Unemployment, credit rationing, and capital accumulation: a tale of two frictions

Summary. This paper develops a model in which two information frictions are embedded into an otherwise conventional neoclassical growth model; an adverse selection problem in the labor market and a costly state verification problem in the credit market. The former allows equilibrium unemployment to arise endogenously while the latter is responsible for equilibrium credit rationing. This structure is used to investigate a theoretical link between the level of unemployment and the extent of credit rationing (and capital formation). The presence of the labor market friction is enough to generate scope for multiple steady state equilibria. The model also generates a large class of endogenous cyclical and chaotic dynamical equilibria. Development trap phenomena may also appear. Received: April 10, 1998; revised version: May 20, 1998     

Appropriation,migration, and unemployment

This article builds general equilibrium models to explore the relationship among appropriation, rural–urban migration, the minimum wage and unemployment. We find that the proportion of appropriated capital plays a key role in the effects of appropriation on unemployment and rural–urban migration. When the proportion of appropriated capital is large, a stronger control on appropriation by the government results in a lower unemployment rate and more rural–urban migrants, and vice versa. In the extended models, the conclusion may be different when the plundered factor changes from capital to land. In the situation with the agricultural sector employing unskilled labour and capital, appropriation has no impact on unemployment, and the effect on migration remains the same. We also discuss the implications of the minimum wage, and find that under plausible conditions, the rise of the minimum wage can alleviate appropriation and reduce unemployment. The situation of migration is ambiguous due to the impacts of two opposite factors.     

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,AWARENESS OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS,AND UNEMPLOYMENT*

We explore the significance of general equilibrium feedback effects for wage‐bargaining. We examine a two‐sector economy and show that if agents only consider labor demand effects low real wages and low unemployment are the consequences. With an intermediate view, i.e., when partial equilibrium effects within a sector are taken into account, high real wages and unemployment result. If all general equilibrium effects are perceived simultaneously, we once again obtain a situation with low wages and unemployment. The results may explain why unemployment is high in some European countries.     

Unobserved Heterogeneity,Exit Rates,and Re‐Employment Wages

Exit rates from unemployment and re‐employment wages decline over a period of unemployment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that the unique equilibrium is separating and that skilled workers have more job opportunities and higher wages. The composition of the unemployed varies with the duration of unemployment, so average exit rates and wages fall with time. The separating equilibrium relies on performance‐related pay schemes and the ability of firms to commit to renting an input that is complementary to worker skills.     

Endogenous, Efficient Long-Run Cyclical Unemployment, Endogenous Long-Run Growth, and Division of Labor

The paper uses a dynamic equilibrium model to explain the concurrence of economic growth and business cycles. Introducing durable goods into a model with ex-ante identical consumer–producers and economies of specialized learning-by-doing, the author shows that when job-shifting costs, economies of specialized learning-by-doing, and trading efficiency are sufficiently large, a dynamic equilibrium with business cycles and unemployment might be Pareto superior to noncyclical growth patterns. Long-run cyclical unemployment still exists when the credit market is imperfect. Extending the model into overlapping generations framework, the author shows that complete division of labor with business cycles would still occur in equilibrium.     

Profit Sharing,Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment*

We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options, increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with endogenous outside options, this relationship is frequently reversed; reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market imperfections—measured by the bargaining power of trade unions—are sufficiently strong and the benefit–replacement ratio is sufficiently high. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.     

How an export boom affects unemployment

Does trade affect the equilibrium rate of unemployment? To answer this question, we propose a small open economy model that incorporates realistic features of labour markets. The model predicts that a sustained improvement in the terms of trade lowers unemployment. We test this prediction for the case of Australia, an economy that is subject to large terms of trade movements. We use a novel technique to estimate the structural model based on a combination of traditional econometric procedures and the calibration of time-varying parameters. Both reduced form and the structural estimates reveal strong evidence that higher export prices, capital accumulation in tradeable goods industries and lower unemployment benefits reduce the equilibrium unemployment rate.     

