Do central bank foreign exchange interventions affect market expectations?

The aim of this article is to study the impact of the Brazilian central bank swap interventions on the FX market from 2006 to 2013. In this period, these nontraditional interventions were the main FX instrument of the Brazilian Government. Since the central bank operates through a sequence of daily interventions in most of the period, we employ the event study method, which is appropriate to investigate cumulative impact of intervention episodes. We analyse the effects on the risk neutral distribution of BRL-USD exchange rate, which incorporates economic valuation besides the likelihoods. We investigate both changes in level and in the dynamics of the moments. Our tests indicate that interventions have little effects on the exchange rate distribution. We only find evidences of some impact on the dynamics of the mean, volatility and skewness over long horizons when the central bank takes short positions on the exchange rate.     

Do central bank law reforms affect the term in office of central bank governors?

In this paper we confirm the hypothesis that central bank independence reforms reduce the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. However, the strength of this effect depends on the rule of law and the degree of political polarization.     

Do central banks respond to exchange rate movements? Some new evidence from structural estimation

This paper investigates the impact of exchange rate movements on the conduct of monetary policy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. We develop and estimate a structural general equilibrium model, in which monetary policy is represented as a simple rule and exchange rate pass‐through is incomplete due to the presence of local currency pricing and distribution services. We find that the Bank of Canada, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and the Bank of England have not adjusted interest rates in response to exchange rate movements since the adoption of inflation targeting, while our model selection results for Australia are less clear.     

Conservative central banks: how conservative should a central bank be?

Using Rogoff's, 1985 model, we determine how inflation averse a central banker should be, given the level of volatility and projected output gap in the economy. We confirm a strong degree of conservatism, almost twice what society would have chosen. But, for a range of developing countries and the OECD, economies that systematically experience higher levels of output volatility would do best to hire a central banker who is more inflation averse than society, but less so than in stable developed economies. Thus, while a conservative central banker remains desirable, the trade‐off is with output volatility rather than with the output gap itself.     

Do central banks act asymmetrically? Empirical evidence from the ECB and the Bank of England

The paper attempts to exploit whether monetary authorities have a different behaviour during recession and expansion. To this end, a multivariate extension of Hamilton Markov-switching model is adopted. First, regime dependent Taylor-type rules are estimated for the Euro Area and the United Kingdom in order to capture the systematic behaviour of central banks. Then, impulse response functions that account for the different phases of the business cycle are analysed. In addition, a comparative analysis concerning the estimated rules as well as the different reaction of real economy to monetary shocks is implemented. The study strongly suggests that central banks cannot neglect the regime where the monetary action takes place. It follows that the phase of business cycle is an important matter in monetary policy decision process.     

How have inflation-targeting central banks responded to supply shocks?

This paper examines how inflation-targeting central banks have responded to supply shocks, based on the sign-restriction VAR approach. It is found that inflation-targeting central banks have become accommodative to adverse supply shocks following the adoption of inflation targeting.     

Do bank bondholders price banks’ ability to manage risk/return?

In this paper, we empirically investigate whether bank bondholders value risk management, measured as risk-return efficiency (RRE), when pricing bond spreads. Based on a sample of 2,452 bonds issued by 78 European listed banks, for the period 2001–2015, we find evidence that the ability of banks to manage risk affects bond spreads: banks with more capable managers obtain a lower cost of debt. In particular our results show that bank bondholders are even more sensitive to RRE during the crisis period, for relatively poorly rated bonds, for unsecured/subordinated debt, and for long maturity debt. Our findings highlight that bondholders’ monitoring of banks is effective and takes into account the efficiency of risk management during financial and economic downturns, but during sound periods bank bondholders should strengthen their monitoring of risk management.     

Do house prices affect campaign contributions?

