Robust central banking under wage bargaining: Is monetary policy transparency beneficial?

We study the role of transparency in an environment of robust monetary policy under wage bargaining. The standard view from the game-theoretical literature is that, with unionised labour markets, monetary policy transparency is unambiguously “bad” (it induces increases in wage and price inflation, unemployment and may lead to higher inflation uncertainty). The empirical literature is instead ambiguous about the macroeconomic effects of transparency. By recasting the earlier theory into a robust monetary policy environment, and focusing transparency on the uncertainty about the preference for price stability, we show that the macroeconomic effects of transparency are more favourable than normally found. The impact on nominal wages, inflation and real variables (real wages and unemployment) is not parameter-free but depends on the public's informedness about this coefficient. The impact on real variables is found to disappear in case unions do not internalise the effect of wage decisions on the economy (i.e. in the case of atomistic unions). Finally, we find that the effect of transparency on inflation uncertainty is more complex than in the standard approach. We show that transparency may have the beneficial effect of reducing inflation variability not only when monetary uncertainty is low (as previously reported), but also when monetary uncertainty exceeds an upper threshold.     

Economic policy uncertainty and real output: evidence from the G7 countries

We use economic policy uncertainty index, and impulse response based test to assess the impact of economic policy-related uncertainty on real economic activity. We use monthly data, over the period from 1985:1 to 2015:3, and impulse response functions to investigate how the economies of the G7 countries respond to positive and negative economic policy uncertainty shocks of different magnitudes. We find that economic policy uncertainty is countercyclical, that the effects of uncertainty shocks increase with size and that the responses of real output to positive and negative economic policy uncertainty shocks are country specific. Our research is important for policymaking and in favour of policies that remove economic uncertainty and its negative effects on the economy. We argue that some control over yellow journalism, a transparent tax system and a set of predictable fiscal and monetary policies can minimize the social costs of economic policy uncertainty.     

ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES

In this paper, we study the impact of central bank opacity on macroeconomic performances in a new Keynesian framework with model uncertainty using robust control techniques. We identify a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to the lack of information about the central bank's preference for robustness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent . We find closed‐form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing the impact of the lack of transparency about the central bank's preferences for robustness. We show that an increased transparency about the central bank's preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond less aggressively to cost‐push shocks, thus reducing the inflation and output gap variability. As a consequence, inflation and output gap are less volatile than under central bank opacity about its preference for robustness.     

A Real Options Approach to Abatement Investments and Green Goodwill

In this paper we adopt the green goodwill argument as to why firms voluntarily invest in abatement capital. We investigate the effects on the abatement investment decision of changes in uncertainty about future green goodwill, competitor abatement investments, regulations, etc., using a real options framework. Our results indicate that increased uncertainty about consumers' willingness to pay for green products in the future discourage voluntary abatement investments. The model also suggests that voluntary abatement investments are promoted by an increased threat of regulation and competitor abatement investments. Furthermore, the benefit-cost ratio of the abatement investment project, at the point where it is optimal to invest, is independent of what regulatory regime (stringent or lenient) the firm operates in. We also conclude that despite the fact that voluntary abatement investment exists, there may still be room for environmental policy.     

Projecting from a Fiction: The Case of Denmark and the Financial Crisis

Institutional and ideational crises are characterised by fundamental uncertainty about the world, and at the same time require swift action on part of decision makers. How do political actors overcome uncertainty to enable collective action? The paper argues that actors use the ideas of the pre-crisis regime and through processes of bricolage seek to fit them to radically different circumstances. This enables action, but it also privileges the actors that benefited from these ideas before the crisis. This helps explain why so relatively few changes to financial regulation are appearing from the recent crisis. The argument is illustrated through the case of financial crisis in Denmark, demonstrating that the Danish authorities used ideas developed since the banking crisis of the 1980s concurring on the discourse that the best solution to the crisis would be a further ‘consolidation' of the sector, that is, fewer small banks and stronger large banks. This shows both the strength and weakness of using old ideas for radically new problems: it enables actors to act in concert, but changes are incremental and the weaknesses of the previous regime may thus live on in the new regime.     

