机构持股与中航工业上市公司绩效研究

一般来说,机构投资者持股后会通过参与公司治理提高公司治理水平,公司治理水平的提升则可以改善公司的业绩。文章通过对机构投资者持股后对中航工业上市公司绩效的影响进行简单数据分析,结果表明机构投资者持股比例越高,其持股公司的业绩并不是越好而是呈现出不规则的、混乱的变化趋势。     

机构投资者持股比例与上市公司治理绩效研究

针对机构投资者持股比例与公司绩效之间关系,选取了2005至2010年在沪深两市公开发行A股的上市公司为研究样本,运用多元回归模型进行实证检验,得出以下实证结论:在我国资本市场上,机构投资者整体持股比例与公司绩效成正相关。但是其治理公司的能力并没有得到充分的发挥,这与我国资本市场上机构投资者制度不完善有很大关系。     

中国上市商业银行经营绩效与机构投资者持股的关系研究

本文选取中国16家上市商业银行2007-2013年数据,分析银行经营绩效与机构投资者持股的关系。首先运用股权结构理论,公司治理理论分析机构投资者对上市银行经营的影响机制。其次,构建综合指标衡量银行绩效,运用面板数据实证分析机构投资者持股与银行经营绩效的关系。最后,根据实证分析得出的结论提出发展机构投资者,提高银行经营绩效的政策建议。     

公司绩效与机构投资者持股的政治关联——基于深交所上市公司的经验证据

随着机构投资者的快速发展以及其持股比例与管理规模的不断扩大,在公司治理方面各方越来越关注,也使其成为了资本市场的重要投资主体。根据深交所上市公司2009-2011年的数据,研究发现,相比于非国有公司的机构投资者国有公司的机构投资者持股比例与公司绩效的正相关关系低。     

机构投资者对于我国上市公司财务绩效的影响

随着我国机构投资者的不断发展和壮大,机构投资者在我国股市中的重要性越来越显现出来,机构在公司治理中也发挥着越来越大的作用。本文从机构投资者在上市公司的持股比例与公司财务绩效之间关系的角度出发,探究机构投资是否会对公司财务绩效产生正向影响。     

机构投资者持股、研发投入与企业绩效

随着我国机构投资者数量、规模及影响力的壮大,其公司治理效应日益显著。积极的机构投资者持股能够较好地参与公司治理,会促使企业增加对研发项目的投入,而短期机构投资者只注重短期收益,即机构投资者持股对研发投资也可能没有影响或者有其他影响。机构投资者类型不同会具有不同的行为特征,公司治理效应也将不同,对研发投资的影响也存在差异。由于数据收集口径的不一致,所选取的行业不一样,关于研发投入与企业财务绩效的关系,其实证结果相差较大。     

机构投资者持股与上市公司派现相关性研究

机构投资者能否通过影响公司的财务决策进而影响公司价值,一直是财务学理论界和实务界关注的问题。本文以2009年沪深两市的A股上市公司为样本,分析了机构投资者持股对上市公司派现的影响,检验机构投资者是否在我国公司治理中发挥治理、监督作用。研究结果表明,机构投资者持股比例越高,上市公司派发现金股利水平越高,并且机构投资者持股在一定程度上能够抑制上市公司恶意派现的现象。     

我国上市公司定向增发价格及经营绩效——基于机构投资者参与的实证研究

企业定向增发的对象主要分为大股东和机构投资者,本文通过选取2006~2012年进行定向增发的上市公司为研究样本,分析机构投资者对增发价格折价率的影响及其在解除锁定后持股比例变化对上市公司经营绩效的影响。实证结果证明:有机构投资者参与的定向增发折价率较低;机构投资者持股比例与上市公司的经营绩效存在显著的正相关关系,证明了机构投资者对大股东具有监督制衡的作用。     

异质性机构投资者对企业碳绩效的影响研究——基于A股高耗能上市公司的经验数据

碳绩效能够向企业内外部传递企业减排信息，碳绩效的提高能为公司创造长期竞争优势。根据利益相关者理论和股东积极主义理论，文章以2012—2020年度A股高耗能行业的上市公司为数据样本，运用碳排放数据计量碳绩效来考察企业机构投资者与碳绩效之间的相关关系，并对机构投资者的异质性进一步研究。研究发现：机构投资者持股比例对企业碳绩效具有正向作用；从投资行为的视角分析，压力抵抗型机构投资者正向促进碳绩效，而压力敏感型机构投资者会抑制碳绩效。     

机构投资者与公司业绩的关系——基于2015-2016上市公司数据

目前我国公司"一股独大"、"内部人控制"侵害中小投资者利益问题严重,机构投资者是公认的待验证有效解决机制。本文从股权集中度出发,以2015、2016年沪深上市公司数据为样本,提出机构投资者持股有利于完善公司股权结构、机构投资者持股通过完善公司股权结构提高公司业绩假设,证明机构投资者通过改善公司股权结构促进了公司业绩增长,在一定程度上能有效改善"一股独大"及"内部人控制"的问题,保护中小投资者利益,提高公司运营效率与业绩。由此提出大力发展机构投资者、遏制投机行为、构建机构投资者主导治理的建议。     

Institutional Ownership and Corporate Investment Performance

This paper examines the role of institutional investors in improving firm performance through the channel of corporate investment decisions. We find that the interaction effect between institutional ownership and capital expenditures is significantly related to firm performance. We examine this relationship for different types of institutional investors, and find that investment advisors are most effective monitors in improving firm performance through corporate investment. Moreover, we find that the monitoring role of institutional investors becomes more important when internal governance is weak. Institutional ownership and other forms of corporate governance mechanisms (including CEO incentive compensation and control, shareholder right provisions, and board of director monitoring) operate as substitutes, rather than complements, in improving capital expenditure decisions. Copyright © 2012 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于投资者情绪的定向增发折扣信号博弈模型研究