Individual campaign contributions are the largest source of financing for U.S. presidential and congressional candidates, though the body of research examining why people give remains small. To help understand these decisions, we estimate the causal impact of house prices on donations across campaigns and parties using an instrumental variables strategy. Our results indicate that an increase in house prices increases ZIP code-level donations to Democratic presidential and congressional candidates, with minuscule or no effect for Republican candidates. The effects in areas with a greater proportion of renters are larger than areas with more homeowners. Since this population is likely to experience higher rents as a result of house price increases, this suggests that pleas for policy may inspire giving. Further, areas with the highest fraction of college educated residents also see the largest effects, when compared to less-educated areas, suggesting a wealth effect exists as well.     

Do government owned banks trade market power for slack?

The ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH)’ posits that banks with market power have less incentives to maximize revenues and minimize cost. Especially government owned banks with a public mandate precluding profit maximization might succumb to a quiet life. We use a unified approach that simultaneously measures market power and efficiency to test the quiet life hypothesis of German savings banks. We find that average local market power declined between 1996 and 2006. Cost and profit efficiency remained constant. Nonparametric correlations are consistent with a quiet life regarding cost efficiency but not regarding profit efficiency. The quiet life on the cost side is negatively correlated with bank size, quality of loan portfolio and local per capita income. The last result indicates that the quiet cost life is therefore potentially due to benevolent excess consumption of local input factors by public savings banks.     

How do central banks react to wealth composition and asset prices?

We assess the response of monetary policy to developments in asset markets in the euro area, the US and the UK. We estimate the reaction of monetary policy to wealth composition and asset prices using: (i) a linear framework based on a fully simultaneous system approach in a Bayesian environment; and (ii) a nonlinear specification that relies on a smooth transition regression model.     

Do practice rounds affect experimental auction results?

Researchers use practice rounds to familiarize participants with experimental auction mechanisms. We find a positive correlation between practice bids and bids submitted in later rounds. We consider three explanations for this correlation: a behavioral anchoring effect, a tendency for some auction participants to be more free-spending, and misconception of the experimental auction’s demand revealing qualities.     

Do high grading standards affect student performance?

This paper explores the effects of high grading standards on student test performance in elementary school. While high standards have been advocated by policy-makers, business groups, and teacher unions, very little is known about their effects on outcomes. Most of the existing research on standards is theoretical, generally finding that standards have mixed effects on students. However, very little empirical work has to date been completed on this topic. This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the effects of grading standards, measured at the teacher level. Using an exceptionally rich set of data including every third, fourth, and fifth grader in a large school district over four years, we match students’ test score gains and disciplinary problems to teacher-level grading standards. In models in which we control for student-level fixed effects, we find substantial evidence that higher grading standards benefit students, and that the magnitudes of these effects depend on the match between the student and the classroom. While dynamic selection and mean reversion complicate the estimated effects of grading standards, they tend to lead to understated effects of standards.     

Do banks crowd in business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis

Trustworthiness as a major aspect of business ethics can evolve when it can be signaled. If this is impossible, only opportunistic traders will survive. For the institution of banks, which can guarantee payment, it is investigated whether they can crowd in trustworthiness. The crucial feature is the bank's ability to discriminate between trustworthy and unreliable debtors which, in our model, is formally captured by the probability difference of accepting their respective credit applications.     

Do the central bank actions reduce interest rate volatility?

This paper investigates how Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) actions influence market uncertainty. We consider two kinds of actions: the monetary policy decision about the interest rate target and the pure communication event of this decision published one week later. Unlike related papers, we measure the market uncertainty by the implied volatility extracted from interest rate options. Implied volatility is more suitable than physical volatility to assess economic effects since it encompass market beliefs adjusted by risk. We use an event study approach to evaluate the impact of CBB actions. The results show that both the decisions about the target rate and the communication event reduce the interest rate volatility.     

When does the cost channel pose a challenge to inflation targeting central banks?

In a sticky-price model where firms finance their production inputs, there is both a lower and an upper bound on the central bank's inflation response necessary to rule out the possibility of self-fulfilling inflation expectations. This paper shows that real wage rigidities decrease this upper bound, but coefficients in the range of those on the Taylor rule place the economy well within the determinacy region. However, when there is time-variation in the share of firms who finance their inputs (i.e. Markov-switching) then inflation targeting interest rate rules frequently result in indeterminacy, even if the central bank also targets output. Adding a nominal growth target to the policy rule can often alleviate this indeterminacy and therefore anchor inflation expectations.     