Firm value in commonly uncertain times: the divergent effects of corporate governance and CSR

Economic uncertainty disrupts firms’ ability to create value. Most related literature examines how various organizational characteristics affect value under extreme conditions – the global financial crisis. However, recent work in quantifying economic uncertainty now makes it possible to take a more nuanced approach in investigating the conditions under which this value reduction can be mitigated during more ‘commonly uncertain’ periods. In this paper we analyze the effects of corporate governance mechanisms and social responsibility investments on Tobin’s q across 13 years and 40 countries. Evidence suggests that shareholder-centric corporate governance policies restrict board and executive flexibility during uncertain times, and therefore stifle their ability to react effectively to adverse macroeconomic changes. We also find that CSR initiatives serve as insurance in that they preserve value under uncertainty by acting as a reservoir of social capital.     

The impact of financial regulation on current account balances

Both global imbalances and financial market deregulation feature prominently among the potential causes of the global financial crisis, but they have been largely discussed separately. In this paper, we take a different angle and investigate the relationship between financial market regulation and current account balances, an area for which limited empirical evidence exists. We use a panel of countries over the period 1980–2010 and employ a novel empirical approach which allows us to simultaneously account for model uncertainty, current account persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. We find robust evidence that financial market regulations affect current account balances and that different aspects of these regulations can have opposing effects on the current account. In particular we find that easing bank entry barriers is negatively associated with the current account balance. In contrast, bank privatization and securities market deregulation tend to raise current account balances. Our results also highlight the importance to control for persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. Once we control for these factors, we find robust evidence for a wide range of current account theories in contrast to previous studies accounting for model uncertainty.     

Keynes and probability: An assessment

Abstract

Most interpreters agree that Keynes had a wide-ranging, complex, ‘vision of the world’, which underlies his theoretical contributions. Whenever this is forgotten, as happens in the so-called neoclassical synthesis, not only the original Keynesian spirit goes lost but also, and especially, we lose substantive bricks for our theoretical constructions. The paper considers an important instance of this general rule; namely Keynes's views on the logic of probability, meant as the field concerning human behaviour in an uncertain world (hence connected to, but distinct from, the pure theory of probability, meant as a field of mathematics). The paper begins by recalling the main aspects of the classical and frequentist approaches to probability and the main criticisms they received, pertaining among other things to the limits of their applicability. We then consider Keynes's own views, stressing three aspects: the definition of probability as pertaining to the field of logic, the notion of uncertainty and of the ‘weight of the argument’, the ‘theory of groups’. We then discuss the subjective approach of de Finetti, Ramsey and Savage, and contrast it with Keynes's own views. Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for the interpretation of Keynes's General Theory, and of his attitude towards econometrics.     

Comparing Fuzzy and Probabilistic Approaches to Preference Uncertainty in Non-Market Valuation

In seeking to value environmental amenities and public goods, individuals often have trouble trading off the (vague) good or amenity against a monetary measure. Valuation in these circumstances can best be described as fuzzy in terms of the amenity being valued, perceptions of property rights, and the numbers chosen to reflect values. In this paper, we apply fuzzy logic to contingent valuation, employing a fuzzy clustering approach for incorporating preference uncertainty obtained from a follow-up certainty confidence question. We develop a fuzzy random utility maximization (FRUM) framework where the perceived utility of each individual is fuzzy in the sense that an individual’s utility belongs to each cluster to some degree. The model is then applied to a Swedish survey that elicited residents’ willingness to pay for enhanced forest conservation and to a Canadian survey of agricultural landowners that elicited their willingness to accept compensation for a tree planting program. Both the WTP and WTA measures we obtain using the fuzzy approach are well below those obtained using standard probability methods. Based on goodness of fit measures and Monte Carlo experimentation, a case can be made for using a fuzzy preference approach for modeling preference uncertainty as opposed to incorporating respondent uncertainty within the random utility maximization framework.      

Investment, uncertainty and irreversibility

This paper investigates the irreversibility of investments and the impact this has on the nature of the relationship between investment and uncertainty. The empirical analysis uses firm‐level data and is based on a survey of 210 rice‐milling firms in the Mekong River Delta in Vietnam, which was carried out during the year 2000. We show that uncertainty reduces investment of rice millers in the presence of irreversibility, as is predicted by the real options approach to investment. We do not find evidence that the negative association between uncertainty and investment is influenced by the degree of irreversibility.     

