Resource scarcity,technological progress,and stochastic growth

Will shortages of natural resources constrain economic growth? The answer seems yes, as the amount of natural resources on earth is finite. There can, however, be two excuses for this. First, the resource-saving technological progress might undo resource scarcity. Second, at the country level, countries can import resources from other countries. This paper revisits these two excuses. For technology, not all technological progress is resource-saving, and its arrival is unpredictable. For the import argument, at the global level, the world cannot make up for a shortage of natural resources by importing. Moreover, the amount of resources is difficult to forecast. To address these, I construct the open, stochastic two-sector endogenous growth model with exhaustible resources. I then analytically show that the answer is sensitive to the interaction between technology and resource shocks. In some cases, I find that higher resource uncertainty accelerates the expected growth and improves the welfare of agents.     

Why do many resource-rich countries have negative genuine saving?: Anticipation of better times or rapacious rent seeking

We investigate the Hartwick rule for saving of a nation necessary to sustain a constant level of private consumption for a small open economy with an exhaustible stock of natural resources. The amount by which a country saves and invests less than the marginal resource rents equals the expected capital gains on reserves of natural resources plus the expected increase in interest income on net foreign assets plus the expected fall in the cost of resource extraction due to expected improvements in extraction technology. Effectively, depletion is then postponed until better times. This suggests that it is not necessarily sub-optimal for resource-rich countries to have negative genuine saving. However, in countries with different groups with imperfectly defined property rights on natural resources, political distortions induce faster resource depletion than suggested by the Hotelling rule. Fractionalised societies with imperfect property rights build up more foreign assets than their marginal resource rents, but in the long run accumulate less foreign assets than homogenous societies. Hence, such societies end up with lower sustainable consumption and are worse off, especially if seepage is strong, the number of rival groups is large and the country does not enjoy much monopoly power on the resource market. Genuine saving is zero in such societies. However, World Bank genuine saving figures based on market rather than accounting prices will be negative, albeit less so in more fractionalised societies with less secure property rights.     

The pattern of specialization and economic growth: The resource curse hypothesis revisited

This paper explores the relation between countries’ pattern of trade specialization and long-term economic growth. It shows that countries specializing in the export of natural resource based products only fail to grow if they do not succeed in diversifying their economies and export structure. This conclusion follows from an empirical investigation that has three innovative features. First, it uses a dynamic panel data analysis. Secondly, it employs disaggregated trade data sets to elaborate different measures of trade specialization that distinguish between unprocessed and manufactured natural resource products and are informative about the countries’ trade diversification experience, their link to world demand trends and involvement in intra-industry trade. The final innovative aspect of the paper relates to our empirical findings: it is only specialization in unprocessed natural resource products that slows down economic growth, as it impedes the emergence of more dynamic patterns of trade specialization.     

Rapacious Resource Depletion,Excessive Investment and Insecure Property Rights: A Puzzle

For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick rule. The theory suggests that power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consumption and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. Also, adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over-estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving. Since our theory suggests that genuine saving is zero while empirically they are negative in resource-rich, fractionalized countries, we suggest ways of resolving this puzzle.     

Drivers of the real effective exchange rates in high and upper‐middle income countries

This paper revisits the nexus between real effective exchange rate (REER) and total factor productivity (TFP) by controlling for trade openness, financial development and natural resources rents. We use a sample of 60 high‐income and upper‐middle income countries over the period 1995–2015 and employ the GMM estimation framework. Our results advance the empirical knowledge on the drivers of REER by providing robust evidence that the impact of TFP is not uniform across different country clusters. We find that in high‐income countries, increasing productivity causes the REER to depreciate hence becoming more trade competitive while the opposite is true for upper‐middle income countries. Furthermore, financial development and natural resources rents have no meaningful impact in the case of upper‐middle income countries but retain a significant effect in high‐income countries. Trade openness plays a key role in explaining the variation in REER in both country clusters.     

Shared renewable resources and gains from trade under technology standards

Using a two‐country, two‐good model of international trade, we examine gains from trade and strategic interaction in resource management among countries that share renewable resources such as fishery stocks. Two goods are a resource good, which is the harvest of the shared stock, and some other good that may be thought of as manufactures. The productivity of the resource good depends on harvesting technology and the stock level. This paper focuses on technology standards (e.g., restrictions on fishing gears, vessels, areas, and time) over other methods for resource management because they are most commonly implemented in fisheries. Technology standards are modeled as a restriction on the harvesting technology; that is, under strict technology standards, firms exploit resources as if they are using inferior harvesting technology. We show that an opening up of trade may reduce the shared stock and cause steady‐state utility to decrease in a resource‐good importing country and increase in a resource‐good exporting country. Strikingly, when the shared stock is in jeopardy (a high demand for the harvest), steady‐state harvest is maximized after an opening up of trade by what we call multilateral resource management in this paper and both countries gain from trade.     

