Can rational individuals keep money under their mattresses forever?

Summary Conditions are given for an infinite horizon consumption-savings model under which savings are bounded away from 0 with probability 1 even in the long-run. That is, with probability 1 there exists a timeT and a minimum level of savingsS such fort > T savings will always be greater thanS. I would like to thank Graziella Bertocchi, Oded Galor, Basilis Gidas, Gil Skillman, David Weil and seminar participants at Brown University. I am also very grateful to an anonymous referee for many useful suggestions.     

An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems

We consider the problem of selecting alternatives from a set of feasible alternatives over which each agent is endowed with a strict preference. We show that there is one and only one rule that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, efficiency, tops-only, and reinforcement. The rule is known as plurality rule, which selects the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number of agents. I would like to thank William Thomson for helpful suggestions and discussions. I am grateful to Biung-Ghi Ju, Hyungjun Kim, and Yan-An Hwang for detailed comments. I am also indebted to the Editor and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions. As usual, I am responsible for any remaining deficiency.     

Floating exchange rates versus a monetary union under rational beliefs: the role of endogenous uncertainty

Using the concept of ex-post optimality, we compare different exchange rate regimes, including floating exchange rates and fixed exchange rates with a Monetary Union in a two country OLG model with stochastic endowments. The emphasis of this comparison is on the welfare consequences of agents having incorrect beliefs. We do not assume that agents can hold any beliefs, but rather that their beliefs are rational that is consistent with the observed empirical behavior of the economy. We study a large set of possible policies, but two of them have our particular interest. The first policy implies devaluations in reaction to a negative shock, while the other implies a fixed exchange rate. These policies have very different consequences. The first will for generic beliefs not result in an ex-post optimal allocation. The other policy is on the other hand always feasible and results in an ex-post optimal allocation. When the two countries form a Monetary Union, the ex-post optimal allocation is also achieved. The meaning of “endogenous uncertainty” as an institutionally induced uncertainty is illustrated. Received: September 1, 2001; revised version: 24 June 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Horace W. Brock, Gianluca Cassese, Paula Orlando, Ho-Mou Wu as well as seminar participants at Copenhagen Business School, ESEM98, Keio University, Kyoto University, Osaka University, SITE (Stanford) and University of Copenhagen for many useful comments on the paper. I am also grateful to Mark J. Garmaise, Takako Fujiwara-Greve, and an anonymous referee for many helpful suggestions for improving the paper. Without the many discussions about Rational Beliefs and related issues I have had with Mordecai Kurz over the years, the research presented here would not have been possible. Financial support from The Carlsberg Foundation, Danish Social Research Council, University of Copenhagen and SITE is gratefully acknowledged.     

Is Kreps-Porteus utility distinguishable from intertemporal expected utility?

Summary In a Lucas (1978) model, with a Kreps-Porteus (1978) nonexpected utility, the following property of equilibrium holds generically in the space of finite-state, Markov output growth rate processes: equilibrium price of equity is distinct from that implied by any intertemporally additive expected utility satisfying specified regularity conditions. In that sense the more general utility functions are observationally distinguishable from the standard expected utility specification.I would like to thank Larry G. Epstein for posing to me the problem studied in this paper and for many suggestions and comments. I am also grateful to Darrell Duffie for helpful suggestions. I am responsible for errors. This papers is part of my Ph.D. thesis at University of Toronto.     

Herd behaviour as an incentive scheme

Summary. We consider a set-up in which firms sequentially adopt a technology. The technology is a public good. Late movers, upon observing the early movers adopting the old technology, (partly) infer that the new technology does not exist. This hampers their incentives to innovate. Early movers anticipate this and rather exert effort to try to invent the new technology. Hence, in our model herding reduces free-rider problems and may - in the presence of switching costs - even increase efficiency.Received: 20 June 2002, Revised: 26 May 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D83, D82, D62.I am very grateful to my thesis advisor Mathias Dewatripont for his many helpful suggestions. I thank seminar participants at ECARES, DELTA, IAE, GREMAQ and WZB. I also benefited from comments made by A.Banerjee, P.Bolton, M.Castanheira, J.Gyntelberg, P.Legros, G.Roland, M.Ruckes, X.Vives, J.Zwiebel and an anonymous referee. I gratefully acknowledge financial assistance provided by the European Commission through its TMR program (Contract number FMRX-CT98-0203) and from the Inter University Poles of Attraction Program (Contract PAI P4/28). Finally, I am also very grateful to M.Castanheira for his many encouragements at the start of my research work.     