Equilibrium unemployment, search behaviour and unemployment persistency

Unemployment persistency and high equilibrium unemployment isoften assumed to be caused by rigidities and low search efficiencyin the labour market, especially in European welfare stateswith generous income replacement schemes. These arguments aretested on data from Sweden, an old welfare state with a longperiod of full employment that has changed into a situationwith high unemployment. Data show a clear and very strong unemploymentduration dependency, but it is not possible to prove that thisis a result of low employability among the long-term unemployed.Getting a job is most of all associated with relative qualifications,recall expectations and local labour market conditions, andnot with search behaviour or high wage demands. It is arguedthat unemployment duration when unemployment is high can bestbe understood as a selection process rather than a search process,and that econometric estimations of equilibrium unemploymentare too pessimistic about the potential for an expansive economicpolicy. It is also argued that an active labour market policyis a more efficient compliment to such a policy than changesin income replacement ratios.     

Hiring subsidies, job creation and job destruction

We quantify the effects of hiring subsidies using the model of Mortensen and Pissarides (2003). The job creation effect can be large in a weak labor market. However, in the long-run, subsidies raise the wage and equilibrium unemployment.     

Stick,Carrot and Skill Acquisition*

We evaluate the impact of specially designed youth unemployment programmes (YUPs), intended to provide young unemployed unskilled workers with skills. If unemployment among skilled workers is lower than among unskilled workers, YUPs imply that unemployment falls. However, YUPs potentially crowd out ordinary training. We set up an equilibrium matching model with endogenous skill choice and examine the impact of an increase in programme participation. We derive a condition for crowding out of ordinary training, as well as a condition for an increase in the skilled labour force and thereby reduced unemployment. The impact of YUPs on welfare and wage dispersion is also considered.     

Labor market dynamics in urban China and the role of the state sector

This paper studies the effect of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the dynamics of the Chinese urban labor market. Using longitudinally matched monthly panel data, we document very low labor force dynamics in the state sector, which leads to a high long-term unemployment rate. We develop and estimate an equilibrium search and matching model with three differences between the state and non-state sectors: labor productivity, labor adjustment cost, and workers’ bargaining power. Counterfactual analysis shows that, among the three channels, reducing the bargaining power of state sector workers is most effective in reducing unemployment duration and unemployment rate.     

Recurrent unemployment,welfare benefits and heterogeneity

The objective of this paper is to investigate the causes of the recurrences of individuals in unemployment during benefit periods. So as to attain this objective, we use administrative data from the Spanish Employment Agency to estimate a duration model with multiple spells that allows for unemployment state dependence through lagged unemployment duration in order to distinguish the heterogeneity and scarring effects. We find that an increase in the duration of previous unemployment benefit periods lengthens the expected duration of future unemployment benefit periods. True state dependence and heterogeneity, intensity of job search and local labour market conditions are among the elements that explain this unemployment state dependence.     

Rational expectations macro models with possible steady-state inflation andunemployment

Consider an economy exhibiting the conventional IS-LM relationships, Phillips curve type price adjustment equations, and rational inflationary expectations. We demonstrate that starting from the disequilibrium situation of either the Keynesian unemployment or the demand inflation type in which money is nonneutral, the economy converges to an equilibrium situation in which all markets clear. On the other hand, starting from the disequilibrium situation of the classical unemployment type in which money is nonneutral, the economy converges to a state of rest in which the goods and the labor markets remain out of equilibrium. However, money is neutral at this state of rest.     

Public firms' merger,employment, and welfare in developing countries: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper examines the effect of a merger of state‐owned firms on wage gap, employment, and social welfare in a general equilibrium setting. For a developing economy with state‐owned firms in the urban sector, a merger via a reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can reduce the cost of capital. It then lowers the skilled wage rate through the factor‐substitution effect, while it raises the unskilled wage by the inflow of capital to the rural sector and hence lowers urban unemployment. In addition, the reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can yield a scale effect to the firms. The beneficial effects on higher urban output and less urban unemployment can improve social welfare of the developing economy.     

