version of the second welfare theorem for economies where markets are strategic.     

Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.     

Must Carry Regulations for Cable Television Systems: An Empirical Analysis

The 1992 Cable Act requires cable systems to carry local broadcasters. Noncarriage of local stations may represent an attempt by cable systems to disadvantage rivals, and thereby raise the prices of advertising and cable service. Alternatively, noncarriage might represent the efficient replacement of low-valued channels with more highly-valued programming. This study attempts to discriminate between these hypotheses with data on cable carriage decisions. The results support the efficiency hypothesis. Systems selling advertising are less likely to drop local stations than nonadvertisers. Dropped stations tend to have low audience ratings, and tend to originate in a different geographic market from the system.     

出口补贴与反补贴对国民福利影响的经济分析

2008年,在全球性金融危机以后,各国政府为增加就业,先后颁布了很多新的出口刺激计划,补贴与反补贴有所增加。分析了补贴与反补贴对国民经济福利的影响,主要的结论是补贴措施与反补贴措施都会导致国民经济总福利的下降,也从集体行动的角度分析了导致福利水平下降的贸易政策为什么会在民主国家实施的问题。     

Tradeable Emission Permits Regulations in the Presence of Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets: Welfare Implications

In the present paper, we analyse the interaction of a competitive market for emission permits with an oligopolistic product market. It is well known that a competitive permits market achieves the cost minimizing distribution of abatement effort among the polluting firms for a given reduction in emissions. However, when the product market is oligopolistic, it may redistribute production inefficiently among firms. It has been suggested that this inefficiency can outweigh the gains obtained from using emission permits instead of command and control. Although this argument is clearly correct under full information, it is shown in the present paper that it reverses under incomplete information. In particular, it is shown that when tradeable emission permits are specified according to the standard textbook example, they yield higher social welfare than the command and control regulation.     

价格歧视战略与福利效应分析

在完全竞争市场条件下 ,竞争均衡可实现帕累托最优效率。垄断市场一般很难提供价格等于边际成本的产量水平 ,其产量与价格选择对社会来说不是最优的。垄断厂商以内生范畴和外生范畴为基础对消费者进行分类 ,使得价格歧视成为一种可行战略。由于定价策略存在差异 ,不同类型的价格歧视便具有不同的福利效应。     

关税、走私和福利效应

本文旨在通过构建开放经济条件下中国走私的均衡分析框架,以期探求：存在走私实际成本时,走私者行为如何决定,以及引入政府反走私行动、关税税率上升等外生冲击后,走私相关效应如国民福利效应将发生怎样变化？     

On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets

In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that, as the number of firms increases, the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to (i) decreasing industry price and increasing or decreasing per-firm output; and (ii) increasing industry price (and decreasing per firm output.) In both cases, per-firm profits are decreasing.
The analysis relies crucially on lattice-theoretic methods and yields general, unambiguous and easily interpretable conclusions of a global nature. As a byproduct of independent interest, new insight into the existence of Cournot equilibrium is developed.     

Global Distortions to Agricultural Markets: Indicators of Trade and Welfare Impacts, 1960 to 2007

Despite recent reforms, world agricultural markets remain highly distorted by government policies. Traditional indicators of those price distortions such as producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) can be poor guides to the policies' economic effects. Recent theoretical literature provides scalar index numbers of trade‐ and welfare‐reducing effects of price and trade policies which this paper builds on to develop more‐satisfactory indexes that can be generated using no more than the data used to generate PSEs and CSEs. We then exploit a new Agricultural Distortion database to provide time‐series estimates of index numbers for 75 developing and high‐income countries over the past half‐century.     

Migration Effects of Welfare Benefit Reform

This study tests for a migration response to the implementation of stricter rules for receiving welfare benefits (means-tested social assistance for individuals who lack sufficient work-related income), in the form of mandatory participation in activation programmes in Stockholm town districts. The results give no indications that activation programmes affect the moving choices of recipients of welfare benefits.     

Welfare Effects of Commodity Taxation in Cournot Oligopoly

In the context of Cournot oligopoly with possibly asymmetric costs, this paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a small specific tax and a small ad valorem tax to increase total surplus. The paper also shows that a shift from a small specific tax to a small ad valorem tax, leaving the tax revenue unchanged, increases the total surplus.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, H21, L13.     

The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation

Recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting. This question has mainly been addressed indirectly, by asking whether the second-best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate. Even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly, comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first-best value, marginal social damage (MSD). On closer examination, however, MSD becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second-best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the Pigouvian rate. Given these observations, the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first-best value, the second-best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements. Even in cases where the second-best environmental tax is lower than its first-best value, the welfare gains may be greater than in a first-best setting. These results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit (revenue recycling effect) exceeds the marginal fiscal cost (tax base effect) over a range of environmental tax rates that, for benchmark models, extends above the first-best Pigouvian rate. These findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods.     

Welfare Effects of Tariff Reduction Formulas

World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations rely on tariff reduction formulas. Formula approaches are of increasing importance in trade talks, because of the large number of countries involved, the wider dispersion in initial tariffs (e.g. tariff peaks), and gaps between bound and applied tariff rates. This paper presents a two country intra‐industry trade model with heterogeneous firms subject to high and low tariffs. We examine the welfare effects of applying three different tariff reduction formulas discussed in the literature that were used and proposed in previous and current General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO negotiations (1) a proportional cut, (2) the Swiss formula and (3) a tiered formula. No single formula dominates for all conditions. The ranking of the three tools depends on the degree of product differentiation in the industry and the achieved reduction in the average tariff.     

The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes

This paper computes the change in welfare associated with the introduction of incentives. We calculate by how much the welfare gains of increased output due to incentives outweigh workers' disutility from increased effort. We accomplish this by studying the use of incentives by a firm in the check-clearing industry. Using this firm's production records, we model and estimate the worker's dynamic effort decision problem. We find that the firm's incentive scheme has a large effect on productivity, raising it by 12% over the sample period for the average worker. Using our parameter estimates, we show that the cost of increased effort due to incentives is equal to the dollar value of a 5% rise in productivity. Welfare is measured as the output produced minus the cost of effort; hence, the net increase in the average worker's welfare due to the introduction of the firm's bonus plan is 7%. Under a first-best scheme, we find that the net increase in welfare is 9%.