On the Non-Existence of Redundant Options

In a seminal paper, Ross (Q J Econ 90:75–89, 1976) shows that if security markets are resolving, then there exist (non-redundant) options that generate complete security markets. Complementing his work, Aliprantis and Tourky (2002) show that if security markets are strongly resolving and the number of primitive securities is less than half the number of states, then every option is non-redundant. Our paper extends Aliprantis and Tourky’s result to the case when their condition on the number of primitive securities is not imposed. Specifically, we show that if there exists no binary payoff vector in the asset span, then for each portfolio there exists a set of exercise prices of full measure such that any option on the portfolio with an exercise price in this set is non-redundant. Since the condition that there exists no binary payoff vector in the asset span holds generically, redundant options are thus rare. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. Research support from the School of Business at The George Washington University is gratefully acknowledged     

Policy consequences of limited cognitive ability

This paper analyses the welfare effects of price restrictions on private contracting in a world where agents have a limited cognitive ability. We deal with that by assuming that people compute the costs and benefits of entering a transaction with an error. We first discuss an example of an auction that will attract the least efficient buyers, because these are those who have made the largest mistake. We then study the case for government intervention when the government knows the distribution of true costs and benefits as well as that of errors. By imposing constraints on transaction prices, the government eliminates some that are on average inefficient - because the price signals that one of the parties has typically grossly overestimated its benefit from participation. This policy may increase aggregate welfare even though some of the transactions being blocked are actually efficient.JEL Classification: D81, J38, K31Gilles Saint-Paul: This paper is based on my Spanish Economic Review lecture at the Spanish Economic Association meeting, Salamanca, December 2002. I am grateful to the organizers for inviting me, and to participants and especially Juan Dolado for their useful comments.     

Hysteresis in economic relationships: An overview

I am grateful for helpful comments to G. Heidbrink, J. Möller, H.J. Ramser, W. Scheremet, and W. Smolny (University of Konstanz).     

Normative judgments and spontaneous order: The contractarian element in Hayek's thought

This paper explores the apparent tension between Hayek's moral skepticism and his role as a defender of liberal institutions. It looks at Hayek's concept of spontaneous order, and asks whether there are any grounds for claiming that spontaneous orders have moral value. The argument from group selection is considered but rejected. Hayek is interpreted as putting most weight on arguments which show, for specific orders (such as the market and common law) that their rules assist each individual in the pursuit of his or her ends, whatever those ends may be. It is suggested that this form of argument is contractarian in character. However, Hayek's contractarianism is distinctive in that it looks for agreement among individuals within an ongoing social order, rather than among rational agents who stand outside any particular society. This paper was written while I was a Visiting Scholar at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University; I am very grateful for the Center's support. An early version was presented at the Friedrich August von Hayek Memorial Symposium in Freiburg, in June 1993. In revising the paper, I have benefited from the comments of the participants at that symposium.     

On justifying a minimum welfare state

Since anarchy is not viable, limited government is the best that the realistic libertarian can hope for. But limited government will itself always be threatened by an inherent tendency to transgress its limits. In modern western societies the regulatory and redistributive welfare state is the major threat to a constitution of liberty. However, a “minimum welfare state” which redistributes personal income among its citizens may comply with the same principles of individual liberty and the rule of law that are embodied in the protective state. Since any state, including the minimal state, necessarily incorporates regulation and redistribution and thus is a welfare state of sorts the non-anarchist liberal should turn against welfare state privileges rather than against redistribution and regulation per se. He may even have good reason to go beyond the minimal state to found a “minimum welfare state” if this is instrumental in securing liberty under the rule of law. I am grateful to the Center for the Study of Public Choice, George Mason University for hospitality both during the period in which this paper was written and on other occasions. I am deeply indebted to the people at the Center for their criticisms and comments. As far as this paper is concerned Geoffrey Brennan's and Richard Wagner's comments were particularly helpful. I should also like to acknowledge helpful oral comments from Kevin Mulligan and Philip van Parijs, who of course is much more of an expert on demogrant schemes than I am. I also wish to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. The general caveat applies.     