Does ownership concentration affect banks’ credit risk? Evidence from MENA emerging markets

The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of ownership concentration on banks’ credit risk. The study employs a dynamic panel approach using data from 98 banks listed in the 10 Middle East and North African (MENA) emerging stock markets between 2003 and 2016. To better understand the nature of the relationship between ownership concentration and bank credit risk and how this relationship is shaped by the recent financial crisis, we conducted a pre- and postcrisis analysis. Our findings document a positive relationship between ownership concentration and nonperforming loans in the precrisis period, which surprisingly reverses during the postcrisis period. We argue that the reversal of this relationship is driven by changes in controlling shareholders’ risk aversion, behavior, and attitude prompted by the financial crisis. Given that central banks are entrusted with forestalling banks’ failure, incorporating ownership concentration, as a fundamental determinant of banks’ credit risk, is crucial to anticipate future financial calamities. Our findings highlight the gravity of agency problems in emerging MENA markets. Reinforcing firm-level as well as country-level governance mechanisms is crucial to restore a sound banking system, enhance markets’ integrity, and increase investors’ confidence.     

Do non-citizens affect U.S. Congressional elections?

U.S. citizens against immigration argue that immigrants commit voter fraud and skew election outcomes towards progressive candidates. These arguments have increased in number and severity since the Supreme Court ruled in 2013 that states cannot require photo identification from voters. We examine whether the size of the non-citizen population is related to election outcomes. Previous research indicates that non-citizens sway elections in favour of progressive candidates but only in elections where the victory margin is small. We find no evidence of a relationship between non-citizens and vote outcomes. We find evidence that the percent of the population that is non-white is positively related to percent of votes cast for democratic candidates.     

Sovereign credit ratings and central banks: Why do analysts pay attention to institutions?

This paper studies the effect of the governance of modern central banks on the ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies Standard and Poor's and Moody's. Until recently, the rating process was not public. Even still, the factors or precise methodologies used by the agencies remain uncertain and analyst judgment remains important. We argue that, given uncertainty over the future paths of countries, the quality of the central bank governance serves as a useful heuristic for a stable and favorable country trajectory. In particular, the central bank's independence signals that the government is committed to general macroeconomic stability, including debt repayment. Additionally, central bank transparency clarifies who is the principal of the bank and provides information about how the central bank understands the economy and monetary policy. Finally, tensions between the central bank and the government, as reflected by irregular turnover of central bank governors, raise doubts about countries’ future prospects. Empirically, we use a variety of models, including mediation analysis, to ensure that the effect we identify stems from the central bank governance itself, as a heuristic for the future paths of countries, and not the central bank's direct contribution to the macroeconomy, as reflected in the available data.     

Do food standards affect the quality of EU imports?

This paper investigates the relationship between the diffusion of EU standards and product quality upgrading using highly disaggregated import data to the EU in the food industry. Results show that, on average, the diffusion of EU voluntary standards boosts the rate of quality upgrading. However, the results are heterogeneous when moving from primary to processed foods, and from ISO to non-ISO standards.     

Do economic sanctions affect protectionism? Evidence from agricultural support

The objective of this paper is to examine whether economic sanctions contribute to influencing the target countries’ protectionist policies in the agricultural sector. Using pooled mean group estimations in a dynamic heterogeneous panel setting, we find robust empirical evidence that, in the long‐run, economic sanctions decrease agricultural protection in the target counties, and this effect is mitigated by the wealth of the target's economy. However, the relationship is insignificant in the short run. Furthermore, our results also suggest that the impact of sanctions on agricultural protection (a) increases with the severity of economic sanctions, (b) is greater for multilateral sanctions than unilateral sanctions, and (c) is more severe on agricultural protection when sanctions span a longer duration.