Labour market institutions in open economy: Sectoral reallocations,aggregate adjustments,and spillovers

We introduce frictional unemployment in a multiworker heterogeneous firm model with a dynamic matching process, one‐ and two‐sector equilibria, and international markets. A change in labour market policies transforms the share of exporters and affects average productivity. The closure of equilibrium with or without sectoral arbitrage plays an important role in generating macro‐level outcomes for employment subsidies. Unemployment benefits, on the other hand, make unemployment and openness rise, independently of sectoral reallocations. We also find that simultaneous implementation of labour market policies remove potential gain in the trade share, and, when it comes to unemployment benefits, may even be detrimental.     

Globalization and labor market outcomes: Wage bargaining, search frictions, and firm heterogeneity

We introduce search unemployment into Melitz's trade model. Firms' monopoly power on product markets leads to strategic wage bargaining. Solving for the symmetric equilibrium we show that the selection effect of trade influences labor market outcomes. Trade liberalization lowers unemployment and raises real wages as long as it improves average productivity. We show that this condition is likely to be met by a reduction in variable trade costs or by entry of new trading countries. Calibrating the model shows that the long-run impact of trade openness on the rate of unemployment is negative and quantitatively significant.     

Excess demand for labor, unemployment, and theories of the Phillips curve

This article has two purposes. First, to examine the assumption that it is possible to map uniquely between unemployment and excess demand for labor; this assumption plays a key role in the theory of the Phillips curve. We show that as both unemployment and excess demand for labor are endogenous and simultaneously determined, in general it is not possible to obtain a unique mapping between unemployment and excess demand for labor and that the Lipsey and Barro and Grossman derivations of the Phillips curve are invalid. Secondly, the article recommends that wage, employment, and unemployment behavior be modelled using short-run supply and demand curves, that is, in a Marshall-Hicks temporary equilibrium framework.     

Job Creation, Job Destruction, and the International Division of Labor

The authors incorporate equilibrium unemployment due to imperfect matching into a model of trade in intermediate inputs. Firms are assumed to be price‐takers and their size is given by technology. Firms enter the market as long as expected profits cover the search cost they incur initially; jobs are endogenously destroyed by random shocks that affect firms’ price–cost margins. Trade increases productivity in the final good and then demand for each intermediate input. Steady‐state unemployment is reduced after trade integration because the rate of job destruction is reduced, which in turn induces an indirect positive effect on job creation. A more volatile environment faced by firms does not necessarily increase unemployment. However, the rate of job destruction unambiguously rises, and rises more under free trade.     

非均衡最优规划模型解的经济政策意义

本文根据非均衡理论的最优规划模型 ,探讨了在凯恩斯失业均衡和抑制性通货膨胀均衡下 ,几个主要的经济变量P、W、G、T、M、A对于家庭消费C和产出Y (或就业L)的影响。主要的结论是 :在凯恩斯失业状态下 ,刺激消费的同时 ,积累仍不可忽视 ;计划经济国家长期过分注重积累的传统经济政策思想是不合理的 ;平衡或盈余的财政政策是计划经济国家的明智之举 ;计划经济国家长期实行低工资水平的政策是错误的     

Economic growth,structural change,and search unemployment

Economic growth is driven by structural change. Structural change does not come without a cost. The most evident social cost of structural change is high and persistent unemployment. This paper develops a model with an endogenously expanding service sector, where the constant flow of workers in and out of employment leads to structural unemployment. The main finding is that the level of unemployment is different between the initial period and the long-run equilibrium growth path, and that along the transition path, the level of unemployment will overshoot its equilibrium level, which can explain the long-run pattern of unemployment in most industrialized countries.