Regulating Service Quality: A Survey

This article reviews the major insights of the economics literature regarding the design of service quality regulation in public utility industries. The focus is on generic service quality issues of primary relevance in the industries, which include the electricity, telecommunications, and water industries. The instruments that public utility regulators commonly employ and the manner in which the regulators employ the instruments to secure desirable levels of service quality are emphasized.JEL classification: L51, L15I am grateful to Mark Armstrong, Sanford Berg, Michael Crew, Lynne Holt, Mark Jamison, Lilia Perez-Chavolla, Paul Sotkiewicz, Dennis Weisman, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Predicting the pattern of international trade in the neoclassical model: a synthesis

I propose a framework that takes a set of conceivable outcomes as the primitive and a prediction is defined by identifying a subset on the set of conceivable outcomes. This notion of predictability serves as an organizing principle for characterizing pattern of trade predictions in single economy and integrated equilibrium formulations of the neoclassical trade model. I identify allocative efficiency as the unifying subset selection criterion for the different formulations of the neoclassical trade model, ranging from Ricardo’s (in Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, reprinted by J. M. Dent, London, in Everyman’s library, 1817) original comparative advantage formulation to the multi-cone Heckscher–Ohlin specification with multiple countries, goods and factors. I am grateful to comments from Jim Anderson, Chris Starmer, Catia Montagna, Peter Neary, two anonymous referees, as well as participants at the June 2007 GEP Conference on ‘New Directions in International Trade Theory’. I am grateful for financial support from NSF research grant SES-0452991 and from Leverhulme Trust Programme grant F114/BF.     

Classical economics and the Great Irish Famine:A study in limits

The Great Irish Famine resulted from two massive failures: the blight that destroyed the potato crop and the non-interventionism of the English government. The first failure, which also occurred in other European countries, was devastating for the Irish who depended on the potato as their main source of nourishment. The second failure was a human failure because English government policy was instructed by classical economics to let the market clear the surplus population from the land and was reinforced by the anti-Irish racism common in England at the time, even among classical economists, notably Nassau Senior and J.S. Mill. For most of the 19th century, the English answer was to ignore the hate and crush the crime which [the land system] produced. In the forty years before 1870 forty-two Coercion Acts were passed. During the same period there was not a single statute to protect the Irish peasant from eviction and rack-renting.—Winston Churchill, The Great Democracies,p. 343. It is commonplace in economic research to assume that the investigator has removed all traces of personal values from his/her work. As Becker (1961, p. 10) implies, that could be a serious error. For that reason, let me state at the outset that I am a first-generation Irish-American, holding dual citizenship in the United States and the Republic of Ireland. My mother and father both were born and raised in County Mayo—the poorest county in western Ireland, where the toll in human lives lost during the Great Famine was staggering. I do not know how many of my own Irish ancestors suffered and died during the Great Famine. What I do know and acknowledge is that my selection of this topic clearly is related to that family background which also very likely influenced the way I have interpreted the evidence presented herein. I concede that someone else sifting through the evidence might come to different conclusions, but I know of no other way to proceed. Supportive comments by Hans Jensen and Peter Danner on earlier drafts are gratefully acknowledged, as are the suggestions made by the editor and an anonymous referee. Any remaining errors are entirely mine.     

The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games

Summary For a class of infinite signaling games, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies of finite approximating games converge to equilibrium strategies of the infinite game. This proves the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for that class of games. It is well known that in general, equilibria may not exist in infinite signaling games.I am very grateful to Karl Iorio with whom I derived most of the results in this paper. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors. I am also grateful to Robert Anderson, Debra Aron, Eddie Dekel, Raymond Deneckere, Michael Kirscheneiter, Steven Matthews, Roger Myerson, Daniel Vincent and Robert Weber for comments on previous drafts of this paper.     

Arrow's equivalency theorem in a model with neoclassical firms

Summary. In this paper we consider a two-period general equilibrium model with uncertainty and real assets as financial instruments. The novelty of the analysis is that real assets are the stocks of neoclassical firms, so that both returns and yields depend on anticipated spot goods prices (and, of course, the yield matrix may change rank with prices). Assuming that financial markets are potentially complete, we establish generic existence of financial equilibrium and prove that there exists a dense set of economies such that financial equilibria are efficient.Received: 19 April 2001, Revised: 23 April 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C60, D51, G10, D60.I am extremely grateful to Dave Cass for drawing my attention to this problem and inspiring me to work on it as well as for many stimulating discussions. I also benefited from discussions with H. Polemarchakis, M. Stinchcombe, and A. Villanacci. I am thankful to the anonymous referee of the first versions of the paper for thoughtful comments and suggestions, and to participants of a recruiting seminar at the University of Texas at Austin (January 2001), the Conference on Economic Design SED 2000, Istanbul, Turkey (June 2000), and Inter-University Student Conference, New York University, New York (May 2000).     

The common law process: Efficiency or order?