International trade and terrestrial open-access renewable resources in a small open economy

Abstract .  In this paper, I investigate the effects of trade liberalization and policies on deforestation by extending a small open economy model with open-access renewable resources developed by Brander and Taylor (1997a) . I endogenize the carrying capacity of the resource. I find, unlike Brander and Taylor, that trade liberalization may increase the forest stock in the resource-abundant country and may decrease the forest stock in the resource-scarce country. Moreover, the policies primarily aimed at protecting forests, such as import restrictions by importing countries and forest certification for well-managed forests, may have perverse effects on the forest stock.     

Resource abundance,market size,and the choice of technology

How resource abundance and market size affect the choice of increasing returns technologies is studied in an overlapping‐generations general equilibrium model in which manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition. The model is surprisingly tractable. First, for the steady state, the wage rate, the level of technology, and capital stock are not affected by the amount of natural resources. An increase in the share of agricultural revenue going to natural resources leads to a lower wage rate and firms choose less advanced technologies. Second, an increase in market size increases the equilibrium wage rate, level of technology, and capital stock. Finally, other things equal, a country with a lower endowment of natural resources or a higher market size has a comparative advantage in producing the manufactured good.     

Endogenous trading bloc formation in a North-South global economy

Abstract .  The majority of the trading blocs to date are between similar countries, rather than between developed and developing countries. This paper provides a rationale for why trading blocs among similar countries may arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. It develops a model of an asymmetric world economy in which there are at least four countries. The countries are differentiated with respect to their market size and they choose their trading partners. In the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, either there is global free trade or free trade areas are formed among similar countries.     

Open-access renewable resources and pollution: Trade and policy implications in a two-country model

We examine the interaction between the relative inter-industry pollution externality and resource stock externality of harvesting in deciding trade patterns and welfare gains from trade in a two-country model (less-developed countries) with renewable resources in the absence of resource management. This paper focuses on the impacts of trade policies on resource conservation and welfare outcomes in two countries with different environmental management regimes. Differences in pollution management standards between both countries determine the direction of trade flow and gains from trade in a diversified production case. The country with a lower pollution intensity parameter, an exporter of resource goods, certainly experiences welfare loss in the post-trade steady-state and may also suffer a decline in utility throughout the transition path. However, a country with higher pollution intensity and importers of resource goods tend to gain from trade. Under national open-access resources, given that pollution is regulated up to a certain point in both countries, this study finds that implementing better restrictions on only one externality factor is not optimal from a post-trade welfare perspective. Lastly, from the point of view of policy suggestion, this paper offers an optimal trade policy that the economic and environmental effects of enforcing import tax on resource goods are likely to be Pareto-improving consequences compared to the implications of using an export tax.     

Distance and trade: Disentangling unfamiliarity effects and transport cost effects

This paper provides evidence supporting Grossman's (Comments on Alan V. Deardorff, Determinants of bilateral trade: Does gravity work in a neoclassical world?. In: Jeffrey A. Frankel (Ed.), The regionalization of the world economy. Chicago: University of Chicago for NBER; 1996) claim that not only transport costs but also unfamiliarity can explain the negative correlation between geographic distances and bilateral trade volumes. A gravity model that controls for as many natural causes of trade as possible reveals that countries high in uncertainty-aversion (based on Hofstede's survey) export disproportionately less to distant countries (with which they are presumably less familiar). More important, this result is mainly driven by differentiated products, not by products with international organized exchanges or with reference prices. For transport costs alone to explain such a trade pattern, one would have to assume that distance-related ad valorem transport costs are higher when a trade route originates from a high uncertainty-aversion country, which is unlikely. This trade pattern is easy to explain, however, if one accepts that geographic distance is a proxy for unfamiliarity and that exporters in high uncertainty-aversion countries are more sensitive to informational ambiguity. A further result is that high uncertainty-aversion countries trade less and thus grow poorer in the long run, which suggests that cultural factors are as important as geographic ones in determining trade openness and prosperity.     

Constant Consumption Paths In Open Economies With Exhaustible Resources

We examine the effects of international trade on the paths of investment which maintain consumption constant over time in each country, each of which produces an essential exhaustible resource such as oil. For countries identical except for the sizes of their oil stocks, the investing of own oil rents in machine capital will not result in constant consumption in each country. Adjusted rent-investment strategies are developed which do yield constant consumption in each country. We also report results on the link in each country between its consumption levels and aggregate current wealth.     

Trade agreements, bargaining and economic growth

Rebelo’s two-sector endogenous growth model is embedded within a two-country international trade framework. The two countries bargain over a trade agreement that specifies: (i) the size of the foreign aid that the richer country gives to the poorer one; (ii) the terms of the international trade that takes place after the aid is given. Foreign aid is given not because of generosity, but because it improves the capital allocation across the world and thus raises total world production. This world production surplus enables the rich country to raise its equilibrium consumption and welfare beyond their no-aid levels. To ensure it, the rich country uses a trade agreement to condition the aid on favorable terms of trade.     

Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability*

Whether natural resources are good or bad for a country's development are shown to depend on the interaction between institutional setting and, crucially, the types of resources possessed by the country. Some natural resources are, for economical and technical reasons, more likely to cause problems such as rent‐seeking and conflicts than others. This potential problem can, however, be countered by good institutional quality. In contrast to the traditional resource curse hypothesis, we show the impact of natural resources on economic growth to be non‐monotonic in institutional quality, and increasingly so for certain types of resources. In particular, countries rich in minerals are cursed only if they have low‐quality institutions, while the curse is reversed if institutions are sufficiently good. Furthermore, if countries are rich in diamonds and precious metals, these effects—both positive and negative—are larger.     

Exhaustible resources,technology choice and industrialization of developing countries

How should the world economy adapt to the increased demand for exhaustible resources from countries like China and India? To address that issue, this paper presents a dynamic model of the world economy with two technologies for production; a resource technology, which uses an exhaustible resource as an input and an alternative technology, which does not. I find that both the time path of resource extraction and the adoption of the alternative technology depend on the optimal allocation of capital across the technologies, and on the size of the capital stock in relation to the resource stock. In particular, if the capital stock is low, only the resource technology is used initially and the alternative technology is adopted with a delay. Next, I use the model to analyze the effects of industrialization of developing countries on the extraction of oil and technology choice for energy production. As a result of industrialization, the alternative technology for energy production is adopted earlier.     

Corruption and the Political Economy of Resource-Based Development: A Comparison of Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

We model how the “supply and demand” for bribes affects resource use by an economy, and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets. This requires adjusting the World Bank’s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption. The impacts of corruption on long-run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across African and Asian economies from 1970 to 2003. Corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of African countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term, but for Asian countries, corruption is less important than point resources. Corruption influences long-run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries, and is also the “pathway” through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use, trade and abundance.     

Do external interventions work? The case of trade reform conditions in IMF supported programs

Trade reform conditions are common in IMF supported programs. Of the 99 countries that had IMF programs during 1993-2003, 77 had trade reform conditions in their programs. Since the WTO has not been found especially effective in promoting trade openness for most developing countries, it is of great interest to see if the IMF has been more effective as it combines carrots and sticks not available to the WTO. Yet, the effectiveness of these trade conditions has not been systematically studied. Using a unique dataset, this paper provides such an assessment. It finds that trade conditions are indeed associated with an increase in trade openness on average, but the effect comes mostly from countries that can be characterized by a high degree of “willingness to reform.”     

“Measurement” or Finding Things Out in Economics: A Comment

Immiserizing growth is a long-term phenomenon that occurs when the gain in a country's social welfare arising from economic growth is more than offset by the loss in such welfare associated with an adverse shift in the terms of trade. In one case explored many years ago by Jagdish Bhagwati, immiserizing growth occurs in a developing nation that has started economic growth but faces unfavorable international demand conditions as it increases its traditional exports. In another case explored recently by Paul A. Samuelson, immiserizing growth occurs for the growing industrialized country when its trade partner follows a policy of import substituting growth and, as a result, shifts the terms of trade against the exporting country. Still others have specified a variety of different cases of immiserizing growth. The author provides a simple graphical method to analyze these situations and then presents data showing that immiserizing growth is a relatively rare phenomenon.     

Do state trading exporters distort trade?

In this paper, we analyse the trade-distorting effects of state trading enterprises (STEs) which exist in some exporting countries. Because of these potential effects, several countries have raised the issue of state enterprises in the Doha Round negotiations in the WTO. The belief is that STEs in certain developed countries have trade effects which are equivalent to an export subsidy. STEs also exist in developing countries, though since the aim of government policy may differ from the developed country case, the trade distortion may be equivalent to an export tax. We present a theoretical model that is sufficiently general to allow us to consider the case of exporting STEs in developed and developing economies. The model is calibrated with data on two examples of STEs, one typical of an STE in a developed country, the other typical of an STE in a developing economy. In each case, we allow for differences in the nature of the STE's pay-off function. The overall conclusion is that STEs do distort trade and the trade distortion effect is potentially significant.     

The effects of labour unions on international capital tax competition

Abstract We analyze the impact of labour market rigidities on tax competition between two imperfectly integrated countries. Following a shift from a competitive to a unionized labour market in both countries, the capital tax can be adjusted upward in the country with the less rigid labour market, whereas the capital tax is always adjusted downward in the other country. Moreover, by reducing the labour cost differential between countries, trade liberalization gives rise to tax and welfare convergences. Finally, when a country adopts a flexible labour market, the unionized country may attract the majority of capital.