The link between inflation and inflation uncertainty: Evidence from G7 countries

In this paper we adopt the Markov-switching heteroscedasticity model to analyse the inflation series for G7 countries and examine the interaction between inflation rate and its uncertainty over both the short- and long-run. It is found that the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty depends on whether the shock is permanent or transitory. The relationship also differs from country to country. High uncertainty about long-run inflation is associated with a significant positive shift in inflation for Canada, Germany, and Japan. High uncertainty about short-run inflation is associated with a significant positive shift in inflation for Germany and USA, and a significant negative shift in inflation for Canada. The modelling approach employed in this paper is empirically supported by various diagnostics including the Vuong test. We also derive the two components of the variance of inflation forecast for a particular forecast horizon. It is found that the inflation uncertainty increases at all horizons in the middle of 1970s and return to the low level in the middle of 1980s.First version received: June 2001/Final version received: October 2003We would like to thank three anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions.     

Quantifying the uncertainty of long-term macroeconomic projections

We propose a practical approach to measuring the uncertainty of long-term economic projections. The presented method quantifies the uncertainty of economic variables by using simulations from a multivariate unobserved components model in which variables are formulated as sums of stationary and nonstationary components. The method captures the correlations between both the stationary and nonstationary components of the variables and offers a seamless analysis of short- and long-term uncertainty. Experiments on artificial data demonstrate that, despite its simplicity, the method performs fairly well compared with alternative methods in terms of long-term predictive accuracy and coverage.     

Climate Policy Under Uncertain and Heterogeneous Climate Damages

We highlight that uncertainty about climate damages and the fact that damages will be distributed heterogeneously across the global population can jointly be an argument for substantially stricter climate policy even if uncertainty and heterogeneity in isolation are not. The reason is that a given climate risk borne by fewer people implies greater welfare losses. However, these losses turn out to be significant only if society is both risk and inequality averse and if climate damages are highly heterogeneous. We discuss how insurance and self-insurance of climate risk could theoretically mitigate this joint effect of uncertainty and heterogeneity and thus admit weaker climate policy. Insurance provides more efficient risk sharing and self-insurance allows strongly impacted individuals to compensate damages by increasing savings. We first use a simple analytical model to introduce the different concepts and then provide more realistic results from the integrated assessment model DICE.     

The Concept of Trust and the Political Economy of John Maynard Keynes,Illustrated Using Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Democratic Dilemma in Europe

Trust is an issue to which Keynesians and post-Keynesians have paid relatively little attention. However, properly understood it is an aspect of almost all activity, including key elements of socio-economic reality. Without trust, market exchange is at the very least problematic, if not impossible. Moreover, trust is intrinsic to a variety of issues with which Keynes, and subsequent Keynesianism have been concerned. In this paper we provide a general social theory conceptualisation of trust and then set out some of the areas where this concept resonates with the work of Keynes in terms of the role of conventions. Conventions quintessentially involve trust and that trust can be unstable, can be withdrawn and can require rebuilding. We illustrate this with reference to central bank policy and the Bank of England's introduction of Forward Guidance. Exploring the problem of trust in the context of banking also highlights a challenge for the continued relevance of Keynes' work. We now live in a neoliberal world and this provides a quite different context for state intervention than was previously the case. Keynes' work is now an argument for the alternative, and as such it requires more than a technical economic argument, it must also address the problem of trust in state policy-makers. We briefly illustrate the challenge this poses with reference to Europe.     

The choice between multiplicative and additive production uncertainty

When modeling output uncertainty, the multiplicative specification is consistently chosen over the additive form, despite the latter being arguably intuitively more obvious. The rationale for this seems to be that when production risk is the only source of uncertainty, additive uncertainty does not reduce output below the certainty level, while multiplicative uncertainty does. We show that, in the absence of hedging, this result is drastically modified when there is simultaneous price and output uncertainty. In this situation the theoretical implications of the two specifications are sufficiently similar to preclude any a priori choice between the two. Thus the choice between the additive and multiplicative formulations may be dictated by how each performs in empirical analyses.     