The common law applies to conflicts not covered by statutes or the U.S. Constitution. Because constitutional law and common law are applicable (common) to all members of the community, they both confront aggregation problems of the sort discussed by Buchanan and Arrow. p ]Recent writings in law and economics view the common law as an efficient process that promotes the evolution of efficient rules through an auction-like mechanism. Because the common law applies to all individuals, however, the auction analogy fails to cope with the problem of aggregating preferences. Moreover, the belief that the efficiency of the common law is enhanced by assigning disputed rights so as to lower transaction costs is also flawed. The common law provides a form of unanimity by allowing individuals to contract around the rule and provides order by maintaining transitivity, through the use of precedent, in the application of the rule to new situations. The authors thank Terry L. Anderson, Peter H. Aranson, Thomas E. Borcherding, James M. Buchanan, Henry N. Butler, William R. Dougan, Ross D. Eckert, D. Bruce Johnsen, Michael E. Libonati, Fred S. McChesney, Roger E. Meiners, Timothy J. Muris, Elinor Ostrom, Vincent Ostrom, Paul H. Rubin, Jeffrey E. Stake, Gordon Tullock, Bruce Yandle Jr., Jack Wiseman, and an anonymous referee of thisJournal for helpful comments. De Alessi was Visiting Research Professor, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, during part of the research.     

Decentralizing lottery allocations in markets with indivisible commodities

Summary In economies with indivisible commodities, consumers tend to prefer lotteries in commodities. A potential mechanism for satisying these preferences is unrestricted purchasing and selling of lotteries in decentralized markets, as suggested in Prescott and Townsend [Int. Econ. Rev.25, 1–20]. However, this paper shows in several examples that such lottery equilibria do not always exist for economies with finitely many consumers. Other conditions are needed. In the examples, equilibrium and the associated welfare gains are realized if consumptions are bounded or if lotteries are based upon a common sunspot device as defined by Shell [mimeo, 1977] and Cass and Shell [J. Pol. Econ.91, 193–227]. The paper shows that any lottery equilibrium is either a Walrasian equilibrium or a sunspot equilibrium, but there are Walrasian and sunspot equilibria that are not lottery equilibria.This paper is based on Chapter 3 of my doctoral dissertation, written while I was a student at Cornell University. I thank Larry Blume, Yue Yun Chen, David Easley, Aditya Goenka, John Marshall, Bruce Smith, John Wooders and an anonymous referee. I am particularly grateful to Karl Shell and Cheng-Zhong Qin. I thank the Academic Senate at UCSB for financial support.     

Job and worker flows in high adjustment cost settings

This paper analyses the relationship between the size of adjustment costs and the intensity of labor market flows. I argue that high adjustment costs inhibit adjustment to temporary shocks, leaving adjustment to long-lived shocks unchanged. Worker turnover is also reduced because of the negative impact that adjustment costs have on churning.Received: January 2002, Accepted: November 2002, JEL Classification: J23, J63I am grateful to the FCT for funding this research (research grant Praxis/PCSH/C/CEG/13/96), and to Pedro Portugal, Daniel Hamermesh and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I thank the Department of Statistics at the Ministry of Labor for providing the data. CETE is supported by the FCT.     

Living with ambiguity: prices and survival when investors have heterogeneous preferences for ambiguity

This paper investigates asset prices and the long run wealth of investors in an asset market populated by investors who have heterogeneous preferences over risk and ambiguity. In a dynamic setting I characterize conditions under which investors who are averse to ambiguity will have an effect on long run asset prices. If ambiguity averse investors always believe that the true distribution could be wrong in many possible directions then a necessary condition for their survival is that the market exhibit no aggregate risk, a condition not met by many asset pricing models of interest. However, unlike investors with irrational beliefs, there do exist markets in which ambiguity averse investors survive. I have greatly benefitted from conversations with David Easley, Karl Shell, Ani Guerdjikova, Val Lambson, Kristian Rydqvist, Liyan Yang, Josh Teitelbaum and Jayant Ganguli as well as seminar participants at Cornell University and the Midwest Economic Theory Meetings. I am grateful to the Solomon Fund for Decision Research at Cornell University for support.     

Optimality for controlled jump processes: a simple approach

Summary This note presents a very simple method for deriving the necessary optimality conditions for optimal control of jump (point) processes. By means of Bellman's principle of optimality, the original stochastic control problem is transformed into a simple optimization problem. The derivation is remarkably simpler than the existing ones in the literature.I am grateful to the referee for many useful comments and suggestions. This research was supported in part by the Bradley Foundation and the Hewlett Foundation.