定向增发是股权再融资手段之一,具有成本低、程序灵活等特点,但许多定增股份的长期市场表现却差强人意。大量统计研究表明,投资者的盲目乐观是定增股份长期市场表现差的主因。针对投资者情绪演化机制,本文将定增投资者积极表现和消极表现设定为信号,将高、低发行折扣率设定为定增企业策略,构建了基于投资者情绪的投资者和定增企业信号博弈模型,通过分析四种贝叶斯Nash均衡路径及企业商誉收益,推论出了投资者情绪的演化机理。研究发现:积极表现并不意味着投资者属于高情绪型,也可能是定增资格驱动下的积极伪装;在高期望商誉收益影响下,定增企业倾向给予高发行折扣率,不再关注投资者情绪类型;定增企业对长期商誉的轻视是金融异象的主要成因,并可能扰乱投资者整体情绪,对定增市场产生较大负面影响。     

Institutional Ownership and Private Equity Placements: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

This paper examines the impact of institutional ownership on the performance of private equity placements (PEPs) for listed firms in China. We find that the presence of institutional investors can alleviate the information asymmetries between listed firms and the market. The market reaction to PEP announcements is significantly smaller if there is a higher portion of institutional shareholdings. Long‐term firm operational performance after PEPs is positively correlated with institutional shareholdings. Moreover, we find that the relationship between institutional shareholdings and PEP performance is mainly driven by nonlisted corporate investors and mutual funds. Finally, the relationship between PEP performance and institutional shareholdings is stronger in smaller PEP issuers.     

试论我国机构投资者参与上市公司治理

随着我国机构投资者的兴起 ,如何有效地参与到上市公司治理之中 ,成为一个非常迫切的问题。分析机构投资者和上市公司治理的现状、参与公司治理的外部环境及内在动因和决策支持模型 ,并对引导机构投资者积极参与公司治理的具体措施等方面进行探讨     

Institutional Investors,Political Connections,and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud

We investigate two under-explored factors in mitigating the risk of corporate fraud and regulatory enforcement against fraud, namely institutional investors and political connections. The role of institutional investors in the effective monitoring of a firm’s management is well established in the literature. We further observe that firms that have a large proportion of their shares held by institutional investors have a lower incidence of enforcement actions against corporate fraud. The importance of political connections for enterprises, whether in a developed market such as the United States or an emerging market such as China, has been established by previous studies. However, we find evidence of another positive effect of political connections: they may reduce the incidence of enforcement action against corporate fraud. We also find that political connections play a more significant role in reducing regulatory enforcement incidents against non-state-owned enterprises and firms in weaker legal environments, whereas institutional ownership plays a more important role in reducing regulatory enforcement incidents against state-owned enterprises.     

基于机构投资者参与公司治理结构的研究

由于机构投资者能够有效地解决上市公司治理机制中个人投资者监督成本内化和收益外化的"搭便车"的现象,从而决定了机构投资者本身就是一种解决企业监控难题的制度。不同性质的机构投资者在证券市场中的功能定位、市场空间和实际作用的不同,完全可以考虑以机构投资者的多元化对企业内部控制和外部控制所能产生的市场互补和功能整合效应,来充分发挥机构投资者在公司治理中的作用。     

Institutional investors in Bulgarian corporate governance reform: obstacles or facilitators?

Institutional investors can play a special role in corporate governance reform given their dual status as both objects and subjects of corporate governance. In transition economies these investors can turn into an obstacle to good governance practices because of inconsistency of their strategy with the reform goals, internal mechanisms of corporate control precluding equitable treatment of shareholders, and serious problems with transparency and disclosure. The expected positive role of institutional investors as subjects of corporate governance may be problematic if they adopt a strategy of accommodation with the anti-reform status quo.     

Does Institutional Blockholder Short‐Termism Lead to Managerial Myopia? Evidence from Income Smoothing

We examine institutional blockholders’ influence on income‐smoothing practices in the Korean market, which provides an interesting setting where family‐oriented chaebols dictate the corporate landscape and impede shareholder activism. The empirical results reveal that institutional shareholders with a short‐term (long‐term) investment horizon facilitate (constrain) managerial myopia. This positive (negative) association is most evident among firms with domestic institutional investors. Therefore, we argue that the presence of domestic institutional investors with transient investment goals incentivizes firms’ management to smooth out earnings.     

Business and Government Ethics in the “New” and “Old” EU: An Empirical Account of Public–Private Value Congruence in Slovenia and the Netherlands

This article studies how financial investors respond to firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance in terms of their investing behaviors, and how such behaviors change contingent on an event that provokes their attention and concerns to CSR. Using the melamine contamination incident in China as a natural experiment, it is found that neither the individual investors’ nor the institutional investors’ behaviors are influenced by firms’ CSR performance before the incident. Nevertheless, in the post-event period, institutional investors’ behaviors are significantly influenced by firms’ CSR performance that exceeds a certain threshold. Furthermore, such an effect diminishes for a better CSR performance. In comparison, the authors do not find any effects of CSR performance on individual investors, either before the event or after the event. Finally, firms’ performance and investors’ behaviors jointly affect firms’ stock returns after the event but not before the event. This article reconciles the mixed findings in the literature on the effect of firms’ CSR performance on their financial performance by showing that such an effect exists in a contingent manner. Furthermore, the authors show that a too low or a too high CSR performance could lead to undesirable responses from investors. Therefore, managers should pay attention to optimizing firms’ CSR activities.