Industrial policy and manufacturing targeting in the US: new methodological tools for strategic policy-making

The economic crisis has pushed several countries to adopt selective industrial policies to promote manufacturing and some selected strategic sectors. Despite this new activism, the process of defining strategic targets risks being carried out with poor rigour on a political level, setting governments up for failure. This paper discusses the notion of strategic sector and proposes a new methodology to increase transparency and effectiveness in the identification of what can be defined as ‘strategic’. Focusing on the analysis of the US manufacturing system, we develop a composite indicator – the Strategic Sector Index (SSI) – to rank manufacturing industries on the basis of their strategic significance. Furthermore, we apply an uncertainty analysis methodology to the SSI to evaluate the robustness of the ranking and to minimise the degree of policy-makers’ discretionality in influencing the results.     

Are economic growth and the variability of the business cycle related? Evidence from five European countries

We use a long series of annual data that span over 100 years to examine the relationship between output growth and its uncertainty in five European countries. Using the GARCH methodology to proxy uncertainty, we obtain two important results. First, more uncertainty about output leads to a higher rate of growth in three of the five countries. Second, output growth reduces its uncertainty in all countries except one. Our results are robust to alternative specifications and provide strong support to the recent emphasis by macroeconomists on the joint examination of economic growth and the variability of the business cycle.     

Robustness to strategic uncertainty

We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others. When payoff functions are continuous we show that our criterion is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and we also give sufficient conditions for existence of a robust strategy profile. In addition, we apply the criterion to Bertrand games with convex costs, a class of games with discontinuous payoff functions and a continuum of Nash equilibria. We show that it then selects a unique Nash equilibrium, in agreement with some recent experimental findings.     

Managing Permit Markets to Stabilize Prices

The political economy of environmental policy favors the use of quantity-based instruments over price-based instruments (e.g., tradable permits over green taxes), at least in the United States. With cost uncertainty, however, there are clear efficiency advantages to prices in cases where the marginal damages of emissions are relatively flat, such as with greenhouse gases. The question arises, therefore, of whether one can design flexible quantity policies that mimic the behavior of price policies, namely stable permit prices and abatement costs. We explore a number of “quantity-plus” policies that replicate the behavior of a price policy through rules that adjust the effective permit cap for unexpectedly low or high costs. They do so without necessitating any monetary exchanges between the government and the regulated firms, which can be a significant political barrier to the use of price instruments.     

‘Expected utility / subjective probability’ analysis without the sure-thing principle or probabilistic sophistication

Summary. The basic analytical concepts, tools and results of the classical expected utility/subjective probability model of risk preferences and beliefs under subjective uncertainty can be extended to general event-smooth preferences over subjective acts that do not necessarily satisfy either of the key behavioral assumptions of the classical model, namely the Sure-Thing Principle or the Hypothesis of Probabilistic Sophistication. This is accomplished by a technique analogous to that used by Machina (1982) and others to generalize expected utility analysis under objective uncertainty, combined with an event-theoretic approach to the classical model and the use of a special class of subjective events, acts and mixtures that exhibit almost-objective like properties. The classical expected utility/subjective probability characterizations of outcome monotonicity, outcome derivatives, probabilistic sophistication, comparative and relative subjective likelihood, and comparative risk aversion are all globally robustified to general event-smooth preferences over subjective acts.Received: 4 May 2004, Revised: 4 October 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D81.This paper presents a considerably improved version of the concept of event-differentiability from Machina (1992). An alternative definition has been independently developed by Epstein (1999) in his analysis of the concept of uncertainty aversion. I am grateful to Kenneth Arrow, Mark Durst, Jürgen Eichberger, Daniel Ellsberg, Clive Granger, Simon Grant, Edi Karni, Peter Klibanoff, David Kreps, Duncan Luce, Robert Nau, Uzi Segal, Peter Wakker, Joel Watson and especially Larry Epstein, Ted Groves and Joel Sobel for helpful discussions and comments. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants No. 9209012 and 9870894.